Procurement Bill [HL]

Lord Aberdare Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th July 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 75A in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, my noble friend Lady Hayman and the noble Earl, Lord Devon, for putting their names to this amendment.

This amendment is consistent with the remarks I have already made in Committee: that there should be specific reference to “social value” as being part of public benefit in order to provide clarity to public bodies, companies and social enterprises; and that social value should be embedded in the procurement process through the appropriate guidance and reporting requirements for public bodies, which this amendment concerns.

This new clause would be added to the Bill mandating the Government to provide “guidance” to the public sector about “how to implement social value”. The Committee is aware that this is of great concern, given that the public policy—the legislative framework—is there for social value, and yet there is no mention of it in the Bill and no mention of how it might be implemented or how it might work with the procurement regime. I hope that we can resolve this matter between now and Report.

[Lord Aberdare (CB)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 71 in this group, which is a simple probing amendment seeking to understand why the Bill exempts contracting authorities from having regard to the national procurement policy statement for contracts involving frameworks or dynamic markets. I can find no explanation, in the Bill’s Explanatory Notes or elsewhere, why such arrangements should not be covered by the terms of the national policy statement, but perhaps the Minister will be able to give a simple answer.

A large number of construction-related public projects will be procured through frameworks and dynamic market contracts. A framework is an agreement with suppliers to establish terms governing contracts that may be awarded during the life of the agreement. The Government themselves acknowledge in the Cabinet Office’s Construction Playbook that framework agreements, as a means of longer-term strategic collaboration in construction, can provide the best medium through which procurement and contracting can deliver transformational improvements.

Last December, the Cabinet Office also published Constructing the Gold Standard: An Independent Review of Public Sector Construction Frameworks, based on an independent and objective review commissioned from Professor David Mosey of King’s College London. To quote the then Cabinet Office Minister:

“This review recognises the potential of frameworks as a powerful engine-room for implementing Construction Playbook policies that include strategic planning, integrated teams, continuous improvement and the delivery of better, safer, faster and greener project outcomes.”


The review states that the Civil Engineering Contractors Association

“identifies over 1,660 public sector construction frameworks procured between 2015 and 2019 with an aggregate value of up to £220 billion.”

Given that the national procurement policy statement will seek to define strategic priorities and set the parameters for better public procurement in line, I hope, with the gold standard prescribed by the review, why should contracting authorities be exempt from having regard to it in agreeing the terms of frameworks?

A similar question arises in relation to dynamic markets. At Second Reading, the Minister stated:

“The new concept of dynamic markets … is intended to provide greater opportunity for SMEs to join and win work in the course of a contracting period.”—[Official Report, 25/5/22; col. 929.]


Again, it is not clear to me why the terms of the national procurement policy statement should not also apply to dynamic markets—although I am quite prepared to believe that I may be missing something.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I have several amendments in this group: Amendments 69, 70, 76 and 79. It was interesting to hear the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, about hospital food. She may not know that I am president of the Hospital Caterers Association. I must come to its rescue: it does a fantastic job, given the budget it is given. What she may not know is that in the Health and Care Act there is a section which mandates Ministers to set standards for hospital food, following the hospital food review. The issue will be whether there is enough resource with which to fund the standards that Ministers will set. As part of this Bill, the noble Baroness might like to look at amending the Health and Care Act to ensure that there is consistency of approach, because she has made a very important point indeed.

We are continuing this debate about the relationship between the Bill and sustainability and environmental outcomes, and the Minister has been responding. His first response was at Second Reading, when he accepted that the Bill does not include any specific provisions on the target to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, but he went on to say that contracting authorities will be required to have regard to national and local priorities, as set out in the national procurement policy statement.

The problem is that the existing national procurement policy statement, published in June last year, is full of ambiguity. If I were a procurement director, I would find it very difficult to find my way through all these objectives, some of which are in a tension with each other. I think the Minister’s response will be, “Ah, but that’s the flexibility we want to give to public bodies to make their decisions themselves”. The problem is that in translating that you still come back to the point that the Government are not, at the end of the day, prepared to use procurement sufficiently to ensure the implementation of their sustainability and environmental policies.

Paragraph 10 of the national procurement policy statement sets out:

“Contracting authorities should have regard to the following national priorities in exercising their functions relating to procurement. The national priorities relate to social value; commercial and procurement delivery; and skills and capability for procurement.”


