Draft Code of Practice on Reasonable Steps to be taken by a Trade Union (Minimum Service Levels)

Debate between Justin Madders and Mick Whitley

Monday 27th November 2023 General Committees

[Justin Madders]

The overwhelming response to the consultation on the measure, and to that on the original Bill, was that the process will be very difficult in practice. That is because it is not about providing minimum service levels, but about trying to stop trade unions from exercising their lawful and democratic right to take industrial action.

The instruction at paragraph 25 of the code of practice that a union should send its compliance notice to its members “by electronic means” is the biggest irony in all this, because the Government have sat on a review on e-balloting for industrial disputes for some five years, yet made no attempt to implement it. Does the Minister finally accept that it might be reasonable to allow trade unions to enter the 21st century, with industrial action communications sent by email? Does he accept that that should include the actual balloting for industrial action? It is inconsistent, to say the least, that the code of practice specifically instructs unions to contact members about industrial action electronically, yet the law specifically prohibits them from balloting their members by email. I know that the Minister has had a lot of practice in e-balloting from his party’s leadership contests, so does he now accept that it should be possible to ballot trade union members on industrial action electronically?

Paragraph 25 further states that

“if the union is aware that any member will be unlikely to access electronic communications before the…strike”

it should send notice by “first class post” instead. What on earth does that mean? Is a union to require a read receipt from every member to form a view of whether they are likely to access their emails? Does the Minister realise that even four days’ notice would be asking rather a lot of Royal Mail, leaving aside bank holidays and weekends, because the latest stats on the delivery of first-class mail show that it is well below its performance targets?

The most problematic aspect of the code is probably paragraph 20, given its provisions on varying work notices. Anyone tasked with ensuring that all the right members are contacted within the incredibly tight timescale of seven days will experience a logistical nightmare, and that would only be exacerbated by the option of amendment only four days out.

Sadly, the provision leaves the door open to employers to deliberately and purposefully issue erroneous work notices in the first instance, only to vary them closer to the relevant date with a view to undermining industrial action. Members should not forget that “four days before” can start at 11.59 pm on the relevant day, effectively leaving three days. While the motivation might not be malevolent—it could be due to negligence—the practical effect of the requirement will be that a union would be expected to contact an employee to encourage them to attend work on the day of a strike, but then say to them a couple of days later, “Actually, you don’t need to attend,” while telling a whole new set of people that they need to attend. It is not hard to see how that could be abused to create an air of confusion on the part of the worker as to whether they are meant to be on strike or at work. When the consequences for making a mistake are so great, it is understandable that a worker would be likely to err on the side of caution and attend the workplace. Of course, all the energy and time expended on deciding who needs to get a notice and who does not could be spent on trying to resolve the dispute.

All those problems are compounded by a contradiction in the code of practice. Paragraph 19 indicates that, under the duty, a union is expected to take reasonable steps to contact members included in a work notice as soon as is “reasonably practical”.

[Mick Whitley]

Does my hon. Friend share my confusion about why the onus for communicating with members who have been named in work notices has been placed on unions, rather than on employers, which routinely communicate with their employees as a matter of course? Does he also worry, as I do, that given the difficulties that unions often encounter in contacting members, the measure greatly increases the likelihood of workers being subject to disciplinary action and even dismissal?

[Justin Madders]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the code puts the onus on trade unions. How odd is it that we are in a world in which a Government instruct a trade union to tell employees to attend the workplace? I cannot think of anything more bizarre. But the measure is not actually about ensuring that people attend work; it is about undermining collective industrial action. From what we have seen today, it is clear that that is exactly the Government’s intention.

The trade union’s duty to take reasonable steps to contact members as soon as is “reasonably practical”, contained in paragraph 19, is contradicted in step 2 of the code, which provides guidance on how to encourage members to comply with a work notice. In this step, the code states that once a union has identified all its members, it should communicate this to them via a compliance notice. Paragraph 23 states that the union

“should send the compliance notice before the strike action”

but that it would be “reasonable” to send the notice

“once it is clear that the work notice will not be subject to variation by the employer—either because the last day on which the employer can vary the work notice without the union’s agreement has passed or because the employer has notified the union in writing that it will not vary the work notice”.

