Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Lloyd Russell-Moyle and Liz Saville Roberts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 5th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[Liz Saville Roberts]

That is a very fair point, which we have discussed to a considerable degree. None the less, there is a public revulsion at the prospect of sexual violence, murder and crimes of that nature, which warrant being mentioned in the Bill for that very reason.

Equally profound and disturbing at first appearance is the power to grant authorisations, which will be given to organisations to decide for themselves internally, without judicial oversight and with limited redress for victims. It is quite extraordinary that there is no provision for how innocent victims of authorised criminal conduct might be compensated, which is surely to be expected in the Bill. I also believe—this point has already been well expressed, but I want to add my voice to it—that trade unions have legitimate concerns, given that covert surveillance has been undertaken in the past against entirely legitimate trade union activity in conjunction with criminal blacklisting.

While quick to quote the book of human rights, the Government have failed to quote chapter and verse of what is permissible and what is beyond the pale. Would the use of sensory overload or stress positions by agents constitute torture and be a violation of human rights? Would they then be criminally culpable? What guarantee can the Minister give that a future UK Government, or even this one, might not seek to legislate for derogations from the European convention on human rights? Given the horizon-spanning nature of the criminal conduct covered by the Bill, where is the threshold for authorising acts, such as phone tapping, that rightly concern the public? What does “proportionate” actually mean? If we do not define it, who does? By what algorithm do we assess the range of proportionality? Where is the shift and the mission creep there?

The Government have also empowered a range of organisations with this new authorisation of criminality, from the Environment Agency to England’s Department of Health and Social Care, but how do the Government intend to prevent creep by Government Departments and the erosion of law? What safeguards will the Government put in place within those Departments? Does the Investigatory Powers Commissioner have sufficient measures and capacity to deal in a timely fashion with the incremental increase in his workload?

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does the right hon. Member agree that it is all well and good having oversight after the effect, but there is a real danger that the authority providing authorisation before the effect is the same authority that is doing the investigation? We all have systems of tunnel vision when we are in the middle of something and are unable to see the wider aspect, and independence at the pre-authorisation stage is really important.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Professional intent, although very laudable in certain circumstances, in this instance could well lead to unpredicted circumstances, and possibly most undesirable ones.

The Bill at present is ill defined and explained, with a focus trained on selected specific issues, and it risks undermining the trust upon which the public agencies tasked with our defence depends. Many, including the Front Benchers of Her Majesty’s Opposition, have said that that will be discussed on Report and in Committee. It is very important, and will evidently be significant when we are able to table amendments and discuss the Bill in detail. However, consideration is down for Thursday week. There will be a Thursday afternoon for Committee and all remaining stages. That is insufficient for the level of scrutiny that a Bill of this seriousness warrants. I beg the Government to consider whether, in all honesty, that is the impression that they wish to leave on the international stage, on which we hope to lead in the rules-based dimension in the future.