ONLINE SAFETY BILL (Third sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage (re-committed clauses and schedules)
Thursday 15th December 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

It will come as no surprise to Members to hear that we have serious concerns about the system of categorisation and the threshold conditions for platforms and service providers, given our long-standing view that the approach taken is far too inflexible.

In previous sittings, we raised the concern that the Government have not provided enough clarity about what will happen if a service is required to shift from one category to another, and how long that will take. We remain unclear about that, about how shifting categories will work in practice, and about how long Ofcom will have to preside over such changes and decisions.

I have been following this Bill closely for just over a year, and I recognise that the online space is constantly changing and evolving. New technologies are popping up that will make this categorisation process even more difficult. The Government must know that their approach does not capture smaller, high-harm platforms, which we know—we have debated this several times—can be at the root of some of the most dangerous and harmful content out there. Will the Minister clarify whether the Government amendments will allow Ofcom to consider adding such small, high-harm platforms to category 1, given the risk of harm?

More broadly, we are pleased that the Government tabled new clause 7, which will require Ofcom to prepare and update a list of regulated user-to-user services that have 75% of the number of users of a category 1 service, and at least one functionality of a category 1 service, or one required combination of a functionality and another characteristic or factor of a category 1 service. It is absolutely vital that Ofcom, as the regulator, is sufficiently prepared, and that there is monitoring of regulated user-to-user services so that this regime is as flexible as possible and able to cope with the rapid changes in the online space. That is why the Opposition support new clause 7 and have not sought to amend it. Moreover, we also support Government amendments 48 and 49, which are technical amendments to ensure that new clause 7 references user-to-user services and assessments of those services appropriately. I want to press the Minister on how he thinks these categories will work, and on Ofcom’s role in that.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I agree with everything that the hon. Lady said. New clause 7 is important. It was missing from the earlier iterations of the Bill, and it makes sense to have it here, but it raises further concerns about the number of people who are required to use a service before it is classed as category 1. We will come later to our amendment 104 to schedule 11, which is about adding high-risk platforms to the categorisation.

I am still concerned that the numbers are a pretty blunt instrument for categorising something as category 1. The number may end up being particularly high. I think it would be very easy for the number to be wrong—for it to be too high or too low, and probably too high rather than too low.

If Twitter were to disappear, which, given the changing nature of the online world, is not outside the realms of possibility, we could see a significant number of other platforms picking up the slack. A lot of them might have fewer users, but the same level of risk as platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. I am still concerned that choosing a number is a very difficult thing to get right, and I am not totally convinced that the Government’s way of going about this is right.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to move amendment 104, in schedule 11, page 213, line 11, at end insert—

“(1A) Regulations made under sub-paragraph (1) must provide for any regulated user-to-user service which OFCOM assesses as posing a very high risk of harm to be included within Category 1, regardless of the number of users.”

This amendment allows Ofcom to impose Category 1 duties on user-to-user services which pose a very high risk of harm.

I would say this, but I think that this is the most important amendment. The key area that the Government are getting wrong is the way in which platforms, providers or services will be categorised. The threshold is based on the number of users. It is the number of users “and” one of those other things, not the number of users “or” one of those other things; even that would make a significant difference.

The Secretary of State talked about the places that have a significant influence over public discourse. It is perfectly possible to have a significant influence over public discourse with a small number of users, or with a number of users that does not number into the millions. We have seen the spread of conspiracy theories that have originated and been perpetuated on very small platforms—very small, shady places on the internet that none of us has experienced or even heard of. Those are the places that have a massive impact and effect.

We know that one person can have a significant impact on the world and on people’s lives. We have heard about the physical harm that people can be incited to cause by the platforms they access, and the radicalisation and extremism they find themselves subject to. That can cause massive, damaging effects to anybody they choose to take physical action against, and to some of the most marginalised communities and groups in society. We are seeing an increase in the amount of hate crime and the number of people who believe conspiracy theories, and not all of that is because of the spread of those things on Facebook and Twitter. It is because of the breadcrumbing and the spread that there can be on smaller platforms.

The most extreme views do not necessarily tip over into “illegal” or “incitement”; they do not actually say, “Please go out and kill everybody in this particular group.” They say, “This particular group is responsible for all of ills you feel and for every negative thing that is happening in your life”, and people are therefore driven to take extremist, terrorist action. That is a significant issue.

I want to talk about a couple of platforms. Kiwi Farms, which is no longer in existence and has been taken down, was a very small platform that dramatically damaged the lives of trans people in particular. It was a platform where people went to incite hatred and give out the addresses of folk who they knew were members of the trans community. Some of those people had to move to another continent to get away from the physical violence and attacks they faced as a result of the behaviour on that incredibly small platform, which very few people will have heard about.

Kiwi Farms has been taken down because the internet service providers decided that it was too extreme and they could not possibly host it any more. That was eventually recognised and change was made, but the influence that that small place had on lives—the difficulties and harm it caused—is untold. Some of that did tip over into illegality, but some did not.

I also want to talk about the places where there is a significant amount of pornography. I am not going to say that I have a problem with pornography online; the internet will always have pornography on it. It attracts a chunk of people to spend time online, and some of that pornography is on large mainstream sites. Searches for incest, underage girls, or black women being abused all get massive numbers of hits. There is a significant amount of pornography on these sites that is illegal, that pretends to be illegal or that acts against people with protected characteristics. Research has found that a significant proportion—significantly more than a half—of pornography on mainstream sites that involves black women also involves violence. That is completely and totally unacceptable, and has a massive negative impact on society, whereby it reinforces negativity and discrimination against groups that are already struggling with being discriminated against and that do not experience the privilege of a cis white man.

It is really grim that we are requiring a number of users to be specified, when we know the harm that caused by platforms that do not have 10 million or 20 million United Kingdom users. I do not know what the threshold will be, but I know it will be too high to include a lot of platforms that have a massive effect. The amendment is designed specifically to give Ofcom the power to designate as category 1 any service that it thinks has a very high risk of harm; I have not set the bar particularly low. Now that the Minister has increased the levels of transparency that will be required for category 1 platforms, it is even more important that we subject extremist sites and platforms—the radicalising ones, which are perpetuating discrimination—to a higher bar and require them to have the transparency that they need as a category 1 service. This is a place where the Bill could really make a difference and change lives, and I am really concerned that it is massively failing to do so.

The reason I have said that it should be Ofcom’s responsibility to designate category 1 services is on the basis that it has the experts who will be looking at all the risk assessments, dealing with companies on a day-to-day basis, and seeing the harms and transparencies that the rest of us will not be able to see. The reporting mechanisms will be public for only some of the category 1 platforms, and we will not be able to find out the level of information that Ofcom has, so it is right that it should be responsible for designating sites as having a very high risk of harm. That is why I tabled the amendment, which would make a massive difference to people who are the most discriminated against as it is and who are the most at risk of harm from extremism. I urge the Minister to think again.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I rise briefly to support everything the hon. Member for Aberdeen North just said. We have long called for the Bill to take a harm-led approach; indeed, the Government initially agreed with us, as when it was in its first iteration it was called the Online Harms Bill rather than the Online Safety Bill. Addressing harm must be a central focus of the Bill, as we know extremist content is perpetuated on smaller, high-harm platforms; this is something that the Antisemitism Policy Trust and Hope not Hate have long called for with regards to the Bill.

I want to put on the record our huge support for the amendment. Should the hon. Lady be willing to push it to a vote—I recognise that we are small in number—we will absolutely support her.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

Labour is pleased to see the introduction of the new clause, which clarifies the role of Ofcom in delivering guidance to providers about their duties. Specifically, the new clause will require Ofcom to give guidance to providers on the kind of content that Ofcom considers to be harmful to children, or relevant to the user empowerment duty in clause 14. That is a very welcome addition indeed.

Labour remains concerned about exactly how these so-called user empowerment tools will work in practice—we have discussed that at length—and let us face it: we have had little assurance from the Minister on that point. We welcome the new clause, as it clarifies what guidance providers can expect to receive from Ofcom once the Bill is finally enacted. We can all recognise that Ofcom has a colossal task ahead of it—the Minister said so himself—so it is particularly welcome that the guidance will be subject to consultation with those that it deems appropriate. I can hope only that that will include the experts, and the many groups that provided expertise, support and guidance on internet regulation long before the Bill even received its First Reading, a long time ago. There are far too many of those experts and groups to list, but it is fundamental that the experts who often spot online harms before they properly emerge be consulted and included in this process if we are to truly capture the priority harms to children, as the new clause intends.

We also welcome the clarification in subsection (2) that Ofcom will be required to provide “examples of content” that would be considered to be—or not be—harmful. These examples will be key to ensuring that the platforms have nowhere to hide when it comes to deciding what is harmful; there will be no grey area. Ofcom will have the power to show them exact examples of what could be deemed harmful.

We recognise, however, that there is subjectivity to the work that Ofcom will have to do once the Bill passes. On priority content, it is most important that providers are clear about what is and is not acceptable; that is why we welcome the new clause, but we do of course wish that the Government applied the same logic to harm pertaining to adults online.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am also happy to support new clause 1, but I have a couple of questions. It mentions that “replacement guidance” may be provided, which is important because, as we have said a number of times, things will change, and we will end up with a different online experience; that can happen quickly. I am glad that Ofcom has the ability to refresh and update the guidance.

My question is about timelines. There do not seem to be any timelines in the new clause for when the guidance is required to be published. It is key that the guidance be published before companies and organisations have to comply with it. My preference would be for it to be published as early as possible. There may well need to be more work, and updated versions of the guidance may therefore need to be published, but I would rather companies had an idea of the direction of travel, and what they must comply with, as soon as possible, knowing that it might be tweaked. That would be better than waiting until the guidance was absolutely perfect and definitely the final version, but releasing it just before people had to start complying with it. I would like an assurance that Ofcom will make publishing the guidance a priority, so that there is enough time to ensure compliance. We want the Bill to work; it will not work if people do not know what they have to comply with. Assurance on that would be helpful.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

That was some stretch of procedure, Dame Angela, but we got there in the end. This new clause is about child user empowerment duties. I am really pleased that the Government have user empowerment duties in the Bill—they are a good thing—but I am confused as to why they apply only to adult users, and why children do not deserve the same empowerment rights over what they access online.

In writing the new clause, I pretty much copied clause 14, before there were any amendments to it, and added a couple of extra bits: subsections (8) and (9). In subsection (8), I have included:

“A duty to include in a service features which child users may use or apply if they wish to only encounter content by users they have approved.”

That would go a step further than the verification process and allow users to approve only people who are in their class at school, people with whom they are friends, or even certain people in their class at school, and to not have others on that list. I know that young people playing Fortnite—I have mentioned Fortnite a lot because people play it a lot—or Roblox are contacted by users whom they do not know, and there is no ability for young people to switch off some of the features while still being able to contact their friends. Users can either have no contact from anyone, or they can have a free-for-all. That is not the case for all platforms, but a chunk of them do not let users speak only to people on their friends list, or receive messages only from people on the list.

My proposed subsection (8) would ensure that children could have a “white list” of people who they believe are acceptable, and who they want to be contacted by, and could leave others off the list. That would help tackle not just online child exploitation, but the significant online bullying that teachers and children report. Children have spoken of the harms they experience as a result of people bullying them and causing trouble online; the perpetrators are mainly other children. Children would be able to remove such people from the list and so would not receive any content, messages or comments from those who make their lives more negative.

Subsection (9) is related to subsection (8); it would require a service to include

“features which child users may use or apply if they wish to filter out private messages from—

(a) non-verified users, or

(b) adult users, or

(c) any user other than those on a list approved by the child user.”

Adults looking to exploit children will use private messaging on platforms such as Instagram. Instagram has to know how old its users are, so anybody who is signed up to it will have had to provide it with their date of birth. It is completely reasonable for a child to say, “I want to filter out everything from an adult.” When we talk about children online, we are talking about anybody from zero to 18, which is a very wide age range. Some of those people will be working and paying bills, but will not have access to the empowerment features that adults have access to, because they have not yet reached that magical threshold. Some services may decide to give children access to user empowerment tools, but there is no requirement to. The only requirement in the Bill on user empowerment tools is for adults. That is not fair.

Children should have more control over the online environment. We know how many children feel sad as a result of their interactions online, and how many encounter content online that they wish they had never seen and cannot unsee. We should give them more power over that, and more power to say, “No, I don’t want to see that. I don’t want people I don’t know contacting me. I don’t want to get unsolicited messaged. I don’t want somebody messaging me, pretending that they are my friend or that they go to another school, when they are in fact an adult, and I won’t realise until it is far too late.”

The Bill applies to people of all ages. All of us make pretty crappy decisions sometimes. That includes teenagers, but they also make great decisions. If there was a requirement for them to have these tools, they could choose to make their online experience better. I do not think this was an intentional oversight, or that the Government set out to disadvantage children when they wrote the adult user empowerment clauses. I think they thought that it would be really good to have those clauses in the Bill, in order to give users a measure of autonomy over their time and interactions online. However, they have failed to include the same thing for children. It is a gap.

I appreciate that there are child safety duties, and that there is a much higher bar for platforms that have child users, but children are allowed a level of autonomy; look at the UN convention on the rights of the child. We give children choices and flexibilities; we do not force them to do every single thing they do, all day every day. We recognise that children should be empowered to make decisions where they can.

I know the Government will not accept the provision—I am not an idiot. I have never moved a new clause in Committee that has been accepted, and I am pretty sure that it will not happen today. However, if the Government were to say that they would consider, or even look at the possibility of, adding child user empowerment duties to the Bill, the internet would be a more pleasant place for children. They are going to use it anyway; let us try to improve their online experience even more than the Bill does already.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North has outlined the case for the new clause eloquently and powerfully. She may not press it to a Division, if the Minister can give her assurances, but if she did, she would have the wholehearted support of the Opposition.

We see new clause 8 as complementing the child safety duties in the legislation. We fully welcome provisions that provide children with greater power and autonomy in choosing to avoid exposure to certain types of content. We have concerns about how the provisions would work in practice, but that issue has more to do with the Government’s triple-shield protections than the new clause.

The Opposition support new clause 8 because it aims to provide further protections, in addition to the child safety duties, to fully protect children from harmful content and to empower them. It would empower and enable them to filter out private messages from adults or non-verified users. We also welcome the measures in the new clause that require platforms and service providers to design accessible terms of service. That is absolutely vital to best protect children online, which is why we are all here, and what the legislation was designed for.

[Paul Scully]

The aim of the user empowerment duty is to give adults more control over certain categories of legal content that some users will welcome greater choice over. Those duties also give adult users greater control over who they interact with online, but these provisions are not appropriate for children. As the hon. Member for Aberdeen North acknowledged, there are already separate duties on services likely to be accessed by children, in scope of part 3, to undertake comprehensive risk assessments and to comply with safety duties to protect children from harm. That includes requirements to assess how many specific functionalities may facilitate the spread of harmful content, as outlined in clause 10(6)(e), and to protect children from harmful content, including content that has been designated as priority harmful content, by putting in place age-appropriate protections.

As such, children will not need to be provided with tools to control any harmful content they see, as the platform will need to put in place age-appropriate protections. We do not want to give children an option to choose to see content that is harmful to them. The Bill also outlines in clause 11(4)(f) that, where it is proportionate to do so, service providers will be required to take measures in certain areas to meet the child-safety duties. That includes functionalities allowing for control over content that is encountered. It would not be appropriate to require providers to offer children the option to verify their identity, due to the safeguarding and data protection risks that that would pose. Although we expect companies to use technologies such as age assurance to protect children on their service, they would only be used to establish age, not identity.

The new clause would create provisions to enable children to filter out private messages from adults and users who are not on an approved list, but the Bill already contains provisions that address the risks of adults contacting children. There are also requirements on service providers to consider how their service could be used for grooming or child sexual exploitation and abuse, and to apply proportionate measures to mitigate those risks. The service providers already have to assess and mitigate the risks. They have to provide the risk assessment, and within it they could choose to mitigate risk by requiring services to prevent unknown users from contacting children.

For the reasons I have set out, the Bill already provides strong protections for children on services that they are likely to access. I am therefore not able to accept the new clause, and I hope that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North will withdraw it.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank you, too, Dame Angela. I echo the Minister’s sentiments, and thank all the Clerks, the Doorkeepers, the team, and all the stakeholders who have massively contributed, with very short turnarounds, to the scrutiny of this legislation. I have so appreciated all that assistance and expertise, which has helped me, as shadow Minister, to compile our comments on the Bill following the Government’s recommittal of it to Committee, which is an unusual step. Huge thanks to my colleagues who joined us today and in previous sittings, and to colleagues from across the House, and particularly from the SNP, a number of whose amendments we have supported. We look forward to scrutinising the Bill further when it comes back to the House in the new year.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank you, Dame Angela, as well as Sir Roger for chairing our debates. Recommittal has been a very odd and unusual process; it has been a bit like groundhog day, discussing things we have discussed previously. I very much appreciate the hard work of departmental and Ofcom staff that went into making this happen, as well as the work of the Clerks, the Doorkeepers, and the team who ensured that we have a room that is not freezing—that has been really helpful.

I thank colleagues from across the House, particularly the Labour Front-Bench spokespeople, who have been incredibly helpful in supporting our amendments. This has been a pretty good-tempered Committee and we have all got on fairly well, even though we have disagreed on a significant number of issues. I am sure we will have those arguments again on Report.

ONLINE SAFETY BILL (Second sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage (re-committed clauses and schedules)
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Angela. With your permission, I will take this opportunity to make some broad reflections on the Government’s approach to the new so-called triple-shield protection that we have heard so much about, before coming on to the amendment tabled in my name in the group.

Broadly, Labour is disappointed that the system-level approach to content that is harmful to adults is being stripped from the Bill and replaced with a duty that puts the onus on the user to keep themselves safe. As the Antisemitism Policy Trust among others has argued, the two should be able to work in tandem. The clause allows a user to manage what harmful material they see by requiring the largest or most risky service providers to provide tools to allow a person in effect to reduce their likelihood of encountering, or to alert them to, certain types of material. We have concerns about the overall approach of the Government, but Labour believes that important additions can be made to the list of content where user-empowerment tools must be in place, hence our amendment (a) to Government amendment 15.

In July, in a little-noticed written ministerial statement, the Government produced a prototype list of content that would be harmful to adults. The list included priority content that category 1 services need to address in their terms and conditions; online abuse and harassment—mere disagreement with another’s point of view would not reach the threshold for harmful content, and so would not be covered; circulation of real or manufactured intimate images without the subject’s consent; content promoting self-harm; content promoting eating disorders; legal suicide content; and harmful health content that is demonstrably false, such as urging people to drink bleach to cure cancer.

We have concerns about whether listing those harms in the Bill is the most effective mechanism, mostly because we feel that the list should be more flexible and able to change according to the issues of the day, but it is clear that the Government will continue to pursue this avenue despite some very worrying gaps. With that in mind, will the Minister clarify what exactly underpins that list if there have been no risk assessments? What was the basis for drawing up that specific list? Surely the Government should be implored to publish the research that determined the list, at the very least.

I recognise that the false communications offence has remained in the Bill, but the list in Government amendment 15 is not exhaustive. Without the additions outlined in our amendment (a) to amendment 15, the list will do little to tackle some of the most pressing harm of our time, some of which we have already heard about today.

I am pleased that the list from the written ministerial statement has more or less been reproduced in amendment 15, under subsection (2), but there is a key and unexplained omission that our amendment (a) to it seeks to correct: the absence of the last point, on harmful health content. Amendment (a) seeks to reinsert such important content into the Bill directly. It seems implausible that the Government failed to consider the dangerous harm that health misinformation can have online, especially given that back in July they seemed to have a grasp of its importance by including it in the original list.

We all know that health-related misinformation and disinformation can significantly undermine public health, as we have heard. We only have to cast our minds back to the height of the coronavirus pandemic to remind ourselves of how dangerous the online space was, with anti-vax scepticism being rife. Many groups were impacted, including pregnant women, who received mixed messages about the safety of covid vaccination, causing widespread confusion, fear and inaction. By tabling amendment (a) to amendment 15, we wanted to understand why the Government have dropped that from the list and on what exact grounds.

In addition to harmful health content, our amendment (a) to amendment 15 would also add to the list content that incites hateful extremism and provides false information about climate change, as we have heard. In early written evidence from Carnegie, it outlined how serious the threat of climate change disinformation is to the UK. Malicious actors spreading false information on social media could undermine collective action to combat the threats. At present, the Online Safety Bill is not designed to tackle those threats head on.