Additionally:

“All contracting authorities should consider the following national priority outcomes alongside any additional local priorities in their procurement activities: creating new businesses, new jobs and new skills; tackling climate change and reducing waste, and improving supplier diversity, innovation and resilience.”


Paragraph 11states:

“Achieving value for money in public procurement remains focused on securing from contractors the best mix of quality and effectiveness to deliver the requirements of the contract, for the least outlay over the period of use of the goods or services bought. But the Government wants to send a clear message that commercial and procurement teams across the public sector do not have to select the lowest price bid, and that in setting the procurement strategy, drafting the contract terms and evaluating tenders they can and should take a broad view of value or money that includes the improvement of social welfare or wellbeing, referred to in HM Treasury’s Green Book as social value.”


Paragraph 12 states that the award criteria can be incorporated

“for comparing final bids and scoring their relative quality, to encourage ways of working and operational delivery that achieve social, economic and environmental benefits”.

This includes tackling climate change and reducing waste; contributing to the UK Government’s legally binding target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050; reducing waste, improving resource efficiency and contributing to the move towards a circular economy; and identifying and prioritising opportunities in sustainable procurement to deliver additional environmental benefits, for example enhanced biodiversity, through the delivery of the contract.

Paragraph 13 makes it clear:

“Public procurement should be leveraged to support priority national and local outcomes for the public benefit. This Statement sets out the national priorities that all contracting authorities should have regard to in their procurement where it is relevant to the subject matter of the contract and it is proportionate to do so”.


But here is the rub. Paragraph 15 states:

“Taking additional social value benefits into account effectively is a balance with delivery of the core purpose of the contract. Contracting authorities should ensure that they do not ‘gold-plate’ contracts with additional requirements which could be met more easily and for better value outside of the contract compliance process, particularly where legislation has already determined that such provisions do not apply, for example by imposing requirements in the Equality Act 2010 on the private sector that are only meant to apply to the public sector”.


Paragraph 14 says:

“There should be a clear link from the development of strategies and business cases for programmes and projects through to procurement specifications and the assessment of quality when awarding contracts. This is in line with Green Book guidance which makes it clear that the procurement specification should come from the strategic and economic dimensions of a project’s business case, and that commercial experts should be involved in the development of the business case from the start”.


The question I would ask is this: if you were a finance director or a procurement director in the public sector, what would you make of it? One has to see this in the context of having been through a decade—in fact, longer than a decade—of austerity where short-term fixes are much more common than longer-term sustainability investments.

I turn to the NHS, where I have some experience, and where I could certainly point to some really good examples of sustainability policies. In theory the intent in the Bill, as I see it, is to place greater emphasis on wider value than lowest price. But what this ignores, certainly in the NHS context, is the financial and economic reality that exists on a day-by-day basis. In an environment where savings are demanded in-year and budgets set annually, the overpowering financial incentive is to achieve cost improvement programmes. These savings filter down through the NHS financial system and become a target for finance directors and procurement directors who generally report to the finance director. While I am sure that if we had some finance directors in front of us, they would say that they strive to focus on long-term value, this requires a less tangible and measurable saving than the fact that product A costs less than product B.

In an NHS environment that is financially driven, targeted and appraised for striving to deliver savings targets in-year, and where the most measurable saving is lowest price, it is clearly going to be challenging to move away from that. This experience is probably reflected across much of the public sector; indeed, other parts of the public sector would probably say that the NHS has had it easier. Those of us in the NHS would of course say, “That’s because we need more money”, but the fact is that if the NHS is finding it difficult, other sectors are going to find it very difficult indeed.

My amendments are simply aimed at seeing sustainable development principles incorporated within the national procurement policy statement and the Wales procurement policy statement. At the end of the day, there really is an issue here, is there not? Whatever procurement policy is set out, public authorities will have challenging decisions to make. My own view is that, because of the way in which this has been put together, and potential future national procurement policy statements, public bodies are going to be left with very ambiguous statements where they do not quite know what they are expected to do. The Minister says, “Ah, but that’s flexibility”. I say that it undermines the wider goals towards which our procurement policy should be driven.

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[Lord Aberdare (CB)]

I thank the Minister for that answer and for getting to it at the third time of asking, by which point I was almost bursting with excitement as to what he was going to say. I am not entirely clear why the Bill seems to take frameworks and dynamic markets out altogether but I will study what the Minister has said and endeavour to understand. I thank him for getting there in the end.

