Charter for Budget Responsibility

Kit Malthouse Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2023 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I have seen many displays of nerve in this Chamber over the last seven years, but I congratulate the Labour Front-Bench shadow, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), on his sheer chutzpah this evening. He was part of a Government who exploded the deficit under Gordon Brown, having been bequeathed a golden financial legacy, and then drove us off an economic cliff with a crash the like of which this country had not seen since the second world war. I draw attention to my entry in the register, because I still own the business that almost went to the wall during that crash, and I determined then, as I do now, to make sure that the right hon. Gentleman and his party never have stewardship of the economy of this country for fear of what they may repeat.

Before the Minister panics, I will say that I am here this evening to support the motion and the charter. While others have mentioned the renewal and the evolution of the charter over the years, it is a useful instrument that George Osborne introduced, albeit that I think he probably did so in contemplation of uncertain victory in 2015, wanting to jam an otherwise profligate and untrustworthy Labour party into a little more discipline for the future. But it is useful in giving guidelines to the wider world, and indeed the markets, about the Government’s intentions in the short and medium term. However, I have some questions for the Minister on this year’s mandate.

The first is about the independence and role of the OBR. As the Minister knows, there has been a lot of concern in the media and elsewhere about the role the OBR has played in the financial turbulence over the last few years, and in particular I want to talk about independence, accountability and its role in the formation of fiscal policy.

On independence, I must express to the Minister, an old friend and constituency neighbour, some concern about the evolution of the role of the OBR. The charter points out at paragraph 3.13:

“The government has adopted the OBR’s fiscal and economic forecasts as the official forecasts for the Budget Report.”

That means the Treasury is not now making its own forecasts; it is relying entirely on the OBR’s forecasts. In my view, that creates an element of conflict. I would hope that the Treasury would produce its own forecast driven by what the Chancellor wants to do, and the OBR would produce a parallel forecast, and then differences between the two could be highlighted and justified or argued about. Then those of us who rely on forecasts for policy making or investment decisions could decide where the fan chart of growth or of debt was likely to go. I am sure the Minister has the charter in front of him. It says in this paragraph that the Treasury still retains the analytical capability to produce those forecasts and reserves the right to disagree with the OBR, but in truth, because it is not producing a forecast, it does not and cannot.

At paragraph 4.11 the charter states that

“the OBR will provide independent scrutiny and certification of the government’s policy costings.”

Certification is an interesting word in this context, because it means that the OBR is basically approving the Government’s policy costings, which implies an element of negotiation and justification rather than assessment and opinion.

Paragraphs 4.20 and 4.21 on page 16 then say that there will basically be an iterative process between the OBR and the Treasury—and presumably the Chancellor—over the formation of the forecasts. That implies an element of negotiation—that the Chancellor will go to the OBR and say, “This is what we’re planning to do. What do you think?” and the OBR will say, “Well, we’re not sure this is going to produce quite the number you need.” So policy is formed in an iterative process.

I might have expected the Chancellor to ask his analysts in the Treasury what the impact of certain policies might be on forecasts. However, doing that directly with the OBR, which is supposedly independent, draws it into the policy formation process in a way that may not be helpful to its sense of independence or, indeed, to our sense of its assessment of the Treasury rules. Effectively, that imbues the OBR with an authority that should, in theory, bring with it an element of accountability.

Forecasts that should and could be produced by the Treasury would be produced under the name of the Chancellor, so if they are proven to be wildly wrong, there is direct accountability in this House through him or—hopefully in time—her. However, that is less the case with the OBR. It will appear periodically in front of the Treasury Committee, which is ably chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin), who is here this evening and who has spoken. Other than that, however, the House will have no opportunity to properly scrutinise, test and understand why the OBR thinks the way it does.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

If I might paraphrase, Treasury officials have Ministers by the short and curlies, which is perhaps not the best position for them to be in.

[Kit Malthouse]

My hon. Friend puts it in a pithy way, as he often does. It is not so much that there is some kind of trap or problem here; it is that a situation has evolved—probably more by accident than by design—whereby the OBR has been drawn into the machinery of the Treasury and therefore acquired an authority and an effective veto, in a way that is perhaps not helpful.

