Russian Shadow Fleet Vessel Leruo Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Addington
Main Page: Lord Addington (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Addington's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness is absolutely right to point out that it is a consistent policy, and I am proud to say a world-leading policy, of support for Ukraine across different Governments—the last Conservative Government, the previous Labour Prime Minister and the current Labour Prime Minister. It is a consistent policy that we should both maintain and be proud of. The noble Baroness is also absolutely right that strength is important, and I am slightly surprised that she suggested the UK, in her view, has a reputation for weakness. Friend and foe alike acknowledge the UK to be world-leading in the breadth, strength and seriousness of the support it offers.
Since 2024 we have challenged more than 700 suspected shadow fleet vessels. The “Smyrtos” is currently detained by the Secretary of State for Transport under transport sanctions powers. It is easy to look at an individual case and ask why we do not repeat it. I can assure the noble Baroness and the House that serious legal, operational, diplomatic and other concerns go into the decision about interdiction and interception. But the idea that the UK is not leading with a broad-ranging, credible and strong policy on sanctions and not cracking down on shadow fleet vessels is not true.
My Lords, when we are dealing with this situation, we are surely talking about making sure that we affect Russia’s capacity to keep waging this war. Can the Government give us some assurance that their attitude towards the shadow fleet, and possibly inspection and boarding, actually works? Can the Minister tell us exactly how he sees that happening now?
The noble Lord is right that the real test of the serious action taken is whether it changes the calculus and makes an impact. Western sanctions have clearly denied Russia access to an estimated $500 billion since February 2022. Russia’s economy is stagnating: it slashed its economic growth forecast this year from 1.3% to 0.4%, it halved its forecast for 2027 and it is estimated to be paying something like a 40% to 60% premium for imports of sanctioned goods. Obviously, sanctions have been going on much longer than the regime for cracking down on the shadow fleet. But we are galvanising a group of countries that are taking this part of the sanctions action very seriously, and there is strong evidence, as I say, that it is actually having an impact on Russia’s capacity to wage war.