(9 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis has been a timely debate, secured by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who, as the House knows, takes a particular interest in defence. I gently point out to the House that although the Backbench Business Committee is responsible for this debate and a number of hon. Members have said it is a shame there are not more debates on defence, there was a debate on Monday of last week on this very subject in Government time. Hon. Members need to recognise that the Government are giving due time to these important matters.
This is a timely debate because it comes as we prepare for the comprehensive spending review and the strategic defence and security review, which will follow the general election. There is no doubt about the support for our armed forces from all 20 Members who have spoken today, including the Opposition spokesman, and about the importance of defence to the nation’s security. Fittingly, this debate was used as an opportunity to speak by a number of hon. Members who are leaving the House later this month having served the House with particular distinction, particularly on defence. I pay tribute to my right hon. and learned Friends the Members for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) and for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), who unfortunately has had to catch a train, although I told him I would mention him; to my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire (Sir Peter Luff), who I am delighted to see in his place; to my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Sir Richard Ottaway), who has given considerable service to this House—I had not appreciated that he had also served on a carrier in an earlier career; and to the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), who has been a very influential figure on the Defence Committee. I am pleased they have all been able to participate, alongside the many other Members whose contributions I may or may not have time to commend.
Clearly, in a democracy, strong defence requires a strong economy, and as we head into the next Parliament, securing our economic recovery will be vital to securing defence spending. We do recognise—we were challenged by some hon. Members on this—that the threats we face have changed since the last strategic defence review, and they will be carefully reviewed in the next SDSR, which will help to determine the investment choices of the next Government.
I listened carefully to the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), a former Defence Minister, whose commitment to defence I do not doubt. I have, however, had the opportunity not only to listen to his remarks today, but to read the interim report—I believe it is described as No. 8—of Labour’s so-called zero-based review, the defence element of which was published only on Saturday. I gently remind the House that he was making some claims about defence being in a better place under a potential Labour Government, but the zero-based review’s foreword indicates that, were Labour to have the opportunity, it would carry out
“a root and branch review of every pound the government spends from the bottom up”.
The defence volume foreword says
“we will make appropriate savings in the Defence budget”.
I take that to mean that every pound of defence spending will be up for review and is not secure as a consequence.
It is a sensible way forward to ensure, as I said in the debate last week, that every single piece of our defence expenditure is reviewed to ensure that we get maximum value for money. If we are going to meet the targets for 2015-16, savings will have to be made and that will be reinvested in what can actually be done. What we do not have is the fiscal straitjacket that the Minister has come 2016-17.
The only comfort that this House can take from the Opposition’s position is that one of the very few Government Departments that the shadow Chancellor would not abolish is the Ministry of Defence.
I wish to set out some context about how, since 2010, defence spending has required, and has undergone, significant reform. The situation we inherited from the Labour Administration was chaotic. There was a severely overheated programme with costs that outstripped the available budget, which left a black hole of £38 billion. Difficult decisions were routinely ducked. The Gray report, commissioned by the previous Government, identified that the average equipment programme overrun was five years, and with an average increase in cost of £300 million. The National Audit Office’s major projects report for 2009 evidenced an increase in costs in that year alone of £1.2 billion across the major projects, including the infamous decision to delay the carriers in a desperate attempt to cram that year’s spending into the available budget. To sort that out required one of the biggest defence transformation programmes undertaken in the western world. Today, the defence budget is in balance—
No, the hon. Gentleman has had his chance. The defence budget is in balance and our plans are affordable. We are on track to deliver £5 billion of efficiency savings in the next Parliament, including £1 billion from the equipment support plan alone. Incidentally, the half-baked plans in the Labour review “A New Deal for UK Defence” would deliver only some 1% of what we are already saving in the Department. The proof of our transformation was set out in the National Audit Office major projects report for 2014, which showed a reduction in cost of £397 million across our 11 largest projects. That was the Ministry of Defence’s best performance on cost since 2005 and best performance on delivering projects on time since 2001.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs I said to my hon. Friend in my fairly comprehensive initial answer, we have allocated £1.5 billion, which is essentially to support the elements being brought back into the core. The original capital cost was more than £5 billion in Iraq, and, I think, £7.6 billion in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. That is of course money that has already been spent, so it is not a continuing drain on the Ministry of Defence budget.
The Government previously announced that the cost of the Vanguard successor programme would be part of the MOD main core equipment budget. I note that today the Minister has published a document on the costings of the assessment phase of Vanguard. It makes reference to the alternatives review. Will he inform the House when the Department will be in a position to tell us the cost of that review?
