Egypt

Debate between Julian Lewis and Gregory Campbell

Wednesday 29th January 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dr Lewis]

That is absolutely correct. My hon. Friend will put me right if I am mistaken, but I recall that part of the deal at the outset was that the Muslim Brotherhood undertook not to run for the presidency—I think that I am right in saying that. That promise was very promptly broken.

In my time trying to comment as best I can on defence and security-related subjects in Parliament, not too many months—certainly not too many years—go by when I do not have recourse to mentioning one of my favourite political quotations from the late, great, Sir Karl Popper in his famous book, “The Open Society and Its Enemies”. I have quoted it before and I suspect that circumstances will require me to quote it again. The paradox of tolerance is that in a free society, people must tolerate all but the intolerant, because if you tolerate the intolerant, the conditions for toleration disappear and the tolerant go with them. I am sure that this is what the people who ousted the Islamists in Egypt would argue was their justification. Although I said earlier that one must not make simplistic comparisons, I am now probably about to do just that. Those people would probably point to the situation in Germany in the 1930s and say, “Wouldn’t it have been better if the army had thrown the Nazis out, once it became clear that they were going to rip up the constitution and remove any chance of a democratic future, and when it saw what the Hitlerites were trying to do to the German system—which had more or less democratically elected them to power in the first place—using the techniques that we are so familiar with in totalitarian takeovers, to get an iron and irreversible grip on the society?” How would we feel now if the army had stepped in then?

I worry when I hear people use phrases such as moderate Islamism. The description of Islamism is the description of an extreme, intolerant ideology; there is no moderate Islamism, any more than there is moderate totalitarianism or moderate extremism. The reality is that there was a choice in Egypt between an Islamist takeover and the ejection of a group of people bent on destroying any sort of emergent democracy in that country and making a terrible mess of running it in the process.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

While the hon. Gentleman is expanding on whether there can be moderate Islamism and the consequence of Islamism emerging in Egypt and other middle eastern nations, might I ask if he shares many people’s concern that religious minorities, including Christians and others, are being systematically purged, not just in thousands or tens of thousands, but in hundreds of thousands, from many nation states right across the middle east?

[Dr Lewis]

I endorse that, and pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman and his party colleagues for raising this question more consistently and more often than any other group of hon. Members in the House. They are right to do so. We have to try to take a long view of the prospects for the re-emergence of some form of moderate government in Egypt. Those of us who have been in, and aware of, politics for a long time can remember the bad old days of Nasser. I am sure that some people would say, “Ah, but those days are likely to come back,” but I remember that most sensible, pro-democratic people were relieved when Nasser’s successor, Sadat, showed himself willing to moderate the more extreme outlooks of Egyptian politics and to make peace with Israel.

I remember, when Sadat was assassinated by what, today, we would call Islamists, how relieved we were that somebody else came forward who carried on his policies. Nevertheless, as is always the case when people come forward and get a grip, as Mubarak did, and do not want to give it up, corruption became rife and the situation ultimately became unstable. Of course, understandably, the people became fed up with him. However, although it took quite a while for the people to become fed up with that form of dictatorship, it did not take them terribly long to be fed up with President Morsi and his group.

Ministry of Defence (Procurement)

Debate between Julian Lewis and Gregory Campbell

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Westminster Hall

[Dr Lewis]

I have to say to the hon. Gentleman—I am tempted to say “my hon. Friend”—that the Liberal Democrats really differ from both of us, because he knows where he stands on nuclear weapons and I know where I stand, but the Liberal Democrats stand firmly with a foot in both camps. They know that they do not want Trident, but they do not want to put themselves in his camp by telling the truth, which is that the majority of their activists are one-sided nuclear disarmers and do not want a strategic nuclear deterrent at all. Therefore, they come up with this fiction that it is possible to have a viable strategic nuclear deterrent with an alternative system to Trident.

That ought to have made no headway at all when the coalition was formed. The reason for that was that I and all the other Conservative Members of Parliament, who were being addressed by the Prime Minister-to-be at a meeting in Committee Room 14, were told what the terms of the coalition agreement would be, or some of the basic outlines of the terms. We were told that we would have to accept certain things that the Liberal Democrats wanted that we did not want, such as a referendum on the alternative vote, but that the Liberals would have to accept things that we wanted that they did not want, such as the renewal of Trident—that was the very example chosen. I remember my friend and colleague the future Chancellor of the Exchequer looking up at that moment, catching my eye—because at the time I was still the party spokesman on the Royal Navy and the nuclear deterrent—and nodding vigorously in confirmation of what the leader of the party had said. You can imagine, Mr Hood, my surprise and dismay—

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

On the issue of discussions and debate, does the lesson of someone nodding vigorously in agreement with a position, only for that subsequently to be replaced by a cold, hard dose of reality, ring a bell in relation to other issues?

[Dr Lewis]

There is always the possibility that people will change their mind when they see different circumstances, but I genuinely feel that that has not applied in this case as a result of what I was about to explain and what hon. Members will remember. Out of the blue, even though the procurement of a replacement and successor system for Trident had specifically been excluded from the terms of the security and defence review, on the day when the statement was made, publishing the review and presenting it to Parliament, we were told that the main gate decision, the contracts for Trident would be put off until after the next election. With the greatest respect to the hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr Campbell), there was no doubt at all that that had nothing to do with hard facts or realities creeping in, and everything to do with politics, as the letter subsequently sent out from the president of the Liberal Democrats, crowing in triumph at the delay of the Trident decision, made clear.

I must not wander too far from the procurement emphasis of this debate. Therefore, I would like to put a specific question to my hon. Friend the Defence Minister with responsibility for procurement issues. It relates to the study that is being done about alternative systems to Trident as a possible nuclear deterrent. That is being done as a gift, a present, a political offering to the Liberal Democrats in the coalition, and I believe that the study is being carried out by the Cabinet Office rather than the Ministry of Defence, although the Ministry of Defence is supplying the material to the Cabinet Office.

I have to say to the Minister that any halfway competent assessment team, facing the problem of examining the existing and the potential systems for carrying a nuclear deterrent in the future, could do a comprehensive study over a period of probably not more than two or three months and arguably over a few weeks, on the basis of the accumulated knowledge of half a century that we have in the business of strategic nuclear deterrence. I would therefore like to know what progress such a study is making or whether it will in fact be spun out until the next general election. The reality is that there is no alternative to Trident for the next generation of the strategic nuclear deterrent, and I suspect that my political opponents in the CND ranks would agree.