Middle East: Recent Developments

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Friday 13th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, as we saw in the US debate over Iraq, military men are often the least belligerent. I begin by congratulating the Minister on yet another magisterial opening speech and the Government on providing yet another debate on the Middle East. I see the Middle East rather like a restless sea: always turbulent but with different spouts of water—different crises—appearing at different times. Two years ago it was Libya and Bahrain; now it is Syria and Egypt. There is always some crisis somewhere in the Middle East.

We would normally expect a concentration on Israel and Palestine, but today that is less the case because essentially the international community has given up on progress. There is indeed some progress in the Occupied Territories at the micro-level of economic development but there is no progress and no prospect of progress on the major issues that divide the parties. However, overall in the Middle East, it is clear that something fundamental is happening in the Arab world. No country is wholly untouched. The flames move from one country to another—from the Maghreb to Sudan and of course to Yemen. The foundations are being shaken and changes are occurring everywhere. The Jordanian King is inviting Hamas. As democrats, we must surely welcome these changes and encourage the developments that are taking place.

I shall make some general reflections, obviously concentrating on the Arab world, yet it is significant that the three most powerful nations in the region—Iran, Turkey and Israel—are non-Arab. The problem, as I see it, is, first, the terms that we use as we seek to describe what is happening: the Arab spring, the Arab awakening or the Arab revolution. We are always seeking to see these developments through a western perspective and we use terms that are less relevant to happenings in a different climate. It is what the French would call the faux amis, or false friends.

We refer to the “Arab spring”. There was an interesting article today in the Financial Times by Tzipi Livni, the former Foreign Minister of Israel, headed “Neither an Arab spring nor an Islamist winter”. Spring sometimes leads to winter. We think of the Prague spring of 1968, which afterwards led to further repression in the old Czechoslovakia. We also think of the hopes raised in 2005 by the Damascus spring and the further repression that came thereafter, leading to the current crisis.

The term “Arab awakening” was used in the early 20th century to describe the Arab nationalist revival at that time. It perhaps had its apogee with Nasser and Egyptian nationalism but it was essentially secular; it did not have a major religious element. Today, religion is often fundamental. Therefore, that is not a model.

Another term is “Arab revolution”. In European terms we think of 1848 or 1989, but the Soviet empire, particularly in central and eastern Europe, covered countries which often had a deep democratic tradition. The danger is in thinking of other revolutions—that of 1789, which began with the liberals blowing on the flames of a revolution that eventually consumed them, and that led to the Terror and eventually the Empire. We also think of the Iranian revolution, which began with the liberals—Bakhtiar and the others—and eventually led to the mullahs. Therefore, we have to be careful. Perhaps the absolutisms are more shaky now because of Twitter, but that is another consideration.

So, in despair, some of the think-tankers in Washington are now talking about the “Arab thing”. However, even that is misleading because the different manifestations of the unrest are as important as the matters that unite. For example, the winner of the recent elections in Libya, Mr Jibril, is called in the western press a liberal, thus attaching our western terms to him, yet he has said that he very much wishes to base his constitution on Sharia law. Where is western liberalism as we look at that?

Therefore, there was an overall failure in the western media to prepare us for the different manifestations, particularly in Tahrir Square. Cairo-based correspondents would interview a group of English-speaking, often western-educated, intellectuals, but in fact, when it came to the elections, 70% of those elected to the lower House and 80% of those elected to the upper House were either Muslim Brotherhood or Salafists. It is too easy to ignore the mass of the people—a point well made by the noble Lord, Lord Lamont. In Syria, the conflict is portrayed in black and white, and it requires the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, in a very good speech, and the noble Lord, Lord Wright, to at least give a certain nuance to the reality of the opposition.

The reality is that throughout the region religion has deep roots, and we ignore that at our peril. Who can forget Sir Anthony Parsons’ mea culpa over the failure of the Foreign Office to understand what was happening in the markets of Iran and a failure to see the importance of the mullahs prior to 1979. In Jordan, which we all admire in many ways, observers now say that the wearing of Islamic dress has advanced massively. In Egypt, people yearn for freedom, as the Gallup polls have shown over time. So the debate over the compatibility of Islam and western-style democracy has yet to be resolved. In Nigeria, for example, I was brought up to think of the major divisions as being between the various tribes. Now, the divisions are no longer tribal but religious ones between Islam and Christianity. The other point to make is the Sunni-Shia divide between and within states. It explains some of the problems, such as those in Syria or those involving Bahrain and the Saudis, preventing the island of Bahrain becoming wholly within the influence of Shia Iran.

Therefore, it is difficult to transplant democracy on to different soil. Israel, of course, is the great exception because of the great Jewish tradition of democracy from the European Jews. I think of the strictures of the several reports of the United Nations Development Programme on human development in the Arab world. Why are the Arab countries not developing more? It is a question not just of governance but of culture. Those reports are well worth reading lest we try to exaggerate the possibilities of development today. The realities exposed by those UNDP reports will not evaporate in the spring sunshine.

Finally, I wish to say a few words about Egypt. It is obviously the key country. It is central geographically in the Arab world; it is the most populous country; and culturally and politically it is by far the most important country. Now, there are new uncertainties—we certainly see through a glass very darkly. There are far more questions than answers. Who is President Morsi? How pragmatic is he? What are the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of women and minorities? What will be its foreign policy? Will Israel be scapegoated if things go wrong? There are still the fundamental problems of the economy—the decline of tourism, for example. We hope that the current confrontation between SCAF, the army and the president will be resolved. Happily, the supreme court is seen by both as playing a major role. One needs a grand bargain, and the army will have to be accommodated. Are both sides ready for that?

How do we respond to this turbulent Arab scene? We should recognise our limitations and recognise that the problems will have to be decided internally. We should be ready to intervene if asked with our use of soft power, such as the Venice Commission, the various foundations, the Westminster Foundation, the German foundations and others, including EU Mediterranean initiatives. We can only be benevolent outsiders with our feet on the ground, realistic but ready to intervene if asked.