UK Defence Spending

Debate between Julian Lewis and Stewart Malcolm McDonald

Thursday 24th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

I am delighted to see my right hon. Friend nodding his assent. Therefore, when we talk about the 2% guideline, we should bear in mind that it is not a ceiling nor a target; it is merely a floor or a minimum. Now we face a similar task regarding the increase in the cap on the size of our nuclear stockpile recently announced in the integrated review. That should be described as a ceiling, not a floor. In other words, it is a maximum and not a target for the number of warheads we will retain.

The integrated review states:

“In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.”

Predictably, this is being denounced as a more than 40% increase in the stockpile, on the basis that increasing a total of 180 to 260 would be an uplift of 44.4%. However, the cancellation of a reduction that has not yet been completed—if indeed it ever began—means that, at most, the total might rise from the previously declared maximum of 225 to a new maximum of 260. Were those the actual present and future totals, the increase would be only about 15.5%, a perfectly reasonable increment to ensure that advances in anti-ballistic missile technology over the 40-plus years of our next generation of Trident warheads cannot undermine our policy of minimum strategic deterrence.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The right hon. Gentleman does not have to wait for the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). He knows that we disagree on this—he mentioned at the start of his speech the last vote on the nuclear deterrent, and I seem to recall that we were in agreement that there should be a vote on the nuclear deterrent. However, when the integrated review was published—he has just mentioned the change in threat and doctrines as a reason for the expansion of the new nuclear policy—it was said that this was somehow to do with things such as cyber-threats, so which computer are we aiming these nuclear weapons at? Does he agree that to say that we would use nuclear weapons in response to a cyber-attack or threat is wholly absurd?

[Dr Lewis]

If the hon. Gentleman, whom I regard as a friend, waits for the next part of my analysis, I hope that all will become clear. However, it is absolutely the case that nuclear weapons, as a deterrent, do not deter every sort of threat that could be ranged against us. If they did, we could abolish all the other armed forces. The truth of the matter is that they deter other weapons of mass destruction. Unless there were a development in the cyber world that could inflict destruction on a mass level comparable with a nuclear exchange, it is entirely incredible to think that nuclear weapons would be used in retaliation to an attack of that sort. I hope that satisfies him on the main point that he was making.

Minimum deterrence relies on the fact that possession of a last-resort strategic nuclear system that can be guaranteed to inflict unacceptable and unavoidable devastation in response to nuclear aggression does not require any ability to match the aggressor missile for missile or warhead for warhead. Nuclear superpowers have huge overkill capabilities that offer zero extra protection against countries with much smaller weapons of mass destruction arsenals, as long as the latter can retaliate with an unstoppable and unbearable counter-strike against any nuclear aggressor who is seeking to wipe them out. Overkill capabilities may have symbolic political value, but in the dread event of a nuclear exchange, all they can do, as was famously said, is to “make the rubble bounce”.

There may exist more up-to-date estimates, but the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s inventory totals for world nuclear stockpiles, published at the beginning of last year, are sufficiently instructive. China, France and the UK, with estimated totals of 320, 290 and 215 respectively, fall into the camp of minimum strategic nuclear deterrence. By contrast, the estimated totals of 5,800 for the United States and 6,375 for Russia go way beyond anything needed to pursue such a policy. The notion that, at some stage in the future, the United Kingdom might end up with 35 more warheads than its previously declared theoretical maximum does not change the fact that we are currently, and shall probably remain, fifth out of five in the size of the nuclear stockpiles held by the permanent member states of the UN Security Council. So why have the Government chosen to take the controversial step of cancelling the reduction in the ceiling of our warhead total from 225 to 180 and raising it to a new ceiling of 260 instead?

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

Can I answer?

[Dr Lewis]

I was just going to say that this is the analysis that the hon. Gentleman was waiting for, but if he really wishes to come in, he can.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

It is a shame that the Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), is no longer here, but I was with him when he said that it is to cover for the fact that we are cutting the Army by 10,000 as a sweetener to the Americans. That is what it is.

[Dr Lewis]

Let us see if the hon. Gentleman was right in anticipating what I have to say.