We all recognise that social media is an important source of news and information for many people, and evidence is emerging of its role in climate change disinformation. The Centre for Countering Digital Hate published a report in 2021 called “The Toxic Ten: How ten fringe publishers fuel 69% of digital climate change denial”, which explores the issue further. Further analysis of activity on Facebook around COP26 undertaken by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue demonstrates the scale of the challenge in dealing with climate change misinformation and disinformation. The research compared the levels of engagement generated by reliable, scientific organisations and climate-sceptic actors, and found that posts from the latter frequently received more traction and reach than the former, which is shocking. For example, in the fortnight in which COP26 took place, sceptic content garnered 12 times the level of engagement that authoritative sources did on the platform, and 60% of the sceptic posts analysed could be classified as actively and explicitly attacking efforts to curb climate change, which just goes to show the importance of ensuring that climate change disinformation is also included in the list in Government amendment 15.

Our two amendments—amendment (a) to amendment 15, and amendment (a) to amendment 16 —seek to ensure that the long-standing omission from the Bill of hateful extremism is put right here as a priority. There is increasing concern about extremism leading to violence and death that does not meet the definition for terrorism. The internet and user-to-user services play a central role in the radicalisation process, yet the Online Safety Bill does not cover extremism.

Colleagues may be aware that Sara Khan, the former lead commissioner for countering extremism, provided a definition of extremism for the Government in February 2021, but there has been no response. The issue has been raised repeatedly by Members across the House, including by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), following the tragic murders carried out by a radicalised incel in his constituency.

Amendment (a) to amendment 16 seeks to bring a formal definition of hateful extremism into the Bill and supports amendment (a) to amendment 15. The definition, as proposed by Sara Khan, who was appointed as Britain’s first countering extremism commissioner in 2018, is an important first step in addressing the gaps that social media platforms and providers have left open for harm and radicalisation.

Social media platforms have often been ineffective in removing other hateful extremist content. In November 2020, The Guardian reported that research from the Centre for Countering Digital Hate had uncovered how extremist merchandise had been sold on Facebook and Instagram to help fund neo-Nazi groups. That is just one of a huge number of instances, and it goes some way to suggest that a repeatedly inconsistent and ineffective approach to regulating extremist content is the one favoured by some social media platforms.

I hope that the Minister will seriously consider the amendments and will see the merits in expanding the list in Government amendment 15 to include these additional important harms.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you for chairing the meeting this afternoon, Dame Angela. I agree wholeheartedly with the amendments tabled by the Labour Front-Bench team. It is important that we talk about climate change denial and what we can do to ensure people are not exposed to that harmful conspiracy theory through content. It is also important that we do what we can to ensure that pregnant women, for example, are not told not to take the covid vaccine or that parents are not told not to vaccinate their children against measles, mumps and rubella. We need to do what we can to ensure measures are in place.

I appreciate the list in Government amendment 15, but I have real issues with this idea of a toggle system—of being able to switch off this stuff. Why do the Government think people should have to switch off the promotion of suicide content or content that promotes eating disorders? Why is it acceptable that people should have to make an active choice to switch that content off in order to not see it? People have to make an active choice to tick a box that says, “No, I don’t want to see content that is abusing me because of my religion,” or “No, I don’t want to see content that is abusing me because of my membership of the LGBT community.” We do not want people to have to look through the abuse they are receiving in order to press the right buttons to switch it off. As the hon. Member for Don Valley said, people should be allowed to say what they want online, but the reality is that the extremist content that we have seen published online is radicalising people and bringing them to the point that they are taking physical action against people in the real, offline world as well as taking action online.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

The amendments relate to the tools proposed in clause 14, which as we know will be available for individuals to use on platforms to protect themselves from harm. As the Minister knows, Labour fundamentally disagrees with that approach, which will place the onus on the user, rather than the platform, to protect themselves from harmful content. It is widely recognised that the purpose of this week’s Committee proceedings is to allow the Government to remove the so-called “legal but harmful” clauses and replace them with the user empowerment tool option. Let us be clear that that goes against the very essence of the Bill, which was created to address the particular way in which social media allows content to be shared, spread and broadcast around the world at speed.

This approach could very well see a two-tier internet system develop, which leaves those of us who choose to utilise the user empowerment tools ignorant of harmful content perpetuated elsewhere for others to see. The tools proposed in clause 14, however, reflect something that we all know to be true: that there is some very harmful content out there for us all to see online. We can all agree that individuals should therefore have access to the appropriate tools to protect themselves. It is also right that providers will be required to ensure that adults have greater choice and control over the content that they see and engage with, but let us be clear that instead of focusing on defining exactly what content is or is not harmful, the Bill should focus on the processes by which harmful content is amplified on social media.

However, we are where we are, and Labour believes that it is better to have the Bill over the line, with a regulator in place with some powers, than simply to do nothing at all. With that in mind, we have tabled the amendment specifically to force platforms to have safety tools on by default. We believe that the user empowerment tools should be on by default and that they must be appropriately visible and easy to use. We must recognise that for people at a point of crisis—if a person is suffering with depressive or suicidal thoughts, or with significant personal isolation, for example—the tools may not be at the forefront of their minds if their mental state is severely impacted.

On a similar point, we must not patronise the public. Labour sees no rational argument why the Government would not support the amendment. We should all assume that if a rational adult is able to easily find and use these user empowerment tools, then they will be easily able to turn them off if they choose to do so.

The Minister knows that I am not in the habit of guessing but, judging from our private conversations, his rebuttal to my points may be because he believes it is not the Government’s role to impose rules directly on platforms, particularly when they impact their functionality. However, for Labour, the existence of harm and the importance of protecting people online tips the balance in favour of turning these user empowerment tools on by default. We see no negative reason why that should not be the case, and we now have a simple amendment that could have a significantly positive impact.

I hope the Minister and colleagues will reflect strongly on these amendments, as we believe they are a reasonable and simple ask of platforms to do the right thing and have the user empowerment tools on by default.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Once again, this is a very smart amendment that I wish I had thought of myself and I am happy to support. The case made by those campaigning for freedom of speech at any cost is about people being able to say what they want to say, no matter how harmful that may be. It is not about requiring me, or anyone else, to read those things—the harmful bile, the holocaust denial or the promotion of suicide that is spouted. It is not freedom of speech to require someone else to see and read such content so I cannot see any potential argument that the Government could come up with against these amendments.

The amendments have nothing to do with freedom of speech or with limiting people’s ability to say whatever they want to say or to promote whatever untruths they want to promote. However, they are about making sure that people are protected and that they are starting from a position of having to opt in if they want to see harmful content. If I want to see content about holocaust denial—I do not want to see that, but if I did—I should have to clearly tick a button that says, “Yes, I am pretty extreme in my views and I want to see things that are abusing people. I want to see that sort of content.” I should have to opt in to be able to see that.

There are a significant number of newspapers out there. I will not even pick up a lot of them because there is so much stuff in them with which I disagree, but I can choose not to pick them up. I do not have that newspaper served to me against my will because I have the opportunity to choose to opt out from buying it. I do not have to go into the supermarket and say, “No, please do not give me that newspaper!” I just do not pick it up. If we put the Government’s proposal on its head and do what has been suggested in the Opposition amendments, everyone would be in a much better position.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

Again, I will keep my comments on clause 19 brief, as we broadly support the intentions behind the clause and the associated measures in the grouping. My hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) spoke at length about this important clause, which relates to the all-important complaints procedures available around social media platforms and companies, in the previous Bill Committee.

During the previous Committee, Labour tabled amendments that would have empowered more individuals to make a complaint about search content in the event of non-compliance. In addition, we wanted an external complaints option for individuals seeking redress. Sadly, all those amendments were voted down by the last Committee, but I must once again press the Minister on those points, particularly in the context of the new amendments that have been tabled.

Without redress for individual complaints, once internal mechanisms have been exhausted, victims of online abuse could be left with no further options. Consumer protections could be compromised and freedom of expression, with which the Government seem to be borderline obsessed, could be infringed for people who feel that their content has been unfairly removed.

Government new clause 2 deals with the meaning of references to

“restricting users’ access to content”,

in particular by excluding restrictions resulting from the use of user empowerment tools as described in clause 14. We see amendments 22 and 59 as important components of new clause 2, and are therefore more than happy to support them. However, I reiterate to the Minister and place on the record once again the importance of introducing an online safety ombudsman, which we feel is crucial to new clause 2. The Joint Committee recommended the introduction of such an ombudsman, who would consider complaints when internal routes of redress had not resulted in resolution, had failed to address risk and had led to significant and demonstrable harm. As new clause 2 relates to restricting users’ access to content, we must also ensure that there is an appropriate channel for complaints if there is an issue that users wish to take up around restrictions in accessing content.

By now, the Minister will be well versed in my thoughts on the Government’s approach, and on the reliance on the user empowerment tool approach more broadly. It is fundamentally an error to pursue a regime that is so content-focused. Despite those points, we see the merits in Government amendments 22 and 59, and in new clause 2, so have not sought to table any further amendments at this stage.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am slightly confused, and would appreciate a little clarification from the Minister. I understand what new clause 2 means; if the hon. Member for Pontypridd says that she does not want to see content of a certain nature, and I put something of that nature online, I am not being unfairly discriminated against in any way because she has chosen to opt out of receiving that content. I am slightly confused about the downgrading bit.

I know that an awful lot of platforms use downgrading when there is content that they find problematic, or something that they feel is an issue. Rather than taking that content off the platform completely, they may just no longer put it in users’ feeds, for example; they may move it down the priority list, and that may be part of what they already do to keep people safe. I am not trying to criticise what the Government are doing, but I genuinely do not understand whether that downgrading would still be allowed, whether it would be an issue, and whether people could complain about their content being downgraded because the platform was a bit concerned about it, and needed to check it out and work out what was going on, or if it was taken off users’ feeds.

Some companies, if they think that videos have been uploaded by people who are too young to use the platform, or by a registered child user of the platform, will not serve that content to everybody’s feeds. I will not be able to see something in my TikTok feed that was published by a user who is 13, for example, because there are restrictions on how TikTok deals with and serves that content, in order to provide increased protection and the safety that they want on their services.

Will it still be acceptable for companies to have their own internal downgrading system, in order to keep people safe, when content does not necessarily meet an illegality bar or child safety duty bar? The Minister has not used the phrase “market forces”; I think he said “commercial imperative”, and he has talked a lot about that. Some companies and organisations use downgrading to improve the systems on their site and to improve the user experience on the platform. I would very much appreciate it if the Minister explained whether that will still be the case. If not, will we all have a worse online experience as a result?

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will keep my comments on this grouping brief, because I have already raised our concerns and our overarching priority in terms of transparency reports in the previous debate, which was good one, with all Members highlighting the need for transparency and reporting in the Bill. With the Chair’s permission, I will make some brief comments on Government amendment 72 before addressing Government amendments 73 and 75.

It will come as no surprise to the Minister that amendment 72, which defines relevant content for the purposes of schedule 8, has a key omission—specifying priority content harmful to adults. For reasons we have covered at length, we think that it is a gross mistake on the Government’s side to attempt to water down the Bill in this way. If the Minister is serious about keeping adults safe online, he must reconsider this approach. However, we are happy to see amendments 73 and 75, which define consumer content and regulated user-generated content. It is important for all of us—whether we are politicians, researchers, academics, civil society, stakeholders, platforms, users or anyone else—that these definitions are in the Bill so that, when it is passed, it can be applied properly and at pace. That is why we have not sought to amend this grouping.

I must press the Minister to respond on the issues around relevant content as outlined in amendment 72. We greatly feel that more needs to be done to address this type of content and its harm to adults, so I would be grateful to hear the Minister’s assessment of how exactly these transparency reports will report back on this type of harm, given its absence in this group of amendments and the lack of a definition.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am pleased to see the list included and the number of things that Ofcom can ask for more information on. I have a specific question about amendment 75. Amendment 75 talks about regulated user-generated content and says it has the same meaning as it does in the interpretation of part 3 under clause 50. The Minister may or may not know that there are concerns about clause 50(5), which relates to

“One-to-one live aural communications”.

One-to-one live aural communications are exempted. I understand that that is because the Government do not believe that telephony services, for example, should be part of the Online Safety Bill—that is a pretty reasonable position for them to take. However, allowing one-to-one live aural communications not to be regulated means that if someone is using voice chat in Fortnite, for example, and there are only two people on the team that they are on, or if someone is using voice chat in Discord and there are only two people online on the channel at that time, that is completely unregulated and not taken into account by the Bill.

I know that that is not the intention of the Bill, which is intended to cover user-generated content online. The exemption is purely in place for telephony services, but it is far wider than the Government intend it to be. With the advent of more and more people using virtual reality technology, for example, we will have more and more aural communication between just two people, and that needs to be regulated by the Bill. We cannot just allow a free-for-all.

If we have child protection duties, for example, they need to apply to all user-generated content and not exempt it specifically because it is a live, one-to-one aural communication. Children are still at significant risk from this type of communication. The Government have put this exemption in because they consider such communication to be analogous to telephony services, but it is not. It is analogous to telephony services if we are talking about a voice call on Skype, WhatsApp or Signal—those are voice calls, just like telephone services—but we are talking about a voice chat that people can have with people who they do not know, whose phone number they do not know and who they have no sort of relationship with.

Some of the Discord servers are pretty horrendous, and some of the channels are created by social media influencers or people who have pretty extreme views in some cases. We could end up with a case where the Discord server and its chat functions are regulated, but if aural communication or a voice chat is happening on that server, and there are only two people online because it is 3 o’clock in the morning where most of the people live and lots of them are asleep, that would be exempted. That is not the intention of the Bill, but the Government have not yet fixed this. So I will make one more plea to the Government: will they please fix this unintended loophole, so that it does not exist? It is difficult to do, but it needs to be done, and I would appreciate it if the Minister could take that into consideration.

ONLINE SAFETY BILL (First sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage (re-committed clauses and schedules)
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point. This is not about mandating that platforms stop doing these things; it is about ensuring that they take this issue into account and that they agree—or that we as legislators agree—with the Royal College of Psychiatrists that we have a responsibility to tackle it. We have a responsibility to ask Ofcom to tackle it with platforms.

This comes back to the fact that we do not have a user advocacy panel, and groups representing children are not able to bring emerging issues forward adequately and effectively. Because of the many other inadequacies in the Bill, that is even more important than it was. I assume the Minister will not accept my amendment—that generally does not happen in Bill Committees—but if he does not, it would be helpful if he could give Ofcom some sort of direction of travel so that it knows it should take this issue into consideration when it deals with platforms. Ofcom should be talking to platforms about habit-forming features and considering the addictive nature of these things; it should be doing what it can to protect children. This threat has emerged only in recent years, and things will not get any better unless we take action.

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

It is a privilege to see you back in the Chair for round 2 of the Bill Committee, Sir Roger. It feels slightly like déjà vu to return to line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, which, as you said, Sir Roger, is quite unusual and unprecedented. Seeing this Bill through Committee is the Christmas gift that keeps on giving. Sequels are rarely better than the original, but we will give it a go. I have made no secret of my plans, and my thoughts on the Minister’s plans, to bring forward significant changes to the Bill, which has already been long delayed. I am grateful that, as we progress through Committee, I will have the opportunity to put on record once again some of Labour’s long-held concerns with the direction of the Bill.

I will touch briefly on clause 11 specifically before addressing the amendments to the clause. Clause 11 covers safety duties to protect children, and it is a key part of the Bill—indeed, it is the key reason many of us have taken a keen interest in online safety more widely. Many of us, on both sides of the House, have been united in our frustrations with the business models of platform providers and search engines, which have paid little regard to the safety of children over the years in which the internet has expanded rapidly.

That is why Labour has worked with the Government. We want to see the legislation get over the line, and we recognise—as I have said in Committee previously—that the world is watching, so we need to get this right. The previous Minister characterised the social media platforms and providers as entirely driven by finance, but safety must be the No. 1 priority. Labour believes that that must apply to both adults and children, but that is an issue for debate on a subsequent clause, so I will keep my comments on this clause brief.

The clause and Government amendments 1, 2 and 3 address the thorny issue of age assurance measures. Labour has been clear that we have concerns that the Government are relying heavily on the ability of social media companies to distinguish between adults and children, but age verification processes remain fairly complex, and that clearly needs addressing. Indeed, Ofcom’s own research found that a third of children have false social media accounts aged over 18. This is an area we certainly need to get right.

I am grateful to the many stakeholders, charities and groups working in this area. There are far too many to mention, but a special shout-out should go to Iain Corby from the Age Verification Providers Association, along with colleagues at the Centre to End All Sexual Exploitation and Barnardo’s, and the esteemed John Carr. They have all provided extremely useful briefings for my team and me as we have attempted to unpick this extremely complicated part of the Bill.

We accept that there are effective age checks out there, and many have substantial anti-evasion mechanisms, but it is the frustrating reality that this is the road the Government have decided to go down. As we have repeatedly placed on the record, the Government should have retained the “legal but harmful” provisions that were promised in the earlier iteration of the Bill. Despite that, we are where we are.

I will therefore put on the record some brief comments on the range of amendments on this clause. First, with your permission, Sir Roger, I will speak to amendments 98, 99—

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

What I am saying is that the clause does not actually allow that middle step. It does not explicitly say that somebody could be stopped from accessing private messaging. The only options are being banned from certain content, or being banned from the entire platform.

I absolutely recognise the hard work that Ofcom has done, and I recognise that it will work very hard to ensure that risks are mitigated, but the amendment ensures what the Minister intended with this legislation. I am not convinced that he intended there to be just the two options that I outlined. I think he intended something more in line with what I am suggesting in the amendment. It would be very helpful if the Minister explicitly said something in this Committee that makes it clear that Ofcom has the power to say to platforms, “Your risk assessment says that there is a real risk from private messaging”—or from livestreaming—“so why don’t you turn that off for all users under 18?” Ofcom should be able to do that.

Could the Minister be clear that that is the direction of travel he is hoping and intending that Ofcom will take? If he could be clear on that, and will recognise that the clause could have been slightly better written to ensure Ofcom had that power, I would be quite happy to not push the amendment to a vote. Will the Minister be clear about the direction he hopes will be taken?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I rise to support my SNP colleagues’ amendments 99, and 96 and 97, just as I supported amendment 98. The amendments are sensible and will ensure that service providers are empowered to take action to mitigate harms done through their services. In particular, we support amendment 99, which makes it clear that a service should be required to have the tools available to allow it to block access to parts of its service, if that is proportionate.

Amendments 96 and 97 would ensure that private messaging and livestreaming features were brought into scope, and that platforms and services could block access to them when that was proportionate, with the aim of protecting children, which is the ultimate aim of the Bill. Those are incredibly important points to raise.

In previous iterations of the Bill Committee, Labour too tabled a number of amendments to do with platforms’ responsibilities for livestreaming. I expressed concerns about how easy it is for platforms to host live content, and about how ready they were to screen that content for harm, illegal or not. I am therefore pleased to support our SNP colleagues. The amendments are sensible, will empower platforms and will keep children safe.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. This is not just about misinformation and disinformation; it is about leading people to really extreme, vile content on the internet. As we all know, that is a rabbit warren. That situation does not change as soon as a 17-year-old turns 18 on their 18th birthday—that they are then exempt when it comes to seeing this horrendous content. The rules need to be there to protect all of us.

As we have heard, terms and conditions can change overnight. Stakeholders have raised the concern that, if faced with a clearer focus on their terms of service, platforms and providers may choose to make their terms of service shorter, in an attempt to cut out harmful material that, if left undealt with, they may be held liable for.

In addition, the fact that there is no minimum requirement in the regime means that companies have complete freedom to set terms of service for adults, which may not reflect the risks to adults on that service. At present, service providers do not even have to include terms of service in relation to the list of harmful content proposed by the Government for the user empowerment duties—an area we will come on to in more detail shortly as we address clause 14. The Government’s approach and overreliance on terms of service, which as we know can be so susceptible to rapid change, is the wrong approach. For that reason, we cannot support these amendments.

I would just say, finally, that none of us was happy with the term “legal but harmful”. It was a phrase we all disliked, and it did not encapsulate exactly what the content is or includes. Throwing the baby out with the bathwater is not the way to tackle that situation. My hon. Friend the Member for Batley and Spen is right that this is a tricky area, and it is difficult to get it right. We need to protect free speech, which is sacrosanct, but we also need to recognise that there are so many users on the internet who do not have access to free speech as a result of being piled on or shouted down. Their free speech needs to be protected too. We believe that the clauses as they stand in the Bill go some way to making the Bill a meaningful piece of legislation. I urge the Minister not to strip them out, to do the right thing and to keep them in the Bill.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Throughout the consideration of the Bill, I have been clear that I do not want it to end up simply being the keep MPs safe on Twitter Bill. That is not what it should be about. I did not mean that we should therefore take out everything that protects adults; what I meant was that we need to have a big focus on protecting children in the Bill, which thankfully we still do. For all our concerns about the issues and inadequacies of the Bill, it will go some way to providing better protections for children online. But saying that it should not be the keep MPs safe on Twitter Bill does not mean that it should not keep MPs safe on Twitter.

