(11 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberThe overall question of the efficacy of the investment security process is for the Cabinet Office. The right hon. Gentleman may well wish to pursue his inquiry with the Minister responsible. I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend, who chairs the Intelligence and Security Committee, will also have views about the process that the Government have put in place. All I can say to both Select Committee Chairs is that, in relation to this specific merger, we cannot comment on whether it is currently undergoing scrutiny through that process, but we believe that the process that is available for the examination of mergers of this kind on national security grounds is robust. Beyond that, I cannot really go.
I am not asking my right hon. Friend to say whether this particular proposed merger is being investigated. What I am asking him to say is whether the Government accept that there is a significant national security dimension to any proposal for a merger involving a major shareholding by a Chinese subservient company.
I hope that my right hon. Friend will forgive me; I am not sure that I can even go so far as to say that. It is on the record that the Government believe that foreign ownership of major critical infrastructure raises security concerns, which is precisely why the process was put in place and the Investment Security Unit was set up. We believe that we now have the ability to determine whether there are serious national security concerns, and if it is determined that there are, powers are available to the Government to take action to protect our national security. I think the answer is yes, but I do not want to be drawn into particular countries or companies. If he will forgive me, I will leave it at that.
Several Members raised wider questions. My hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Chris Loder) is right that we need to look at the context in which the merger is possibly being considered. His test of whether it is good for his constituents is a perfectly valid one. As he observed, this is the third time we have debated connectivity in 24 hours. That is a measure of how important it is to people. It is the Government’s very firm view that the roll-out of 5G connectivity has huge potential for such things as public services, industry, transport and education. There will be enormous benefits to obtaining the widespread adoption of 5G—benefits that might amount to £159 billion by 2035.
That is why the Prime Minister’s commitment to the UK becoming a science and technology superpower will deliver benefits for everybody in this country. Connectivity, and the availability of mobile telephony, lies at the heart of that. We are already beginning to see benefits from 5G, but the Government are clear that we wish to move beyond the current basic, or non-stand-alone 5G, towards stand-alone 5G. Considerable investment is taking place: something like nearly £2 billion is being invested by the mobile operators in enhancing and improving their networks, and 5G is now available from at least one operator outside 85% of premises.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt was genuinely a pleasure to hear the hon. Member for Stirling (Alyn Smith) express himself in such fluent and consensual terms. The fact that he says his party is willing to agree with Government Members does not come as a surprise to me, because I know from my experience on the last two iterations of the Defence Committee, where I had the pleasure of serving alongside two Members of the SNP, that that is exactly true. That is how it was that, on a cross-party basis, all three parties represented on the Committee were able to agree at quite an early stage that defence expenditure is too low, and that something in the order of 3% of GDP is a more realistic target if Britain is to hold her head up in the world with safety.
Before I develop that theme, however, I want to pick up one point from the excellent speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale), and that is his reference to the BBC, in which he concentrated on the World Service. In about 2011, when the then Sir Ming Campbell and I were both members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I remember that we learned with alarm of the coalition Government’s plan to stop the ring-fenced funding not only of the BBC World Service but of the vital BBC Monitoring Service based at Caversham Park. We expressed the view at the time that the result of putting that funding on the shoulders of the BBC in return for allowing the BBC to have its usual requested rise in the licence fee would come back to bite us—and so it did, because both those budgets were badly squeezed, and I think I am right in saying that in the end the Government felt it necessary to restore separate funding for the BBC World Service, but sadly not for the BBC Monitoring Service.
The position is that the BBC continues to fund the World Service, but it now receives an additional grant from the Foreign Office that has allowed it to expand its services. I very much hope that the Foreign Office will continue—and perhaps increase—that funding.
Yes, but the trouble is that no such grant was made to the BBC Monitoring Service, which is our principal source of what is called open-source intelligence—or, as the BBC prefers to say, open-source information. The Defence Committee produced a hard-hitting report entitled “Open Source Stupidity”, because that was entirely our opinion of the effect of that cutback by the coalition Government. It led directly to the closure of Caversham Park, and although BBC Monitoring continues to do very good work, it is a shame and a disgrace that it is not specially separately funded, as it used to be.
Coming back to the main topic, this is, as we know, a debate on Britain’s future place in the world. However magnified, however static or even however reduced our future place in the world may be, we have to be able to keep our country safe. As I never tire of explaining to the House, the basis of any sensible defence policy depends on three concepts: deterrence, containment, and a realisation of the unpredictability of future conflicts. The examples I always give—I fear that people will start joining in in a chorus if I do it again, but I do so nevertheless—are the Yom Kippur war in 1973 that took hyper-sensitive Israel by surprise, the Falklands war in 1982 that took us by surprise, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that took everybody by surprise, and the 9/11 attacks in 2001 that took the world’s then only superpower by surprise.
What do I conclude from the fact that most wars in the 20th century—I could give many more older examples —were usually not predicted significantly in advance? I conclude that if we are going to have an adequate defence policy, we have to be able to defend flexibly against a whole spectrum of future potential threats because we do not know which of those threats is going to materialise.