Syria and the Middle East Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Anderson of Swansea
Main Page: Lord Anderson of Swansea (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Anderson of Swansea's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the subject today is the situation in Syria and the Middle East. Naturally, the focus has been on the tragedy of Syria but in the Middle East itself the foundations are shaking and all is connected.
There was apparent stability five years ago, with long-existing autocratic regimes in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen. Today, only the monarchies are relatively untouched: Morocco is certainly untouched; Jordan is still relatively stable, although I refer to what the noble Baroness said about the very generous reception of the refugees by the King and people of Jordan. However, the long-suffering Palestinians in the camps in Syria will find the door closed in Jordan because of the fear of destabilising further the kingdom.
Of course, in most countries the human rights of minorities—particularly but not only Christians—are more threatened than before. Our view of recent events in the Middle East has changed radically. Today it is less fashionable to refer to the Arab spring. The mood of euphoria in Tahrir Square a year or two ago has been replaced by the demonstrations of yesterday against President Morsi, the new pharaoh. His supporters can counter only that he won the election, as if winning elections is sufficient for any democracy. The dilemma, as one experienced analyst wrote of Egypt, is that:
“With the Muslim Brotherhood the transition will be difficult: without them it will be impossible”.
The term “Arab uprising” is now more frequently used—although I understand that the US State Department is known to refer to “the Arab thing”—but all these terms suggest some uniformity in the several countries, when, as we know, one cannot attach one label to so many different national events. However, constant themes are the search for dignity, the loss of deference and the readiness to challenge authority. We refer to the current phase as transition but are puzzled as to what. This search for dignity, this loss of deference, refers not only to the Middle East but to adjoining countries such as Turkey and even, as we have seen, to Brazil.
Honest horizon-scanners should recognise that they cannot see beyond the first curve and that they failed to see the turbulence rising prior to 2008. Yes, there were fine analyses of the problems in the Arab world, such as the search for modernity; for example, successive UNDP reports on human development in the Arab world in the mid-2000s. However, the forecasters did not see the speed of events, just as they failed to see the Iranian revolution prior to 1979. This suggests that our policy planners should proceed in a spirit of humility and that we should have a certain scepticism about the likely scene in the Middle East in, say, five years’ time.
Middle East borders have become more fluid. I enjoyed the article by the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Baglan, in a recent World Today about the fluidity of those borders, which are perhaps even more artificial and certainly more recent than the borders in Africa after the Berlin Conference. But are we creating a new Turkish sphere of influence in the region? We think of the position of the Kurds, dealt a bad hand by history and now with a new dynamic not only from the Kurdistan regional government in Erbil in northern Iraq but from Turkey’s opening to the PKK. Perhaps this will ultimately be an attempt to recreate the old Ottoman Empire. Even in the previously stable Syria there is talk about an ultimate split with the Alawites perhaps retreating to their former, short-lived, post-First World War entity.
There is a danger also that conflagration may spread over national boundaries and engulf the whole region. The obvious example is Hezbollah’s incursion into Syria as a potential game-changer there and its impact on an already unstable Lebanon. There are skirmishes around the Golan Heights. President Assad may ultimately, in desperation, try to involve Israel in the conflict, but Israel has, so far, shown a masterly restraint.
It was the received wisdom up to, let us say, five years ago that Israel and Palestine were at the heart of all conflicts in the Middle East, but that dispute is surely hardly related to the current turmoil. No Israeli flags were burnt in Tahrir Square. Perhaps this is a good time, therefore, to attempt to restart negotiations. Secretary Kerry has been extremely active in his pre-negotiation phase and there are rumours of an Israeli settlement freeze—again—and the freeing of some Palestinian prisoners, but Palestinian divisions remain, as do the giant obstacles of refugees and, above all, Jerusalem. It would be interesting to have the judgment of the Government on the current prospects for the peace process.
I have said that forward planning is generally difficult; it is nowhere more so than in Syria. Commentators refer to a sea change having taken place over the past year. A year ago, the rebels were largely nationalists, secular and DIY. They have been replaced by more professional and more hard-line force, including international jihadists—hence the problem of arms supply, which so many noble Lords have touched on. It is rumoured that the US may begin to supply lethal arms within a month. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary give the impression of wanting to follow and are edging in that direction.
The blunt truth is surely this: the readiness to intervene for humanitarian purposes is cyclical. It arose after the Chicago speech of Prime Minister Blair in 1999 and followed through with some successes in Sierra Leone and Libya, but then we had Afghanistan and Iraq and, as a result, there is no appetite now in our Parliament or in the country for such intervention. I concede, however, that the mood could change if there were a major use of chemical weapons by the regime. If we arm the rebels, we will do so by proxy and, of course, it is most unlikely that arms supply would necessarily shorten the conflict, as the Russians and Iranians would possibly only step up their own supply in response.
Amid the swirling uncertainties, what is the appropriate response of the UK and the West, with paralysis at the UN Security Council and a relative stalemate on the battlefield? The starting point is surely recognition that we have a limited influence on events. No longer can we intervene and redraw boundaries as we did under the Sykes-Picot accord. It is, I concede, hardly a moral stand to stand on the sidelines with one’s arms folded, but we must have a more cautious agenda and search for ways where we can positively help at the margins.
It is of course the humanitarian crisis which is of most immediate concern. Jordan, as has been said, is in danger of being overwhelmed by refugees. My understanding is that the UK Government have responded most impressively. It would be helpful to have an update on the extent to which other countries have failed to live up to the obligations which they undertook at Kuwait and afterwards. In the short term, the refugee crisis is likely to worsen, as the government forces appear to have a new momentum after Qusair.
Consistent with our values, we must help in democracy-building and in the protection of minorities—Christians are clearly the major losers in this conflict. Finally, at the political end, we should seek to mediate in a region where a spirit of “winner takes all” prevails; it is an existential threat for President Assad. We must recognise the interest of, and work with, both Russia and Iran, and reject the French attempt to exclude Iran from Geneva II. The latest news from Geneva is disappointing in the extreme, as Assad perhaps seeks to improve his negotiating position on the battlefield. I accept that extreme dilemmas face us in responding. I have an awful feeling that the situation will get worse before it gets better; that the Syria that emerges will, even if it is united, be more unstable; and, overall, that the Middle East will pose a greater risk to ourselves and to the interests of the West.