I understand how we have got to this situation. What I cannot understand is the Minister’s being willing to stand up there and say, “We can’t have these clauses because they are a risk to freedom of speech.” Why are they in the Bill in the first place if they are such a big risk to freedom of speech? If the Government’s No. 1 priority is making sure that we do not have these clauses, why did they put them in it? Why did it go through pre-legislative scrutiny? Why were they in the draft Bill? Why were they in the Bill? Why did they agree with them in Committee? Why did they agree with them on Report? Why have we ended up in a situation where, suddenly, there is a massive epiphany that they are a threat to freedom of speech and therefore we cannot possibly have them?

What is it that people want to say that they will be banned from saying as a result of this Bill? What is it that freedom of speech campaigners are so desperate to want to say online? Do they want to promote self-harm on platforms? Is that what people want to do? Is that what freedom of speech campaigners are out for? They are now allowed to do that a result of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We have all heard from organisations and individuals who have had their lives destroyed as a result of “legal but harmful”—I don’t have a better phrase for it—content online and of being radicalised by being driven deeper and deeper into blacker and blacker Discord servers, for example, that are getting further and further right wing.

A number of the people who are radicalised—who are committing terror attacks, or being referred to the Prevent programme because they are at risk of committing terror attacks—are not so much on the far-right levels of extremism any more, or those with incredible levels of religious extremism, but are in a situation where they have got mixed up or unclear ideological drivers. It is not the same situation as it was before, because people are being radicalised by the stuff that they find online. They are being radicalised into situations where they “must do something”—they “must take some action”—because of the culture change in society.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Member is making a powerful point. Just a few weeks ago, I asked the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, at the Dispatch Box, whether the horrendous and horrific content that led a man to shoot and kill five people in Keyham—in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard)—would be allowed to remain and perpetuate online as a result of the removal of these clauses from the Bill. I did not get a substantial answer then, but we all know that the answer is yes.

[Kirsty Blackman]

That is the thing: this Bill is supposed to be the Online Safety Bill. It is supposed to be about protecting people from the harm that can be done to them by others. It is also supposed to be about protecting people from that radicalisation and that harm that they can end up in. It is supposed to make a difference. It is supposed to be game changer and a world leader.

Although, absolutely, I recognise the importance of the child-safety duties in the clauses and the change that that will have, when people turn 18 they do not suddenly become different humans. They do not wake up on their 18th birthday as a different person from the one that they were before. They should not have to go from that level of protection, prior to 18, to being immediately exposed to comments and content encouraging them to self-harm, and to all of the negative things that we know are present online.

Online Safety Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The UK has a vast media literacy skills and knowledge gap, which leaves the population at risk of harm. Indeed, research from Ofcom found that a third of internet users are unaware of the potential for inaccurate or biased information. Similarly, about 61% of social media users who say they are confident in judging whether online content is true or false actually lack the skills to do so.

Good media literacy is our first line of defence against bad information online. It can make the difference between decisions based on sound evidence and decisions based on poorly informed opinions that can harm health and wellbeing, social cohesion and democracy. Clause 103 of the draft Bill proposed a new media duty for Ofcom to replace the one in section 11 of the Communications Act 2003, but sadly the Government scrapped it from the final Bill.

Media literacy initiatives in the Online Safety Bill are now mentioned only in the context of risk assessments, but there is no active requirement for internet companies to promote media literacy. The draft Bill’s media literacy provision needed to be strengthened, not cut. New clauses 14, 15 and 16 would introduce a new, stronger media literacy duty on Ofcom, with specific objectives. They would require the regulator to produce a statutory strategy for delivering on it and then to report on progress made towards increasing media literacy under the strategy. There is no logical reason for the Minister not to accept these important new clauses or work with Labour on them.

Over the past few weeks, we have debated a huge range of issues that are being perpetuated online as we speak, from vile, misogynistic content about women and girls to state-sponsored disinformation. It is clear that the lessons have not been learned from the past few years, when misinformation was able to significantly undermine public health, most notably throughout the pandemic. Harmful and, more importantly, false statistics were circulated online, which caused significant issues in encouraging the uptake of the vaccine. We have concerns that, without a robust media literacy strategy, the consequences of misinformation and disinformation could go further.

The issues that Labour has raised about the responsibility of those at the top—the Government—have been well documented. Only a few weeks ago, we spoke about the Secretary of State actually contributing to the misinformation discourse by sharing a picture of the Labour leader that was completely out of context. How can we be in a position where those at the top are contributing to this harmful discourse? The Minister must be living in a parallel universe if he cannot see the importance of curbing these harmful behaviours online as soon as possible. He must know that media literacy is at the very heart of the Bill’s success more widely. We genuinely feel that a strengthened media literacy policy would be a huge step forward, and I sincerely hope that the Minister will therefore accept the justification behind these important new clauses.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I agree entirely on these new clauses. Although the Bill will make things safer, it will do that properly only if supported by proper media literacy and the upskilling of everybody who spends any portion of their lives online. They all need better media literacy, and I am not excluding myself from that. Everybody, no matter how much time they have spent online, can learn more about better ways to fact-check and assess risk, and about how services use our data.

I pay tribute to all those involved in media literacy—all the educators at all levels, including school teachers delivering it as part of the curriculum, school teachers delivering it not as part of the curriculum, and organisations such as CyberSafe Scotland in my constituency, which is working incredibly hard to upskill parents and children about the internet. They also include organisations such as the Silver City Surfers in Aberdeen, where a group of young people teaches groups of elderly people how to use the internet. All those things are incredibly helpful and useful, but we need to ensure that Ofcom is at the top of that, producing materials and taking its duties seriously. It must produce the best possible information and assistance for people so that up-to-date media literacy training can be provided.

As we have discussed before, Ofcom’s key role is to ensure that when threats emerge, it is clear and tells people, “This is a new threat that you need to be aware of,” because the internet will grow and change all the time, and Ofcom is absolutely the best placed organisation to be recognising the new threats. Obviously, it would do that much better with a user advocacy panel on it, but given its oversight and the way it will be regulating all the providers, Ofcom really needs to take this issue as seriously as it can. It is impossible to overstate the importance of media literacy, so I give my wholehearted backing to the three new clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

My hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire is not present and he had intended to move this new clause. If the Committee does not mind, I will do more reading and look at my notes more than I would normally when giving a speech.

Misinformation and disinformation arise during periods of uncertainty, either acutely, such as during a terror attack, or over a long period, as with the pandemic. That often includes information gaps and a proliferation of inaccurate claims that spread quickly. Where there is a vacuum of information, we can have bad actors or the ill-informed filling it with false information.

Information incidents are not dealt with effectively enough in the Bill, which is focused on regulating the day-to-day online environment. I accept that clause 146 gives the Secretary of State powers of direction in certain special circumstances, but their effectiveness in real time would be questionable. The Secretary of State would have to ask Ofcom to prioritise its media literacy function or to make internet companies report on what they are doing in response to a crisis. That is just too slow, given the speed at which such incidents can spread.

The new clause might involve Ofcom introducing a system whereby emerging incidents could be reported publicly and different actors could request the regulator to convene a response group. The provision would allow Ofcom to be more proactive in its approach and, in I hope rare moments, to provide clear guidance. That is why the new clause is a necessary addition to the Bill.

Many times, we have seen horrendous incidents unfold on the internet, in a very different way from how they ever unfolded in newspapers, on news websites or among people talking. We have seen the untold and extreme harm that such information incidents can cause, as significant, horrific events can be spread very quickly. We could end up in a situation where an incident happens and, for example, a report spreads that a Muslim group was responsible when there is absolutely no basis of truth to that. A vacuum can be created and bad actors step into it in order to spread discrimination and lies, often about minority groups who are already struggling. That is why we move the new clause.

For the avoidance of doubt, new clause 45, which was tabled by Labour, is also to be debated in this group. I am more than happy to support it.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

As we know, the new clause would give Ofcom a proactive role in identifying and responding to misinformation incidents that can occur in a moment of crisis. As we have discussed, there are huge gaps in the Bill’s ability to sufficiently arm Ofcom with the tools it will likely need to tackle information incidents in real time. It is all very well that the Bill will ensure that things such as risk assessments are completed, but, ultimately, if Ofcom is not able to proactively identify and respond to incidents in a crisis, I have genuine concerns about how effective this regulatory regime will be in the wider sense. Labour is therefore pleased support the new clause, which is fundamental to ensuring that Ofcom can be the proactive regulator that the online space clearly needs.

The Government’s methods of tackling disinformation are opaque, unaccountable and may not even work. New clause 45, which would require reporting to Parliament, may begin to address this issue. When Ministers are asked how they tackle misinformation or disinformation harms, they refer to some unaccountable civil service team involved in state-based interference in online media.

I thank those at Carnegie UK Trust for their support when researching the following list, and for supporting my team and me to make sense of the Bill. First, we have the counter-disinformation unit, which is based in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and intends to address mainly covid issues that breach companies’ terms of service and, recently, the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In addition, the Government information cell, which is based in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, focuses on war and national security issues, including mainly Russia and Ukraine. Thirdly, there is the so-called rapid response unit, which is based in the Cabinet Office, and mainly tackles proactive counter-messaging.

Those teams appear to nudge service providers in different ways where there are threats to national security or the democratic process, or risks to public health, yet we have zero record of their effectiveness. The groups do not publish logs of action to any external authority for oversight of what they raise with companies using the privilege authority of Her Majesty’s Government, nor do they publish the effectiveness of their actions. As far as we know, they are not rooted in expert independent external advisers. That direct state interference in the media is very worrying.

In our recent debate on amendment 83, which calls on the Government to include health misinformation and disinformation in the Bill, the Minister clearly set out why he thinks the situation is problematic. He said,

“We have established a counter-disinformation unit within DCMS whose remit is to identify misinformation and work with social media firms to get it taken down. The principal focus of that unit during the pandemic was, of course, covid. In the past three months, it has focused more on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, for obvious reasons.

In some cases, Ministers have engaged directly with social media firms to encourage them to remove content that is clearly inappropriate. For example, in the Russia-Ukraine context, I have had conversations with social media companies that have left up clearly flagrant Russian disinformation. This is, therefore, an area that the Government are concerned about and have been acting on operationally already.”––[Official Report, Online Safety Public Bill Committee, 14 June 2022; c. 408.]

Until we know more about those units, the boundary between their actions and that of a press office remains unclear. In the new regulatory regime, Ofcom needs to be kept up to date on the issues they are raising. The Government should reform the system and bring those units out into the open. We support Carnegie’s longer term strategic goal to set up a new external oversight body and move the current Government functions under Ofcom’s independent supervision. The forthcoming National Security Bill may tackle that, but I will leave that for the Minister to consider.

There must be a reporting system that requires the Government to set out their operational involvement with social media companies to address misinformation and disinformation, which is why we have tabled new clause 45. I hope the Minister will see that the current efforts in these units are hugely lacking in transparency, which we all want and have learned is fundamental to keep us all safe online.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

Given that clarification, I will not press the new clause. The Minister has made the case strongly enough and has clarified clause 85(1) to my satisfaction. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 23

Priority illegal content: violence against women and girls

“(1) For the purposes of this Act, any provision applied to priority illegal content should also be applied to any content which—

(a) constitutes,

(b) encourages, or

(c) promotes

violence against women or girls.

(2) ‘Violence against women and girls’ is defined by Article 3 of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (‘the Istanbul Convention’).” —(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause applies provisions to priority illegal content to content which constitutes, encourages or promotes violence against women and girls.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause would apply provisions applied to priority illegal content also to content that constitutes, encourages or promotes violence against women and girls. As it stands, the Bill is failing women and girls. In an attempt to tackle that alarming gap, the new clause uses the Istanbul convention definition of VAWG, given that the Home Secretary has so recently agreed to ratify the convention—just a decade after was signed.

The Minister might also be aware that GREVIO—the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence—which monitors the implementation of the Istanbul convention, published a report in October 2021 on the digital dimension of violence against women and girls. It stated that domestic laws are failing to place the abuse of women and girls online

“in the context of a continuum of violence against women that women and girls are exposed to in all spheres of life, including in the digital sphere.”

The purpose of naming VAWG in the Bill is to require tech companies to be responsible for preventing and addressing VAWG as a whole, rather than limiting their obligations only to specific criminal offences listed in schedule 7 and other illegal content. It is also important to note that the schedule 7 priority list was decided on without any consultation with the VAWG sector. Naming violence against women and girls will also ensure that tech companies are held to account for addressing emerging forms of online hate, which legislation is often unable to keep up with.

We only need to consider accounts from survivors of online violence against women and girls, as outlined in “VAWG Principles for the Online Safety Bill”, published in September last year, to really see the profound impact that the issue is having on people’s lives. Ellesha, a survivor of image-based sexual abuse, was a victim of voyeurism at the hands of her ex-partner. She was filmed without her consent and was later notified by someone else that he had uploaded videos of her to Pornhub. She recently spoke at an event that I contributed to—I believe the right hon. Member for Basingstoke and others also did—on the launch of the “Violence Against Women and Girls Code of Practice”. I am sure we will come to that code of practice more specifically on Report. Her account was genuinely difficult to listen to.

This is an issue that Ellesha, with the support of EVAW, Glitch, and a huge range of other organisations, has campaigned on for some time. She says:

“Going through all of this has had a profound impact on my life. I will never have the ability to trust people in the same way and will always second guess their intentions towards me. My self confidence is at an all time low and although I have put a brave face on throughout this, it has had a detrimental effect on my mental health.”

Ellesha was informed by the police that they could not access the websites where her ex-partner had uploaded the videos, so she was forced to spend an immense amount of time trawling through all of the videos uploaded to simply identify herself. I can only imagine how distressing that must have been for her.

Pornhub’s response to the police inquiries was very vague in the first instance, and it later ignored every piece of following correspondence. Eventually the videos were taken down, likely by the ex-partner himself when he was released from the police station. Ellesha was told that Pornhub had only six moderators at the time—just six for the entire website—and it and her ex-partner ultimately got away with allowing the damaging content to remain, even though the account was under his name and easily traced back to his IP address. That just is not good enough, and the Minister must surely recognise that the Bill fails women in its current form.

If the Minister needs any further impetus to genuinely consider the amendment, I point him to a BBC report from last week that highlighted how much obscene material of women and girls is shared online without their consent. The BBC’s Angus Crawford investigated Facebook accounts and groups that were seen to be posting pictures and videos of upskirting. Naturally, Meta—Facebook’s owner—said that it had a grip on the problem and that those accounts and groups had all been removed, yet the BBC was able to find thousands of users sharing material. Indeed, one man who posted videos of himself stalking schoolgirls in New York is now being investigated by the police. This is the reality of the internet; it can be a powerful, creative tool for good, but far too often it seeks to do the complete opposite.

I hate to make this a gendered argument, but there is a genuine difference between the experiences of men and women online. Last week the Minister came close to admitting that when I queried whether he had ever received an unsolicited indecent picture. I am struggling to understand why he has failed to consider these issues in a Bill proposed by his Department.

The steps that the Government are taking to tackle violence against women and girls offline are broadly to be commended, and I welcome a lot of the initiatives. The Minister must see sense and do the right thing by also addressing the harms faced online. We have a genuine opportunity in the Bill to prevent violence against women and girls online, or at least to diminish some of the harms they face. Will he please do the right thing?

Online Safety Bill (Seventeenth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I drafted this new clause following a number of conversations and debates that we had in Committee about how the Act will be scrutinised. How will we see whether the Act is properly achieving what it is supposed to achieve? We know that there is currently a requirement in the Bill for a review to take place but, as has been mentioned already, that is a one-off thing; it is not a rolling update on the efficacy of the Act and whether it is achieving the duties that it is supposed to achieve.

This is particularly important because there are abilities for the Secretary of State to make changes to some of the Act. Presumably the Government would not have put that in if they did not think there was a possibility or a likelihood that changes would have to be made to the Act at some future point. The Bill is certainly not perfect, but even from the Government’s point of view it is not perfect for all time. There is a requirement for the Act to be updated; it will have to change. New priority harms may have to be added. New details about different illegal acts may have to be added to the duties. That flexibility is given, and the Secretary of State has that flexibility in a number of cases.

If the Act were just going to be a standing thing, if it were not going to be updated, it would never be future-proof; it would never work in the changing world that we have. We know that this legislation has taken a very long time to get here. We have been sadly lacking in significant regulation in the online world for more than 20 years, certainly. For a very long time we have not had this. Now that the Act is here—or it will be once the Bill passes through both Houses of Parliament—we want it to work.

That is the point of every amendment we have tabled: we are trying to make the Bill better so that it works and can keep people as safe as possible. At the moment, we do not know how safe the internet will be as a result of the Bill. Even once it begins to be implemented, we will not have enough information on the improvements it has created to be able to say, “Actually, this was a world-leading piece of legislation.”

It may be that the digital regulation committee that I am suggesting in this new clause has a look regularly at the implementation of the Bill going forward and says, “Yep, that’s brilliant.” The committee might look at the implementation and the increasing time we spend online, with all the harms that can come with that, and says, “Actually, you need to tweak that a bit” or, “That is not quite fulfilling what it was intended to.” The committee might also say, “This brand new technology has come in and it is not entirely covered by the Act as it is being implemented.” A digital regulation committee was proposed by the Joint Committee, I think, to scrutinise implementation of the legislation.

The Government will say that they will review—they always do. I have been in so many Delegated Legislation Committees that involve the Treasury and the Government saying, “Yes, we keep everything under review—we always review everything.” That line is used in so many of these Committees, but it is just not true. In January I asked the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

“how many and what proportion of (a) primary and (b) secondary legislation sponsored by (i) their Department…has undergone a post legislative review”.

It was a written question I put to a number of Departments including DCMS. The reply I got from the Minister here was:

“The number of post legislative reviews the Department has undertaken on primary and secondary legislation in each of the last five years is not held within the Department.”

The Government do not even know how many pieces of primary or secondary legislation they have reviewed. They cannot tell us that all of them have been reviewed. Presumably, if they could tell us that all of them have been reviewed, the answer to my written question would have been, “All of them.” I have a list of the number they sponsored. It was six in 2021, for example. If the Department had reviewed the implementation of all those pieces of legislation, I would expect it to be shouting that from the rooftops in response to a written question. It should be saying, “Yes, we are wonderful. We have reviewed all these and found that most of them are working exactly as we intended them to.”

I do not have faith in the Government or in DCMS—nor pretty much in any Government Department. I do not have faith in their ability or intention to adequately and effectively review the implementation of this legislation, to ensure that the review is done timeously and sent to the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, or to ensure those proper processes that are supposed to be in place are actually in place and that the Bill is working.

It is unfortunate for the Minister that he sent me that reply earlier in the year, but I only asked the question because I was aware of the significant lack of work the Government are doing on reviewing whether or not legislation has achieved its desired effect, including whether it has cost the amount of money they said it would, whether it has kept the amount of people safe that they said it would, and that it has done what it needs to do.

I have a lack of faith in the Government generally, but specifically on this issue because of the shifting nature of the internet. This is not to take away from the DCMS Committee, but I have sat on a number of Select Committees and know that they are very busy—they have a huge amount of things to scrutinise. This would not stop them scrutinising this Act and taking action to look at whether it is working. It would give an additional line of scrutiny, transparency and defence, in order to ensure that this world-leading legislation is actually world-leading and keeps people safe in the way it is intended to.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

It is an honour to support the new clause moved by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. This was a recommendation from the Joint Committee report, and we believe it is important, given the sheer complexity of the Bill. The Minister will not be alarmed to hear that I am all in favour of increasing the scrutiny and transparency of this legislation.

Having proudly served on the DCMS Committee, I know it does some excellent work on a very broad range of policy areas, as has been highlighted. It is important to acknowledge that there will of course be cross-over, but ultimately we support the new clause. Given my very fond memories of serving on the Select Committee, I want to put on the record my support for it. My support for this new clause is not meant as any disrespect to that Committee. It is genuinely extremely effective in scrutinising the Government and holding them to account, and I know it will continue to do that in relation to both this Bill and other aspects of DCMS. The need for transparency, openness and scrutiny of this Bill is fundamental if it is truly to be world-leading, which is why we support the new clause.