[Lord True (Con)]

Well, I did try to get there but I had an intervention, then another intervention. It would be discourteous not to respond to—or be provoked by, as some may feel—the odd intervention. Is that not the give and take of debate, which is what our blessed Parliament is all about? If I have given the noble Lord incorrect advice, I will correct it, but what I have read out is the legal advice that I have been given.

Amendment 78A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, provides that a Minister of the Crown may not introduce a Bill in either House of Parliament to amend or omit Clause 13, which relates to the Wales procurement policy statement, unless, as the noble Lord explained, Senedd Cymru has resolved by a majority of those present in voting to approve it. This is an uncongenial part for the noble Lord: the effect of this amendment would be to fetter the power of this and any future Parliament. The Government therefore cannot accept this amendment. However, as I mentioned earlier—he was kind enough to allude to this—we respect the devolution settlement and the competence of Wales on this matter. I have placed that and the degree of co-operation we have with the Welsh Government on the record in Hansard. That due respect for the devolution settlement is something that the Government aspire to see continue in this case, but we cannot accept the lock that he requests in the amendment.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I start with my usual apology that the rules for remote contributors mean that I will be commenting on amendments that have not yet been spoken to by their authors. I have one amendment in this group, Amendment 528C, which has been signed by my noble friend Lord Scriven, to which I will return.

I support Amendments 101A, 528A and 528B which set out the arrangements for procurement, taking into consideration low-income countries and ask that particularly during a public health emergency, not only a pandemic, they should meet certain criteria that are higher than usual.

The World Health Organization’s report, The COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons Learned for the WHO European Region, recommends as its fifth area for action:

“Strengthening procurement systems, supply chains, operational support and logistics”.


The reason why that it is one of the key recommendations is, I am afraid, the chaos that happened in the early months of the pandemic and the frankly shameful behaviour of some of the wealthy countries which disregarded the fact that Covid was a worldwide virus and that all countries needed access to key goods and services to deal with it—whether PPE, kit for testing, or vaccines as they came on stream.

This Committee is not the place to go into the detail of that; I suspect that most Members of your Lordships’ House will have it fresh in their memories from the last two years. However, I hope that the UK pandemic inquiry will look at our Government’s behaviour, including the taking of vaccines from the vaccine fund COVAX, which was designed specifically to support countries that could not afford either the development or the cost of vaccines in those early days, and, in particular, the blocking of a TRIPS waiver for intellectual property, which prevented low-income countries manufacturing their own vaccines. These amendments would ensure that any future Government must reflect carefully on their role in helping low-income countries have fair access to the tools that they need to manage any major future health emergency.

Amendment 528C is a probing amendment that seeks to remove the provisions in Sections 79 and 80 of the Health and Care Act for NHS England to have its procurement rules set by the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care using a statutory instrument. On earlier occasions in Committee, I asked Ministers a series of questions to which I really hope we will receive answers today. Prior to this, each response from the Dispatch Box, in essence, laid out the differences between the arrangements under the Bill and those in Sections 79 and 80 of the Health and Care Act, which we know already. I will not repeat the details of the likely problems that this will cause in the complex interface of what is and is not covered by the Health and Care Act; it certainly is not as clear-cut as the sections would imply. Much more fundamentally, the reason I have tabled this amendment is to try to elicit answers to the two following questions.

First, why should a body such as NHS England, which procures contracts for £70 billion a year of taxpayers’ money, have procurement rules that are not consulted on widely or taken through the same scrutiny available under the legislation process that this Bill—for all its failings and problems—must continue to go through? During the passage of the Health and Care Bill, no Minister seemed to be able to explain why, and the same is true for this Bill. The £70 billion was specifically for NHS England. The total NHS departmental spend on health in 2019-20 was in excess of £160 billion, so I suspect that the real clinical and associated spending is significantly higher than the £70 billion I quoted. It is the Government’s largest budget after social protection—that is, benefits and pensions—yet the Health and Care Act sets out a procurement regime that is much less visible and accountable than that proposed by the Government in this Bill.

