Stalking (Protection of Victims)

Kevin Foster Excerpts

Thursday 17th September 2015 Commons Chamber

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to lead this debate on stalking and I refer Members to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

May I begin by placing on record my gratitude to my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham), who has played an active role in taking up the case? I also thank Gloucestershire CID and the officer in the case of Knight for their assistance to me, but most of all, I would like to thank my constituent, Dr Eleanor Aston. It is her dreadful ordeal as the victim of stalking that was the principal trigger for the debate. She was targeted by a stalker in a way which, as the court heard, caused her “exceptional anxiety and suffering”. She has shown great courage in supporting the debate, and she deserves the gratitude of the whole House.

I will say a little more about the circumstances of her case in a moment, but thought it might be helpful to set out my main point at the beginning. Stalking is a horrible, violating crime that rips relationships apart and shatters lives. My principal point is that the powers to punish offenders and protect the victims of this horrible offence are wholly inadequate, and that inadequacy is particularly blatant when the stalking concerned forms part of a pattern of repeat offending.

So that you know where I am heading, Mr Deputy Speaker, I am calling for two principal things. First, I want an increase in sentencing powers for offences of stalking contrary to section 4(4)(a) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and, secondly, a review of the restrictive rule in section 265 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which means that in any case in which a court sentences a defendant for an offence that he commits on licence—not just stalking—the court must order the new sentence to run concurrently with the old one. It sounds arcane, but it is not. The situation leads to injustice and I shall explain why in a moment. The point is that currently the law does not get that difficult balance right. It creates a sentencing straitjacket that restricts the court’s ability to do justice. The judge in the case affecting my constituent thought that that was wrong. I think it is wrong, too.

I am not seeking something that would have dramatic knock-on effects. Civil servants rightly reach for their calculators to work out what the impact of any legislative change would be. But the cases in which there would be a particularly lengthy sentence for stalking, or indeed an extended sentence, are likely to be rare. Equally, the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to impose back-to-back sentences are likely to be infrequent. The simple point is that when the circumstances demand it, courts should have the tools they need to do justice and protect the victim.

I need to set out a little more detail about the case involving my constituent. Dr Aston is a general practitioner, described at Gloucester Crown Court as “successful and popular”, and she practises at a local surgery in Gloucestershire. Raymond Knight, the defendant, became a patient at her surgery in 2007. As is sometimes the case with this type of offending, the harassment began annoyingly but relatively innocuously, with the defendant sending cards and inappropriate messages to the surgery, but it soon became far more serious.

Raymond Knight began attending Dr Aston’s surgery and vandalising her car, and in 2009 he was convicted of harassment, contrary to section 2 of the 1997 Act, and a restraining order was imposed with conditions. It did not work. He continued to stalk her. He attended her surgery over 100 times and vandalised it, posting foul items through the letter box, and he attended her home frequently. He was arrested and multiple photos were found on his camera and computer. In July 2010 he was sentenced to a two-year community order.

Once again, the community order completely failed to work and the stalking continued. I will set out some of the details so that the House understands why I am making these points. The defendant showed up at a party for Dr Aston’s young daughter and slashed her car tyre. He was arrested again following reports of hacking a water pipe and interfering with the gas supply. In May 2013 he was convicted and sentenced to 44 months’ imprisonment for eight breaches of a restraining order and causing criminal damage.

What about the effect on the victim? Dr Aston was advised by the police to change her name and job and move address. It was suggested that she should come off the General Medical Council register. The stalking led to her being off work for many months, and she was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.

What happened next? This is where the law goes wrong. The defendant was released on licence in July 2014, the half-way point of his sentence, with a condition to reside at a bail hostel in Weymouth. However, as is not uncommon in offences of this nature, within six months he was offending again. In December 2014 Dr Aston received two packages, one to her home address in Cheltenham and the other to her medical practice in Gloucester. One was threatening and abusive in content. It suggested that the defendant had been watching her and knew her car registration, where her husband worked and where her children went to school. Chillingly, the second package simply read, “Guess who’s back?”