[Chris Philp]

I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss this issue once again. I want to put on the record my thanks to the Joint Committee, which the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire sat on, for doing such fantastic work in scrutinising the draft legislation. As a result of its work, no fewer than 66 changes were made to the Bill, so it was very effective.

I want to make one or two observations about scrutinising the legislation following the passage of the Bill. First, there is the standard review mechanism in clause 149, on pages 125 and 126, which provides for a statutory review not before two years and not after five years of the Bill receiving Royal Assent.

Online Safety Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

Good morning, Sir Roger. As the Minister has outlined, clause 173 gives the Secretary of State the power to amend the list of fraud offences in what will be section 36 in relation to the duties about fraudulent advertising. Although we recognise that this power is subject to some constraints, Labour has concerns about what we consider to be an unnecessary power given to the Secretary of State to amend duties about fraudulent advertising on category 1 services.

We welcome the provisions outlined in clause 173(2), which lists the criteria that any new offences must meet before the Secretary of State may include them in the list of fraud offences in section 36. The Minister outlined some of those. Along the same lines, the provision in clause 173(3) to further limit the Secretary of State’s power to include new fraud offences—it lists types of offences that may not be added to section 36—is a positive step.

However, we firmly believe that delegated law making of this nature, even when there are these minor constraints in place, is a worrying course for the Government to pursue when we have already strongly verbalised our concerns about Ofcom’s independence. Can the Minister alleviate our concerns by clarifying exactly how this process will work in practice? He must agree with the points that colleagues from across the House have made about the importance of Ofcom being truly independent and free from any political persuasion, influence or control. We all want to see the Bill change things for the better so I am keen to hear from the Minister the specific reasoning behind giving the Secretary of State the power to amend this important legislation through what will seemingly be a simple process.

As we all know, clause 174 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations to amend or repeal provisions relating to exempt content or services. Regulations made under this clause can be used to exempt certain content or services from the scope of the regulatory regime, or to bring them into scope. It will come as no surprise to the Minister that we have genuine concerns about the clause, given that it gives the Secretary of State of the day the power to amend the substantive scope of the regulatory regime. In layman’s terms, we see this clause as essentially giving the Secretary of State the power to, through regulations, exempt certain content and services from the scope of the Bill, or bring them into scope. Although we agree with the Minister that a degree of flexibility is crucial to the Bill’s success and we have indeed raised concerns throughout the Bill’s proceedings about the need to future-proof the Bill, it is a fine balance, and we feel that these powers in this clause are in excess of what is required. I will therefore be grateful to the Minister if he confirms exactly why this legislation has been drafted in a way that will essentially give the Secretary of State free rein on these important regulations.

Clauses 175 and 176 seek to give the Secretary of State additional powers, and again Labour has concerns. Clause 175 gives the Secretary of State the power to amend the list in part 2 of schedule 1, specifically paragraph 10. That list sets out descriptions of education and childcare relating to England; it is for the relevant devolved Ministers to amend the list in their respective areas. Although we welcome the fact that certain criteria must be met before the amendments can be made, this measure once again gives the Secretary of State of the day the ability substantively to amend the scope of the regime more broadly.

Those concerns are felt even more strongly when we consider clause 176, which gives the Secretary of State the power to amend three key areas in the Bill—schedules 5, 6 and 7, which relate to terrorism offences, to child sexual exploitation and abuse content offences—except those extending to Scotland—and to priority offences in some circumstances. Alongside stakeholders, including Carnegie, we strongly feel that the Secretary of State should not be able to amend the substantive scope of the regime at this level, unless moves have been initiated by Ofcom and followed by effective parliamentary oversight and scrutiny. Parliament should have a say in this. There should be no room for this level of interference in a regulatory regime, and the Minister knows that these powers are at risk of being abused by a bad actor, whoever the Secretary of State of the day may be. I must, once again, press the Minister to specifically address the concerns that Labour colleagues and I have repeatedly raised, both during these debates and on Second Reading.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a couple of questions, particularly on clause 176 and the powers to amend schedules 6 and 7. I understand the logic for schedule 5 being different—in that terrorism offences are a wholly reserved matter—and therefore why only the Secretary of State would be making any changes.

My question is on the difference in the ways to amend schedules 6 and 7—I am assuming that Government amendment 126, which asks the Secretary of State to consult Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and which we have already discussed, will be voted on and approved before we come to clause 176. I do not understand the logic for having different procedures to amend the child sexual exploitation and abuse offences and the priority offences. Why have the Government chosen two different procedures for amending the two schedules?

I understand why that might not be a terribly easy question to answer today, and I would be happy for the Minister to get in touch afterwards with the rationale. It seems to me that both areas are very important, and I do not quite understand why the difference is there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you, Sir Roger. I thank the shadow Minister for running through some of our shared concerns about the clauses. Similarly, I will talk first about some of the issues and questions that I have about the clauses, and then I will speak to amendment 76. Confusingly, amendment 76 was tabled to clause 189, which we are not discussing right now. I should have raised that when I saw the provisional selection of amendments. I will do my best not to stray too far into clause 189 while discussing the amendment.

I have raised before with the Minister some of the questions and issues that I have. Looking specifically at clause 181, I very much appreciate the clarification that he has given us about users, what the clause actually means, and how the definition of “user” works. To be fair, I agree with the way the definition of “user” is written. My slight concern is that, in measuring the number of users, platforms might find it difficult to measure the number of unregistered users and the number of users who are accessing the content through another means.

Let us say, for example, that someone is sent a WhatsApp message with a TikTok link and they click on that. I do not know whether TikTok has the ability to work out who is watching the content, or how many people are watching it. Therefore, I think that TikTok might have a difficulty when it comes to the child safety duties and working out the percentage or number of children who are accessing the service, because it will not know who is accessing it through a secondary means.

I am not trying to give anyone a get-out clause. I am trying to ensure that Ofcom can properly ensure that platforms that have a significant number of children accessing them through secondary means are still subject to the child safety duties even though there may not be a high number of children accessing the platform or the provider directly. My major concern is assessing whether they are subject to the child safety duties laid out in the Bill.

I will move straight on to our amendment 76, which would amend the definition of “content” in clause 189. I have raised this issue with the Minister already. The clause, as amended, would state that

“‘content’ means anything communicated by means of an internet service, whether publicly or privately, including but not limited to”—

and then a list. The reason I suggest that we should add those words “but not limited to” is that if we are to have a list, we should either make an exhaustive list or have clarity that there are other things that may not be on the list.

I understand that it could be argued that the word “including” suggests that the provision actually goes much wider than what is in the list. I understand that that is the argument that the Minister may make, but can we have some more clarity from him? If he is not willing to accept the amendment but he is willing to be very clear that, actually, the provision does include things that we have not thought of and that do not currently exist and that it genuinely includes anything communicated by means of an internet service, that will be very helpful.

I think that the amendment would add something positive to the Bill. It is potentially the most important amendment that I have tabled in relation to future-proofing the Bill, because it does feel as though the definition of “content”, even though it says “including”, is unnecessarily restrictive and could be open to challenge should someone invent something that is not on the list and say, “Well, it’s not mentioned, so I am not going to have to regulate this in the way we have to regulate other types of content.”

I have other questions about the same provision in clause 189, but I will hold on to those until we come to the next grouping.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I rise briefly to support amendment 76, in the name of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Labour supports broadening the definition of “content” in this way. I refer the Minister to our earlier contributions about the importance of including newspaper comments, for example, in the scope of the Bill. This is a clear example of a key loophole in the Bill. We believe that a broadened definition of “content” would be a positive step forward to ensure that there is future-proofing, to prevent any unnecessary harm from any future content.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

As we know, the clause sets out the meanings of various terms used in the Bill. Throughout our Committee debates, Labour has raised fundamental concerns on a number of points where we feel the interpretation of the Bill requires clarification. We raised concerns as early as clause 8, when we considered the Bill’s ability to capture harm in relation to newly produced CSEA content and livestreaming. The Minister may feel he has sufficiently reassured us, but I am afraid that simply is not the case. Labour has no specific issues with the interpretations listed in clause 189, but we will likely seek to table further amendments on Report in the areas that we feel require clarification.

[Kirsty Blackman]

In one of our earlier debates, I asked the Minister about the difference between “oral” and “aural”, and I did not get a very satisfactory answer. I know the difference in their dictionary definition—I understand that they are different, although the words sound the same. I am confused that clause 189 uses “oral” as part of the definition of content, but clause 49 refers to

“one-to-one live aural communications”

in defining things that are excluded.

I do not understand why the Government have chosen to use those two different words in different places in the Bill. It strikes me that, potentially, we mean one or the other. If they do mean two different things, why has one thing been chosen for clause 49 and another thing for clause 189? Why has the choice been made that clause 49 relates to communications that are heard, but clause 189 relates to communications that are said? I do not quite get the Government’s logic in using those two different words.

I know this is a picky point, but in order to have good legislation, we want it to make sense, for there to be a good rationale for everything that is in it and for people to be able to understand it. At the moment, I do not properly understand why the choice has been made to use two different words.

More generally, the definitions in clause 189 seem pretty sensible, notwithstanding what I said in the previous debate in respect of amendment 76, which, with your permission, Sir Roger, I intend to move when we reach the appropriate point.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Amendment 139 was tabled by a Member who is not a member of the Committee, and nobody has claimed it, so we come to amendment 49.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 193, page 161, line 1, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) Subject to subsection (2A) below, the other provisions of this Act come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.

(2A) The provisions of Part 5 shall come into force at the end of the period of three months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”

This amendment would bring Part 5 into force three months after the Act is passed.

We all understand the need for the Bill, which is why we have been generally supportive in Committee. I hope we can also agree that the measures that the Bill introduces must come into force as soon as is reasonably possible. That is particularly important for the clauses introducing protections for children, who have been subject to the harms of the online world for far too long already. I was glad to hear the Minister say in our discussions of clauses 31 to 33 that the Government share the desire to get such protections in place quickly.

My hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South also spoke about our concerns about the commencement and transitional provisions when speaking to clauses 170 to 172. We fundamentally believe that the provisions on pornography in part 5 cannot, and should not, be susceptible to further delay, because they require no secondary legislation. I will come to that point in my comments on the amendment. More broadly, I will touch briefly on the reasons why we cannot wait for the legislation and make reference to a specific case that I know colleagues across the House are aware of.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reading East (Matt Rodda) has been a powerful voice on behalf of his constituents Amanda and Stuart Stephens, whose beloved son Olly was tragically murdered in a field outside his home. A BBC “Panorama” investigation, shown only a few days ago, investigated the role that social media played in Olly’s death. It specifically highlighted disturbing evidence that some social media algorithms may still promote violent content to vulnerable young people. That is another example highlighting the urgent need for the Bill, along with a regulatory process to keep people safe online.

We also recognise, however, the important balance between the need for effective development of guidance by Ofcom, informed by consultation, and the need to get the duties up and going. In some cases, that will mean having to stipulate deadlines in the Bill, which we feel is a serious omission and oversight at present.

The amendment would bring part 5 of the Bill into force three months after it is enacted. The Minister knows how important part 5 is, so I do not need to repeat myself. The provisions of the amendment, including subsequent amendments that Labour and others will likely table down the line, are central to keeping people safe online. We have heard compelling evidence from experts and speeches from colleagues across the House that have highlighted how vital it is that the Bill goes further on pornographic content. The amendment is simple. It seeks to make real, meaningful change as soon as is practically possible. The Bill is long delayed, and providers and users are desperate for clarity and positive change, which is what led us to tabling the amendment.

[Kirsty Blackman]

In the interests of not having to make a speech in this debate, I want to let the hon. Member know that I absolutely support the amendment. It is well balanced, brings the most important provisions into force as soon as possible, and allows the Secretary of State to appoint dates for the others.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention, and I am grateful for her and her party’s support for this important amendment.

It is also worth drawing colleagues’ attention to the history of issues, which have been brought forward in this place before. We know there was reluctance on the part of Ministers when the Digital Economy Act 2017 was on the parliamentary agenda to commence the all-important part 3, which covered many of the provisions now in part 5. Ultimately, the empty promises made by the Minister’s former colleagues have led to huge, record failures, even though the industry is ready, having had years to prepare to implement the policy. I want to place on record my thanks to campaigning groups such as the Age Verification Providers Association and others, which have shown fierce commitment in getting us this far.

It might help if I cast colleagues’ minds back to the Digital Economy Act 2017, which received Royal Assent in April of that year. Following that, in November 2018, the then Minister of State for Digital and Creative Industries told the Science and Technology Committee that part 3 of the DEA would be in force “by Easter next year”. Then, in December 2018, both Houses of Parliament approved the necessary secondary legislation, the Online Pornography (Commercial Basis) Regulations 2018, and the required statutory guidance.

But shortly after, in April 2018, the first delay arose when the Government published an online press release stating that part 3 of the DEA would not come into force until 15 July 2019. However, June 2019 came around and still there was nothing. On 20 June, five days after it should have come into force, the then Under-Secretary of State told the House of Lords that the defendant had failed to notify the European Commission of the statutory guidance, which would need to be done, and that that would result in a delay to the commencement of part 3

“in the region of six months”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2019; Vol. 798, c. 883.]

However, on 16 October 2019, the then Secretary of State announced via a written statement to Parliament that the Government

“will not be commencing part 3 of the Digital Economy Act 2017 concerning age verification for online pornography.”—[Official Report, 16 October 2019; Vol. 666, c. 17WS.]

A mere 13 days later, the Government called a snap general election. I am sure those are pretty staggering realities for the Minister to hear—and defend—but I am willing to listen to his defence. It really is not good enough. The industry is ready, the technology has been there for quite some time, and, given this Government’s fondness for a U-turn, there are concerns that part 5 of the Bill, which we have spent weeks deliberating, could be abandoned in a similar way as part 3 of the DEA was.

The Minister has failed to concede on any of the issues we have raised in Committee. It seems we are dealing with a Government who are ignoring the wide-ranging gaps and issues in the Bill. He has a relatively last-ditch opportunity to at least bring about some positive change, and to signify that he is willing to admit that the legislation as it stands is far from perfect. The provisions in part 5 are critical—they are probably the most important in the entire Bill—so I urge him to work with Labour to make sure they are put to good use in a more than reasonable timeframe.

Online Safety Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage & Committee Debate - 13th sitting
Tuesday 21st June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

With your permission, Ms Rees, I will speak to clause stand part and clauses 124 to 127 at the same time. Labour supports clause 123, which outlines the powers that Ofcom will have when applying to the court for business disruption measures. Business disruption measures are court orders that require third parties to withdraw services or block access to non-compliant regulated services. It is right that Ofcom has these tools at its disposal, particularly if it is going to be able to regulate effectively against the most serious instances of user harm. However, the Bill will be an ineffective regime if Ofcom is forced to apply for separate court orders when trying to protect people across the board from the same harms. We have already waited too long for change. Labour is committed to giving Ofcom the powers to take action, where necessary, as quickly as possible. That is why we have tabled amendments 50 and 51, which we feel will go some way in tackling these issues.

Amendment 50 would give Ofcom the ability to take action against a schedule of non-compliant sites, while still preserving the right of those sites to oppose the application for—and/or appeal through the courts against any—orders to block access or support services. The Bill currently requires Ofcom to seek a separate court order for each service against which it wishes to take enforcement action in the form of blocking access or services. That is the only effective mechanism for overseas websites. UK-based services will be subject to enforcement notices and financial penalties that can be enforced without having to go to court. That creates a disadvantage for UK sites, which can be more easily enforced against.

Given that there are 4 million to 5 million pornographic websites, for example, the requirement for separate court orders will prevent Ofcom from taking action at scale and creating a level playing field for all adult sites. Under the Bill, Ofcom must take action against each offending website or social media company individually. While we acknowledge that the Government have stated that enforcement action can be taken against multiple offending content providers, in our opinion that is not made clear in the Bill.

Moreover, we are concerned that some pornography websites would seek to avoid the Bill’s requirements by changing their domain name—domain hopping. That was threatened last year when Germany moved to issue a blocking order against major providers of internet pornography. That is why Ofcom must be granted clear enforcement powers to take swift action against multiple websites and content providers in one court action or order.

This group of amendments would also provide clarity and ease of enforcement for internet service providers, which will be expected to enforce court orders. Labour wants the Bill to be genuinely effective, and amendments 50 and 51 could ensure that Ofcom has the tools available to it to take action at pace. We urge the Minister to accept these small concessions, which could have a hugely positive impact.

Amendment 51 would give Ofcom the ability to take action against a schedule of non-compliant sites, while preserving the right of those sites to oppose an application for an order to block access or support services, or to appeal through the courts against any such order.

It will come as no surprise that Labour supports clause 124, which sets out the circumstances in which Ofcom may apply to the courts for an interim service restriction order. We particularly support the need for Ofcom to be able to take action when time is not on its side, or where, put plainly, the level of harm being caused means that it would be inappropriate to wait for a definite failure before taking action.

However, we hope that caution is exercised if Ofcom ever needs to consider such an interim order; we must, of course, get the balance right in our approach to internet regulation more widely. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could outline his understanding of the specifics of when these orders may be applied. More broadly, Labour agrees that Ofcom should be given the power to act when time demands it, so we have not sought to amend clause 124 at this stage.

Labour also supports the need for Ofcom to have the power to apply to the courts for an access restriction order, as outlined in clause 125. It is vital that Ofcom is given the power to prevent, restrict or deter individuals in the UK from accessing a service from a non-compliant provider. We welcome the specific provisions on access via internet service providers and app stores. We all know from Frances Haugen’s testimony that harmful material can often be easily buried, so it is right and proper that those are considered as “access facilities” under the clause. Ultimately, we support the intentions of clause 125 and, again, have not sought to amend it at this stage.

We also support clause 126, which sets out the circumstances in which Ofcom may apply to the courts for an interim access restriction order. I will not repeat myself: for the reasons I have already outlined, it is key that Ofcom has sufficient powers to act, particularly on occasions when it is inappropriate to wait for a failure to be established.

We welcome clause 127, which clarifies how Ofcom’s enforcement powers can interact. We particularly welcome clarification that, where Ofcom exercises its power to apply to the courts for a business disruption order under clauses 123 to 126, it is not precluded from taking action under its other enforcement powers. As we have repeatedly reiterated, we welcome Ofcom’s having sufficient power to reasonably bring about positive change and increase safety measures online. That is why we have not sought to amend clause 127.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you for chairing this morning’s sitting, Ms Rees.

I agree with the hon. Member for Pontypridd that these clauses are necessary and important, but I also agree that the amendments are important. It seems like this is a kind of tidying-up exercise, to give Ofcom the ability to act in a way that will make its operation smoother. We all want this legislation to work. This is not an attempt to break this legislation—to be fair, none of our amendments have been—but an attempt to make things work better.

Amendments 50 and 51 are fairly similar to the one that the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children proposed to clause 103. They would ensure that Ofcom could take action against a group of sites, particularly if they were facing the same kind of issues, they had the same kind of functionality, or the same kind of concerns were being raised about them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Clause 130 sets up a committee to advise Ofcom on misinformation and disinformation, which is the only direct reference to misinformation and disinformation in the entire Online Safety Bill. However, the Bill gives the committee no identifiable powers or active role in tackling harmful misinformation and disinformation, meaning that it has limited practical purpose. It is also unclear how the advisory committee will fit with Ofcom’s wider regulatory functions.

The remaining provisions in the Bill are limited and do not properly address harmful misinformation and disinformation. If tackling harmful misinformation and disinformation is left to this clause, the Bill will fail both to tackle harm properly, and to keep children and adults safe.

The clause risks giving a misleading impression that action is being taken. If the Government and Ofcom proceed with creating the committee, we need to see that its remit is strengthened and clarified, so that it more effectively tackles harmful disinformation and misinformation. That should include advising on Ofcom’s research, reporting on drivers of harmful misinformation and disinformation, and proportionate responses to them. There should also be a duty on Ofcom to consult the committee when drafting relevant codes of practice.

That is why we have tabled amendment 57. It would change the period by which the advisory committee must report from 18 months to six. This is a simple amendment that encourages scrutiny. Once again, the Minister surely has little reason not to accept it, especially as we have discussed at length the importance of the advisory committee having the tools that it needs to succeed.

Increasing the regularity of these reports from the advisory committee is vital, particularly given the ever-changing nature of the internet. Labour has already raised concerns about the lack of futureproofing in the Bill more widely, and we feel that the advisory committee has an important role and function to play in areas where the Bill itself is lacking. We are not alone in this view; the Minister has heard from his Back Benchers about just how important this committee is.

