(2 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMy hon. Friend is correct, but that would be a civil action for negligence, for which remedies would be available. We treat private land separately, but I think the was saying something rather different, about where private land becomes public land. When the index offence takes place, it relates to a motor vehicle on public land; we are not dealing with particularly difficult definitional issues. I undertake to take that point away; I had not understood it from the motion and the explanation of the hon. Member for Swansea East, so it might require some further thought. I hope conversations are happening in the Department for Transport, but I will ensure that that point is included in the Department’s thinking.
I point out, in the interest of completeness, that there is a broad definition of land that is defined as “private”. Some complications may exist around the classifications of private land, such as that used for military, commercial or other official purposes or land that is exempt from legal proceedings for offences committed there. There is a legal framework in place. Accidents on private land are covered by civil law and compensation—I talked about negligence in relation to a quad bike. In extreme cases such as gross negligence manslaughter or breaches of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the criminal law may be engaged too. With all that in mind, I urge hon. Members to withdraw the motion.
I hear what the Minister says, and I will withdraw the motion. It was a probing amendment in an attempt to give consideration to this issue, which affects so many people—our constituents—day in, day out; I gave the figures. As I said, I recuse myself from giving examples, because they are dreadfully distressing for people and I do not want to distress Members any more than I need to. I recused myself from giving examples, of which there are so many, but I hope the Minister hears the spirit of what I tried to say. It is not about people wanting vengeance; it is about getting an element of justice. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to these matters, because at some point they will come back.
I acknowledge and accept that this is not a transport Committee, but my proposals are within the scope of the Bill, so the Government have the power to pursue them if they wish. I ask the Ministers to take them away and think about them. I will be in touch with the Department for Transport, although, as I mentioned earlier, Departments are often packed out with work. None the less, this issue is of such import—it impacts on the lives of our constituents day in, day out—and we and the Government must consider it very carefully as early as practically possible. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 19
Use of another person’s dwelling place for criminal purposes: cuckooing
“(1) A person ‘P’ commits an offence if—
(a) P makes regular use of or takes up residence in a residential building lawfully occupied by another person ‘R’,
(b) P uses the residential building as a base for criminal activities including but not limited to—
(i) dealing, storing or taking unlawfully held controlled drugs,
(ii) facilitating sex work,
(iii) taking up residence without a lawful agreement with R in circumstances where R is under duress or otherwise being coerced or controlled, or
(iv) financially abusing R.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) ‘building’ includes any structure or part of a structure (including a temporary or moveable structure), and
(b) a building is ‘residential’ if it is designed or adapted, before the time of entry, for use as a place to live.
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause would make cuckooing an offence. Cuckooing is where the home of a vulnerable person is taken over by a criminal in order to use it to deal, store or take drugs, facilitate sex work, as a place for them to live, or to financially abuse the occupier.
Brought up, and read the First time.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank my hon. Friend for his sensible question; I will write to him. One of the points I have clarified is that prison officers understand the use of reasonable force, because they have to use it at other times, and it is well understood by the police. “Reasonable force” has a meaning in context—it is not just a judgment call to be made on the day. However, that is a good point, and it deserves a response.
Returning to my remarks, in exercising their discretion a judge may decide not to order an individual to attend if they may cause significant disruption in court or further distress to victims, or if there is a significant mental health complaint that may prevent their attendance. Courts will also be required to consult with young offending teams before any decision is made on a child offender. I recognise that the provisions may not guarantee that every offender will end up attending their sentencing hearing.
I am unsure whether the Minister has considered the issue in relation to the victims charter. The victim’s family could be in court. Is there the potential, as part of the victims charter, to consult the family—
Yes—to consult the victim or the victim’s family on that issue? The victim or their family could be sat there, and the person could be brought in and be challenging, difficult and so on. As part of victims’ rights, would the Minister consider giving consideration to the consultation of the victim or their family in those situations?
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is generally accepted—this is consistent with the thrust of what we have heard—that it is an affront to the victim’s family when the defendant, who is a ward of the court for the purposes of the criminal proceedings, elects not to attend their sentencing. It has always been presented in one way, but the hon. Gentleman is correct: there is an argument to be made, particularly if the defendant is difficult, disruptive or perhaps politically motivated—[Interruption.] I have been reminded that it is for judges to decide, but the point that the hon. Gentleman makes is that perhaps the victim’s family should be part of that decision-making exercise.
