Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 3rd December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the four maiden speakers and wish to make three brief reflections.

First, there is a consensus that this SDSR is valuable and welcome. It is certainly an improvement on its 2010 cost-cutting-exercise predecessor. However, I question whether the pace of change has been fully taken into account. There must be concern about the timeframe given the many uncertainties—the play of the “contingent and the unforeseen”, the “unknown unknowns”, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, 9/11, the Arab spring and mass migration to Europe—all of which stand as a corrective to long-term planning.

There is a need, of course, for flexibility and agility in doctrine and procurement, where the lead times—such as for the maritime patrol capability and the new strike brigades—are long. Again, the Vanguard replacement seems to have been stretched incredibly from 2024 to 2028, and now to the early 2030s. Surely the case for adaptable platforms capable of modification as the nature of the threat changes has been made.

The history of the Upholder class submarine is instructive—planned in the early 1980s, abandoned in the early 1990s and eventually sold cheaply to Canada. I concede that part of the reason was cost-cutting, but the key consideration was that its role as a barrier to Soviet incursions into the North Sea had become redundant. Thus, even five-year projections can be swiftly undermined by events. For example, had Scotland become independent with an anti-Trident Government, we would need a massive rethink of strategy and bases.

We need to learn from overseas examples. From his previous knowledge of the health brief, I ask the noble Earl whether he is confident that there is, for example, sufficient spare capacity in our London hospitals to cope with a major terror attack as the Paris hospitals appear to have coped. Is the planning for this contingency adequate?

My second reflection is that the SDSR has a welcome emphasis on inter-departmentalism at home and co-operation with our alliances abroad—certainly compared with its predecessor—but are the boundaries between the MoD, DfID and the FCO still too stark, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said? Should the departments not be seen as three legs of a tripod? Yet two of the three legs have a guaranteed budget, so the FCO has to take the strain. Is the balance correct? Are the boundaries of these budgets sufficiently flexible? For example, our military contribution to tackling Ebola was properly charged to the defence budget.

I come to my third and final reflection. The Oracle at Delphi advised those who sought its wisdom to “know yourself”. Yes, we are pre-eminent in soft power, but have we reached a true understanding of our role in the world? Did I detect a certain bravado in the tone of the review? The Prime Minister said exultantly, “Britain is back”. Have we made a root-and-branch examination of our role and capabilities? The Falklands, the last of our unilateral campaigns, could not now be repeated. The review should be read in parallel with the LSE review already cited. Thus, have we fully adjusted to our proper role in the alliances with increased specialisation in procurement and in regional market share? Is there now a case for a new St Malo treaty to add Germany to the Franco-UK alliance? Must we in the UK continue to have the full spectrum of capability? I am not confident that these and other questions have been adequately answered in the review.