Amendment 58 would require Ofcom to produce a code of practice on system-level disinformation. Again, this amendment will come as no surprise to the Minister, given the concerns that Labour has repeatedly raised about the lack of provisions relating to disinformation in the Bill. It seems like an obvious omission that the Bill has failed to consider a specific code of practice around reducing disinformation, and the amendment would be a simple way to ensure that Ofcom actively encourages services to reduce disinformation across their platforms. The Minister knows that this would be a welcome step, and I urge him to consider supporting the amendment.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to briefly agree with the sentiments of the Opposition Front Bench, especially about the strength of the committee and the lack of teeth that it currently has. Given that the Government have been clear that they are very concerned about misinformation and disinformation, it seems odd that they are covered in the Bill in such a wishy-washy way.

The reduction of the time from 18 months to six months would also make sense. We would expect the initial report the committee publish in six months to not be as full as the ones it would publish after that. I do not see any issue with it being required to produce a report as soon as possible to assess how the Act is bedding in and beginning to work, rather than having to wait to assess—potentially once the Act is properly working. We want to be able to pick up any teething problems that the Act might have.

We want the committee to be able to say, “Actually, this is not working quite as we expected. We suggest that Ofcom operates in a slightly different way or that the interaction with providers happens in a slightly different way.” I would rather that problems with the Act were tackled as early as possible. We will not know about problems with the Act, because there is no proper review mechanism. There is no agreement on the committee, for example, to look at how the Act is operating. This is one of the few parts of the Bill where we have got an agreement to a review, and it would make sense that it happen as early as possible.

We agree that misinformation and disinformation are very important matters that really need to be tackled, but there is just not enough clout in the Bill to allow Ofcom to properly tackle these issues that are causing untold harm.

Online Safety Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. We talk time and again about this Bill being world leading, but with that comes a responsibility to show global leadership. Other countries around the world will be looking to us, and this Parliament, when they adopt their own, similar legislation, and we need to be mindful of that when looking at what powers we give to a Secretary of State—particularly in overruling any independence of Ofcom or Parliament’s sovereignty for that matter.

New clause 10 provides a viable alternative. The Minister knows that this is an area where even his Back Benchers are divided. He must closely consider new clause 10 and recognise that placing power in Ofcom’s hands is an important step forward. None of us wants to see a situation where the Secretary of State is able to influence the regulator. We feel that, without this important clause and concession, the Government could be supporting a rather dangerous precedent in terms of independence in regulatory systems more widely.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to talk about a specific example. Perhaps the Minister will be able to explain why the legislation is written this way around when I would have written it the opposite way around, much more in line with proposed new clause 10.

Snapchat brought in the Snap Map feature, which that involved having geolocation on every individual’s phone; whenever anyone took a photo to put it on Snapchat, that geolocation was included. The feature was automatically turned on for all Snapchat users when it first came in, I think in 2017. No matter what age they were, when they posted their story on Snapchat, which is available to anyone on their friends list and sometimes wider, anyone could see where they were. If a child had taken a photo at their school and put it on Snapchat, anyone could see what school they went to. It was a major security concern for parents.

That very concerning situation genuinely could have resulted in children and other vulnerable people, who may not have even known that the feature had been turned on by default and would not know how to turn on ghost mode in Snapchat so as not to post their location, being put at risk. The situation could have been helped if media literacy duties had kicked in that meant that the regulator had to say, “This is a thing on Snapchat: geolocation is switched on. Please be aware of this if your children or people you are responsible for are using Snapchat.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

With your permission, Ms Rees, I will also speak to clause stand part.

Labour welcomes the clause. We see it as a positive step forward that the Government have committed to creating a new offence in certain circumstances where sending a photograph or film of a person’s genitals to another person will cause distress or humiliation. However, the Government have missed a huge opportunity to accurately capture the problems caused by sharing intimate images online. I will come to that shortly in addressing amendments 41 and 42.

We know that the act of sending unsolicited genital images—cyber-flashing, or sending dick pics—is a huge problem here in the UK. Research from Bumble has shown how disproportionally the issue affects young women. The statistics are shocking and speak for themselves. A whopping 48% of millennial women said that they had been sent an unsolicited sexual image in the last year alone. I must pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Basingstoke, who we all know shared her own experiences of cyber-flashing relatively recently. She is not alone—not in this House or in the country.

I have my own experiences, as do friends, colleagues and even my staff members, and we all share the same concerns about the prevalence of cyber-flashing. The Minister does not need to be reminded of it; he knows of the extent of the issues. We heard compelling evidence only a few weeks ago from Professor Clare McGlynn and Nima Elmi from Bumble, among others.

Labour firmly believes, as Professor McGlynn has outlined, that cyber-flashing is problematic because it is non-consensual conduct of a sexual nature. Distributing these images is not in and of itself wrong, but doing so without the consent of the recipient is. The non-consensual act breaches women’s rights to sexual autonomy, to be treated with dignity and to be free from sexual violence, regardless of the motive of the perpetrator.

We know that men’s motivations for cyber-flashing are varied and overlapping. They include misogyny, causing distress, sexual gratification, humour, boosting status among peers, sexual intimidation, and transactional motivations. Yet there is no evidence that the harms experienced by women are worse when offenders have the specific motivations identified in motive-based proposals, such as causing distress.

For example, a woman may be sent unsolicited penis images while on public transport, making her feel threatened and fearful for her safety, regardless of whether the sender intended to cause her alarm or was simply trying to impress his friends as a bit of banter. That is why the consent approach really is crucial, as I will now discuss in relation to amendments 41 and 42.

Amendment 41 would make it an offence to send an image of genitals to another person if the recipient has not given consent to receive that image. Labour recognises that there are two main options when drafting a new cyber-flashing criminal offence. The first is what we are trying to achieve with these amendments—a comprehensive consent-based offence requiring proof of non-consent. The alternative, as currently proposed by the Law Commission, is far too limited. It offers a motive-based offence, which applies only on proof of specific motives on the part of the offender, such as to cause distress, alarm or humiliation, to get sexual gratification, or to cause distress by being reckless. This is hugely problematic for women and girls across the country, and the Minister must recognise the message this sends to them.

Proving a motive behind an offence as simple as merely sending a photograph is nigh on impossible. If we really want to see systemic change in attitudes to women and girls, we fundamentally should not be creating laws that place the burden on the victim. A consent-based offence, as in our amendments, covers all forms of cyber-flashing, regardless of the motives of the sender. Motive requirements create an unjustified hierarchy of abuses and victims, and they do not reflect victims’ experiences. Requiring proof of specific motives will make investigations and prosecutions more difficult.

We know from police and victims that investigations and prosecutions for sharing sexual images without consent, such as revenge porn, are not taken forward due to similar motive requirements. How, therefore, can the Minister think that the provisions in the Bill related to cyber-flashing go far enough? Will they actually create change? I mentioned on Second Reading our genuine concerns about the levels of misogyny that have become far too normalised across our communities and within our society as a whole.

The consent-based offence provides a much better foundation for education and prevention projects. It sends the message that all sexual activity should be grounded in consent. It better supports education about online activities, with a focus on consent-based practices, and makes clear that any taking or sharing of sexual images without consent is wrong, harmful and criminal. Those are all positives.

The stakeholders are calling for a consent-based approach. The Opposition want the same. Even the Minister’s own Back Benchers can see that the Bill fails to capture and address the real harms women and girls face online. The Minister can likely sense my exasperation. It comes from a place of genuine frustration. I cannot understand how there has not been any movement on this from the Government side.

My final point—and indeed plea—is to urge the Minister to consider what is going on internationally on this issue. He will know that a consent-based cyber-flashing offence has been adopted in Texas and is being debated in other US states. Consent is easily obtained and criminal charges easily avoided. It is important to remember that avoiding being charged with a criminal offence is straightforward. All the sender needs to do is ask, “Would you like to see a picture of my genitals?” It is as simple as that. I am sure even the Minister can agree on that point. I urge him to genuinely consider amendments 41 and 42. There has been no movement from the Minister and no concessions thus far as we have scrutinised the Bill, but he must know that the Bill is far from perfect in its current form.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I would like to make a couple of comments. The shadow Minister mentioned education and prevention projects, which are key. In Scotland, our kids’ sex, health and relationship education in schools teaches consent from the earliest possible age. That is vital. We have a generation of men who think it is okay to send these images and not seek consent. As the shadow Minister said, the problem is everywhere. So many women have received images that they had no desire to see. They did not ask for them, and they did not consent to receive them, but they get them.

Requiring someone to prove the intent behind the offence is just impossible. It is so unworkable, and that makes it really difficult. This is yet another issue that makes it clear that we need to have reference to violence against women and girls on the face of the Bill. If that were included, we would not be making such a passionate case here. We would already have a code of conduct and assessments that have to take place on the basis of the specific harm to women and girls from such offences. We would not be making the case so forcefully because it would already be covered.

I wish the Minister would take on board how difficult it is for women and girls online, how much of an issue this specific action causes and how much pain and suffering it causes. It would great if the Minister could consider moving somewhat on this issue in order to protect women and girls.

Online Safety Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Thursday 16th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Thank you for your efforts in chairing our meeting today, Sir Roger. My thoughts are with the hon. Member for Batley and Spen and her entire family on the anniversary of Jo Cox’s murder; the SNP would like to echo that sentiment.

I want to talk about my amendment, and I start with a quote from the Minister on Second Reading:

“A number of Members…have raised the issue of small platforms that are potentially harmful. I will give some thought to how the question of small but high-risk platforms can be covered.”—[Official Report, 19 April 2022; Vol. 712, c. 133.]

I appreciate that the Minister may still be thinking about that. He might accept all of our amendments; that is entirely possible, although I am not sure there is any precedent. The possibility is there that that might happen.

Given how strong I felt that the Minister was on the issue on Second Reading, I am deeply disappointed that there are no Government amendments to this section of the Bill. I am disappointed because of the massive risk of harm caused by some very small platforms—it is not a massive number—where extreme behaviour and radicalisation is allowed to thrive. It is not just about the harm to those individuals who spend time on those platforms and who are radicalised, presented with misinformation and encouraged to go down rabbit holes and become more and more extreme in their views. It is also about the risk of harm to other people as a result of the behaviour inspired in those individuals. We are talking about Jo Cox today; she is in our memories and thoughts. Those small platforms are the ones that are most likely to encourage individuals towards extremely violent acts.

If the Bill is to fulfil its stated aims and take the action we all want to see to prevent the creation of those most heinous, awful crimes, it needs to be much stronger on small, very high-risk platforms. I will make no apologies for that. I do not care if those platforms have small amounts of profits. They are encouraging and allowing the worst behaviours to thrive on their platforms. They should be held to a higher level of accountability. It is not too much to ask to class them as category 1 platforms. It is not too much to ask them to comply with a higher level of risk assessment requirements and a higher level of oversight from Ofcom. It is not too much to ask because of the massive risk of harm they pose and the massive actual harm that they create.

Those platforms should be punished for that. It is one thing to punish and criminalise the behaviour of users on those platforms—individual users create and propagate illegal content or radicalise other users—but the Bill does not go far enough in holding those platforms to account for allowing that to take place. They know that it is happening. Those platforms are set up as an alternative place—a place that people are allowed to be far more radical that they are on Twitter, YouTube, Twitch or Discord. None of those larger platforms have much moderation, but the smaller platforms encourage such behaviour. Links are put on other sites pointing to those platforms. For example, when people read vaccine misinformation, there are links posted to more radical, smaller platforms. I exclude Discord because, given its number of users, I think it would be included in one of the larger-platform categories anyway. It is not that there is not radical behaviour on Discord—there is—but I think the size of its membership excludes it, in my head certainly, from the category of the very smallest platforms that pose the highest risk.

We all know from our inboxes the number of people who contact us saying that 5G is the Government trying to take over their brains, or that the entire world is run by Jewish lizard people. We get those emails on a regular basis and those theories are propagated on the smallest platforms. Fair enough—some people may not take any action as a result of the radicalisation that they have experienced as a result of their very extreme views. But some people will take action and that action may be simply enough to harm their friends or family, it may be simply enough to exclude them and drag them away from the society or community that they were previously members of or it might, in really tragic cases, be far more extreme. It might lead people to cause physical or mental harm to others intentionally as a result of the beliefs that they have had created and fostered on those platforms.

That is why we have tabled the amendments. This is the one area that the Government have most significantly failed in writing this Bill, by not ensuring that the small, very high-risk platforms are held to the highest level of accountability and are punished for allowing these behaviours to thrive on their platforms. I give the Minister fair warning that unless he chooses to accept the amendments, I intend to push them to a vote. I would appreciate it if he gave assurances, but I do not believe that any reassurance that he could give would compare to having such a measure in the Bill. As I say, for me the lack of this provision is the biggest failing of the entire Bill.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I echo the comments of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. I completely agree with everything she has just said and I support the amendments that she has tabled.

The Minister knows my feelings on the Government’s approach to categorisation services; he has heard my concerns time and time again. However, it is not just me who believes that the Government have got their approach really wrong. It is also stakeholders far and wide. In our evidence sessions, we heard from HOPE not hate and the Antisemitism Policy Trust specifically on this issue. In its current form, the categorisation process is based on size versus harm, which is a fundamentally flawed approach.

The Government’s response to the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Bill makes it clear that they consider that reach is a key and proportional consideration when assigning categories and that they believe that the Secretary of State’s powers to amend those categories are sufficient to protect people. Unfortunately, that leaves many alternative platforms out of category 1, even if they host large volumes of harmful material.

The duty of care approach that essentially governs the Bill is predicated on risk assessment. If size allows platforms to dodge the entry criteria for managing high risk, there is a massive hole in the regime. Some platforms have already been mentioned, including BitChute, Gab and 4chan, which host extreme racist, misogynistic, homophobic and other extreme content that radicalises people and incites harm. And the Minister knows that.

I take this opportunity to pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), who has campaigned heavily on the issue since the horrendous and tragic shooting in Keyham in his constituency. One of my big concerns about the lack of focus on violence against women and girls in the Bill, which we have mentioned time and time again, is the potential for the rise of incel culture online, which is very heavily reported on these alternative platforms—these high-harm, high-risk platforms.

I will just give one example. A teacher contacted me about the Bill. She talked about the rise of misogyny and trying to educate her class on what was happening. At the end of the class, a 15-year-old boy—I appreciate that he is under 18 and is a child, so would come under a different category within the Bill, but I will still give the example. He came up to her and said: “Miss, I need to chat to you. This is something I’m really concerned about. All I did was google, ‘Why can’t I get a girlfriend?’” He had been led down a rabbit hole into a warren of alternative platforms that tried to radicalise him with the most extreme content of incel culture: women are evil; women are the ones who are wrong; it is women he should hate; it is his birth right to have a girlfriend, and he should have one; and he should hate women. That is the type of content that is on those platforms that young, impressionable minds are being pointed towards. They are being radicalised and it is sadly leading to incredibly tragic circumstances, so I really want to push the Minister on the subject.

We share the overarching view of many others that this crucial risk needs to be factored into the classification process that determines which companies are placed in category 1. Otherwise, the Bill risks failing to protect adults from substantial amounts of material that causes physical and psychological harm. Schedule 10 needs to be amended to reflect that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I appreciate the shadow Minister’s bringing that issue up. Would she agree that, given we have constraints on broadcast and newspaper reporting on suicide for these very reasons, there can be no argument against including such a measure in the Bill?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I completely agree. Those safeguards are in place for that very reason. It seems a major omission that they are not also included in the Online Safety Bill if we are truly to save lives.

The Bill’s own pre-legislative scrutiny Committee recommended that the legislation should

“adopt a more nuanced approach, based not just on size and high-level functionality, but factors such as risk, reach, user base, safety performance, and business model.”

The Government replied that they

“want the Bill to be targeted and proportionate for businesses and Ofcom and do not wish to impose disproportionate burdens on small companies.”

It is, though, entirely appropriate to place a major regulatory burden on small companies that facilitate the glorification of suicide and the sharing of dangerous methods through their forums. It is behaviour that is extraordinarily damaging to public health and makes no meaningful economic or social contribution.

Amendment 82 is vital to our overarching aim of having an assessed risk of harm at the heart of the Bill. The categorisation system is not fit for purpose and will fail to capture so many of the extremely harmful services that many of us have already spoken about.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Labour supports clause 85, which gives Ofcom the power to require the provision of any information it requires in order to discharge its online safety functions. We strongly believe that, in the interests of transparency, Ofcom as the regulator must have sufficient power to require a service provider to share its risk assessment in order to understand how that service provider is identifying risks. As the Minister knows, we feel that that transparency should go further, and that the risk assessments should be made public. However, we have already had that argument during a previous debate, so I will not repeat those arguments—on this occasion, at least.

Labour also supports clause 86, and we particularly welcome the clarification that Ofcom may require the provision of information in any form. If we are to truly give Ofcom the power to regulate and, where necessary, investigate service providers, we must ensure that it has sufficient legislative tools to rely on.

The Bill gives some strong powers to Ofcom. We support the requirement in clause 87 to name a senior manager, but again, we feel those provisions should go further. Both users and Ofcom must have access to the full range of tools they need to hold the tech giants to account. As it stands, senior managers can be held criminally liable only for technical offences, such as failing to supply information to the regulator, and even then, those measures might not come in until two years after the Bill is in place. Surely the top bosses at social media companies should be held criminally liable for systemic and repeated failures to ensure online safety as soon as the Bill comes into force, so can the Minister explain the reasons for the delay?

The Minister will be happy to hear that Labour supports clause 88. It is important to have an outline on the face of the Bill of the circumstances in which Ofcom can require a report from a skilled person. It is also important that Ofcom has the power to appoint, or give notice to a provider requiring them to appoint, a skilled person, as Labour fears that without those provisions in subsections (3) and (4), the ambiguity around defining a so-called skilled person could be detrimental. We therefore support the clause, and have not sought to amend it at this stage.

Again, Labour supports all the intentions of clause 89 in the interests of online safety more widely. Of course, Ofcom must have the power to force a company to co-operate with an investigation.

Again, we support the need for clause 90, which gives Ofcom the power to require an individual to attend an interview. That is particularly important in the instances outlined in subsection (1), whereby Ofcom is carrying out an investigation into the failure or possible failure of a provider of a regulated service to comply with a relevant requirement. Labour has repeatedly called for such personal responsibility, so we are pleased that the Government are ensuring that the Bill includes sufficient powers for Ofcom to allow proper scrutiny.

Labour supports clause 91 and schedule 11, which outlines in detail Ofcom’s powers of entry, inspection and audit. I did not think we would support this much, but clearly we do. We want to work with the Government to get this right, and we see ensuring Ofcom has those important authorisation powers as central to it establishing itself as a viable regulator of the online space, both now and for generations to come. We will support and have not sought to amend the clauses or schedule 11 for the reasons set out.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to make a brief comment echoing the shadow Minister’s welcome for the inclusion of senior managers and named people in the Bill. I agree that that level of personal liability and responsibility is the only way that we will be able to hold some of these incredibly large, unwieldy organisations to account. If they could wriggle out of this by saying, “It’s somebody else’s responsibility,” and if everyone then disagreed about whose responsibility it was, we would be in a much worse place, so I also support the inclusion of these clauses and schedule 11.

Online Safety Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Thursday 16th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones (Pontypridd) (Lab)]

Under this chapter, Ofcom will have the power to direct companies to use accredited technology to identify child sexual exploitation and abuse content, whether communicated publicly or privately by means of a service, and to remove that content quickly. Colleagues will be aware that the Internet Watch Foundation is one group that assists companies in doing that by providing them with “hashes” of previously identified child sexual abuse material in order to prevent the upload of such material to their platforms. That helps stop the images of victims being recirculated again and again. Tech companies can then notify law enforcement of the details of who has uploaded the content, and an investigation can be conducted and offenders sharing the content held to account.

Those technologies are extremely accurate and, thanks to the quality of our datasets, ensure that companies are detecting only imagery that is illegal. There are a number of types of technology that Ofcom could consider accrediting, including image hashing. A hash is a unique string of letters and numbers that can be applied to an image and matched every time a user attempts to upload a known illegal image to a platform.

PhotoDNA is another type, created in 2009 in a collaboration between Microsoft and Professor Hany Farid at the University of Berkeley. PhotoDNA is a vital tool in the detection of CSEA online. It enables law enforcement, charities, non-governmental organisations and the internet industry to find copies of an image even when it has been digitally altered. It is one of the most important technical developments in online child protection. It is extremely accurate, with a failure rate of one in 50 billion to 100 billion. That gives companies a high degree of certainty that what they are removing is illegal, and a firm basis for law enforcement to pursue offenders.

