Foreign Affairs

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, the debate title asks us to “take note” of the UK’s position on foreign affairs, so where do we stand today?

One useful starting point is the finding of an Ipsos poll in January. The question was “What difference has leaving the EU had on the UK’s standing on the world stage?” and 54% of those polled said it had a negative effect. Some 17% said that it had a positive effect. I concede, however, that on soft power we remain a superpower. The latest Brand Finance survey had the UK again in second place after the US. Much of that, however, is outside the control of government—for example, the quality of our universities.

The international context is bleak for all of us, certainly compared with 20 or 30 years ago. There is no peace dividend, no new international stability, no greater co-operation among nations, and democracy and the rules-based system are in retreat. The picture today is one of wars and rumours of wars. The evolution of relations between NATO and Russia is instructive. Twenty or 30 years ago, there was a NATO-Russia Act; today, we have Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the flippant threat of Trump to abandon Article 5 of the NATO treaty.

What used to be called the third world, now the global South, is increasingly moving away from the western orbit. Some wars we almost ignore; for example, those in Sudan and eastern Congo. Some force themselves upon us, such as the Houthi war in Yemen, and affect our shipping and food prices. Some, of course, are threats to our allies and domestically. On Ukraine, and of course again on the Middle East, there is essentially a cross-party consensus in this House and beyond. In Ukraine, momentum has certainly passed to Russia. Germany agonises over the supply of Taurus long-range missiles. Republicans in Congress block aid and arms to Ukraine. However, it is unlikely that either side in the conflict will win a decisive victory.

For Ukraine to lose would be a great defeat for the West. It is fighting gallantly for all of us, yet surely we should not give unconditional support and subcontract our own policy entirely to Ukraine’s. If Russia were to prevail, Trump and the Republicans in Congress, and possibly the German Chancellor, would bear a heavy responsibility. There should be twin tasks of military support and looking for diplomatic openings.

On Gaza, the position is different. After the atrocities of 7 October, there was enormous international sympathy for Israel, but Netanyahu has frittered much of that away through his intransigence, the creation of a humanitarian catastrophe and the pictures of starving children; President Biden had warned against a response of fury. There is at least a possibility of some good emerging if a grand deal were agreed, including a two-state solution.

The Oracle at Delphi advised us to “Know thyself”, and that should be part of our international role—a national introspection of what we can do. However, there is a degree of unreality post Brexit. If we were to tilt to the Indo-Pacific, that would be a tilt away from Europe, where our interests mainly lie and where we currently seek to avoid the major part of our foreign policy at a time when Europe is facing new threats in the Arctic and in Ukraine.

I end on this. Our foreign and security policy interests are closely aligned with the European Union. There are three blocs today: China is hostile; the US may become unreliable; the EU is our regional alternative. Theresa May considered a treaty in this area—do the Government envisage building a closer relationship? What new institutions does the Foreign Secretary favour, or are we too constrained by Brexiteers in the ranks of the Conservatives? The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, our welcome Foreign Secretary, ran well once. Where does he stand today on closer relations with the European Union on foreign and security policy?