Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLiz Twist
Main Page: Liz Twist (Labour - Blaydon and Consett)Department Debates - View all Liz Twist's debates with the Cabinet Office
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI do not know whether I need to declare this, but I am a member of the British Legion.
It is always best to put these things on the record.
Thank you, Mr Byrne, for joining us in person. Will you say who you are for the record, and who you are here on behalf of?
Charles Byrne: I am Charles Byrne, director general of the Royal British Legion.
Q
Charles Byrne: The point we have been working around so far is that at the moment there is no time limit, even allowing for point of knowledge. This would introduce a time limit. That time limit does not apply more widely in other civilian cases, so we see that as a disadvantage. What impact might that have on morale? Good question. Would it possibly make those who get caught in this situation feel less valued? That would be my conclusion.
Q
Charles Byrne: I am glad you called that out, but I do not think I am in any way qualified or able to answer that question.
The Bill requires additional weight to be given to the stresses of operations when deciding to prosecute. To what extent do you think service personnel are adequately trained to deal with these stresses?
General Sir John McColl: My personal opinion on that is that the training that service personnel receive generally for conducting operations is absolutely first class. Indeed, that will reflect on their conduct on operations and that conduct will be affected by the role of the chain of command. I think they are well prepared. I am sure there are exceptions and that there will be difficulties, but in general terms that is what I would say. It is a question that you should really be asking of the serving chiefs within the Ministry of Defence, rather than a retired general, such as myself.
Q
General Sir John McColl: Training can always be improved, there is no doubt about that. After every operation there is always analysis of the training people go through to ensure that they are prepared for whatever they may have to deal with. I am sure that is the case. The area where training has particularly improved over recent years, but continually needs to be improved, is that of mental resilience. If I am being honest, that is something we did not pay significant attention to in previous decades. We need to do better in that particular area.
I think Mr Byrne wants to say something.
Charles Byrne: I think this is an area I probably need to be careful about. Echoing John’s comments from the personal perspective, I was with friends last night, one of whom is still serving with the Royal Marines. He spoke very passionately about how well their training goes and a new element of the programme, I think called Regain. It is taken very seriously and good work is being done to recognise and address the mental stresses, the mental health and mental strain.
I am going to call Peter Gibson on a supplementary and then I will come to you, Mr Anderson.
And to confirm for the record, you are General Sir Nick Parker.
General Sir Nick Parker: Yes. Not to be muddled with Carter.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I start by echoing the previous witnesses. Malicious claims have to be taken very seriously, and I welcome everything that does that, but to answer your question, my concern is that the process risks the legitimacy of the armed forces, and I am not convinced that what is being done is the most effective way to deal with the challenge. It feels to me as if we are treating a symptom through this Bill, not going to the cause at the heart of the problem. I will elaborate very quickly on that, if you are happy.
As far as legitimacy is concerned, we deploy on operations, quite rightly answering to the highest possible standards. While I am not a legal expert—again, I am applying my operational experience to this—during the passage of the Bill, particularly part 1, there has been a weight of eminent legal opinion that I trust, including from people who were involved in the service legal issues before, who are concerned that one of the effects of the Bill will be to demonstrate in some way that the British are not operating under international legal norms. If that were the case, it would be extremely challenging both externally, if we are working in a coalition with other countries where our behaviours need to be consistent, and with the enemy. Most of the enemies I have faced do not follow international law, but it may well be that that is the case, and if we are seen to be prepared to operate outside the international norms, that risks calling us into question and adding another complex element to the decision making that the chain of command needs to take.