The reason that is a problem is that economics is an inexact science—if we put three economists in a room, we will have five opinions. Economics is not delineated in the way chemistry is; it is as much an art as it is a science, and much of it is actually psychology. So if the OBR is to be so involved in policy making, it is important that we understand the economic basis of its assessments. For example, do the people who produce these now Treasury —but actually OBR—forecasts appreciate, understand and believe in the Laffer curve? Do they think that if we reduce taxation, income will rise? That sits at the heart of the argument the Conservative party has had over the last few months about corporation tax. If we cut it, will we collect more money? Seemingly, the forecasts say not. Those are the kinds of judgment that anybody forming economic and fiscal policy must make.

There are also more fundamental issues—about, say, the operation of capital. If the head of the OBR is going to be so involved in policy formation—if there is to be a negotiation between the Chancellor and the OBR on an iterative basis—will that person be operating on the same ideological basis in terms of capital versus labour? Are they a Keynesian? Are they a monetarist? What is the impact of those kinds of belief system? Drawing the OBR into the Treasury machine therefore creates some difficulty for an organisation that, as I know the Minister will agree, has value because of its independence and its alternative view of what the Treasury is trying to do.

The second issue I want to raise is about the mandate. The previous charter contained a point about balancing the budget within three years; that is omitted from this charter. As the Minister said, things have changed, so that has been dropped. When we are effectively chasing a ratio as measured against GDP, we are chasing a moving number, which may make our lives more difficult. For example, if we are chasing a debt-to-GDP ratio, and our GDP is falling, we have to work ever harder to hit our target. The things we have to do to hit that target may also, paradoxically, reduce GDP even further, so we end up chasing ourselves down a spiral against a moving target. That is why, in last year’s charter, which has changed, the idea of balancing the budget within three years, and ensuring that our expenditure did not exceed our income, was quite helpful; it meant that there were two absolute numbers over which we had some control.

Fortunately, in its February forecast, the Bank of England says that if there is a recession, it will be shallower than we thought, which is good. That is not least because last year’s Budget represented a mild fiscal loosening in its initial stages, although not so much later on, with the energy price cap and all the rest of it. That may have helped with aggregate demand, making the recession less severe. However, if GDP does fall, the ratio that the Treasury is chasing will worsen, unless there are significant spending cuts or yet more tax rises, both of which may exacerbate the fall in GDP. That is why I am nervous about the mandate. The objective of reducing debt against GDP is absolutely right, but I ask the Minister to guard against the issue that I have raised.

Finally, I want to say something about the longer term. As politicians, we often focus naturally on a three to five-year horizon. We do that because, guess what, there are elections in a three to five-year horizon, and it is a horizon that is understandable and controllable. However, as the Minister will know, there are significant long-term issues for this country, which are driven by demographics and the nature of our economy. He will know that there are alarming reports that look way into the future, and if he has looked at the significant work done by my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) before he was a Minister, he will know what I am talking about.

To take an example, the Government Actuary’s quinquennial review of the national insurance fund basically says that it will run out of money in about 20 years’ time. Indeed, the rise in the pension age that we have just put through may mean that that period will be shorter, unless there is significant Government intervention in the form of more money going into the fund, which will basically mean tax rises. In addition, the OBR’s financial stability report from last year—it now does a long-term financial stability report—forecasts that, on the current trajectory, although our debts will start to fall in the short term, by the time we get to the middle of the century, they will be well above 200% of GDP and heading towards 270%, and we will be running at a deficit of 10% of GDP.

These long-term trends are driven fundamentally by demographic issues. As a country, we are growing older. We have fewer workers per pensioner, and we are not replacing ourselves from a birth rate point of view, and that will cause an enormous problem. Other countries are in a worse situation. In Japan, on current rates, the population will have halved by the end of this century, which will be economically catastrophic for the country. Unless we start chasing our tail—raising taxes to pay more in welfare and Government spending—we will be in big trouble, which may exacerbate our GDP issues. When we put together the whole cocktail of forecasts—short, medium and long term—they scream out at us to think about the model we are operating.

The wealth of this country was built on three great leaps forward in growth. We had the industrial revolution. That was followed at the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th century by mass industrialisation, and since the ’70s we have had the IT revolution. In some of those periods, particularly the last, growth was quite turbulent, but throughout them, there was a very high average level of growth; 3%, 4%, 5% or 6% a year was not uncommon. We stand on the verge of another technological revolution—a great leap forward with automation, artificial intelligence, the way we do things and the green economy. We are on an ellipse of scientific discovery. Life sciences are a particular passion of mine, because there are a number of companies on the verge of curing cancer.