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am pleased to hear that, but I am also rather sceptical about what the Secretary of State says. Clearly, the emphasis in Committee and the mood music have been that the GoCo seems to be the main show in town, and there has been scant examination of what DE&S-plus will do. We must ensure that as the process goes ahead and the Bill goes to the other place proper scrutiny is maintained. Not only is this a major change to how we procure defence equipment in this country but it will have an impact on our relationships with international allies.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s final point: this clearly needs to be scrutinised properly. However, let me gently make the point to him that part 1 of the Bill inevitably focused on a GoCo rather than DE&S-plus because DE&S-plus does not need legislation whereas a GoCo does.
(11 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman is making a very important point as part of what appears to be a shift in the official Opposition’s position on continuous-at-sea deterrence. I would be grateful if he would confirm what I think he is saying. Is it the case that he wants to maintain a minimum deterrent capability, which would most likely be four boats unless technological change suggested that it could be maintained with fewer than four boats?
That is exactly the case, and I think that the Defence Secretary has said the same thing. It will be achieved not by sticking a finger in the air and thinking of a policy, but by thinking about what we need to keep our nuclear deterrent credible and by maintaining the important continuous-at-sea deterrent.
As has been said, we are convinced that the only credible way forward for a minimum nuclear deterrent is a continuous-at-sea deterrent; otherwise, the UK would be vulnerable. The Chief Secretary’s suggestion would not only make the UK more vulnerable, but lead to a situation where we would not possess first strike or even second-strike capabilities. It would also be a significant escalatory factor if the UK stepped up its armed CASD posture. It is simply not credible and it is also very dangerous.
There are options that the alternatives review did not consider, so why are the Liberal Democrats set on the proposals outlined by the Chief Secretary? I think it is the old Liberal Democrat trick—many of us who have dealt with them in local government have seen this over many years—of trying to ride both horses at the same time. They want to appease the party’s unilateralist wing and persuade them that they are scaling down the nuclear ladder, while simultaneously claiming to the electorate that they have a credible nuclear policy, but they have been found out by the alternatives review.
The Liberal Democrats have commissioned a review in Government time, using taxpayers’ money and resources, in order to supplement their own party’s policy manifesto for 2015. I tabled a written question to the Chief Secretary yesterday asking how much the review cost, and I await his response. The Lib Dem plans have been found wanting and they are now scrambling around frantically for a bizarre policy solution in order to advance their much-heralded differentiation strategy, through which they are trying to place themselves between the Labour party and their coalition partners.
We have all waited for the publication of this report and I think we all genuinely thought it would suggest a credible alternative. Our position is clear: we are committed to the minimum, credible independent nuclear deterrent, which is why we put that policy to the House in 2006. I completely disagree with the Chief Secretary’s comment that this is the most thorough review undertaken. That is complete nonsense, because that review was done in 2006. He should also look at the three comprehensive reports commissioned by the Defence Committee, which covered all the issues.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Leigh, in a different capacity from when you chaired the Public Accounts Committee, on which I was privileged to sit.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) on securing the debate. As all speakers have said, it demonstrates the increasing interest among not only Members of the House but the public at large about the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, as currently deployed in Afghanistan and as might be deployed in the future. As she said, only last month I responded to a similar debate, which had been secured by my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti). He made a brief intervention during the hon. Lady’s speech, and I am sorry that he is not with us to hear mine, because I will try to cover many of the issues raised in this debate and since the previous one in early November.
I start by setting out the context of how, where and why the UK armed forces employ remotely piloted aircraft systems, or UAVs as they are regularly referred to. In this debate, I shall use the term RPAS—remotely piloted aircraft systems—as the more accurate description of their capability, not only because that is what they are, but because that is how they are commonly referred to by the armed forces, particularly the RAF. Although the vehicles are unmanned, the system is guided by a whole team of highly trained and skilled people. Pilots, sensor operators and analysts all make decisions in real time, just like the crew of a manned aircraft. Defence remains a human endeavour. As the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) said, humans have taken stand-off weapons development through the generations and the centuries, but there has always been human involvement.
Does the Minister agree that there are also lawyers in the chain of that decision-making process, who ensure that the targets selected fall within legal parameters?
I will explain how the UK armed forces use rules of engagement that are clearly defined and informed by legal opinion, as the hon. Gentleman indicates.
RPAS technology is principally required and used by our armed forces for surveillance and reconnaissance tasks, as several Members mentioned, providing vital intelligence in support of our forces on the ground. While the utility of sensors is broadly similar to those aboard conventionally manned aircraft, RPAS have the ability to loiter for longer, building an intelligence picture that significantly enhances the situational awareness of commanders, forces on the ground and air crew.
RPAS surveillance and reconnaissance capability and the requirement for ever better intelligence, precision and situational awareness are such that they are now vital to mission success, as has been clearly demonstrated in theatre in Afghanistan. The UK currently only deploys RPAS for support of operations in Afghanistan. With the progress of technology and increasing appreciation of their military utility, the number deployed in Afghanistan has continued to increase, with further task lines of Reaper due to become operational next year.