Secondly, is it appropriate that procurement arrangement processes for such a large amount of taxpayers’ money should be determined by a Secretary of State using Henry VIII powers? Not only is this process much less transparent, and it cannot hold Ministers to account, but the capacity is there for a future Secretary of State to change the procurement process much more quickly than under the processes of this Bill. It was helpful during the passage of the Health and Care Bill that the Government bowed to the strong report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which said that at the very least it must be upgraded to be subject to an affirmative procedure. But frankly, Members’ suspicions were aroused by the original proposals that it should be subject to a negative procedure.

During the passage of the Health and Care Bill, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said:

“We are grateful for the input of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in advising us on this. In summary, these regulations will allow the NHS to procure healthcare services in a way that reflects the reality of those services without unnecessary bureaucracy and with the ultimate goal of providing value for patients, taxpayers and the population in the vital health services they need.”—[Official Report, 3/3/22; col.1028.]


For the last three and a half days, we have been debating in detail unnecessary bureaucracy and the ultimate goal of providing value for taxpayers, clients and the population in the vital public services they need. I am still struggling to understand why the second-largest public spender in this country is able to use this unaccountable and untransparent procedure. I hope that the Minister will specifically explain to the Grand Committee why this route was chosen for the NHS. If the Minister cannot answer this, will he meet those of us who are interested— I have already asked him twice for meetings—so that we can discuss this prior to Report?

[Lord Aberdare (CB)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 120 and 129A in this group. I will also speak to Amendment 119 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, and my noble friend Lord Best’s Amendment 131. Perhaps Amendments 119 and 120 should have come up on Monday, when we were discussing SMEs.

Amendment 120 seeks to address the barriers faced by smaller providers and charities through specifications that disqualify or discourage them from bidding. These typically stem from process taking precedent over purpose, or from narrow or mistaken interpretations of procurement rules. Lloyds Bank Foundation research has found numerous examples of disproportionate thresholds being imposed—some of which we heard about on Monday—including requiring suppliers to demonstrate income unrelated to the size of the contract being tendered for, requiring evidence of having previously delivered contracts much larger than the one tendered for, or unreasonable insurance requirements.

Excessive requirements at the pre-qualification questionnaire—PQQ—and invitation to tender—ITT—stages can also act as significant barriers. To cite one example: a youth association applying to be added to a framework of suppliers linked to the troubled families initiative had to complete a 49-page PQQ and 99-page full tender. Greater clarity is needed about what a proportionate approach looks like.

My Amendment 120, which the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, has also signed, seeks to add a requirement for contracting authorities to include consideration of the impact of conditions on the ability of a broad range of suppliers, including smaller businesses and charities, to access public contracts as part of their assessment of proportionality. Without this, there is a danger that smaller providers will continue to be disqualified on technicalities or by arbitrary barriers, even where they are well placed to deliver the service or are already doing so.

I have also added my name to Amendment 119 from the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, which would allow for conditions requiring suppliers who seek to participate in a contract to be

“signatories of good standing on the Prompt Payment Code”.

All too often, we hear from small businesses of the Prompt Payment Code being honoured more in the breach than the observance, even by businesses that have signed up to it. Making adherence to the code allowable as a condition of participation seems an eminently sensible way of giving it stronger teeth and I hope that the Minister, who has been so responsive in his willingness to look seriously at many of the good ideas proposed by members of this Committee, will look at this one as well.

Amendment 129A to Clause 22, which is in my name, seeks to ensure that the advantages of flexibility in setting award criteria are not undermined by post-award negotiations or other price and cost uncertainties which could affect, or even invalidate, value-for-money considerations used in awarding contracts. To avoid this, the amendment requires the contract to include

“an objective mechanism for determining price and cost after contract award and before the goods, services or works are supplied.”

Only through such a mechanism for confirming value for money being put in place at the time of a contract’s award is it possible to secure maximum supplier contributions to improving value and reducing risks, including through the early appointment of specialists. This is an aspect of early supply chain involvement and having an objective post-award process to achieve the benefits associated with it.

To give an example, those benefits were illustrated by the innovations, cost savings, reduced carbon emissions and local business opportunities agreed by the Ministry of Justice with the supplier and specialists engaged on its Five Wells prison construction project after their appointment and before commencement of work on site; this project featured as a case study in the Construction Playbook. So I hope that the Minister will consider this amendment carefully as a way of ensuring that value for money commitments are met in the procurement of any goods, services or works.