Ukraine

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the history of this crisis and the Government’s response so far. In my judgment, the Government have acted thus far in a very sure-footed way in a continuing, fast-moving crisis. I hope that the Minister will recognise the importance of the European Union as an instrument of our policy, and that we will be ready to use that instrument far more than in the past.

We are clearly witnessing the most important and severe crisis in East-West relations since the fall of the Berlin Wall. I shall not go back to 1945, because we have had the invasion of Hungary, the Cuban missile crisis and the attack on Czechoslovakia. What is clear is that Russia is about to annex Crimea. It is a fait accompli. Russia is creating another frozen conflict in Europe, joining Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria in Moldova, which is probably the most vulnerable of all the neighbouring countries. It is uncertain whether Russia will follow a similar course with east Ukraine, and possibly with other neighbouring countries. Perhaps the nearest precedent is that of Sudetenland in 1938, when the Nazis—the Russians will clearly not like this precedent—invaded in response to calls from their compatriots in the then Czechoslovakia. We have to ask: when will President Putin stop? It is also uncertain whether each move by Russia has been planned in advance like a sophisticated game of chess, even over the referendum. Perhaps one could plausibly ask: if there is a referendum in Crimea, why not a referendum in Chechnya, in Dagestan or in other parts of the Caucasus?

This crisis is an opportunity to learn more about Russia and perhaps to shed some of our illusions about contemporary Russia. It is also an opportunity to learn more about ourselves in the democratic West and whether the main priorities of our foreign policy are based on commerce or on wider strategic principles. Of particular interest is the robust response of an awakened Germany. I contrast the response of Chancellor Schroeder, who joined Nord Stream shortly after he left office, with the response of Chancellor Merkel. Germany now seems prepared to give far greater prominence to longer-term strategic interests over short-term commercial considerations. I certainly welcome this new assertiveness of a democratic Germany.

Our starting point is surely recognising that Russia has important interests of history, geography and ethnicity in Ukraine. Thus, the immediate response of Kiev, which was soon rescinded, in relation to the Russian language was most unwise. These clear interests of Russia could, with good will, have been accommodated, for example, through international guarantees for the Russian minority, including on the status of the Russian language, more autonomy and a voluntary renunciation of joining military alliances—that is, neutrality. However, the agenda of President Putin was clearly wider than that.

Since the early 1990s, we in the West have treated Russia on a basis that we now think of as an illusion, in the vain hope that Russia was firmly on the path to democracy. There was some evidence of that during the time of President Yeltsin, however chaotic. We have been prepared to overlook serious failings, ignoring the almost Stalinist monolith of so many Russian parliamentary responses, culminating in the unanimous vote in the Russian Parliament in respect of military intervention in Ukraine. It was unanimous: there was not one dissident in that parliament—no one prepared to say, “Don’t count me in on that”.

We have accepted on the way, after a short-lived process, the Litvinenko affair, Magnitsky, the invasion and continued occupation of 20% of Georgia since 2008, and the Russian failure to comply with the ceasefire agreement over Georgia in that year. Russia has ignored international agreements such as that in Budapest, and a guarantor power of the Budapest agreement is now the aggressor, undermining the territorial integrity of the country it purported to guarantee. The fact that Russia was prepared to lie so blatantly—for example, on the presence of Russian troops in Crimea, outside its military bases—is bound to shake confidence in Russia in the short and medium term.

Again, what does the crisis tell us about the firmness of the West so far? The response, I concede, has been weak. “Great things we shall do”, but, as my noble friend has said, we have done very little thus far. Let us accept that a step-by-step process is relevant, important interests are involved and one country should not be expected to bear a disproportionate burden of the pain. President Putin clearly relies on disarray on the western side. Will there be business as usual with Russia after a short interval? No, our illusions should be over. We should have a far more realistic policy towards Russia.

What should be our appropriate response? First, we should assist Ukraine economically, financially and politically, for example, in democracy-building. Secondly, we should recognise that the diplomatic track is unlikely to lead anywhere, seek to contain and isolate Russia at the United Nations and elsewhere, and make clear to Russians privately that there are indeed red lines. We should give reassurances, particularly to our Baltic allies, who are very concerned at the moment. Is it too optimistic to see the beginning of a stronger European foreign policy emerging from this crisis?

We should also consider the position of Russia in those international organisations of which it is a member which deal with human rights. We think, for example, of the OSCE, which came into being after the Helsinki agreements of 1975, and the basket containing human rights that are so massively infringed by Russia. We think of the Council of Europe, the main human rights organisation in Europe, with its 48 countries. I note that the Conservative group has withdrawn from the family group in the parliamentary assembly which contained Russia, the EDG. Is it too much to ask that the Conservatives should consider joining the mainstream right-wing family, the EPP? Or is that a joining too far?

Finally, on sanctions, the travel bans and asset freezes are relatively easy. Economic and financial sanctions must be calibrated and, I accept, further down the track; but they are likely to be the most effective. I think of South Africa in 1986. The real blow to the apartheid regime came when the Chase Manhattan bank refused to roll over certain loans in respect of South Africa.

Russia must be forced to pay a heavy price, but let us also accept that we will have to pay a price, economically and commercially, because of the shock to the world economy. We need to reduce our dependence on Russian oil and gas. The world is now awash with oil. I anticipate that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, may have a few well chosen words to say on that theme later when he comes to speak.

Already, after the failure of the Kerry-Lavrov talks, billions of dollars have been repatriated from the West by Russians, yields on Russian government 10-year bonds have risen sharply, and the rouble has fallen to a record low. Yes, there has been a slight upturn in the Russian stock exchange, but I judge that that will be short-lived as further sanctions take place along the road.

Russia is already paying a heavy price, and all this before effective sanctions. The next few weeks will be a clear test for the West: a test of our international credibility. Many friends—those who are currently apprehensive in the world, including many of Russia’s neighbours—will be watching our reaction very closely.