Ukraine

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Friday 26th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I was in NATO headquarters just before the illegal invasion and can confirm that many thought Russia would take Kyiv within a few days. Indeed, Putin probably thought so too, given the disparity of resources. So we stand in awe of the magnificent response of the people of Ukraine. Putin has forged unity and, in the process, strengthened NATO with the accession of Finland and soon Sweden.

Since February 2022, however, there has been a massive loss of life on both sides, a great destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure and, of course, an ebb and flow since, with some successes, such as in Crimea, but also the relative failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. We now await the promised Russian counteroffensive. Now, I concede, we can see only through a glass darkly, and there many imponderables, such as the effect of a possible Trump victory in the US elections and, possibly, the success of the anti-Ukraine elements—the populists—in the European Parliament elections in the summer. Have we reached a stage where we should begin to think the unthinkable and look at the imponderables? Yes, there is some evidence of war fatigue, a lack of ammunition, the Ukrainian force’s disparity of firepower and the deployment by Ukraine of relatively elderly forces. There is some evidence of doubts within the West, clearly of Orbán in Hungary and now Fico in Slovakia—some might call them Putin’s fifth column in Europe.

One road ahead is clear: the continuation of the same loss of life and destruction. Another is constructively to ask what we understand to be the relative interests of both sides. For Ukraine, it is a future through NATO and allying itself more with the West and the European Union, and the expulsion of Russia—which, frankly, appears unlikely now, given the relative stalemate at the front. There is some evidence that Zelensky is preparing his people for this, and it could include some form of territorial concessions. I recall, historically, that a German observer at Versailles said, “The hand which signs this treaty will be signing its own death warrant”. Clearly, if Zelensky were to make these certain territorial concessions, he would need a referendum to buttress that with popular support.

Can security be obtained for Ukraine short of NATO membership, by prioritising EU membership with appropriate security guarantees? It is possibly too late now, and I note the scepticism of the noble Earl, Lord Oxford and Asquith, about Putin’s worldview regarding the unity of Ukraine and Russia. Historically, Russia has sought a barrier to invasion from the west—it has memories of Napoleon and Hitler. Will historians in future see the offer of NATO membership at the Istanbul NATO summit as an historic mistake and unnecessary provocation? It is probably now too late to change that. Is it impossible to envisage a deal on NATO membership? It is claimed that, shortly after the invasion, at Istanbul, the Ukrainians were prepared at least to talk about something less than full NATO membership, but that was scuppered by the atrocities of the Russian forces at Bucha. I concede that it is probably premature to talk of that, but Putin is now planning a counteroffensive and awaiting Trump, so it will be some time before one can perhaps look at that.

I note the recent statement of the Italian Government. Giorgia Meloni has been far more positive in her supply of arms to Ukraine than one expected, but her Defence Minister Crosetto recently told the Italian defence committee—after drawing attention to Ukraine’s persistent problems numerically and in terms of the armament inferiority—that

“We must be realistic and cannot ignore the military situation on the field … The time seems to have come for effective diplomatic action”.


This point was well made by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer. In effect, the Italians are coupling military support with a call for effective diplomatic action. If we analyse the war aims of both sides and the danger of this war continuing and even escalating, it is at least worth considering this, even if it will not fructify as we would hope.

In conclusion, all wars end sometime. They either end in complete victory for one side, as happened in 1918 and 1945—that appears very unlikely, given the disposition of forces in Ukraine—or they end in a messy deal, as at Dayton in 1995, which persists today. Alternative, they end by drawing a line where the forces stand, as in Korea. The Italian suggestion is worth considering. It is not defeatist, I would argue, but realistic at least to examine it—yes, accepting the heroism of the people of Ukraine, and accepting the passions of war. The Italian suggestion may at least be the least bad way forward.