That is the legitimacy side. On the effectiveness side, it appears as if part 1 of the Bill focuses entirely on the process of prosecution, whereas for me the big issue here is the process of investigation and, critically in that process, ensuring that the chain of command is deeply connected with what goes on from the very outset. I do not think there is any serviceman or woman who would not accept that bad behaviour on the frontline must be treated quickly and efficiently. Nobody would want anything in the process that somehow allows people who have behaved badly on the frontline to get away with it. But all of us would believe that the process has to be quick, efficient and effective to remove the suspicion of a malicious allegation as quickly as possible. I cannot see how this Bill does that.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: In the complexity of the frontline, there is an enormous amount going on and it is very difficult to produce accurate, timely records of what is occurring. It may be that someone will stand up and contradict me, but when I served we had a thing called a battalion war diary, which was very nearly a mandraulic, hand-written process. We need to change our culture of record keeping on the frontline so that there are sophisticated ways of recording exactly what is going on, so that when somebody comes to look at an allegation of bad behaviour, they have good, accurate records that are endorsed by the people who gave the orders to those who have undertaken the act and they are also held accountable for what happened. That needs to be investigated not, in my view, by an RMP lance corporal who has been trained to do a whole load of important but relatively menial things, nor by an independent constable from Northumbria who has no idea of the activity on the frontline, but by a properly found investigative organisation that is a genuine independent part of the organisation and respected by both those on the frontline and those outside the armed forces as an effective body. That certainly did not exist when I was serving, and I think it would require resources to create it.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: The chain of command is responsible for giving its orders to our people both before, during and after a battle. In all three circumstances there are levels of complexity. Clearly, in the heat of battle the complexity increases in some ways, but the pressures on individuals often increase quite significantly afterwards. The chain of command is the organisation that gives the orders and should be accountable for the collective action of those it is in charge of. When something occurs that is challenged by people, in the terms of a malicious claim, the chain of command should be the first port of call to present why what happened is or is not acceptable, because the chain of command has to own the responsibility of the actions of its people. The thing that I have found quite difficult—I have done a little bit of work with some people in Northern Ireland, which I know is not this case—is that it appears in law that the chain of command is not really considered a factor in all this, yet it is right at the heart of it.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I am not suggesting that the chain of command frustrates investigations. I think that the lack of accurate, timely, well maintained information, recording what is occurring, means that there may be confusion. I think there are also probably instances where levels of the chain of command do not take sufficient responsibility for what their subordinates should do. A very brief example: in Afghanistan, the lack of force density in certain parts of the theatre may have meant that a significant level of force was used in order to protect our own people, because there were so few of them. The reality may be that there should have been more people allocated to the ground, in order to achieve the objectives that were being set. I think the responsibility for that sits quite high up in the chain of command, and there people need to understand their responsibility for the decisions they are making. I am not convinced that at each level of the chain of command we have yet created the right culture to support the effective dealing with things like malicious claims.
I would add that I think one of the key things that we have to do is to produce mechanisms that establish a really effective duty of care for those who are placed under the spotlight by malicious claims. Of course, if you deal with these things quickly, that will help, but anything that drags out, even for two or three years, puts individuals under massive pressure. If the chain of command does not have the ability to look after them, because it somehow distances itself from them, then we have got to address that as well.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: No, I think it focuses too much on prosecution and putting checks in place to ensure that prosecutions are absolutely as fair as they need be, when the reality is that you need to go back down the pipe and deal with what is happening on the coalface.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: Only that you must understand the challenge that exists in a complex operational environment. I am not suggesting some sort of panacea that will provide a perfect level of information, but we have to do much better at providing accurate, timely information, and having an independent, properly found investigating system, respected by all, that can then take that information, investigate it and come to as quick a conclusion as possible about the actions of the people who are being investigated.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: We operate in grey zone warfare anyway, so I imagine that the Bill and everything being discussed has been generated in that environment. My point is not whether the Bill addresses that, but that it does not address the core, which is the investigation, in black, white, grey—wherever it is. The emphasis appears to be on prosecution. In reality, it should be on what is happening in the investigative process, whether it is grey zone or not.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I do not understand why sexual acts have been excluded, but not murder and torture. I do not understand why that distinction has been made and whether it undermines the fundamental credibility of the Bill. As I said at the beginning, I am not a legal expert, but I have been told by people whose views I respect that even putting in conditions for prosecution that separate your military from the normal process will be viewed with some suspicion by those who uphold international law more generally.
I have heard enough people whose views I respect telling me that they are concerned about the five-year time limit or time point; they are concerned about the exclusion of sexual offences; they are concerned about the triple lock and why it needs to be applied when our systems for prosecution are perfectly effective if the investigation is effectively carried out and properly presented. If that is the case, we will potentially be viewed by other countries as operating in a way that contravenes international norms.