The defendant was arrested the following day and his licence was revoked. In other words, he was required to serve the balance of the original 44-month sentence. On 15 May 2015 he was sentenced for several offences, including stalking and breach of a restraining order. In his sentencing remarks, the judge stated that the defendant had conducted a campaign for six years in which he had sought to “terrorise” the victim. But the law went wrong, because the maximum sentence the judge could impose for the stalking was five years’ imprisonment. Where there is an early guilty plea, the judge is obliged, as in all cases, to deduct a third from the sentence. That means in reality a maximum sentence of around three years and four months. Of course, prisoners serve half their sentence, so the total time to be served in prison is little more than 18 months. We should bear in mind the fact that that is for the most serious examples of stalking.

The judge in this case clearly felt that the sentence was inadequate. He stated:

“I am frustrated that the maximum sentence for harassment is five years. I would, if I could, give you longer.”

In fact, His Honour Judge Tabor QC appears to have done his best to do justice by imposing consecutive sentences for some breaches of the restraining order, but that is somewhat beside the point.

The second problem facing the sentencing judge was that because of the restrictive wording of section 265 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, he was obliged to order that the new sentence of five years should run concurrently with the period of licence that he was serving on recall. In other words, he was not allowed to order the defendant to serve out the balance of his original sentence before starting his new one. What did the judge make of that? He added:

“I also make it clear that I feel it is wrong that I am not entitled to pass a consecutive sentence on you.”

The effect of all this is clear. In this case, the judge’s hands were tied. He was able neither to punish the offender nor to protect the victim in the way that justice demanded.

So what needs to change? First, the maximum sentence for stalking contrary to section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 needs to be increased. If we think about where stalking fits into the hierarchy, that point is well made. The maximum sentence for criminal damage—an offence against property—is 10 years, and the maximum sentence for a single one-off dwelling house burglary is 14 years. It is bordering on the absurd that the maximum penalty for a campaign of stalking over many years that left the victim feeling, in the words of the judge, “terrorised”, is so much less.

Secondly, to protect the victim, stalking should be a specified offence. That would allow the court, in the most serious cases, after a proper, evidence-based assessment of the defendant, and having found him to be “dangerous” within the meaning of the 2003 Act, to impose an extended period of licence. That would require the defendant, on release, to know that he had to obey the law for an extended period, failing which he could be returned to prison. It may be noted that in this case the judge said:

“I have no doubt at all that you are dangerous in the sense that you pose a significant risk to her in future in terms of causing her serious harm.”

[Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making some powerful arguments. Does he agree that because the history of the law dates from a time before social media and the internet had exploded as it has now, when there are much greater opportunities to stalk someone and find out the details of their family, the deterrent needs to be stronger than perhaps it was in previous years?

[Alex Chalk]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. He is absolutely right. I suspect that stalking is as old as the sea, but the opportunities to stalk are much greater now than they have ever been. Indeed, stalking was discussed in this House during the previous Parliament, but then, as now, there was a growing sense that the courts do not have the tools they need to be able to address it.

Let me make it crystal clear that I am not from the brigade that says we should be locking people up and throwing away the key. I am merely suggesting that there needs to be proportionality so that judges can, in appropriate circumstances, ensure that the punishment fits the crime and, just as importantly if not more so, that victims can be protected. Just imagine what it is like when you, as the victim, know that the person who has made your life a misery is due to be released from prison for the most serious type of stalking offence about 18 months after he was sent there.

Let me return to my point about back-to-back sentencing, which might sound arcane, but is critical. At the moment, a defendant may commit an offence of stalking, go to prison, be released at the halfway point, and then, as is not uncommon, do exactly the same again. The judge should be able to say, “Right, you go and complete the balance of your sentence. You were told that you would be released at the halfway point but your sentence has not come to an end. If you commit further offences, you are liable to be recalled on licence to complete your sentence, and then you will have to start a sentence for the new crime that you have committed.” That discretion is not open to the court. The judge is obliged by section 265 of the 2003 Act to make the sentences run concurrently. That is wrong. The courts should not be prevented from imposing a consecutive sentence of imprisonment in those cases, no doubt rare, where it is called for. I repeat that I am not saying that that should happen in every case, or even in most cases. I am simply saying that it should be on the list of options available to the sentencing judge, who views the circumstances in the round.

In the overwhelming majority of cases I believe our courts—by which I mean judges, barristers, solicitors, police officers and court staff—deliver a standard of justice of which we can all be proud. In this case, however, our criminal justice system fell short. My constituent, Dr Aston, was not given the protection she required and it is time to put that right.