Procurement Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting)

Kirsty Blackman Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 2nd February 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Burghart]

New clause 1 would legislate for the establishment of a committee to consider the threat to national security and cyber-security from suppliers in supply chains delivering public contracts. The Government take national security considerations extremely seriously, and we understand the importance of countering threats to our security throughout our supply chains. We recently demonstrated that through our action to remove Chinese surveillance equipment from sensitive sites across the Government estate. The inclusion of the national security exclusion ground in schedule 7 to the Bill will bring about a significant improvement to the existing EU-derived regime. It will allow a supplier to be excluded on national security grounds, even when the procurement does not meet the bar for exemption on those grounds.

We understand the intention behind the hon. Lady’s new clause, but it duplicates aspects of the new procurement regime underpinned by the Bill. I have already mentioned the ability to exclude a supplier on grounds of national security. The Bill requires any contracting authority that wishes to rely on those grounds when excluding a supplier or rejecting their tender to first notify a Minister of the Crown, who must be satisfied that the supplier should be excluded.

The notification not only ensures that the Minister agrees to the exclusion, but serves to alert them, if they are not already aware, that there may be security concerns about the supplier. The Minister may accordingly decide to investigate the supplier under clause 60, which could lead to the supplier being placed on the debarment list under clause 62. Furthermore, if a supplier already holds a public contract and is found to meet any exclusion ground, clause 77(2)(b) enables the contract to be terminated. Clause 77(2)(c) extends that to subcontracts. As with exclusion, any proposed termination on the grounds of national security must be brought to the attention of the Minister for a decision; again, that could trigger debarment from future procurements.

Under the new clause, the proposed committee would also consider threats to cyber-security. Existing policy in this area is detailed in procurement policy note 09/14. That mandates that where contracts have certain characteristics, suppliers must meet the technical requirements prescribed by the Cyber Essentials scheme. That applies when ICT systems and services supplied by the contract either store or process data at official level. In addition, the MOD, through the defence cyber protection partnership, has developed the cyber-security model that is to be applied to its procurements to ensure cyber-security-related risks are adequately managed throughout the life of the contract.

In short, contracting authorities are already alive to the need to consider national security, including cyber-threats, when procuring public services, and are well placed to review their contracts and supply chains for such threats, bolstered by the provisions of the Bill. However, I am mindful of the concerns raised by colleagues on Second Reading, and those concerns will continue to inform Government thinking as we move forward.

Amendments 15 to 19 seek to make exclusion on national security grounds mandatory, rather than discretionary. Any risk to national security should of course be taken very seriously indeed, but it is right that we leave some scope for nuance and flexibility in the application of the exclusion ground. Suppliers may pose a risk in some contexts, but not in others. For instance, in a relatively innocuous procurement, the exclusion of a supplier might not be merited if the contracting authority was confident that there was no potential for harm. A company that might raise concern in the manufacture of one technical device might also produce paper clips, which would not be a threat to national security.

It is important to note that contracting authorities must consider all exclusion grounds, mandatory and discretionary, against every supplier in each procurement. Any decision not to exclude a supplier that poses a national security risk must be weighed against that risk, and I am confident that contracting authorities will do so carefully.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I understand what the Minister is saying, but if the contracting authority is spending public money on those paper clips, it is funding a company that can breach national security and do things that are against the national interest. The contract may not be a risk to national security, but the company is, so surely it should be a mandatory, rather than a discretionary, exclusion.

[Alex Burghart]

There would be a balance of risks. Not all security threats are proven. Of course, it is up to the authority to assess the concerns at the time.

Question put, That the amendment be made.