(4 days, 1 hour ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI hope to help the hon. Gentleman with the points I am about to make.
What I would say to begin with is that we have talked throughout this Committee about using an opt-in model. There is this idea that everyone will be doing this, but we have rightly set out requirements for specialised training and so on. There will clearly be individual doctors in the NHS, and so on, who decide that they want to provide these services, and specialisms and appropriate regulation will accordingly be developed as part of that.
The other thing I would highlight is that the current drafting explicitly requires a range of provision. The second doctor must be independent. Indeed, clause 8(6)(d) requires that they must not be
“a partner or colleague in the same practice or clinical team as the coordinating doctor”,
so although some are suggesting, perhaps in a positive sense, that there should be one, entirely separate organisation that does all this, that would not meet those requirements. There are those who are trying to instil a fear of one large organisation being set up to take someone from start to finish, but that is not possible under the Bill as drafted.
I am reflecting on the earlier intervention on me by the hon. Member for Stroud about how the only payment under assisted dying would be made at the very end, so therefore there would no possibility of a doctor making an assessment at an earlier stage in the process being influenced. Now the hon. Member for Sunderland Central is saying—this is obviously implied by the drafting—that the different bits of the approval process would need to be delivered separately. Whether that involved a payment from the NHS or a private provider, the doctor making those assessments will clearly be paid at different stages in the process.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that this points to the fundamental problem we have in this Committee, which is that we do not have a proposed model that we can properly scrutinise? All of us are just talking about potential suppositions about how things might work. We are effectively talking about a range of straw men.
No, I do not agree with the hon. Member, and I will tell her why. The reality is that the shape of the health provider landscape is different in different parts of the country. For example, in Wolverhampton, there has been a significant amount of vertical integration, such that in many cases GP services are part of the NHS provider trust. Therefore, those amendments that would prohibit any public body from participating would explicitly prohibit GPs in Wolverhampton from that provision. Elsewhere, some hospices—a small number—are provided directly by the NHS. Given the history of the hospice sector in the UK, there is clearly a strong voluntary and charitable element of that provision, which is entirely right, but that varies in different parts of the country.
To return to the point made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, there are some hospices and end-of-life providers who have made it known that, if this law passes, they may wish to explore whether they will provide such services. Equally, others will not. This goes back to the conscience debate that we had last week. There will be no obligation, so a hospice in one part of the country may well say, “Yes, we wish to provide this service as an option to our patients,” whereas a hospice in another part of the country might say, “We do not.” We need to get past this metropolitan mindset, whereby ll the providers are within easy travelling distance from each other.
The hon. Gentleman is providing a masterclass in scaremongering. I know he needs Labour votes to switch before Third Reading, but this service must be explicitly commissioned by the Secretary of State, and it is inconceivable that they would commission that in the way that the hon. Gentleman describes. The co-ordinating doctor is of course one person, and they would be involved in the first assessment and the provision of assistance. Whether that is a doctor employed by the NHS or somebody else, it can only be one individual, but there are the other safeguards we have talked about, such as the panel, which the hon. Gentleman has spoken against. It is absolutely appropriate that the Secretary of State has the powers and the duty to commission the service, and that they will do so from range of providers, reflecting the differences.
On the other point that some hon. Members have made about regulation, I remind the Committee that any provider will be regulated not only under this Act, but by the Care Quality Commission, in entirely uniform manner. I am therefore confused by the points made by opponents of the Bill. Some have said there should be no provision of this by the NHS or any public body, some say there should be no provision by charities—including, presumably, local hospices, should they make that decision—while others say there should be no provision by local GP practices to provide continuity of care.
Perhaps those different points reflect different ideologies within the Committee that are deeper than this issue, but they perhaps also reflect the fact that opponents of the Bill simply do not want this service to be provided at all.
No, I am going to finish this point.
The hon. Member for East Wiltshire did a good job of reading a Bevan quotation before—although I do not advise him to seek Labour party selection with such gravitas in his voice. However, I think he is the heir not to Bevan, but to Bernard Braine, the Member for South East Essex, who said in the 1967 debate on the David Steel abortion Bill:
“The idea has been spread around that it will be available on the National Health Service.”
In reference to the waiting lists, Braine went on to ask:
“Are our consultant gynaecologists going to make that list longer by making beds available to those who want abortions?”—[Official Report, 13 July 1967; Vol. 750, c. 1382.]
That is the tradition of objection that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire is in. Just because he does not wish to have the option for himself, he does not believe that there should be free-at-the-point-of-use provision on the NHS for anyone else.
I will take Bevan back to this side of the Committee Room. He said:
“The essence of a satisfactory health service is that the rich and the poor are treated alike, that poverty is not a disability and that wealth is not advantaged”.
At the moment, at the end of life, wealth clearly is advantaged. Those who are wealthy and are able to go to Switzerland do have choice at the end of life. Dignity and independence and autonomy should not be based on ability to pay. That is why we need to pass this Bill; that is why the powers to commission in new clause 36 are entirely appropriate and necessary; that is why I support it.
(1 week, 4 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesTo me, amendment 430, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, strikes the right balance. Under clause 30 the Secretary of State “may” make provision for codes of practice on these matters if that is required; I am uncomfortable with saying that the Secretary of State “must” do so, when it is likely that it will be more appropriate for the GMC or some other body to make those regulations. We get into a difficult precedent if the Secretary of State must specify the reaction in certain medical circumstances but we routinely leave that to medical regulation and practice more widely. I think a “may” power, as set out in amendment 430, would allow that backstop provision, but would not get into the issue of “must”. It is also likely to be more respectful of the conversations as outlined in clause 9.