Lastly, there is webpage blocking. Most of the imagery that the Internet Watch Foundation removes from the internet is hosted outside the UK. While it is waiting for removal, it can disable public access to an image or webpage by adding it to our webpage blocking list. That can be utilised by search providers to de-index known webpages containing CSAM. I therefore ask the Minister, as we continue to explore this chapter, to confirm exactly how such technologies can be utilised once the Bill receives Royal Assent.

Labour welcomes clause 105, which confirms, in subsection (2), that where a service provider is already using technology on a voluntary basis but it is ineffective, Ofcom can still intervene and require a service provider to use a more effective technology, or the same technology in a more effective way. It is vital that Ofcom is given the power and opportunity to intervene in the strongest possible sense to ensure that safety online is kept at the forefront.

However, we do require some clarification, particularly on subsections (9) and (10), which explain that Ofcom will only be able to require the use of tools that meet the minimum standards for accuracy for detecting terrorism and/or CSEA content, as set out by the Secretary of State. Although minimum standards are of course a good thing, can the Minister clarify the exact role that the Secretary of State will have in imposing these minimum standards? How will this work in practice?

Once again, Labour does not oppose clause 106 and we have not sought to amend it at this stage. It is vital that Ofcom has the power to revoke a notice under clause 103(1) if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the provider is not complying with it. Only with these powers can we be assured that service providers will be implored to take their responsibilities and statutory duties, as outlined in the Bill, seriously.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I have a few questions, concerns and suggestions relating to these clauses. I think it was the hon. Member for Don Valley who asked me last week about the reports to the National Crime Agency and how that would work—about how, if a human was not checking those things, there would be an assurance that proper reports were being made, and that scanning was not happening and reports were not being made when images were totally legal and there was no problem with them. [Interruption.] I thought it was the hon. Member for Don Valley, although it may not have been. Apologies—it was a Conservative Member. I am sorry for misnaming the hon. Member.

The hon. Member for Pontypridd made a point about the high level of accuracy of the technologies. That should give everybody a level of reassurance that the reports that are and should be made to the National Crime Agency on child sexual abuse images will be made on a highly accurate basis, rather than a potentially inaccurate one. Actually, some computer technology—particularly for scanning for images, rather than text—is more accurate than human beings. I am pleased to hear those particular statistics.

Queries have been raised on this matter by external organisations—I am particularly thinking about the NSPCC, which we spoke about earlier. The Minister has thankfully given a number of significant reassurances about the ability to proactively scan. External organisations such as the NSPCC are still concerned that there is not enough on the face of the Bill about proactive scanning and ensuring that the current level of proactive scanning is able—or required—to be replicated when the Bill comes into action.

During an exchange in an earlier Committee sitting, the Minister gave a commitment—I am afraid I do not have the quote—to being open to looking at amending clause 103. I am slightly disappointed that there are no Government amendments, but I understand that there has been only a fairly short period; I am far less disappointed than I was previously, when the Minister had much more time to consider the actions he might have been willing to take.

The suggestion I received from the NSPCC is about the gap in the Bill regarding the ability of Ofcom to take action. These clauses allow Ofcom to take action against individual providers about which it has concerns; those providers will have to undertake duties set out by Ofcom. The NSPCC suggests that there could be a risk register, or that a notice could be served on a number of companies at one time, rather than Ofcom simply having to pick one company, or to repeatedly pick single companies and serve notices on them. Clause 83 outlines a register of risk profiles that must be created by Ofcom. It could therefore serve notice on all the companies that fall within a certain risk profile or all the providers that have common functionalities.

If there were a new, emerging concern, that would make sense. Rather than Ofcom having to go through the individual process with all the individual providers when it knows that there is common functionality—because of the risk assessments that have been done and Ofcom’s oversight of the different providers—it could serve notice on all of them in one go. It could not then accidentally miss one out and allow people to move to a different platform that had not been mentioned. I appreciate the conversation we had around this issue earlier, and the opportunity to provide context in relation to the NSPCC’s suggestions, but it would be great if the Minister would be willing to consider them.

I have another question, to which I think the Minister will be able to reply in the affirmative, which is on the uses of the technology as it evolves. We spoke about that in an earlier meeting. The technology that we have may not be what we use in the future to scan for terrorist-related activity or child sexual abuse material. It is important that the Bill adequately covers future conditions. I think that it does, but will the Minister confirm that, as technology advances and changes, these clauses will adequately capture the scanning technologies that are required, and any updates in the way in which platforms work and we interact with each other on the internet?

I have fewer concerns about future-proofing with regard to these provisions, because I genuinely think they cover future conditions, but it would be incredibly helpful and provide me with a bit of reassurance if the Minister could confirm that. I very much look forward to hearing his comments on clause 103.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

We welcome clause 104, but have tabled some important amendments that the Minister should closely consider. More broadly, the move away from requiring child sexual exploitation and abuse content to be prevalent and persistent before enforcement action can be taken is a positive one. It is welcome that Ofcom will have the opportunity to consider a range of factors.

Despite this, Labour—alongside the International Justice Mission—is still concerned about the inclusion of prevalence as a factor, owing to the difficulty in detecting newly produced CSEA content, especially livestreamed abuse. Amendments 35, 36, 39 and 40 seek to address that gap. Broadly, the amendments aim to capture the concern about the Bill’s current approach, which we feel limits its focus to the risk of harm faced by individuals in the UK. Rather, as we have discussed previously, the Bill should recognise the harm that UK nationals cause to people around the world, including children in the Philippines. The amendments specifically require Ofcom to consider the presence of relevant content, rather than its prevalence.

Amendment 37 would require Ofcom’s risk assessments to consider risks to adults and children through the production, publication and dissemination of illegal content—an issue that Labour has repeatedly raised. I believe we last mentioned it when we spoke to amendments to clause 8, so I will do my best to not repeat myself. That being said, we firmly believe it is important that video content, including livestreaming, is captured by the Bill. I remain unconvinced that the Bill as it stands goes far enough, so I urge the Minister to closely consider and support these amendments. The arguments that we and so many stakeholders have already made still stand.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I echo the sentiments that have been expressed by the shadow Minister, and thank her and her colleagues for tabling this amendment and giving voice to the numerous organisations that have been in touch with us about this matter. The Scottish National party is more than happy to support the amendment, which would make the Bill stronger and better, and would better enable Ofcom to take action when necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Labour welcomes this important clause, which lists the enforceable requirements. Failure to comply with those requirements can trigger enforcement action. However, the provisions could go further, so we urge the Minister to consider our important amendments.

Amendments 52 and 53 make it abundantly clear that more access to, and availability of, data and information about systems and processes would improve understanding of the online environment. We cannot rely solely on Ofcom to act as problems arise, when new issues could be spotted early by experts elsewhere. The entire regime depends on how bright a light we can shine into the black box of the tech companies, but only minimal data can be accessed.

The amendments would require Ofcom simply to produce a code of practice on access to data. We have already heard that without independent researchers accessing data on relevant harm, the platforms have no real accountability for how they tackle online harms. Civil society and researchers work hard to identify online harms from limited data sources, which can be taken away by the platforms if they choose. Labour feels that the Bill must require platforms, in a timely manner, to share data with pre-vetted independent researchers and academics. The EU’s Digital Services Act does that, so will the Minister confirm why such a provision is missing from this supposed world-leading Bill?

Clause 136 gives Ofcom two years to assess whether access to data is required, and it “may”, but not “must”, publish guidance on how its approach to data access might work. The process is far too slow and, ultimately, puts the UK behind the EU, whose legislation makes data access requests possible immediately. Amendment 52 would change the “may” to “must”, and would ultimately require Ofcom to explore how access to data works, not if it should happen in the first place.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Frances Haugen’s evidence highlighted quite how shadowy a significant number of the platforms are. Does the hon. Member agree that that hammers home the need for independent researchers to access as much detail as possible so that we can ensure that the Bill is working?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I agree 100%. The testimony of Frances Haugen, the Facebook whistleblower, highlighted the fact that expert researchers and academics will need to examine the data and look at what is happening behind social media platforms if we are to ensure that the Bill is truly fit for purpose and world leading. That process should be carried out as quickly as possible, and Ofcom must also be encouraged to publish guidance on how access to data will work.

Ultimately, the amendments make a simple point: civil society and researchers should be able to access data, so why will the Minister not let them? The Bill should empower independently verified researchers and civil society to request tech companies’ data. Ofcom should be required to publish guidance as soon as possible —within months, not years—on how data may be accessed. That safety check would hold companies to account and make the internet a safer and less divisive space for everyone.

The process would not be hard or commercially ruinous, as the platforms claim. The EU has already implemented it through its Digital Services Act, which opens up the secrets of tech companies’ data to Governments, academia and civil society in order to protect internet users. If we do not have that data, researchers based in the EU will be ahead of those in the UK. Without more insight to enable policymaking, quality research and harm analysis, regulatory intervention in the UK will stagnate. What is more, without such data, we will not know Instagram’s true impact on teen mental health, nor the reality of violence against women and girls online or the risks to our national security.

We propose amending the Bill to accelerate data sharing provisions while mandating Ofcom to produce guidance on how civil society and researchers can access data, not just on whether they should. As I said, that should happen within months, not years. The provisions should be followed by a code of practice, as outlined in the amendment, to ensure that platforms do not duck and dive in their adherence to transparency requirements. A code of practice would help to standardise data sharing in a way that serves platforms and researchers.

The changes would mean that tech companies can no longer hide in the shadows. As Frances Haugen said of the platforms in her evidence a few weeks ago:

“The idea that they have worked in close co-operation with researchers is a farce. The only way that they are going to give us even the most basic data that we need to keep ourselves safe is if it is mandated in the Bill. We need to not wait two years after the Bill passes”.––[Official Report, Online Safety Public Bill Committee, 26 May 2022; c. 188, Q320.]

Online Safety Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you, Ms Rees, for your hard work in chairing the Committee this morning; we really appreciate it. Amendment 89 relates to below-the-line comments on newspaper articles. For the avoidance of doubt, if we do not get amendment 89, I am more than happy to support the Labour party’s amendment 43, which has a similar effect but covers slightly fewer—or many fewer—organisations and places.

Below-the-line comments in newspaper articles are infamous. They are places that everybody fears to go. They are worse than Twitter. In a significant number of ways, below-the-line comments are an absolute sewer. I cannot see any reasonable excuse for them to be excluded from the Bill. We are including Twitter in the Bill; why are we not including below-the-line comments for newspapers? It does not make any sense to me; I do not see any logic.

We heard a lot of evidence relating to freedom of speech and a free press, and I absolutely, wholeheartedly agree with that. However, the amendment would not stop anyone writing a letter to the editor. It would not stop anyone engaging with newspapers in the way that they would have in the print medium. It would still allow that to happen; it would just ensure that below-the-line comments were subject to the same constraints as posts on Twitter. That is the entire point of amendment 89.

I do not think that I need to say much more, other than to add one more thing about the direction by comments to other, more radical and extreme pieces, or bits of information. It is sometimes the case that the comments on a newspaper article will direct people to even more extreme views. The newspaper article itself may be just slightly derogatory, while some of the comments may have links or references to other pieces, and other places on the internet where people can find a more radical point of view. That is exactly what happens on Twitter, and is exactly some of the stuff that we are trying to avoid—sending people down an extremist rabbit hole. I do not understand how the Minister thinks that the clause, which excludes below the line newspaper comments, is justifiable or acceptable.

Having been contacted by a number of newspapers, I understand and accept that some newspapers have moderation policies for their comments sections, but that is not strong enough. Twitter has a moderation policy, but that does not mean that there is actually any moderation, so I do not think that subjecting below-the-line comments to the provisions of the Bill is asking too much. It is completely reasonable for us to ask for this to happen, and I am honestly baffled as to why the Minister and the Government have chosen to make this exemption.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Before I address the amendments, I will speak to clause 49 more broadly.

Labour has concerns about a number of subsections of the clause, including subsections (2), and (8) to (10)— commonly known as the news publisher content exemption, which I have spoken about previously. We understand that the intention of the exemption is to shield broadcasters and traditional newspaper publishers from the Bill’s regulatory effects, clause 50(2) defines a “recognised news publisher” as a regulated broadcaster or any other publisher that publishes news, has an office, and has a standards code and complaints process. There is no detail about the latter two requirements, thus enabling almost any news publishing enterprise to design its own code and complaints process, however irrational, and so benefit from the exemption. “News” is also defined broadly, and may include gossip. There remains a glaring omission, which amendment 43 addresses and which I will come to.

During an earlier sitting of the Committee, in response to comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton as we discussed clause 2, the Minister claimed that

“The metaverse is a good example, because even though it did not exist when the structure of the Bill was conceived, anything happening in the metaverse is none the less covered by the Bill. Anything that happens in the metaverse that is illegal or harmful to children, falls into the category of legal but harmful to adults, or indeed constitutes pornography will be covered because the Bill is tech agnostic.”––[Official Report, Online Safety Public Bill Committee, 7 June 2022; c. 204.]

Clause 49 exempts one-to-one live aural communications from the scope of regulation. Given that much interaction in virtual reality is live aural communication, including between two users, it is hard to understand how that would be covered by the Bill.

There is also an issue about what counts as content. Most standard understandings would define “content” as text, video, images and audio, but one of the worries about interactions in VR is that behaviour such as physical violence will be able to be replicated virtually, with psychologically harmful effects. It is very unclear how that would be within the scope of the current Bill, as it does not clearly involve content, so could the Minister please address that point? As he knows, Labour advocates for a systems-based approach, and for risk assessments and systems to take place in a more upstream and tech-agnostic way than under the current approach. At present, the Bill would struggle to be expanded effectively enough to cover those risks.

Amendment 43 removes comments sections operated by news websites where the publisher has a UK turnover of more than £100 million from the exemption for regulated user-generated comment. If the Bill is to be effective in protecting the public from harm, the least it must accomplish is a system of accountability that covers all the largest platforms used by British citizens. Yet as drafted, the Bill would exempt some of the most popular social media platforms online: those hosted on news publisher websites, which are otherwise known as comments sections. The amendment would close that loophole and ensure that the comments sections of the largest newspaper websites are subject to the regime of regulation set out in the Bill.

Newspaper comments sections are no different from the likes of Facebook and Twitter, in that they are social media platforms that allow users to interact with one another. This is done through comments under stories, comments in response to other comments, and other interactions—for example, likes and dislikes on posts. In some ways, their capacity to cause harm to the public is even greater: for example, their reach is in many cases larger than even the biggest of social media platforms. Whereas there are estimated to be around 18 million users of Twitter in the UK, more than twice that number of British citizens access newspaper websites every month, and the harm perpetuated on those platforms is severe.

In July 2020, the rapper Wiley posted a series of antisemitic tweets, which Twitter eventually removed after an unacceptable delay of 48 hours, but under coverage of the incident in The Sun newspaper, several explicitly antisemitic comments were posted. Those comments contained holocaust denial and alleged a global Jewish conspiracy to control the world. They remained up and accessible to The Sun’s 7 million daily readers for the best part of a week. If we exempt comments sections from the Bill’s proposed regime and the duties that the Bill sets for platforms, we will send the message that that kind of vicious, damaging and harmful racism is acceptable.

Similarly, after an antisemitic attack in the German city of Halle, racists comments followed in the comments section under the coverage in The Sun. There are more examples: Chinese people being described as locusts and attacked with other racial slurs; 5G and Bill Gates conspiracy theories under articles on the Telegraph website; and of course, the most popular targets for online abuse, women in public life. Comments that described the Vice-President of the United States as a “rat” and “ho” appeared on the MailOnline. A female union leader has faced dozens of aggressive and abusive comments about her appearance, and many of such comments remain accessible on newspaper comments sections to this day. Some of them have been up for months, others for years.

Last week, the Committee was sent a letter from a woman who was the victim of comments section abuse, Dr Corinne Fowler. Dr Fowler said of the comments that she received:

“These comments contained scores of suggestions about how to kill or injure me. Some were general ideas, such as hanging, but many were gender specific, saying that I should be burnt at the stake like a witch. Comments focused on physical violence, one man advising that I should slapped hard enough to make my teeth chatter”.

She added:

“I am a mother: without me knowing, my son (then 12 years old) read these reader comments. He became afraid for my safety.”

Without the amendment, the Bill cannot do anything to protect women such as Dr Fowler and their families from this vile online abuse, because comments sections will be entirely out of scope of the Bill’s new regime and the duties designed to protect users.

As I understand it, two arguments have been made to support the exemption. First, it is argued that the complaints handlers for the press already deal with such content, but the handler for most national newspapers, the Independent Press Standards Organisation, will not act until a complaint is made. It then takes an average of six months for a complaint to be processed, and it cannot do anything if the comments have not been moderated. The Opposition do not feel that that is a satisfactory response to the seriousness of harms that we know to occur, and which I have described. IPSO does not even have a code to deal with cases of antisemitic abuse that appeared on the comments section of The Sun. IPSO’s record speaks for itself from the examples that I have given, and the many more, and it has proven to be no solution to the severity of harms that appear in newspaper comments sections.

The second argument for an exemption is that publishers are legally responsible for what appears on comments sections, but that is only relevant for illegal harms. For everything else, from disinformation to racial prejudice and abuse, regulation is needed. That is why it is so important that the Bill does the job that we were promised. To keep the public safe from harm online, comments sections must be covered under the Bill.

The amendment is a proportionate solution to the problem of comments section abuse. It would protect user’s freedom of expression and, given that it is subject to a turnover threshold, ensure that duties and other requirements do not place a disproportionate burden on smaller publishers such as locals, independents and blogs.

I have reams and reams and reams of examples from comments sections that all fall under incredibly harmful abuse and should be covered by the Bill. I could be here for hours reading them all out, and while I do not think that anybody in Committee would like me to, I urge Committee members to take a look for themselves at the types of comments under newspaper articles and ask themselves whether those comments should be covered by the terms of the Bill. I think they know the answer.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On a point of order, Ms Rees. Are we considering clause 49 now? I know that it is supposed to considered under the next set of amendments, but I just wondered, because I have separate comments to make on that clause that I did not make earlier because I spoke purely to the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Briefly, as with earlier clauses, the Labour party recognises the challenge in finding the balance between freedom of expression and keeping people safe online. Our debate on the amendment has illustrated powerfully that the exemptions as they stand in the Bill are hugely flawed.

First, the exemption is open to abuse. Almost any organisation could develop a standards code and complaints process to define itself as a news publisher and benefit from the exemption. Under those rules, as outlined eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for Batley and Spen, Russia Today already qualifies, and various extremist publishers could easily join it. Organisations will be able to spread seriously harmful content with impunity—I referred to many in my earlier contributions, and I have paid for that online.

Secondly, the exemption is unjustified, as we heard loud and clear during the oral evidence sessions. I recall that Kyle from FairVote made that point particularly clearly. There are already rigorous safeguards in the Bill to protect freedom of expression. The fact that content is posted by a news provider should not itself be sufficient reason to treat such content differently from that which is posted by private citizens.

Furthermore, quality publications with high standards stand to miss out on the exemption. The Minister must also see the lack of parity in the broadcast media space. In order for broadcast media to benefit from the exemption, they must be regulated by Ofcom, and yet there is no parallel stipulation for non-broadcast media to be regulated in order to benefit. How is that fair? For broadcast media, the requirement to be regulated by Ofcom is simple, but for non-broadcast media, the series of requirements are not rational, exclude many independent publishers and leave room for ambiguity.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a couple of questions that were probably too long for interventions. The Minister said that if comments on a site are the only user-generated content, they are not in scope. It would be really helpful if he explained what exactly he meant by that. We were talking about services that do not fall within the definition of “recognised news publishers”, because we were trying to add them to that definition. I am not suggesting that the Minister is wrong in any way, but I do not understand where the Bill states that those comments are excluded, and how this all fits together.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

With your permission, Ms Rees, I will speak to clause 52 before coming to amendment 61. Illegal content is defined in clause 52(2) as

“content that amounts to a relevant offence.”

However, as the Minister will know from representations from Carnegie UK to his Department—we share its concerns—the illegal and priority illegal regimes may not be able to operate as intended. The Bill requires companies to decide whether content “amounts to” an offence, with limited room for movement. We share concerns that that points towards decisions on an item-by-item basis; it means detecting intent for each piece of content. However, such an approach does not work at the scale on which platforms operate; it is bad regulation and poor risk management.

There seem to be two different problems relating to the definition of “illegal content” in clause 52. The first is that it is unclear whether we are talking about individual items of content or categories of content—the word “content” is ambiguous because it can be singular or plural—which is a problem for an obligation to design and run a system. Secondly, determining when an offence has taken place will be complex, especially bearing in mind mens rea and defences, so the providers are not in a position to get it right.

