(9 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI wish to draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
The tragic clash between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism can only be resolved with the creation of a Palestinian state with agreed and secure borders, with international backing and support, alongside the state of Israel, and the only way to bring that about in a lasting and peaceful way, to the benefit of both peoples, is through direct negotiations, where agreements are made, assurances are given and where there is full security and long-term peace. That needs agreement on borders, and some agreement has been made, but the differences are relatively small in length but critical in nature. It needs agreement on how to share Jerusalem, on refugee issues, agreement on security and agreement that setting up a Palestinian state would be the end of claims and the end of conflict, not a staging post for an attack on Israel’s existence.
We should remember that the peace treaty that was signed with Egypt in 1979 has stood the test of time, despite drastic changes in regime and Governments. In contrast, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal of settlers and soldiers from Gaza in 2005 has not resulted in peace. It has led to the terrorist organisation, Hamas, violently overthrowing Fatah, launching its barrage of rockets and now directing the terror tunnels at the civilians of Israel. We saw the results in the horrendous events of last summer.
Two years ago, the Palestinian Authority were given some status in the United Nations in an attempt to look for a diplomatic UN route to try to resolve what appeared to be intractable problems. What has happened since then, and what use has been made of that diplomacy? The most recent effort to find a negotiated peace was that undertaken by John Kerry. The truth is that it was President Abbas who did not give an answer to the framework agreement that John Kerry put forward as a basis for further negotiations. Israel agreed to it, quite rightly, though it did not want to; it had to be pushed and pressurised to do so. President Abbas has still not given any answer; instead, he returned to the United Nations.
On 26 September, President Abbas addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations. That was the sort of approach that the proposed resolution envisages: no direct negotiations, and dealing with this by resolution, and through United Nations debates. He spoke about “genocide” by Israelis, and about Palestinian “martyrs”. Is that the language used about the suicide bombings directed at the young people and civilians of Israel at a time when peace negotiations, following Oslo, were very much under way? He spoke about “forced withdrawals”. That is not the language of peace.
It should be remembered that while peace negotiations were under way following the Oslo negotiations, in one month alone—March 2002—80 Israeli civilians were killed and 600 injured in targeted suicide bombings on the streets of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ashkelon, in a concerted attempt to undermine and destroy that peace process. No wonder there is concern among the people of Israel; they know that during those peace negotiations—it was right to stick to them and to keep going with them —terror groups sent by, among others, Yasser Arafat, were targeting, killing and maiming Israeli civilians. The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza—a correct, unilateral withdrawal—was followed by rockets, the terror tunnels, and more and more death.
This is not an easy issue; if it was easy to resolve, it would have been resolved by now. Both Jews and Palestinians deserve to have their states, and to live in peace and security, side by side. Direct negotiations are the way—
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberSecurity was one area on which the Select Committee expressed concerns and raised questions. Some of those concerns are touched upon in some of the amendments. The change in security arrangements—responsibility in part moving from the Department to the CAA—is linked to a change to an outcome-focused, risk-assessment regime, but that basic change of policy has not been fully debated. The Committee did not address the subject in depth; instead, we looked at certain specific issues, which are in the Bill.
The shift in responsibility from the Department to the CAA will result in increased costs to the industry. While industry generally supports the changes in the Bill, it is concerned about costs. It has been stated that the cost will be £5 million a year, but I understand that, in fact, the figure could be a great deal higher.
Another issue is how the division of responsibilities will operate in practice. Under the proposed changes, the Secretary of State is to have responsibility for policy and the CAA is to have responsibility for operational matters, but it is unclear how that division will be made and how that would operate, particularly in emergency situations when swift decisions may be required.
That issue is linked to the concern we expressed about staffing, and the possibility of staff in the Department who have expertise in this area not moving to the CAA and therefore not being available to deploy their expertise where and when it is most needed. We have not received any clear answers on that. We suggested there might be secondments. I understand that the Department is not very supportive of that idea, and does not accept that it may solve the problem. We remain concerned about this possible loss of expertise.
I understand that the CAA will be undertaking its new responsibilities by 2014. That is not a long time in the future. It is important that the issues I have raised are addressed. There is also the question of whether the move to an outcome-focused, risk-assessment approach will, in fact, maintain—or, indeed, increase—vital levels of security.