Libya

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Friday 1st April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on his helpful update, both on Libya and on the wider repercussions of the Arab awakening. I shall have but three reflections. First, what are British interests in this conflict? Secondly, what light does this conflict throw on wider issues? Thirdly, what happens after Gaddafi?

First, it is perhaps not very fashionable nowadays to talk about British interests, either narrowly or more broadly defined. Certainly, interests as shown by the relatively low number of diplomatic personnel we have had in Tripoli suggest that we do not have major interests there as we do in certain neighbouring countries. Equally, we have substantial oil interests with British companies very much involved but, whatever the future of Libya, they will still have to sell the oil on which they are very much dependent.

We have an interest in migration. I recall that when I was in Libya, five or so years ago, it was claimed, following the time when he claimed that he was the leader of Africa as well of the Middle East, that Gaddafi invited all African citizens to come to his country. There were said to be up to a million people from sub-Saharan Africa waiting for Tunisian boatmen to bring them over to Europe. Over the weekend we heard that the first boat since the troubles had arrived in Italy with 300 potential migrants, mostly Eritreans and Ethiopians, with another 800 on the way. We certainly have an interest in moderating that illegal flow from north Africa.

However, what is crystal clear is that, more broadly defined, we have an interest in international law and in keeping in close touch with our allies, hence the importance of the two Security Council resolutions—1970 and 1973. They were a triumph of the Security Council, bringing on board all the relevant players without being vetoed by some who one might have thought would veto them on the grounds of interference in the internal affairs of another country. However, in my judgment a clear reading of both 1970 and 1973 leads to this conclusion: their primary purpose—certainly that of 1973—is as the Prime Minister said in the other place. Resolution 1973 limits our operations; its primary purpose is clearly civilian protection. All the activities that we take part in must be seen in that light. Clearly, when a military convoy threatened Benghazi, it was wholly consistent with Resolution 1973 for the French planes initially to take out those tanks and armoured personnel carriers. That was probably also true when we took out the ammunition dumps, which would have been used for attacks on civilians.

Beyond that there are difficulties. What happens if those tanks are retreating from civilian areas? What is the position on the supply of arms to both sides? I submit that a clear reading of Article 9 of Security Council Resolution 1970 shows that we cannot supply arms to either side in the conflict. Unless and until a new Security Council resolution in respect of arms supply is moved, we must be constrained, as NATO has now agreed. Although it is in the interests of the country, of world peace generally, and certainly of regional peace, that Gaddafi no longer be there—it is impossible to conceive of a pluralist democracy under the rule of law if Gaddafi remains in place—it would be wholly wrong to seek to remove him by force and have regime change. The carefully constructed coalition would evaporate if regime change was made a clear aim. We have to be extremely careful. It is in our interest to remain four-square within international law.

As a side reflection on this, there was no mention in the coalition document of the Maghreb, yet it is now at the centre of attention, which shows the extent to which events move quickly—beyond documents of even a year or so ago. However, in Libya and the Maghreb, the response to the Arab awakening may be the defining issue for the coalition, as perhaps Iraq was for my own Government over the period from 2000.

As a second reflection, what light does the conflict in Libya throw on other issues? From the United States we have had the Obama doctrine, which is more restrained and avoids the Richard Haass-type “reluctant sheriff” approach. It seeks to ensure that there is a new multilateralism, working with allies. It will be interesting to see the extent to which that new multilateralism is shown in other areas as well because of the fear of overstretch within the US Administration.

From the European Union, yes, there are resources, but not unity. Germany abstained from Resolution 1973. France was quick off the mark. Perhaps the German and French responses were due to the proximity of elections, but neither Baden-Württemberg nor the cantonal elections in France showed that they succeeded. However, we hear little about the European External Action Service. Disunity and the British-French alliance have been the major features of the European Union response. Perhaps there will also be new thoughts on humanitarian intervention, but I have no time to go along that path.

Finally, on the post-Gaddafi situation, some of his advisers may say to him that it would be wise now, having reached a high point and taken the oil-exporting areas, to stop, call for a real ceasefire and allow in observers and humanitarian assistance. At that point, he would possibly split the coalition. What is clear is that we have an interest in stability in the region; that we should work through our alliances to ensure that; and that the European Union has the resources of soft power. Certainly, from the experience in central and eastern Europe, with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, it has the instruments for soft power. Clearly, the United Nations must be in the driving seat. Clearly, the Arab League must be the party that is most engaged. Our interest should surely be to work through the European Union as one of our key instruments to ensure, as far as we can, that our border area—the Maghreb—is given as much, if not more, attention than the eastern partnership. That, surely, is in our interest, in the interests of the region and in global interests.