Hong Kong National Security Legislation: UK Response

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd June 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and First Secretary of State (Dominic Raab)]

I would like to update the House on the situation in Hong Kong. As all Members will know, Hong Kong’s historic success was built on its autonomy, its freedoms and the remarkable resourcefulness and determination of its people. We have long admired their prosperity and their values, respected through China’s own expression of the one country, two systems approach—an approach that China itself has long articulated and affirmed as the basis for its relations with Hong Kong. The UK, through successive Governments, has consistently respected and supported that model, as reflected both in China’s Basic Law and also the joint declaration, which, as Members will know, is the treaty agreed by the United Kingdom and China, registered with the United Nations, as part of the arrangements for the handover of Hong Kong that were made back in 1984.

Set against this Chinese framework and the historical context, on 22 May, during a meeting of the National People’s Congress, China considered a proposal for a national security law for Hong Kong, and then on 28 May the National People’s Congress adopted that decision. China’s Foreign Minister, State Councillor Wang Yi, made it clear that the legislation will seek to ban treason, secession, sedition and subversion, and we expect it to be published in full shortly.

This proposed national security law undermines the one country, two systems framework that I have described, under which Hong Kong is guaranteed a high degree of autonomy with Executive, legislative and independent judicial powers. To be very clear and specific about this, the imposition of national security legislation on Hong Kong by the Government in Beijing, rather than through Hong Kong’s own institutions, lies in direct conflict with article 23 of China’s own Basic Law and with China’s international obligations freely assumed under the joint declaration. The Basic Law is clear that there are only a limited number of areas in which Beijing can impose laws directly, such as for the purposes of defence and foreign affairs, or in exceptional circumstances in which the National People’s Congress declares a state of war or a state of emergency.

The proposed national security law, as it has been described, in terms of the substance and detail, raises the prospect of prosecution in Hong Kong for political crimes, which would undermine the existing commitments to protect the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as set out in the joint declaration, but also reflecting the international covenant on civil and political rights. Finally, the proposals also include provision for the authorities in Hong Kong to report back to Beijing on progress in pursuing national security education of its people—a truly sobering prospect.

We have not yet seen the detailed published text of the legislation, but I can tell the House that if legislation in those terms is imposed by China on Hong Kong, it would violate China’s own Basic Law. It would upend China’s one country, two systems paradigm, and it would be a clear violation of China’s international obligations, including those made specifically to the United Kingdom under the joint declaration.

Let me be clear about the approach that the United Kingdom intends to take. We do not oppose Hong Kong passing its own national security law. We do strongly oppose such an authoritarian law being opposed by China, in breach of international law. We are not seeking to intervene in China’s internal affairs, only to hold China to its international commitments, just as China expects of the United Kingdom. We do not seek to prevent China’s rise—far from it. We welcome China as a leading member of the international community, and we look to engage with China on everything from trade to climate change. It is precisely because we recognise China’s role in the world that we expect it to live up to the international obligations and the international responsibilities that come with it.

On Thursday, working closely with our partners in Australia, Canada and the United States, the UK released a joint statement expressing our deep concerns over this proposed new security legislation. Our partners in New Zealand and Japan have issued similar statements. The EU has too, and I have had discussions with a number of our EU partners. The UK stands firm with our international partners in our expectation that China lives up to its international obligations under the Sino-British joint declaration.

There is time for China to reconsider. There is a moment for China to step back from the brink and respect Hong Kong’s autonomy and respect China’s own international obligations. We urge the Government of China to work with the people of Hong Kong and with the Hong Kong Government to end the recent violence and to resolve the underlying tensions based on political dialogue. If China continues down this current path, if it enacts this national security law, we will consider what further response we make working with those international partners and others.

I hope the whole House agrees that we, as the United Kingdom, have historical responsibilities—a duty I would say—to the people of Hong Kong. I can tell the House now that if China enacts the law, we will change the arrangements for British National (Overseas) passport holders in Hong Kong. The House will recall that the BNO status was conferred on British dependent territories’ citizens connected with Hong Kong as part of the package of arrangements that accompanied the joint declaration in 1984 in preparation for the handover of the territory. Under that status currently, BNO passport holders are already entitled to UK consular assistance in third countries. The British Government also provide people with BNO passports visa-free entry into the UK for up to six months as visitors.

If China follows through with its proposed legislation, we will put in place new arrangements to allow BNOs to come to the UK without the current six-month limit, enabling them to live and apply to study and work for extendable periods of 12 months, thereby also providing a pathway to citizenship.

Let me just finish by saying that, even at this stage, I sincerely hope that China will reconsider its approach, but if it does not the UK will not just look the other way when it comes to the people of Hong Kong; we will stand by them and live up to our responsibilities. I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Speaker]

I shall now call the shadow Foreign Secretary, Lisa Nandy, who has up to five minutes to reply.