In the absence, at present at any rate, of any briefing on the issue, classified or otherwise, from my parliamentary colleagues on the Defence ministerial team, here are the four possible explanations that occur to me. Explanation 1—most probably, as already stated—is that it is an insurance policy to prevent a potential aggressor from calculating that advances in anti-ballistic missile systems have reduced our retaliatory capability to a point where our response to an attack becomes bearable or even avoidable. Explanation 2—quite probably—is that it is to give more headroom for the time, in the late 2030s or early 2040s, when we are due to exchange our current stockpile of warheads for next-generation nuclear warheads, while at the same time preventing disruption of our continuous at-sea deterrent patrols. Explanation 3— possibly—is that it is to send a signal internationally that the UK is determined to keep nuclear weapons as long as other countries have them and remains committed to doing whatever is required to maintain their invulnerability. And—here it comes—explanation 4, conceivably, is that it is also tailored for a domestic audience worried about cuts in the size of the Army, in order to offer reassurance, or at least to divert some attention from those reductions.

What seems most unlikely is an intention to invest in additional warheads of the existing design. We are certainly cancelling their reduction from a theoretical maximum of 225 to one of only 180 for any or all of the four reasons listed, particularly the first explanation. Raising the maximum from 225 to 260 to provide extra headroom for the eventual transition from current warheads to their replacements is a sensible explanation, though not a conclusive one, given that the changeover is not due to happen for well over a decade.

Despite the imposition of a dedicated supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament as the Leader of the Opposition in 2015, hon. and right hon. Labour Members ensured that their party’s policy remained multilateralist. Previously, on 14 March 2007, Parliament had voted by 409 to 161 in favour of proceeding with the initial gate for renewal of the Trident submarine fleet. Even that huge majority was eclipsed on 18 July 2016, when it rose to 355 after MPs voted for the decisive main gate stage to proceed by 472 to only 117.

There is nothing in article VI of the non-proliferation treaty that requires any country already in possession of a recognised nuclear arsenal to get rid of it and to achieve a nuclear-free world prior to a state of grace when general and complete conventional disarmament—also referred to in the non-proliferation treaty, but seldom cited by those who quote it selectively—can be guaranteed. There is a very good reason for this, because if we were to abandon all nuclear weapons in an unreformed world, that would be a recipe for disaster. In a conventional war taking place in a nuclear-free world, the former nuclear powers would immediately race to reacquire the bomb. The first to succeed would then use its monopoly, as occurred in 1945. If the treaty’s vision of general and complete conventional disarmament ever becomes reality, then nuclear weapons can indeed also safely be declared redundant; but, until that day dawns, the United Kingdom is perfectly capable of changing the size of its warhead stockpile without breaching the non-proliferation treaty in order to maintain indefinitely the credibility of its strategic minimum deterrence policy.

Britain in the World

Debate between Julian Lewis and Stewart Malcolm McDonald

Monday 13th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. However, I have found through long experience that although it is a rather crude shorthand, this business of percentages is the one straightforward, simple and clear way of showing to the country what has been happening in relative terms, compared with other high spending Departments, to defence expenditure.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

May I urge the right hon. Gentleman not to oversimplify what is actually complex, and rightly so? Should not the debate be led by capability over the simplicity of saying that we meet a certain target? We do an assessment of where the threat picture is at, we determine what capability is required to meet that threat assessment, and we spend the money accordingly. Targets, while simple and easy to understand, do not paint the whole picture.

[Dr Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. He came in as if on cue, because I was just about to paint what I regard as the spectrum of threats that are necessary to give us the flexibility that we need to have if we are going to prepare an adequate defence policy.

UK Special Forces: Iraq and Afghanistan

Debate between Julian Lewis and Stewart Malcolm McDonald

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

It is almost as if the hon. Gentleman can see the notes in front of me, because I am coming to that exact point.

The allegations uncovered by the joint BBC and The Sunday Times investigation have to be taken out of the Government’s hands and given to an independent inquiry led by a judge. No honest person could disagree with that.