Yes, I think it is important that families be consulted throughout the process and beyond it. The judge has discretion, but the victim should have the right to be consulted. What the judge does is a completely different matter, but the families or the victim should be consulted if appropriate.
I will come back to that. For the purposes of this afternoon’s Public Bill Committee, the issue is not whether the courts have an adequate understanding of grooming.
I will give my experience. I was appointed as counsel to the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. I worked on that inquiry from 2016 to 2017, and it is on my Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I was also instructed by a Telford victim in a public law challenge—not a criminal law challenge in the High Court—against the local authority in relation to its breaches of various duties to her. So I have direct familiarity with cases of this nature.
There are many, many issues with this kind of offence. I think that the courts understand child sexual exploitation and grooming gangs and that it is left deliberately loose in law so that a range of behaviours can be encompassed. The one that the public are most familiar with is sexual exploitation, but there are other forms of grooming that go much wider and where there is no sexual element. It is right that that flexibility exists so that somebody is not outside the possibility of being a victim of a grooming offence.
This is an incredibly complex, difficult, challenging and sensitive subject. A question arises, though, and I will put it to the Minister. There are many definitions of grooming. There are international definitions —legal definitions in other countries—of what grooming is. So while I accept the point the Minister makes about trying to keep it flexible, we have the capacity to easily —if not easily, then as clearly as we can—determine what exploitation or grooming actually is. The work has been done and we have to build upon it. Does the Minister not agree that it is not beyond the wit of this Parliament to try to determine or define what we consider grooming to be? I say that with all of the sensitivity that I can bring.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and I promise that I will give some thought to that, but I just wanted to come back to the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. This is not about creating a new offence. The treatment that the victim the hon. Lady described was subjected to is already covered by criminal law. This amendment is simply about an aggravating element going into statute in relation to grooming.
As the hon. Lady is well aware, the difference is that we are confining our amendment to the grooming of children for sexual purposes. That is our amendment. We have focused our amendment on that because child sexual exploitation by grooming gangs has been so problematic and so serious.
I will go back to some of the examples that the hon. Lady gave, although it is very difficult to respond to an individual’s case in the context of a Public Bill Committee, because I do not know all the details. I think that the hon. Lady said that the person was 27 and had been groomed since the age of 13. The vast part of what she suffered in the early days would be captured by this provision, because she was a child. I appreciate what the hon. Lady said about the continuing grooming—I think she said that that person is still being groomed today.
I will keep my remarks concise. Let us look at adult sexual exploitation—I accept, by the way, the breadth of the problem without reservation. First, the adult, simply by virtue of being an adult, has more ability to vocalise their experience than a child does. Secondly, there are more forms of exploitation—for example, forced labour or human trafficking, both of which overlapped with what the hon. Lady described. The case of children who are victims of grooming gangs is specific, and it is also a direct thing that we dealt with. The clause is directed just at children.
I hear the point that the Minister makes about the ability to vocalise. I gently challenge her on that one, however, because people who have been abused and exploited for many years, from childhood through, also find it incredibly difficult to vocalise. There is no question about that whatever. That is not to dismiss anything she says, but it is to recognise that vocalisation does not start at 18, 20 or 21; it might never, ever appear, given the nature of the exploitation and abuse that has happened to that particular person. I ask her just to think on that particular issue, not necessarily to respond now, but to put it into the mix.
I have to take this back to what it is. It is not about creating an offence. It is not about saying, “If you sexually exploit a child, you’ve committed a criminal offence, but if you sexually exploit an adult woman, you haven’t.” That is not what this is about, and I do not want to get lost in that. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described a series of offences that, if they achieved convictions, would be category A offences. They are unbelievably serious offences. We are not denying that.
The clause, however, is directed at grooming gangs as they relate to children. The purpose of the clause is to capture the wider membership of the grooming gangs so that even if people did not directly groom the victim, they are on the hook for the same aggravation. It is to bring in the entirety of the grooming gang. As I said, that is usually defined by the CPS in terms of how it will choose to prosecute a case. That can be very wide indeed. It can bring hundreds to court, or certainly tens, but that is a decision for the CPS. The clause potentially brings all gang members within the scope of the aggravation, simply because they have been identified as part of the gang, if one of those victims has been groomed. That is the purpose of the clause.