I am listening to what the hon. Gentleman is saying, and a lot of what he is talking about in terms of giving doctors discretion makes a lot of sense in a routine medical intervention, but this is not a routine medical intervention. This is a very serious point, and the doctor’s judgment in this case could well fall either side of what is permissible by the law. That is why it is so important that it is really clear. Whether we decide in Committee that it must be on the face of the Bill, or whether we want, as per the hon. Member for Ipswich’s amendment 532, to leave it to the Secretary of State, it must be clear and specific.
I think the Bill is very clear on the legal parameters. A doctor may not act, in terms of administering the substance, in a way to hasten death. Within that, we are back into the realms of normal medical practice, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud set out. I am sure that there will be legal guidance, whether that be from the GMC or elsewhere, if and when the Bill were to pass. The Secretary of State would have the powers anyway under clause 30, but for the avoidance of doubt, amendment 430 strikes the right balance in giving backstop permissions to the Secretary of State to clarify anything if needed.
I disagree. As clause 9 makes clear, the doctor will have had a conversation with the patient about their wishes in advance, in exactly the same way as a surgeon would have a conversation with a patient in advance of high-risk surgery—
I am not going to take any further interventions; I am going to answer this point and make some progress.
The surgeon would say, “If this procedure fails, would you wish me to attempt resuscitation? Would you wish to be put on a support system?” The hon. Gentleman misunderstands current practice on consultation with patients, in advance of procedures, about their wishes, which is where there is significant established evidence.
(3 weeks, 4 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI rise to speak against the amendment; there are significant issues with it both in practice and in principle. In terms of practice, I draw Members’ attention to the fact that the amendment does not mention a psychosocial assessment; it mentions mandating “a psychosocial intervention”. As defined by the World Health Organisation, a psychosocial intervention can be as brief as five minutes. I know that it is a brief intervention: I used to manage services delivering psychosocial interventions. Nowhere in the amendment is the type of psychosocial intervention or its purpose specified. If Members hope that the amendment will lead to a psychosocial assessment—
For clarity, if the amendment specified a psychosocial assessment, would the hon. Gentleman be minded to support it?
The holistic assessment is already set out elsewhere in the Bill, so the amendment is not required. Amendment 275, which we made to clause 4, requires “all appropriate” psychological support to have been discussed with an individual in advance of the first declaration. I clearly supported that amendment, and I am very grateful that the Committee did.
From a practical point of view, amendment 271 talks about six months from the point of diagnosis, but if I had prostate cancer, I might have had prostate cancer for absolutely years—so is it six months from the point of being diagnosed with prostate cancer or six months from the point of being told that that is terminal? There are a huge range of practical issues with the amendment as currently written, but there are also issues regarding the principle as well.
Would the hon. Gentleman not accept that a terminal illness in itself is a risk factor for an increased risk of suicide, and also that that risk is increased in the first six months following the diagnosis? That is the thinking behind the amendment.
I accept that that is a risk factor, but it is by no means determinative. Therefore, that risk factor has to be considered in the round with other risk factors such as levels of family and social support. As set out, the amendment does not distinguish between someone receiving a terminal diagnosis by themselves without any support network, and someone who expects to receive a terminal diagnosis at the end of a very long illness. As a point of principle I do not accept that we should mandate psychosocial interventions or that people must receive a level of healthcare in order for them to access other options related to their care—let alone the practicalities, which I have laid out, about when the provision would apply in relation to diagnosis and the fact that it is an intervention, which is in no way an assessment or any such thing.
(2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Professor Whitty: You are absolutely right: it is a completely normal part of medical and wider nursing, and other practice, but particularly medical practice, to consider issues of consent and capacity. It can be that someone says they do not want treatment that is clearly going to be lifesaving. A very well-known example is that of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who choose not to have blood products. If they are bleeding heavily, that is an issue that could lead to the end of their life. Provided they understand that and they have capacity, that has to be respected.
The alternative way—the other thing that doctors have to do—is to give people advice before they have major operations, chemotherapy or other drugs that may in themselves lead to the end of their life, but which also may lead to a benefit. Explaining to people the risks and benefits, including the fact that they may lose their life as a result of the next stage—if someone is at high anaesthetic risk, that is not a trivial risk sometimes with operations—is a very standard part of medical practice that you do from the point that you qualify. Obviously, as people get more senior, they tend to be more experienced in it—and, as with most things, if you get more experience, you generally get better at it.
Q
Professor Whitty: If I am honest, I think it would be extremely difficult. If I may, I will explain why, because it is a really important question. Let us take cancer. For the great majority of people with the majority of cancers that are diagnosed tomorrow, the doctor who is seeing them will say, in all confidence, “You have cancer and I expect you to be alive not just next Christmas, but for many years to come.” The fact that they have cancer is not in itself a demonstration that they are going to die. In fact, the majority will not. Almost 80% of people with breast cancer diagnosed tomorrow will still be alive 10 years later, for example.
Equally, there are people who may not have a single disease that is going to lead to the path to death, but they have multiple diseases interacting, so they are highly frail; it is therefore not the one disease that is the cause, but the constellation that is clearly leading them on a path inexorably to a death at some point in the foreseeable future. Exact timings are tricky—we might want to come back to that. I therefore think it is quite difficult to specify that certain diseases are going to cause death and others are not, because in both directions that could be misleading.