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[Dominic Raab]

Of course, dependants would be considered. The hon. Lady rightly pointed out that the threat to Hong Kong is not just to its autonomy and freedoms, but to its economy and to investment in Hong Kong, which the UK and many others have serious interests in. The actions of China are, inexplicably, putting at risk what has long been regarded as one of the jewels in the economic crown for China. So she makes important points on that.

The hon. Lady asked why we had not called for an independent investigation into the police, but in fact I called for it in August 2019 and made that clear, having spoken to chief executive Carrie Lam. The hon. Lady also asked about universal suffrage, which of course is envisaged in the basic law for Hong Kong; I set that out as our position in the House of Commons last September. On both points I welcome her support and that of the Labour party. She then asked about international action, where the United Kingdom has been in the vanguard. We have been co-ordinating with our Five Eyes partners—I had a virtual meeting with them yesterday evening, where we reaffirmed our solidarity on this point. I have had calls and been engaged with the European Union, which has put out a statement—it is not as strong as the one we put out, but it shows that the EU is engaged actively on this. I have been speaking to my German, French and other European partners about it, and I also spoke to my Japanese opposite number today. The issue was discussed in the UN Security Council, but of course China, and indeed Russia, will veto any more substantive debate.

The hon. Lady asked about the specific measures we are proposing. I have been very clear on BNOs. Equally, we will work closely with our international partners on what the right next steps are. I think the focus right now, in order to proceed in a productive way that is likely to give ourselves the best chance of the outcome we want, is on setting out our position clearly and working with our international partners, and the ball is in the court of the Government in China. They have a choice to make here: they can cross the Rubicon and violate the autonomy and the rights of the people of Hong Kong, or they can step back, understand the widespread concern of the international community and live up to their responsibilities as a leading member of the international community.

[Mr Speaker]

We now come to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Tom Tugendhat.

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[Dominic Raab]

I thank my hon. Friend, the Chairman of the Select Committee, who makes a range of really important points. He is absolutely right to focus on what is the most effective way to build a groundswell of support for the principled stance that we are taking and for opposition to the actions of China where they flout international law. He will also know from his position and his widespread experience, to which I pay tribute, that beyond Five Eyes, the European Union and others, there is a whole range of different opinions on how to engage and deal with China and a range of approaches that China takes—from inducements to intimidation—to cajole, sway and, frankly, coerce countries to bend to its will.

The approach that we are taking is trying to maximise the number of countries around the world—not the usual suspects that China will dismiss as trying to weaken it or to keep it down—to make the most powerful statement and, ultimately, to moderate the actions of China. Unless we can build up that bigger caucus of opinion—my hon. Friend mentioned Africa and South America, and we are working with all of those partners—we will be less effective when it comes to facing down what is clearly egregious behaviour in relation to Hong Kong and some of the other matters that he referred to.

[Mr Speaker]

I call Stewart Malcolm McDonald, who has two minutes. I inform the House that I am expecting to run this statement till about 12.45 pm.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald (Glasgow South) (SNP)]

I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement and, like others, I welcome much of what was in it. SNP Members of course stand in full solidarity with those in Hong Kong, and indeed those in Taiwan, who see this as a glimpse of what Beijing might have up its sleeve for them in the future. In fact, anyone who has the heel of state oppression on them right now—let us be honest, that is increasing by the day—deserves our support.

I can accept that this is tricky: it is not a black-and-white situation, given the nature of the actors involved. I think that what the Government are doing on BNOs is right, but is there not a danger that allowing so many people to leave is actually exactly what Beijing wants? While I think it is the right thing to do to allow people to come here and, as the Foreign Secretary mentioned in his statement, to provide them with a path to citizenship, when West Berliners were threatened with oppression, we did not just offer them all visas to leave; we actually stood up for them and offered to defend them. Beyond the statement on BNOs, which is I think right, what else are the Government planning to do in future to support those who are not BNOs and who will be left behind in Hong Kong to deal with the effects of this new law?

I would also like to ask the Foreign Secretary—the Chair of the Select Committee took the question out of my mouth—to expand on how he is teasing together a greater international coalition, because that will be tricky if he is going to bring in the middle east, Africa and others, given China’s enormous global economic footprint through such things as the belt and road initiative and the China strategy. Can I ask him when he expects to see the text of the law? Is there anything in the joint agreement that allows the UK Government to see that sooner rather than later? At what point does he envisage having to take further steps? No one is calling for sanctions just yet, but surely work must be going on to put together something that constitutes a price for Beijing’s heavy hand. Can he confirm whether the law that the authorities in Beijing want to impose has directly led to a reversal on the Huawei decision?