The use of the phrase “amounts to” in clause 52(2) seems to suggest that platforms will be required to identify accurately, in individual cases, where an offence has been committed, without any wriggle room drafted in, unlike in the draft Bill. As the definition now contains no space for error either side of the line, it could be argued that there are more incentives to avoid false negatives than false positives—providers can set higher standards than the criminal law—and that leads to a greater risk of content removal. That becomes problematic, because it seems that the obligation under clause 9(3) is then to have a system that is accurate in all cases, whereas it would be more natural to deal with categories of content. This approach seems not to be intended; support for that perspective can be drawn from clause 9(6), which recognises that there is a distinction between categories of content and individual items, and that the application of terms of service might specifically have to deal with individual instances of content. Critically, the “amounts to” approach cannot work in conjunction with a systems-based approach to harm reduction. That leaves victims highly vulnerable.

This problem is easily fixed by a combination of reverting to the draft Bill’s language, which required reasonableness, and using concepts found elsewhere in the Bill that enable a harm mitigation system to operate for illegal content. We also remind the Minister that Ofcom raised this issue in the evidence sessions. I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed whether we can expect a Government amendment to rectify this issue shortly.

More broadly, as we know, priority illegal content, which falls within illegal content, includes,

“(a) terrorism content,

(b) CSEA content, and

(c) content that amounts to an offence specified in Schedule 7”,

as set out in clause 52(7). Such content attracts a greater level of scrutiny and regulation. Situations in which user-generated content will amount to “a relevant offence” are set out in clause 52(3). Labour supports the inclusion of a definition of illegal content as outlined in the grouping; it is vital that service providers and platforms have a clear indication of the types of content that they will have a statutory duty to consider when building, or making changes to the back end of, their business models.

We have also spoken about the importance of parity between the online and offline spaces—what is illegal offline must be illegal online—so the Minister knows we have more work to do here. He also knows that we have broad concerns around the omissions in the Bill. While we welcome the inclusion of terrorism and child sexual exploitation content as priority illegal content, there remain gaps in addressing violence against women and girls content, which we all know is hugely detrimental to many online.

The UK Government stated that their intention for the Online Safety Bill was to make the UK the safest place to be online in the world, yet the Bill does not mention online gender-based violence once. More than 60,000 people have signed the Glitch and End Violence Against Women Coalition’s petition calling for women and girls to be included in the Bill, so the time to act is now. We all have a right to not just survive but thrive, engage and play online, and not have our freedom of expression curtailed or our voices silenced by perpetrators of abuse. The online space is just as real as the offline space. The Online Safety Bill is our opportunity to create safe digital spaces.

The Bill must name the problem. Violence against women and girls, particularly those who have one or multiple protected characteristics, is creating harm and inequality online. We must actively and meaningfully name this issue and take an intersectional approach to ending online abuse to ensure that the Bill brings meaningful change for all women. We also must ensure that the Bill truly covers all illegal content, whether it originated in the UK or not.

Amendment 61 brings offences committed overseas within the scope of relevant offences for the purposes of defining illegal content. The aim of the amendment is to clarify whether the Bill covers content created overseas that would be illegal if what was shown in the content took place in the UK. For example, animal abuse and cruelty content is often filmed abroad. The same can be said for dreadful human trafficking content and child sexual exploitation. The optimal protection would be if the Bill’s definition of illegal content covered matter that would be illegal in either the UK or the country it took place in, regardless of whether it originated in the UK.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I do not intend to make a speech, but I want to let the hon. Lady know that we wholeheartedly support everything that she has said on the clause and amendment 61.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s contribution, and for her support for the amendment and our comments on the clause.

The Bill should be made clearer, and I would appreciate an update on the Minister’s assessment of the provisions in the Bill. Platforms and service providers need clarity if they are to take effective action against illegal content. Gaps in the Bill give rise to serious questions about the overwhelming practical challenges of the Bill. None of us wants a two-tier internet, in which user experience and platforms’ responsibilities in the UK differ significantly from those in the rest of the world. Clarifying the definition of illegal content and acknowledging the complexity of the situation when content originates abroad are vital if this legislation is to tackle wide-ranging, damaging content online. That is a concern I raised on Second Reading, and a number of witnesses reiterated it during the oral evidence sessions. I remind the Committee of the comments of Kevin Bakhurst from Ofcom, who said:

“We feel it is really important—hopefully this is something the Committee can contribute to—that the definition of ‘illegal content’ is really clear for platforms, and particularly the area of intent of illegality, which at the moment might be quite tricky for the platforms to pick up on.”––[Official Report, Online Safety Public Bill Committee, 24 May 2022; c. 8, Q7.]

That has been reiterated by myriad other stakeholders, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments.

Online Safety Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. As parliamentarians we are seen as experts in an array of fields. I do not purport to be an expert in all things, as it is more a jack of all trades role, and it would be impossible for one Secretary of State to be an expert in everything from animal abuse to online scam ads, from fraud to CSAM and terrorism. That is why it is fundamental that the Secretary of State consults with experts and stakeholders in those fields, for whom these things are their bread and butter—their day job every day. I hope the Minister can see that regulation of the online space is a huge task to take on for us all. It is Labour’s view that any Secretary of State would benefit from the input of experts in specific fields. I urge him to support the amendment, especially given the wider concerns we have about transparency and power sharing in the Bill.

It is welcome that clause 56 will force Ofcom, as the regulator, to carry out important reviews that will assess the extent to which content is harmful to children and adults when broadly appearing on user-to-user services. As we have repeatedly said, transparency must be at the heart of our approach. While Labour does not formally oppose the clause, we have concerns about subsection (5), which states:

“The reports must be published not more than three years apart.”

The Minister knows that the Bill has been long awaited, and we need to see real, meaningful change and updates now. Will he tell us why it contains a three-year provision?

[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank the Minister for his clarification earlier and his explanation of how the categories of primary priority content and priority content can be updated. That was helpful.

Amendment 62 is excellent, and I am more than happy to support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Clause 68 outlines the duties covering regulated provider pornographic content, and Ofcom’s guidance on those duties. Put simply, the amendments are about age verification and consent, to protect women and children who are victims of commercial sexual exploitation.

I am moving a series of targeted amendments, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson), which I hope that all hon. Members will be able to support because this is an issue that goes beyond party lines. This is about children who have been sexually abused, women who have been raped, and trafficking victims who have been exploited, who have all suffered the horror of filmed footage of their abuse being published on some of the world’s biggest pornography websites. This is about basic humanity.

Currently, leading pornography websites allow members of the public to upload pornographic videos without verifying that everyone in the film is an adult, that they gave their permission for it to be uploaded to a pornography website, or even that they know the film exists. It is sadly not surprising that because of the absence of even the most basic safety measures, hugely popular and profitable pornography websites have been found hosting and profiting from filmed footage of rape, sex trafficking, image-based sexual abuse and child sexual abuse. This atrocious practice is ongoing and well documented.

In 2019, PayPal stopped processing payments for Pornhub—one of the most popular pornography websites in the world—after an investigation by The Sunday Times revealed that the site contained child abuse videos and other illegal content. That included an account on the site dedicated to posting so-called creepshots of UK schoolgirls. In 2020, The New York Times documented the presence of child abuse videos on Pornhub, prompting Mastercard, Visa and Discover to block the use of their cards for purchases on the site.

New York Times reporter Nicholas Kristof wrote of Pornhub:

“Its site is infested with rape videos. It monetizes child rapes, revenge pornography, spy cam videos of women showering, racist and misogynist content, and footage of women being asphyxiated in plastic bags.”

That particular pornography website is now subject to multiple lawsuits launched against its parent company, MindGeek, by victims whose abuse was published on the site. Plaintiffs include victims of image-based sexual abuse in the UK, such as Crystal Palace footballer Leigh Nicol. Her phone was hacked, and private content was uploaded to Pornhub without her knowledge. She bravely and generously shared her experience in an interview for Sky Sports News, saying:

“The damage is done for me so this is about the next generation. I feel like prevention is better than someone having to react to this. I cannot change it alone but if I can raise awareness to stop it happening to others then that is what I want to do… The more that you dig into this, the more traumatising it is because there are 14-year-old kids on these websites and they don’t even know about it. The fact that you can publish videos that have neither party’s consent is something that has to be changed by law, for sure.”

I agree. It is grotesque that pornography website operators do not even bother to verify that everyone featured in films on their sites is an adult or even gave permission for the film to be uploaded. That cannot be allowed to continue.

These amendments, which I hope will receive the cross-party backing that they strongly deserve, would stop pornography websites publishing and profiting from videos of rape and child sexual abuse by requiring them to implement the most basic of prevention measures.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I support the hon. Member’s amendments. The cases that she mentions hammer home the need for women and girls to be mentioned in the Bill. I do not understand how the Government can justify not doing so when she is absolutely laying out the case for doing so.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I agree with the hon. Member and welcome her intervention. We will be discussing these issues time and again during our proceedings. What is becoming even more apparent is the need to include women and girls in the Bill, call out violence against women and girls online for what it is, and demand that the Government go further to protect women and girls. This is yet another example of where action needs to happen. I hope the Minister is hearing our pleas and that this will happen at some point as we make progress through the Bill.

More needs to be done to tackle this problem. Pornography websites need to verify that every individual in pornographic videos published on their site is an adult and gave their permission for the video to be published, and enable individuals to withdraw their consent for pornography of them to remain on the site. These are rock-bottom safety measures for preventing the most appalling abuses on pornography websites.

Online Safety Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Thursday 9th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

I do not know whether everybody draws the same distinction as me. For me the distinction is that, because it will be happening with proactive technology—technological means will be scanning those messages rather than humans—nobody will see the messages. Software will scan messages, and should there be anything that is illegal—should there be child sexual abuse material—that is what will be flagged and further action taken.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East heard during my contribution, but this technology does exist, so it is possible. It is a false argument made by those who believe that impacting end-to-end encryption will limit people’s privacy. The technology does exist, and I named some that is able to scan without preventing the encryption of the data. It simply scans for those images and transfers them over existing databases. It would have no impact on anybody’s right to privacy.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank the shadow Minister for her assistance with that intervention, which was incredibly helpful. I do not have concerns that anybody will be able to access that data. The only data that will be accessible is when the proactive technology identifies something that is illegal, so nobody can see any of the messages except for the artificial intelligence. When the AI recognises that something is abuse material, at that point the Bill specifies that it will go to the National Crime Agency if it is in relation to child abuse images.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification.

The Government have drafted the Bill in a way that puts codes of practice at its heart, so they cannot and should not be susceptible to delay. We have heard from platforms and services that stress that the ambiguity of the requirements is causing concern. At least with a deadline for draft codes of practice, those that want to do the right thing will be able to get on with it in a timely manner.

The Age Verification Providers Association provided us with evidence in support of amendment 48 in advance of today’s sitting. The association agrees that early publication of the codes will set the pace for implementation, encouraging both the Secretary of State and Parliament to approve the codes swiftly. A case study it shared highlights delays in the system, which we fear will be replicated within the online space, too. Let me indulge Members with details of exactly how slow Ofcom’s recent record has been on delivering similar guidance required under the audio-visual media services directive.

The directive became UK law on 30 September 2020 and came into force on 1 November 2020. By 24 June 2021, Ofcom had issued a note as to which video sharing platforms were in scope. It took almost a year until, on 6 October 2021, Ofcom issued formal guidance on the measures.

In December 2021, Ofcom wrote to the verification service providers and

“signalled the beginning of a new phase of supervisory engagement”.

However, in March 2022 it announced that

“the information we collect will inform our Autumn 2022 VSP report, which intends to increase the public’s awareness of the measures platforms have in place to protect users from harm.”

There is still no indication that Ofcom intends to take enforcement action against the many VSPs that remain non-compliant with the directive. It is simply not good enough. I urge the Minister to carefully consider the aims of amendment 48 and to support it.

Labour supports the principles of clause 42. Ofcom must not drag out the process of publishing or amending the codes of practice. Labour also supports a level of transparency around the withdrawal of codes of practice, should that arise.

Labour also supports clause 43 and the principles of ensuring that Ofcom has a requirement to review its codes of practice. We do, however, have concerns over the Secretary of State’s powers in subsection (6). It is absolutely right that the Secretary of State of the day has the ability to make representations to Ofcom in order to prevent the disclosure of certain matters in the interests of national security, public safety or relations with the Government of a country outside the UK. However, I am keen to hear the Minister’s assurances about how well the Bill is drafted to prevent those powers from being used, shall we say, inappropriately. I hope he can address those concerns.

On clause 44, Ofcom should of course be able to propose minor amendments to its codes of practice. Labour does, however, have concerns about the assessment that Ofcom will have to make to ensure that the minor nature of changes will not require amendments to be laid before Parliament, as in subsection (1). As I have said previously, scrutiny must be at the heart of the Bill, so I am interested to hear from the Minister how exactly he will ensure that Ofcom is making appropriate decisions about what sorts of changes are allowed to circumvent parliamentary scrutiny. We cannot and must not get to a place where the Secretary of State, in agreeing to proposed amendments, actively prevents scrutiny from taking place. I am keen to hear assurances on that point from the Minister.

On clause 45, as I mentioned previously on amendment 65 to clause 37, as it stands, service providers would be treated as complying with their duties if they had followed the recommended measures set out in the relevant codes of practice, as set out in subsection (1). However, providers could take alternative measures to comply, as outlined in subsection (5). Labour supports the clause in principle, but we are concerned that the definition of alternative measures is too broad. I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on his assessment of the instances in which a service provider may seek to comply via alternative measures. Surely the codes of practice should be, for want of a better phrase, best practice. None of us want to get into a position where service providers are circumnavigating their duties by taking the alternative measures route.

Again, Labour supports clause 46 in principle, but we feel that the provisions in subsection (1) could go further. We know that, historically, service providers have not always been transparent and forthcoming when compelled to be so by the courts. While we understand the reasoning behind subsection (3), we have broader concerns that service providers could, in theory, lean on their codes of practice as highlighting their best practice. I would be grateful if the Minister could address our concerns.

We support clause 47, which establishes that the duties in respect of which Ofcom must issue a code of practice under clause 37 will apply only once the first code of practice for that duty has come into force. However, we are concerned that this could mean that different duties will apply at different times, depending on when the relevant code for a particular duty comes into force. Will the Minister explain his assessment of how that will work in practice? We have concerns that drip feeding this information to service providers will cause further delay and confusion. In addition, will the Minister confirm how Ofcom will prioritise its codes of practice?

Lastly, we know that violence against women and girls has not a single mention in the Bill, which is an alarming and stark omission. Women and girls are disproportionately likely to be affected by online abuse and harassment. The Minister knows this—we all know this—and a number of us have spoken up on the issue on quite a few occasions. He also knows that online violence against women and girls is defined as including, but not limited to, intimate image abuse, online harassment, the sending of unsolicited explicit images, coercive sexting and the creation and sharing of deepfake pornography.

The Minister will also know that Carnegie UK is working with the End Violence Against Women coalition to draw up what a code of practice to tackle violence against women and girls could look like. Why has that been left out of the redraft of the Bill? What consideration has the Minister given to including a code of this nature in the Bill? If the Minister is truly committed to tackling violence against women and girls, why will he not put that on the face of the Bill?

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a quick question about timelines because I am slightly confused about the order in which everything will happen. It is unlikely that the Bill will have been through the full parliamentary process before the summer, yet Ofcom intends to publish information and guidance by the summer, even though some things, such as the codes of practice, will not come in until after the Bill has received Royal Assent. Will the Minister give a commitment that, whether or not the Bill has gone through the whole parliamentary process, Ofcom will be able to publish before the summer?

Will Ofcom be encouraged to publish everything, whether that is guidance, information on its website or the codes of practice, at the earliest point at which they are ready? That will mean that anyone who has to apply those codes of practice or those regulations—people who will have to work within those codes, for example, or charities or other organisations that might be able to make super-complaints—will have as much information as possible, as early as possible, and will be able to prepare to fully implement their work at the earliest possible time. They will need that information in order to be able to gear up to do that.

Online Safety Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Thursday 9th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I will talk about this later, when we come to a subsequent clause to which I have tabled some amendments—I should have tabled some to this clause, but unfortunately missed the chance to do so.

I appreciate the Minister laying out why he has designated the people covered by this clause; my concern is that “affected” is not wide enough. My logic is that, on the strength of these provisions, I might not be able to report racist content that I come across on Twitter if I am not the subject of that content—if I am not a member of a group that is the subject of the content or if I am not caring for someone who is the subject of it.

I appreciate what the Minister is trying to do, and I get the logic behind it, but I think the clause unintentionally excludes some people who would have a reasonable right to expect to be able to make reports in this instance. That is why I tabled amendments 78 and 79 to clause 28, about search functions, but those proposals would have worked reasonably for this clause as well. I do not expect a positive answer from the Minister today, but perhaps he could give consideration to my concern. My later amendments would change “affected person” to “any other person”. That would allow anyone to make a report, because if something is illegal content, it is illegal content. It does not matter who makes the report, and it should not matter that I am not a member of the group of people targeted by the content.

I report things all the time, particularly on Twitter, and a significant amount of it is nothing to do with me. It is not stuff aimed at me; it is aimed at others. I expect that a number of the platforms will continue to allow reporting for people who are outwith the affected group, but I do not want to be less able to report than I am currently, and that would be the case for many people who see concerning content on the internet.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Lady is making a really important point. One stark example that comes to my mind is when English footballers suffered horrific racist abuse following the penalty shootout at the Euros last summer. Hundreds of thousands of people reported the abuse that they were suffering to the social media platforms on their behalf, in an outcry of solidarity and support, and it would be a shame if people were prevented from doing that.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I absolutely agree. I certainly do not think I am suggesting that the bigger platforms such as Twitter and Facebook will reduce their reporting mechanisms as a result of how the Bill is written. However, it is possible that newer or smaller platforms, or anything that starts after this legislation comes, could limit the ability to report on the basis of these clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

rose—

[Alex Davies-Jones]

rose—

[Chris Philp]

I give way first to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North—I think she was first on her feet—and then I will come to the hon. Member for Pontypridd.

Online Safety Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

We do not oppose clauses 2, 3 or 4, or the intentions of schedules 1 and 2, and have not sought to amend them at this stage, but this is an important opportunity to place on record some of the Opposition’s concerns as the Bill proceeds.

The first important thing to note is the broadness in the drafting of all the definitions. A service has links to the UK if it has a significant number of users in the UK, if the UK users are a target market, or if

“there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a material risk of significant harm to individuals”

in the UK using the service. Thus, territorially, a very wide range of online services could be caught. The Government have estimated in their impact assessment that 25,100 platforms will be in scope of the new regime, which is perhaps a conservative estimate. The impact assessment also notes that approximately 180,000 platforms could potentially be considered in scope of the Bill.

The provisions on extraterritorial jurisdiction are, again, extremely broad and could lead to some international platforms seeking to block UK users in a way similar to that seen following the introduction of GDPR. Furthermore, as has been the case under GDPR, those potentially in scope through the extraterritorial provisions may vigorously resist attempts to assert jurisdiction.

Notably absent from schedule 1 is an attempt to include or define how the Bill and its definitions of services that are exempt may adapt to emerging future technologies. The Minister may consider that a matter for secondary legislation, but as he knows, the Opposition feel that the Bill already leaves too many important matters to be determined at a later stage via statutory instruments. Although it good to see that the Bill has incorporated everyday internet behaviour such as a like or dislike button, as well as factoring in the use of emojis and symbols, it fails to consider how technologies such as artificial intelligence will sit within the framework as it stands.

It is quite right that there are exemptions for everyday user-to-user services such as email, SMS, and MMS services, and an all-important balance to strike between our fundamental right to privacy and keeping people safe online. That is where some difficult questions arise on platforms such as WhatsApp, which are embedded with end-to-end encryption as a standard feature. Concerns have been raised about Meta’s need to extend that feature to Instagram and Facebook Messenger.

The Opposition also have concerns about private messaging features more widely. Research from the Centre for Missing and Exploited Children highlighted the fact that a significant majority of online child abuse takes place in private messages. For example, 12 million of the 18.4 million child sexual abuse reports made by Facebook in 2019 related to content shared on private channels. Furthermore, recent data from the Office for National Statistics shows that private messaging plays a central role in contact between children and people they have not met offline before. Nearly three quarters—74%—of cases of children contacted by someone they do not know initially take place by private message. We will address this issue further in new clause 20, but I wanted to highlight those exemptions early on, as they are relevant to schedule 1.