That is completely inconsistent with what the code of practice states earlier—that the union should contact its members as soon as is “reasonably practical”. They cannot both be right. Given the consequences of getting this wrong for both the trade union and the individual, the code of practice really ought not to contain such a mixed message. Will the Minister therefore confirm whether a union is supposed to wait until the conditions in paragraph 23 are met, or just get on with it as soon as is “reasonably practical”, as paragraph 19 suggests?

Beyond that issue, the code’s recommendations on encouraging members to comply with a work notice are plainly unreasonable, misleading and complex. Step 2 of the code contains stipulations that are drafted in such a way that grounds for legal challenge will inevitably be opened. Paragraph 26 and annex A, in particular, can be seen to do this. Paragraph 26 includes a list of eight features that a compliance notice must state “clearly and conspicuously”, and annex A contains a pro forma template for unions to use, which is recommended for use by unions at paragraph 27. Paragraph 27 states that a union can amend the template but that the compliance notice must retain

“the overall substance and effect of the notice”.

So why go down this road at all? Why go to the trouble of drafting a template letter and then say that unions can vary it? Is that not just inviting trouble?

We know that the slightest transgression in an industrial action ballot can lead some employers to seek injunctions, even though the practical effect of that transgression is nil, so there is a concern that any deviations from the template will invite legal challenge from employers. The TUC believes that deviations

“will almost certainly lead some employers to seek to legally challenge unions”.

Does the Minister agree with that point of view? How does he think that such satellite litigation will aid the resolution of industrial disputes? Can he also explain the rationale for including a pro forma template on top of the guidance contained in paragraph 26?

Unfortunately, that is not the only way in which the code could instigate legal challenge. Plenty of areas in the code appear to allow for challenges if the union makes an error. Paragraph 39, for instance, states:

“communicating with members whom the union knows are identified in a work notice to induce them to strike”

could constitute an act that undermines steps taken to comply with a work notice. Taken literally, that means that for the period of the work notice, the trade union cannot contact any member subject to one at all with any information on the industrial action. Is the Minister saying that on certain occasions, for a certain period, a trade union cannot contact some members to tell them what is happening with the strike? The mere mention that a strike is taking place could be considered an inducement to strike. I am interested to hear what the Minister says about that, because to me it looks like a fundamental attack on democratic freedoms.

If the Minister does not accept that that is the intention behind paragraph 39, does he accept that there could be a real problem in some circumstances—for example, where there is a technological or administrative error in distributing emails on a mailing list that could risk some of the wrong members receiving that email? Trade unions in those circumstances would lose their protection from liability in tort and employees would lose their automatic protection from unfair dismissal. Is that really what is intended with the code of practice, because that is what paragraph 39 seems to suggest?

The stakes are far too high for such an error to constitute a breach of the code, especially given that the names included in the work notice are liable to change, often at short notice. As there is already guidance in the code stating that compliance notices should include statements telling those on work notices to ignore calls to take part in strikes, paragraphs 38 to 40 seem excessively punitive and unnecessary. The only conclusion that one can draw from such a communication—a blackout around strikes—is that this is a deliberate attempt to undermine trade unions and impact the effectiveness of industrial action.

I will return briefly to the annex and paragraph 26; this is an example of the state trying to dictate the contents of a union’s communications with its members. First, according to the stipulation in paragraph 26(f), unions are expected to encourage workers to undertake the work set out in the work notices. We think it is inappropriate for a union to encourage a worker to comply with a work notice, as it could undermine the collective endeavour of industrial action. Yes, a union must advise a worker of the possible consequences of failing to comply with a work notice, but it is not the role of the state to instruct a union to do that in an enthusiastic way, as is implied in the code of practice.

What does “encourage” even mean? Is it like a football supporter encouraging their team from the terraces and cheering the team on? Is it sending text messages to a mobile phone with affirming messages such as “Please go to work today. I know you’ve got this”? It seems a very odd thing to request that a trade union encourage its members to go to work, given that presumably on every other day, the employee does not require such encouragement to turn up and do their job.