If we are to capture this upswing in human ingenuity, we have to think about the model of our economy and the operation of capital within it, and whether we have the right fiscal measures to encourage the kind of buccaneering capitalism that took advantage of those three previous upswings. We did less of that in the third period, the IT revolution. We went through a period of what I suppose we could call centre left or socialist Governments, and it was not de rigueur until the ’80s to be an entrepreneur. We sat on the operation of capital and, as a result, we missed the swing. That is why we do not have an Apple, a Microsoft, a Facebook or a Google. We have some companies coming, and we had some nascent companies. Some Members will be old enough to remember Acorn. For a while it was going to be a great world-beating company, but it fell by the wayside.

The Minister thinks about these issues carefully, and is conscious of the need to energise capital in a way that will build the businesses, products and jobs of the future. I urge those on the Treasury Front Bench to reflect on the longer-term issues that I have raised, and to recognise the kind of straitjacket that we are putting ourselves in. That, and the debts we incurred during covid, may well mean that we miss the next upswing in the world economy, unless we are willing to take risks with the mandate. There has been much debate in this House, and certainly in the media, about going for growth, but if we miss this upswing in growth, we really will miss a huge opportunity for the next generation of our fellow countrymen.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

It is a privilege to close this debate on behalf of the Government. I thank those who contributed to the debate, including the distinguished Chair of the Select Committee, who highlighted some of the issues and presumptions of Government policy. I cannot comment on what will happen with fuel duty, as that will be the Chancellor’s decision. I thank the right hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) for his contribution, in which he seemed to suggest more targets and a poverty of ambition on behalf of the Government, and I can assure him that that is not the case.

I would like to respond to my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), who made a number of observations about the independence of the OBR; its certification and validation role; and the iterative process and whether that compromised the apparent independence of the Treasury. He described economics as not just an art or a science but even psychology. I can confirm that the OBR’s remit is unchanged: it is the Government’s official forecaster. But—as he notes and I am pleased to confirm—the Treasury maintains considerable analytical capability to support the policy advice to Ministers, and it does a very good job of it too. There is a clear separation between the OBR and policymaking, but it is a matter of securing credibility for those policies, and I think he would agree with me that that is a very important point.

[Kit Malthouse]

I guess the issue is: whose forecasts are they? If the OBR produces forecasts and Treasury officials say, “Well, Chancellor, we have looked over the forecasts and we think they are right,” that is qualitatively different, in the public’s mind, to the Treasury producing a forecast and the OBR saying to the public, “Well, we have looked over them and we think they are right.” While it does say that the Treasury reserves the right to disagree with the OBR, the nature of the iterative process presumably means that will never happen, because they agree before anything is published.

[John Glen]

What we can agree is that the budget responsibility committee has discretion over all judgments underpinning its forecasts. Of course, there is obviously a range of views—my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) is always clear in his disagreements with what the OBR may or may not forecast—but what we are saying is that there is validity in and a need for an official forecast, and that is what we have.

With respect to the shadow Chief Secretary, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), before he gets a little too complacent he should be wary of the £90 billion of uncosted net spending commitments that his party has made since the turn of the year. I think the OBR would be very interested in what we would find there.

The charter represents our bedrock to prosperity. It will get debt falling but invest in the future. It will rebuild our fiscal buffers, bolster our economic fundamentals and deliver for the whole country. A vote for this charter is a vote for sustainable public finances, and that is why I commend the motion to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Charter for Budget Responsibility: Autumn 2022 update, which was laid before this House on 26 January, be approved.

Business of the House (8 fEBRUARY)

Ordered,

That at the sitting on Wednesday 8 February, notwithstanding the provisions of Standing Order No. 16 (Proceedings under an Act or on European Union documents), the Speaker shall put the Questions necessary to dispose of proceedings on

(1) the Motion in the name of Secretary Suella Braverman relating to Police Grant Report not later than three hours after the commencement of proceedings on that Motion, and

(2) the Motions in the name of Secretary Michael Gove relating to Local Government Finance not later than three hours after the commencement of proceedings on the first such Motion or six hours after the commencement of proceedings relating to Police Grant Report, whichever is the later; proceedings on those Motions may continue, though opposed, after the moment of interruption; and Standing Order No. 41A (Deferred divisions) shall not apply.—(Penny Mordaunt.)