On a similar point, we remain concerned about how emerging online systems such as the metaverse have had no consideration in Bill as it stands. Only last week, colleagues will have read about a researcher from a non- profit organisation that seeks to limit the power of large corporations, SumOfUs, who claimed that she experienced sexual assault by a stranger in Meta’s virtual reality space, Horizon Worlds. The organisation’s report said:

“About an hour into using the platform, a SumOfUs researcher was led into a private room at a party where she was raped by a user who kept telling her to turn around so he could do it from behind while users outside the window could see—all while another user in the room watched and passed around a vodka bottle.”

There is currently no clear distinction about how these very real technologies will sit in the Bill more widely. Even more worryingly, there has been no consideration of how artificial intelligence systems such as Horizon Worlds, with clear user-to-user functions, fit within the exemptions in schedule 1. If we are to see exemptions for internal business services or services provided by public bodies, along with many others, as outlined in the schedule, we need to make sure that the exemptions are fit for purpose and in line with the rapidly evolving technology that is widely available overseas. Before long, I am sure that reality spaces such as Horizon Worlds will become more and more commonplace in the UK too.

I hope that the Minister can reassure us all of his plans to ensure that the Bill is adequately future-proofed to cope with the rising expansion of the online space. Although we do not formally oppose the provisions outlined in schedule 1, I hope that the Minister will see that there is much work to be done to ensure that the Bill is adequately future-proofed to ensure that the current exemptions are applicable to future technologies too.

Turning to schedule 2, the draft Bill was hugely lacking in provisions to tackle pornographic content, so it is a welcome step that we now see some attempts to tackle the rate at which pornographic content is easily accessed by children across the country. As we all know, the draft Bill only covered pornography websites that allow user-generated content such as OnlyFans. I am pleased to see that commercial pornography sites have now been brought within scope. This positive step forward has been made possible thanks to the incredible efforts of campaigning groups, of which there are far too many to mention, and from some of which we took evidence. I pay tribute to them today. Over the years, it is thanks to their persistence that the Government have been forced to take notice and take action.

Once again—I hate to repeat myself—I urge the Minister to consider how far the current definitions outlined in schedule 2 relating to regulated provider pornographic content will go to protect virtual technologies such as those I referred to earlier. We are seeing an increase in all types of pornographic and semi-pornographic content that draws on AI or virtual technology. An obvious example is the now thankfully defunct app that was making the rounds online in 2016 called DeepNude. While available, the app used neural networks to remove clothing from images of women, making them look realistically nude. The ramifications and potential for technology like this to take over the pornographic content space is essentially limitless.

I urge the Minister carefully to keep in mind the future of the online space as we proceed. More specifically, the regulation of pornographic content in the context of keeping children safe is an area where we can all surely get on board. The Opposition have no formal objection at this stage to the provisions outlined in schedule 2.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Thank you, Sir Roger, for chairing our sittings. It is a pleasure to be part of this Bill Committee. I have a couple of comments on clause 2 and more generally.

The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Pontypridd, made some points about making sure that we are future-proofing the Bill. There are some key issues where we need to make sure that we are not going backwards. That particularly includes private messaging. We need to make sure that the ability to use AI to find content that is illegal, involving child sexual abuse for example, in private messages is still included in the way that it is currently and that the Bill does not accidentally bar those very important safeguards from continuing. That is one way in which we need to be clear on the best means to go forward with the Bill.

Future-proofing is important—I absolutely agree that we need to ensure that the Bill either takes into account the metaverse and virtual reality or ensures that provisions can be amended in future to take into account the metaverse, virtual reality and any other emerging technologies that we do not know about and cannot even foresee today. I saw a meme online the other day that was somebody taking a selfie of themselves wearing a mask and it said, “Can you imagine if we had shown somebody this in 1995 and asked them what this was? They wouldn’t have had the faintest idea.” The internet changes so quickly that we need to ensure that the Bill is future-proofed, but we also need to make sure that it is today-proofed.

I still have concerns, which I raised on Second Reading, about whether the Bill adequately encompasses the online gaming world, where a huge number of children use the internet—and where they should use it—to interact with their friends in a safe way. A lot of online gaming is free from the bullying that can be seen in places such as WhatsApp, Snapchat and Instagram. We need to ensure that those safeguards are included for online gaming. Private messaging is a thing in a significant number of online games, but many people use oral communication—I am thinking of things such as Fortnite and Roblox, which is apparently a safe space, according to Roblox Corporation, but according to many researchers is a place where an awful lot of grooming takes place.

My other question for the Minister—I am not bothered if I do not get an answer today, as I would rather have a proper answer than the Minister try to come up with an answer right at this moment—is about what category the app store and the Google Play store fall into.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I want to just put it on the record that the irony is not lost on me that we are having tech issues relating to the discussion of the Online Safety Bill. The Opposition have huge concerns regarding clause 5. We share the frustrations of stakeholders who have been working on these important issues for many years and who feel the Bill has been drafted in overly complex way. In its evidence, the Carnegie UK Trust outlined its concerns over the complexity of the Bill, which will likely lead to ineffective regulation for both service users and companies. While the Minister is fortunate to have a team of civil servants behind him, he will know that the Opposition sadly do not share the same level of resources—although I would like to place on the record my sincere thanks to my researcher, Freddie Cook, who is an army of one all by herself. Without her support, I would genuinely not know where I was today.

Complexity is an issue that crops up time and again when speaking with charities, stakeholders and civil society. We all recognise that the Bill will have a huge impact however it passes, but the complexity of its drafting is a huge barrier to implementation. The same can be said for the regulation. A Bill as complex as this is likely to lead to ineffective regulation for both service users and companies, who, for the first time, will be subject to specific requirements placed on them by the regulator. That being said, we absolutely support steps to ensure that providers of regulated user-to-user services and regulated search services have to abide by a duty of care regime, which will also see the regulator able to issue codes of practice.

I would also like to place on record my gratitude—lots of gratitude today—to Professor Lorna Woods and Will Perrin, who we heard from in evidence sessions last week. Alongside many others, they have been and continue to be an incredible source of knowledge and guidance for my team and for me as we seek to unpick the detail of this overly complex Bill. Colleagues will also be aware that Professor Woods and Mr Perrin originally developed the idea of a duty of care a few years ago now; their model was based on the idea that social media providers should be,

“seen as responsible for public space they have created, much as property owners or operators are in a physical world.”

It will come as no surprise to the Minister that Members of the Opposition fully fall behind that definition and firmly believe that forcing platforms to identify and act on harms that present a reasonable chance of risk is a positive step forward.

More broadly, we welcome moves by the Government to include specific duties on providers of services likely to be accessed by children, although I have some concerns about just how far they will stretch. Similarly, although I am sure we will come to address those matters in the debates that follow, we welcome steps to require Ofcom to issue codes of practice, but have fundamental concerns about how effective they will be if Ofcom is not allowed to remain fully independent and free from Government influence.

Lastly, on subsection 7, I imagine our debate on chapter 7 will be a key focus for Members. I know attempts to define key terms such as “priority content” will be a challenge for the Minister and his officials but we remain concerned that there are important omissions, which we will come to later. It is vital that those key terms are broad enough to encapsulate all the harms that we face online. Ultimately, what is illegal offline must be approached in the same way online if the Bill is to have any meaningful positive impact, which is ultimately what we all want.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to make a couple of brief comments. Unfortunately, my hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire is not here as, ironically, he is at the DCMS committee taking evidence on the Online Safety Bill. That is a pretty unfortunate clash of timing, but that is why I am here solo for the morning.

I wanted to make a quick comment on subsection 7. The Minister will have heard the evidence given on schedule 7 and the fact that the other schedules, particularly schedule 6, has a Scottish-specific section detailing the Scottish legislation that applies. Schedule 7 has no Scotland-specific section and does not adequately cover the Scottish legislation. I appreciate that the Minister has tabled amendment 126, which talks about the Scottish and Northern Irish legislation that may be different from England and Wales legislation, but will he give me some comfort that he does intend Scottish-specific offences to be added to schedule 7 through secondary legislation? There is a difference between an amendment on how to add them and a commitment that they will be added if necessary and if he feels that that will add something to the Bill. If he could commit that that will happen, I would appreciate that—obviously, in discussion with Scottish Ministers if amendment 126 is agreed. It would give me a measure of comfort and would assist, given the oral evidence we heard, in overcoming some of the concerns raised about schedule 7 and the lack of inclusion of Scottish offences.

Online Safety Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th June 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to amendments to clause 9 and to clauses 23 and 24, which I did not speak on earlier. I am also very grateful that we are being broadcast live to the world and welcome that transparency for all who might be listening.

On clause 9, it is right that the user-to-user services will be required to have specific duties and to take appropriate measures to mitigate and manage the risk of harm to individuals and their likelihood of encountering priority illegal content. Again, however, the Bill does not go far enough, which is why we are seeking to make these important amendments. On amendment 18, it is important to stress that the current scope of the Bill does not capture the range of ways in which child abusers use social networks to organise abuse, including to form offender networks. They post digital breadcrumbs that signpost to illegal content on third-party messaging apps and the dark web, and they share child abuse videos that are carefully edited to fall within content moderation guidelines. This range of techniques, known as child abuse breadcrumbing, is a significant enabler of online child abuse.

Our amendment would give the regulator powers to tackle breadcrumbing and ensure a proactive upstream response. The amendment would ensure that tens of millions of interactions with accounts that actively enable the discovery and sharing of child abuse material will be brought into regulatory scope. It will not leave that as ambiguous. The amendment will also ensure that companies must tackle child abuse at the earliest possible stage. As it stands, the Bill would reinforce companies’ current focus only on material that explicitly reaches the criminal threshold. Because companies do not focus their approach on other child abuse material, abusers can exploit this knowledge to post carefully edited child abuse images and content that enables them to connect and form networks with other abusers. Offenders understand and can anticipate that breadcrumbing material will not be proactively identified or removed by the host site, so they are able to organise and link to child abuse in plain sight.

We all know that child abuse breadcrumbing takes many forms, but techniques include tribute sites where users create social media profiles using misappropriated identities of known child abuse survivors. These are used by offenders to connect with likeminded perpetrators to exchange contact information, form offender networks and signpost child abuse material elsewhere online. In the first quarter of 2021, there were 6 million interactions with such accounts.

Abusers may also use Facebook groups to build offender groups and signpost to child abuse hosted on third-party sites. Those groups are thinly veiled in their intentions; for example, as we heard in evidence sessions, groups are formed for those with an interest in children celebrating their 8th, 9th or 10th birthdays. Several groups with over 50,000 members remained alive despite being reported to Meta, and algorithmic recommendations quickly suggested additional groups for those members to join.

Lastly, abusers can signpost to content on third-party sites. Abusers are increasingly using novel forms of technology to signpost to online child abuse, including QR codes, immersive technologies such as the metaverse, and links to child abuse hosted on the blockchain. Given the highly agile nature of the child abuse threat and the demonstrable ability of sophisticated offenders to exploit new forms of technology, this amendment will ensure that the legislation is effectively futureproofed. Technological change makes it increasingly important that the ability of child abusers to connect and form offender networks can be disrupted at the earliest possible stage.

Turning to amendment 21, we know that child abuse is rarely siloed on a single platform or app. Well-established grooming pathways see abusers exploit the design features of social networks to contact children before they move communication across to other platforms, including livestreaming sites, as we have already heard, and encrypted messaging services. Offenders manipulate features such as Facebook’s algorithmic friend suggestions to make initial contact with a large number of children. They can then use direct messages to groom them and coerce children into sending sexual images via WhatsApp. Similarly, as we heard earlier, abusers can groom children through playing videogames and then bringing them on to another ancillary platform, such as Discord.

The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children has shared details of an individual whose name has been changed, and whose case particularly highlights the problems that children are facing in the online space. Ben was 14 when he was tricked on Facebook into thinking he was speaking to a female friend of a friend, who turned out to be a man. Using threats and blackmail, he coerced Ben into sending abuse images and performing sex acts live on Skype. Those images and videos were shared with five other men, who then bombarded Ben with further demands. His mum, Rachel, said:

“The abuse Ben suffered had a devastating impact on our family. It lasted two long years, leaving him suicidal.

It should not be so easy for an adult to meet and groom a child on one site then trick them into livestreaming their own abuse on another app, before sharing the images with like-minded criminals at the click of a button.

Social media sites should have to work together to stop this abuse happening in the first place, so other children do not have to go through what Ben did.”

The current drafting of the Bill does not place sufficiently clear obligations on platforms to co-operate on the cross-platform nature of child abuse. Amendment 21 would require companies to take reasonable and proportionate steps to share threat assessments, develop proportionate mechanisms to share offender intelligence, and create a rapid response arrangement to ensure that platforms develop a coherent, systemic approach to new and emerging threats. Although the industry has developed a systemic response to the removal of known child abuse images, these are largely ad hoc arrangements that share information on highly agile risk profiles. The cross-platform nature of grooming and the interplay of harms across multiple services need to be taken into account. If it is not addressed explicitly in the Bill, we are concerned that companies may be able to cite competition concerns to avoid taking action.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On the topic of child abuse images, the hon. Member spoke earlier about livestreaming and those images not being captured. I assume that she would make the same point in relation to this issue: these live images may not be captured by AI scraping for them, so it is really important that they are included in the Bill in some way as well.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I completely agree with the hon. Member, and appreciate her intervention. It is fundamental for this point to be captured in the Bill because, as we are seeing, this is happening more and more. More and more victims are coming forward who have been subject to livestreaming that is not picked up by the technology available, and is then recorded and posted elsewhere on smaller platforms.

Legal advice suggests that cross-platform co-operation is likely to be significantly impeded by the negative interplay with competition law unless there is a clear statutory basis for enabling or requiring collaboration. Companies may legitimately have different risk and compliance appetites, or may simply choose to hide behind competition law to avoid taking a more robust form of action.

New and emerging technologies are likely to produce an intensification of cross-platform risks in the years ahead, and we are particularly concerned about the child abuse impacts in immersive virtual reality and alternative-reality environments, including the metaverse. A number of high-risk immersive products are already designed to be platform-agnostic, meaning that in-product communication takes place between users across multiple products and environments. There is a growing expectation that these environments will be built along such lines, with an incentive for companies to design products in this way in the hope of blunting the ability of Governments to pursue user safety objectives.

Separately, regulatory measures that are being developed in the EU, but are highly likely to impact service users in the UK, could result in significant unintended safety consequences. Although the interoperability provisions in the Digital Markets Act are strongly beneficial when viewed through a competition lens—they will allow the competition and communication of multiple platforms—they could, without appropriate safety mitigations, provide new means for abusers to contact children across multiple platforms, significantly increase the overall profile of cross-platform risk, and actively frustrate a broad number of current online safety responses. Amendment 21 will provide corresponding safety requirements that can mitigate the otherwise significant potential for unintended consequences.

The Minister referred to clauses 23 and 24 in relation to amendments 30 and 31. We think a similar consideration should apply for search services as well as for user-to-user services. We implore that the amendments be made, in order to prevent those harms from occurring.

Online Safety Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th May 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q So as a result of these exemptions, the Bill as it stands could make the internet less safe than it currently is.

Kyle Taylor: The Bill as it stands could absolutely make the internet less safe than it currently is.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q You have done a really good job of explaining the concerns about journalistic content. Thinking about the rest of the Bill for a moment, do you think the balance between requiring the removal of content and the prioritisation of content is right? Do you think it will be different from how things are now? Do you think there is a better way it could be done in the Bill?

Ellen Judson: The focus at the moment is too heavily on content. There is a sort of tacit equation of content removal—sometimes content deprioritisation, but primarily content removal—as the way to protect users from harm, and as the threat to freedom of expression. That is where the tension comes in with how to manage both those things at once. What we would want from a Bill that was taking more of a systems approach is thinking: where are platforms making decisions about how they are designing their services, and how they are operating their services at all levels? Content moderation policy is certainly included, but it goes back to questions of how a recommendation algorithm is designed and trained, who is involved in that process, and how human moderators are trained and supported. It is also about what functionality users are given and what behaviour is incentivised and encouraged. There is a lot of mitigation that platforms can put in place that does not talk about directly affecting user content.

I think we should have risk assessments that focus on the risks of harms to users, as opposed to the risk of users encountering harmful content. Obviously there is a relationship, but one piece of content may have very different effects when it is encountered by different users. It may cause a lot of harm to one user, whereas it may not cause a lot of harm to another. We know that when certain kinds of content are scaled and amplified, and certain kinds of behaviour are encouraged or incentivised, we see harms at a scale that the Bill is trying to tackle. That is a concern for us. We want more of a focus on some things that are mentioned in the Bill—business models, platform algorithms, platform designs and systems and processes. They often take a backseat to the issues of content identification and removal.

Kyle Taylor: I will use the algorithm as an example, because this word flies around a lot when we talk about social media. An algorithm is a calculation that is learning from people’s behaviour. If society is racist, an algorithm will be racist. If society is white, an algorithm will be white. You can train an algorithm to do different things, but you have to remember that these companies are for-profit businesses that sell ad space. The only thing they are optimising for in an algorithm is engagement.

What we can do, as Ellen said, through a system is force optimisation around certain things, or drive algorithms away from certain types of content, but again, an algorithm is user-neutral. An algorithm does not care what user is saying what; it is just “What are people clicking on?”, regardless of what it is or who said it. An approach to safety has to follow the same methodology and say, “We are user-neutral. We are focused entirely on propensity to cause harm.”

The second piece is all the mitigation measures you can take once a post is up. There has been a real binary of “Leave it up” and “Take it down”, but there is a whole range of stuff—the most common word used is “friction”—to talk about what you can do with content once it is in the system. You have to say to yourself, “Okay, we absolutely must have free speech protections that exceed the platform’s current policies, because they are not implemented equally.” At the same time, you can preserve someone’s free expression by demonetising content to reduce the incentive of the company to push that content or user through its system. That is a way of achieving both a reduction in harm and the preservation of free expression.

Online Safety Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Kirsty Blackman and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th May 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Very briefly, Dame Rachel, I will build on what you were just saying, based on your experience as a headteacher. When I make my school visits, the teachers overwhelmingly tell me how, on a daily basis, they have to deal with the fallout from an issue that has happened online or on social media. On that matter, the digital media literacy strategy is being removed from the Bill. What is your thinking on that? How important do you see a digital media literacy strategy being at the heart of whatever policy the Government try to make regarding online safety for children?

Dame Rachel de Souza: There is no silver bullet. This is now a huge societal issue and I think that some of the things that I would want to say would be about ensuring that we have in our educational arsenal, if you like, a curriculum that has a really strong digital media literacy element. To that end, the Secretary of State for Education has just asked me to review how online harms and digital literacy are taught in schools—reviewing not the curriculum, but how good the teaching is and what children think about how the subject has been taught, and obviously what parents think, too.

I would absolutely like to see the tech companies putting some significant funding into supporting education of this kind; it is exactly the kind of thing that they should be working together to provide. So we need to look at this issue from many aspects, not least education.

Obviously, in a dream world I would like really good and strong digital media literacy in the Bill, but actually it is all our responsibility. I know from my conversations with Nadhim Zahawi that he is very keen that this subject is taught through the national curriculum, and very strongly.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q I have a quick question on parental digital literacy. You mentioned the panel that you put together of 16 to 21-year-olds. Do you think that today’s parents have the experience, understanding, skills and tools to keep their children properly safe online? Even if they are pretty hands-on and want to do that, do you think that they have all the tools they need to be able to do that?

Dame Rachel de Souza: It is a massive concern to parents. Parents talk to me all the time about their worries: “Do we know enough?” They have that anxiety, especially as their children turn nine or 10; they are thinking, “I don’t even know what this world out there is.” I think that our conversations with 16 to 21-year-olds were really reassuring, and we have produced a pamphlet for parents. It has had a massive number of downloads, because parents absolutely want to be educated in this subject.

What did young people tell us? They told us, “Use the age controls; talk to us about how much time we are spending online; keep communication open; and talk to us.” Talk to children when they’re young, particularly boys, who are likely to be shown pornography for the first time, even if there are parental controls, around the age of nine or 10. So have age-appropriate conversations. There was some very good advice about online experiences, such as, “Don’t worry; you’re not an expert but you can talk to us.” I mean, I did not grow up with the internet, but I managed parenting relatively well—my son is 27 now. I think this is a constant concern for parents.

I do think that the tech companies could be doing so much more to assist parents in digital media literacy, and in supporting them in how to keep their child safe. We are doing it as the Office of the Children’s Commissioner. I know that we are all trying to do it, but we want to see everyone step up on this, particularly the tech companies, to support parents on this issue.