Egypt

Debate between Kwasi Kwarteng and Iain McKenzie

Wednesday 29th January 2014 Westminster Hall

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The two broad groups that I have characterised—I will talk about secular parties later—are the two most powerful groups, and of course within those groups there is a wide range of views and dispositions. There are extremist elements in the Muslim Brotherhood. There are also some quite extreme repressive elements in the army. My hon. Friend is right again to say that the majority of people are trapped in the middle of those two contending and powerful forces, but I must stress that the fundamental problem with Egypt at the moment, as I see it, is that one side is simply unwilling to reach any kind of accommodation with the other.

Let us look at the elections that have taken place in the past three or four years. The one fact that has come out starkly and undeniably is the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood. I can say, as a member of the delegation that has travelled to Egypt over three or four years, that each time we asked, “How popular is the Muslim Brotherhood?” its support was underestimated; it was never overestimated. People always said 15% to 20%, but then in the elections it always performed much better than anyone had anticipated. Equally surprising was the strength of the Salafis, who got one quarter of the parliamentary seats. Political Islam in Egypt is a powerful force. What I think should draw the attention of this House and Members of Parliament is the fact that the army’s attempt to sideline political Islam is fraught with danger. That is potentially one of the fundamental causes of stress and conflict in the years ahead.

The big question is how the army will deal with acts of terror in the future. Clearly, in the past two weeks we have seen an intolerable level of violence in Cairo. We have also seen sporadic terrorist bombings. Added to that is military repression. We are entering on a particularly vicious cycle, and everyone in the west—politicians, diplomats and everyone else in the outside world—will have to take a view on that. It is obvious to me and to members of our delegation that the army is determined to impose itself as the central player in Egyptian politics. Anyone who doubts that need only look at the referendum that took place two weeks ago.

[Mr Iain McKenzie (Inverclyde) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. He says that the military are imposing themselves as the dominant power in Egyptian politics. Does he not agree that they are putting themselves forward as the only power in Egypt’s politics? Now it looks very much as though the general who led the coup will put himself forward for the presidency, putting the country back into a situation in which the military are in charge.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Yes, that is a broad characterisation of where we are. However, we have to accept that the army is supported by a large number of people. That is why I am always hesitant to talk about coups and all that sort of thing. There is popular support for the army, and it is unrealistic and perhaps rather naive of us to think otherwise. It is not a military junta that has suddenly emerged out of nowhere and is seeking to dominate the country. There is a groundswell of support for the army. How big that is and whether it constitutes a majority, no one knows.

However, this is a much more nuanced situation than one in which a bunch of generals have decided to claim power for themselves. If we look at the economic conditions in which Egypt has suffered for the past three or four years—the total collapse of tourism, which constituted between 15% and 25%, depending on different estimates, of the economy—we see that there is a massive and pressing need for stability, and it was in that cauldron that that military regime, if we want to call it that, emerged. That has happened across modern history. Across the world, we have seen situations in which there is a cry for stability and then someone emerges, often from a military background, to try to impose order. That is a very similar situation to the one that we find in Egypt.

The leading indication, the most obvious example, of the army’s determination was the result of the referendum: 98.1% of people voted for the constitution. Those of us who live in democratic countries such as Britain will know that there is not a single issue on which 98% of people would vote one way. I even suggested to one of my researchers that if there was a referendum on what day of the week it was—on a point of fact—we would not see 98% of people agreeing to that. We might see 90%, but there would still be dissent on what is a very palpable and obvious question, so the 98.1% does arouse suspicions about the transparency, openness and fairness of the process. If we look for other examples in the Arab world of 98% mandates—actually, I was told that Saddam Hussein used to get 100% in his elections—we find that there are not that many other examples of people getting 98%.

[Mr McKenzie]

The hon. Gentleman is very kind to give way again. On those statistics, does he agree that that 98% was based on a 38% turnout?

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

Absolutely, but 38% is not a disgracefully low turnout. That is quite a large turnout. In our local elections, we would be quite happy to get 38%. That does not invalidate them as exercises in local democracy, so I do not think that the turnout was particularly depressing. It was a reasonable turnout, but the 98% of the 38% does raise legitimate questions.