The hon. Gentleman touches on an important wider point, which is Parliament’s broader ability to hold special forces operations to account. That is woefully lacking in this country, and we are being outdone by the United States—the United States!—on the oversight of special forces. In this modern age, the public expect there to be proper parliamentary scrutiny and parliamentary oversight. The system needs updating.

Clearly, there cannot be a free-for-all in which every single Member can access information on live special forces operations, as only a fool would suggest such a thing, but it cannot be beyond the House’s collective imagination, or beyond the collective imagination of the small group of Members, some of whom are unfortunately no longer with us, who regularly attend debates on defence, to propose a mechanism by which we can catch up with the United States—the US system is not perfect, but it is something—Denmark and Norway and have proper oversight of special forces operations.

Indeed, it has been mentioned before in the House by both the Labour Opposition and the Scottish National party, to great resistance from Conservative Members, that the time has come for us to introduce a proper war powers Act. I say to the Government that it is better to take this stuff on now and to have a serious parliamentary debate on the scrutiny efforts this Parliament can take forward before it ends up in the International Criminal Court—nobody wants to see that, but it may well be heading there. A failure to deal with this properly, to be judicious and sober in approaching these matters and to ensure that justice is done and the pursuit of the truth is absolutely unforgiving is nothing short of an assault on our values. It is worth remembering that the ICC was set up with the United Kingdom’s enthusiastic support, and rightly so. As I said, I do not want to see this end up in the ICC and I am sure that neither does the Minister. He has an opportunity to ensure that it does not.

Against a backdrop of assaults on the international rules-based order, which the Government tell us day in, day out they want to defend and uphold, surely we must respond to this mind-blowing investigation properly.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

rose—

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

I detect that the former Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence wishes to intervene.

[Dr Lewis]

Before the hon. Gentleman concludes, may I ask whether he feels that a mechanism similar to that of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which conducts investigations into matters relating to the intelligence agencies that cannot be discussed on the Floor of the House, might not be a slightly more appropriate response than the much wider aim of a war powers Act, with all that that would entail?

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

It sounds to me as though I have an ally in the former Chair of the Defence Committee, because I think that part of the remit of the judge-led inquiry that I have advocated on the Floor of the House tonight should be to make a recommendation to the House on what mechanism the House or the Government bring to the House so that these operations can be properly scrutinised. The ISC would be an obvious outfit for that, although I know that other Members would perhaps disagree.

Defence

Debate between Julian Lewis and Stewart Malcolm McDonald

Thursday 11th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The hon. Gentleman is much more optimistic than me. I have seen just this week, on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, how the Government do this kind of thing. They take every opportunity to pull the wool over people’s eyes. He need only ask his colleagues the hon. Members for Moray and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, as well as the rest of the Scottish Conservative intake. We need a proper SDSR that takes account of the fact that we will no longer be members of the European Union, and of the fact that we have had currency fluctuations and the devaluation of the pound. I am in favour of taking more time if we get a more considered outcome, but the cynic in me suggests that that is not what is at play.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will see that separating defence from the amalgam that has been created could be a good thing, by focusing attention on the purely defence aspect, as he acknowledges, and by giving a new Defence Secretary the opportunity to fight and win the battles with the Treasury that need to be fought and won.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

I am amazed that with their combined experience, the hon. Member for North Wiltshire and the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) appear so optimistic, and I fear they are trying to square a circle that cannot be squared. For more than a year, the SNP has called for a proper SDSR to take account of the fact that we are leaving the European Union, as well as the devaluation of the pound and currency fluctuations.

We must also address the nonsense that we have heard about 2% of GDP. The Government do not spend 2% of GDP on defence, and we should not let them get away with claiming that they do. That 2% includes things such as pensions, efficiency savings, and all sorts of things that it ought not to include. [Interruption.] I see that you are getting nervous about the time, Madam Deputy Speaker, so I will conclude my remarks and say that I think we should have more such debates on defence in the House. I think we should do that in Government time, and that the Defence Secretary should have turned up to the first defence debate of his tenure. It should not always be up to the Opposition to drag the Government to this Chamber to explain their woeful record.