To deliver operational RPAS capability for our forces in Afghanistan, a number of UK RPAS are being used for development trials and training in the UK and in a number of our partner nations. I confirm again that currently the operational deployment for RPAS is for the purposes of operations in Afghanistan, and that UK RPAS are saving the lives of both British and coalition service personnel and Afghan civilians on a daily basis. In that respect, RPAS are no different from other aircraft. The same rules that govern the use of conventional military aircraft apply to RPAS. As I said, UK RPAS are anything but unmanned.
As I have explained a couple of times, we are at present using RPAS on operations in Afghanistan, and at present we have no other operational use in mind for UK assets beyond Afghanistan. I think that is as far as I can go on that matter at the moment.
I will pick up on some of the comments made by the hon. Member for North Durham. I am grateful for his support for the continued use of unmanned aircraft systems. I am glad that he referred to the joint doctrine document, because it begins to set out some of the issues that are of concern. However, I do not accept the need to undertake a codification of separate rules for RPAS. As I have already mentioned, and as the hon. Gentleman acknowledges, all aircraft operators must follow national and international laws, together with the rules of engagement. Those rules are the same whether an air, sea or land-based platform is being used. Similarly, we have well-established command, control and supervisory frameworks for all our operational assets, so we do not believe at this point that additional measures are needed for RPAS. I will just pick up on the thrust of why I think he was suggesting that we need to take the public with us in our use of RPAS, which is something that I agree with. There is a greater role to be played by politicians and the military in explaining to the public the utility of unmanned systems from a military perspective, from the safety perspective of our own personnel, which is obviously vital, and in minimising the risk of collateral damage when weaponised systems are used. As a Government, we need to do more, and I welcome the help of the hon. Gentleman in advocating the use of such systems to the public at large.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston said that we have to bring the public with us. The Americans are already looking at codification. Would it not be a help to the MOD in getting the arguments across? I accept that an anorak like me reads those documents, but the average person in the street does not. If we had a clearly laid out code, it would give reassurance to individuals who are rightly worried that this new technology is not under any type of control; that is not the case, so it will at least give them some reassurance.
The difficulty with a code is how it is differentiated from rules of engagement. For the reasons I have explained, we do not wish to publish specific rules of engagement, so having a code would head us down a direction of potentially having to publish more about our operational use than would be safe for us to do.
We already have procedures in place for the oversight of all the military capabilities that we have deployed, and the National Security Council will consider whether forces should be deployed in the future. It operates with the benefit of the NSDR and NSDA, to use military acronyms—
I am in danger of falling into a trap that I should not have set myself.
Finally, RPAS is not shielded in secrecy, which was the expression used in the article in The Times that was referred to earlier in the debate. During the last few weeks, months and years, we have released significant details about our use of RPAS, but our use of RPAS should not be confused with general MOD policy on safeguarding information relevant to targeting and intelligence. I hope that, on reflection, the hon. Gentleman will recognise that that is an overriding requirement and puts to rest the need for any potential confusion with a system of codification, rules of engagement or secrecy over the matter.
Let me finish by restating that the UK complies fully with its obligations under international law, as set out in article 36 of additional protocol 1 to the Geneva conventions, to review all new weapons, and means and methods of warfare. That process applies to unmanned capabilities as well as to other manned weapons systems.
I welcome the opportunity presented by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston to put on the record once again the Government’s clear view of the benefits of RPAS in minimising the risk to civilians, as well as to our own service personnel and other coalition forces. RPAS provide vital intelligence to our forces on the ground and I can only see their importance increasing, as part of our overall service capability.
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberAs my hon. Friend knows, the Ministry of Defence has a terms of business agreement with BAE Systems Maritime Naval Ships. That agreement commits the company to maintain warship design and build capability, and elements of support covering all complex service warships in the UK. The Government continue to work with BAE Systems on the utilisation of shipbuilding capability once work on the current carrier programme is complete. As my hon. Friend knows, Corvette offshore patrol vessels are currently under construction by BAE Systems in Portsmouth for the royal navy of Oman.
I welcome the Minister to his new position. As he will know, there is a long and proud record on the Clyde of building warships for the British Navy, and a complex ship for the British Navy has never been built in a foreign country. Will the contract for the Type 26 ships contain a clause for the event of a vote for an independent Scotland in 2014?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind words. As my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces said, the Government are not currently planning on the basis that the Scottish people will vote in favour of independence in a referendum. The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) is right to say that the UK has not built a complex warship outside its shores since the second world war, and I believe that the only times it did so during the first and second world wars were in then colonial territories for local use. The Government remain committed to using UK industry to build UK warships.
In the unlikely event that Scotland should decide to separate from the UK, the Scottish defence industry would be eligible to bid only for contracts placed by a future Scottish Government or competed outside the UK, or placed by the UK or other Governments. That is because, as the hon. Gentleman knows, many UK defence contracts are exempted from procurement rules for reasons of national security.