Benefit Sanctions

Karen Buck Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2022 Westminster Hall

[Ms Karen Buck (Westminster North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to respond for the Opposition to this short and important debate under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I, too, congratulate the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens) on introducing the debate and making a powerful speech. We have heard powerful contributions, and many who spoke drew on their own experiences of cases as well as cases brought to them by advice agencies in their constituencies.

Before the debate, I asked my local citizens advice bureau about the changes it had experienced in terms of clients with concerns about sanctions. It told me that there has been an increase in calls for help, including appeals from clients who were bedbound when the sanction was imposed because they had covid and were quarantining. I was told about someone who was sanctioned for attending a funeral and about a young woman who was forced to leave her home because she became pregnant outside marriage and feared for her safety. She was sanctioned for not wishing to return to a jobcentre near her family home in order to attend an appointment.

What has come through all of the speeches is the strong theme—it is a theme that has come up time and again whenever we have debated social security issues over recent months and years—of the impact on mental health. So many of the clients who come to us asking for help with sanctions and other aspects of social security problems are highly vulnerable and sometimes chaotic in their vulnerability, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) stated. Sometimes they have significant mental health concerns that should have been a red flag.

As we have heard, this debate is well timed because over the last few months it has become increasingly clear that the DWP’s approach to sanctions has changed in ways that Ministers have so far been unwilling to explain or justify. The evidence lies in the sheer volume of sanctions that the Department has been handing out. Let us not be distracted by the suspension of most forms of conditionality during the pandemic. That was, of course, the right thing to do, and obviously that meant there was bound to be some degree of a resurgence in sanctions once things opened up again. But that does not explain—and this point has been made several times this afternoon—why sanction levels and rates are so much higher now than they were before the pandemic.

Several Members have referred to the work of Dr David Webster, whose regular briefings on sanctions for the Child Poverty Action Group have served to bring the issue to the fore. He finds that the number of sanctions handed out per month in May to July of this year was on average 45,000, equivalent to 2.5% of people on universal credit subject to conditionality, compared with 1.4% in the three months before the pandemic. That increase in the number of adverse sanction decisions is reflected in the cumulative number of people on universal credit serving a sanction at any point in time. Dr Webster writes:

“The number of universal credit claimants who were serving a sanction in August was 115,274…more than three times the pre-pandemic peak of 36,771 in October 2019.”

Of course, there were more people on universal credit in August 2022 than in October 2019, but as Dr Webster shows, the percentage of universal credit claimants subject to conditionality serving a sanction was 6.4% in August, more than double the pre-pandemic peak of 3.1% in October 2019. And for unemployed people—those in the searching for work group—Dr Webster estimates that nearly 8% were under sanction in August 2022. My first question to the Minister is: how have we arrived at a situation where one in 13 unemployed universal credit claimants are currently under sanction?

We should be under no illusion that sanctions are just a slap on the wrist for claimants. Typically, sanctions involve the withdrawal of 100% of the universal credit standard allowance, and even the reduced rate for the lowest level of sanction is 40% of the standard allowance. And except for the lowest level sanctions, the penalties continue after the person sanctioned has complied with the rules—for seven days rising to 28 days for low level sanctions, while higher level sanctions apply for 28 days and 91 days rising to 182 days, depending on whether there have been previous failures to comply in the same year.

An increase in the sanction rate is not just a technical matter. People on universal credit do not have a margin of income that they can fall back on to weather an interruption to benefit payments—all the less as the four-year benefit freeze has permanently eroded the real-term value of benefits.

There is an urgent need to understand what lies behind the increase. Has there been a revolution in people’s behaviour or attitudes since 2019? If so, what is the evidence for that? Has the level of non-compliance with conditionality really doubled since the pandemic? Have there been operational changes leading to more sanctions being issued without any change in the level of compliance? Has there been a change in the Department’s policy on sanctions? Or is the increase an unintended consequence of other factors? in other words, is the sanctions regime out of control?

The purpose of sanctions has been well described by Professor Paul Gregg as a backstop to the system of benefit conditionality. The point is that while sanctions set at a reasonable level serve an important function, they are not an end in themselves. A sudden increase in the number of sanctions such as we have seen should be seen by any responsible Government as a cause for concern rather than for self-congratulation. It raises the fear that the sanctions tail is wagging the conditionality dog, that the Government are more concerned with signalling toughness than with improving employment outcomes, and that the purpose of conditionality has been twisted towards catching people out rather than maintaining contact with the labour market. Or, no less worryingly, it raises the fear that the number of sanctions has shot up because the Government have lost control of the sanctions regime and no longer know what they are doing.

The fact that the Government have suppressed their own research into the effectiveness of the universal credit sanctions regime is hardly reassuring. In 2018, in response to a Work and Pensions Committee report, the Department agreed to

“evaluate the effectiveness of reforms to welfare conditionality and sanctions,”

and said that this would focus

“on whether the sanctions regime within Universal Credit (UC) is effective at supporting claimants to search for work.”

It said that it would publish the results in spring 2019, but we know what happened. The research was undertaken, but earlier this year the last Secretary of State but one—the right hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal (Dr Coffey)— reneged on the commitment to publish the results. That is the behaviour of a Government who are uninterested in learning lessons, and evasive of public scrutiny.

[Chris Stephens]

I thank the shadow Minister for making that important point. The same applies to the drivers of food bank use, which include sanctions.

[Ms Buck]

Sanctions are indeed an important driver of the increase in food banks, which is another symptom of widespread structural failure in the system.

It would be refreshing if the new Secretary of State took a different view of the matter. A doubling in the rate of sanctions in the context of a cost of living crisis and permanent reductions in the value of benefits is a serious matter. I hope that the Minister can give a suitably serious response.