Trade (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Lloyd Russell-Moyle and Liam Byrne

Report stage
Tuesday 19th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Liam Byrne]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and I commend his contribution both to the Committee and to the report that we published on the CPTPP earlier this year.

There are a number of important new clauses and amendments not only about the future expansion plans of the CPTPP and what our policy on those might look like, but also, in the names of my right hon. and hon. Friends, about investor-state dispute settlement. This is important because in all the fanfare, arguments and passionate bits of literature and speeches offered by the Government about the virtues of the treaty, it was always positioned as a gateway to the fastest-growing economy on Earth that will represent a significant fraction of economic growth in the future. Of course, what was often missing from those eloquent descriptions was a recognition that the countries in the CPTPP represent only about a fifth, at best, of the Indo-Pacific region.

We are surely right to worry that there could well be a Government drive to expand the orbit of the treaty to a much wider group of nations. If the Government really want to take aim at the biggest economies on Earth, they may well encourage China to join. However, when I asked the Secretary of State whether it was her policy to agree to or block China’s accession, she said that that was not something we could discuss on the Floor of the House or in the Select Committee. That is why safeguards are needed. We might even be so bold as to merely ask for a little bit of clarity on the Government’s future strategy. That is why the amendments on the future pathway of the treaty are so important and why I hope we will have a vote on some aspect of that today, even if it is not on the new clause tabled by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green.

I will talk briefly about new clause 3, which relates to ISDS. It is important, because His Majesty’s Government have agreed side letters with a number of countries to take us out of the ISDS process. That is not an exemption or safeguard that we saw when it came to agreeing to the treaty, yet the treaty includes countries such as Canada—I think we are just about on fraternal terms with Canada at the moment; we may have failed to agree an FTA with it, but quite why is a matter of some dispute between the Canadian Government and the Secretary of State. Canada is home to some of the biggest pension fund investors on the planet and we know that those funds are especially litigious. Although the Minister was right, when he answered these questions in earlier conversations, to say we have never lost an ISDS case, the reality is that many fear there will be a chilling effect on the regulations we bring forward because of a fear of the peril of ISDS procedures.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

My right hon. Friend is speaking very well on some of the new clauses I have tabled on ISDS. It is of course true that getting the side letters for all member states was good enough for New Zealand, so it was protected more—not fully protected, I grant him. If it was good enough for New Zealand, it should have been good enough for us. Is it not a sign that Ministers have lacked ambition, or is it a sign of complacency?

[Liam Byrne]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps it is because we did not want to overly annoy the Canadians, but the truth is that the talks with the Canadians have broken down—at a cost, by the way, to the UK automotive industry. In fact, UK cars will be hit on average by a £3,000 tariff in about a month or two, because of the breakdown of those talks. It is important for us to have a vote on why we do not have those procedures, why we do not have those safeguards and why we do not have those side letters.

Finally, I want to underline the point made by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green. As a House, we must become far more skilled, far more ready and far more adroit at debating the kinds of treaties we will be asked to sign. Once upon a time, when the Berlin wall came down, we promised ourselves that we could look forward to a new world of free trade, and we hoped that that free trade could bring political progress and a democratic process—Wandel durch Handel, as the Germans liked to say.

However, that reality is now smashed; that era ended with the second invasion of Ukraine. We are now in new times, when we have to debate not just military security but economic security, and economic security questions are always freighted with dilemmas. We are a small nation and our adversaries are big, so we must always act with our allies, but not all our allies are good, and many of our friends would prefer not to pick a side. Our adversaries plan for self-sufficiency, but we cannot. We prefer open, free trade, but global supply chains are risky. We like markets to decide, but security always requires state action. We know that we need to work proactively to shape the long term, but democracies frequently entail a short-term change of Government, and too often our politics is reactive.