Lord Alderdice
Main Page: Lord Alderdice (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Alderdice's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(11 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there are some debates in your Lordships’ House that are of particular solemnity and consequence. This is one such debate. In exercising the privilege of participating in it, I draw the attention of the House to my interest as the executive chairman of the Changing Character of War Centre at Pembroke College, Oxford.
The problem in Ukraine is not new. I recall reflecting in this House, on 28 May 2015, on how we merely wrung our hands over Crimea and worried about the initial events in Ukraine but did not do much to address either the problem of Russian aggression or the extension of EU influence and ambition as far as Ukraine was concerned. I suggested that, if we did not find a way to engage more with Russia, we should be prepared for that region to be critical in the triggering of a future global conflict. It is clear that we were not adequately prepared for the current war. We did not do enough to persuade Russia about the consequences—the sufficiently robust consequences—that there would be if there were aggression in Ukraine. We did not persuade him that there would be a significant western military response. We could have done much more.
Now that we are effectively at war, I have some doubts as to whether we have prepared sufficient resources. I ask the Minister to let the House know whether we, and indeed Europe as a whole, are yet in a position to provide Ukraine the weapons and ammunition it needs, since we clearly did not have those when the war started. If Donald Trump is re-elected, as the noble Lord, Lord Owen, warned us, we may not be able to be confident that the US will continue to be a dependable ally and umbrella for European defence.
On the kinds of resources needed by Ukraine, I observe that despite the expectations in advance, this has been a remarkably old-style, conventional war. There have been hybrid elements, but much less impact from cyberwar than was predicted, for instance. To date, there has also been less of an air war than might have been expected, although that may change with the arrival of F-16s. This has been a much more traditional artillery war, with the major technical advance being the appearance of drones. Old-style defences of trenches and mines mean that whoever is defending territory is almost persistently retaining the upper hand. In the first stage, the Ukrainians were successfully defending against Russian attacks. Now it is the Russians who are defending conquered territory, which they have extensively mined and where they can transparently see the Ukrainian approach. It cruelly resembles Verdun and the Somme, the battles of World War I.
For the present, this looks to be a more traditional war of attrition than the kind of war that Europeans and Americans might have expected, with mobile manoeuvring offensives. I wonder if NATO’s approach and the training that NATO has been providing to our Ukrainian allies may have needed considerable adaptation. Can the Minister give us any indication of how far the NATO military approach and plans, and indeed the training we have been giving, have had to adapt to the realities on the ground in this war?
It is not just a question of military resources and tactics, vital as these are. On 16 October 2019, I drew the attention of the House to another observation: that overwhelming physical and military force is no longer of itself effective in wars. The United States and its allies have involved themselves in a whole series of wars, from Vietnam through Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, and none has had a successful outcome, despite all the resources made available. In fact,
“All have made the situation worse”.—[Official Report, 16/10/19; col. 114.]
As we reflect on another war, this time in Ukraine, we should think about whether our assumptions about war are borne out by the evidence now available to us.
Speaking on 16 August 2021, President Biden identified what he believed to be the key factor in Afghanistan:
“We spent over a trillion dollars. We trained and equipped an Afghan military force of some 300,000 strong—incredibly well equipped—a force larger in size than the militaries of many of our NATO allies. We gave them every tool they could need. We paid their salaries, provided for the maintenance of their air force ... What we could not provide them was the will to fight”.
A previous US President, Barack Obama, was of the same view as his director of national intelligence at the time:
“We underestimated the Viet Cong ... we underestimated ISIL and overestimated the fighting capability of the Iraqi army ... It boils down to predicting the will to fight, which is an imponderable”.
But Presidents Biden and Obama were wrong: the will to fight is not an imponderable; it is, in fact, as some of my academic colleagues have shown, a measurable phenomenon, and it is as likely to be as critical in the outcome of this war now as in the other conflicts I have mentioned. Can the Minister tell us how far we have been measuring—not just hoping about, but measuring and assessing—the will to fight of the two sides in this war? The outcome remains uncertain but, despite Russia’s military, economic and numerical superiority, the Ukrainians have to date shown remarkable resistance. Their will to fight will be crucial: are we assessing their will to fight? It will also be crucial whether the will to fight remains on the Russian side or is lacking: are we assessing that?
Does Europe have the resources? Does NATO have the right tactics and strategy? Are we assessing the will to fight? Finally, the Minister said that it could all be ended simply by the withdrawal of Mr Putin, but it is not just that. As has been pointed out, there are the enormous and horrendous crimes against humanity, exemplified by the ICC indictment against him. There is also the reconstruction of Ukraine, and foreign policy and substantial change beyond Europe. Have His Majesty’s Government stressed that the problem is no longer just Russia? As the noble Lord, Lord Owen, pointed out, there are other countries that do not necessarily share our view of this situation.
After the last two great and terrible global conflicts, the international architecture had to be refashioned. Can the United Nations survive without major reconstruction after this conflict? Are His Majesty’s Government looking at the substantial, long-term global and political consequences of this terrible war? As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said, it will not be possible just to return to the status quo ante bellum. The time will come, if it has not already, when we will have to address the enormity of the geopolitical as well as human consequences of this terrible, spreading war, the ultimate outcomes of which we cannot yet know.