Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Julian Huppert and Mark Durkan

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Huppert]

First, just because somebody can be recalled does not mean they would automatically be recalled. How to phrase that in the code would be an interesting question. Trying to have repeated recalls of those Members would be a somewhat futile and repetitive exercise, as it was with the case of Charles Bradlaugh, the Member for Northampton. He was elected three times as an atheist and refused to take a religious oath. The rules were eventually changed because it was made quite clear that his electorate wanted him. I think that, in the case of the Members the hon. Gentleman is referring to, there would have to be some sort of accommodation that there would not be recall elections for that process.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

rose—

[Dr Huppert]

That may be addressed by the proposals from the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), who I suspect is about to say that.

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[Mark Durkan]

What would be the hon. Gentleman’s guarantee that nobody’s constituents in Northern Ireland would be prone to engage in a futile or repetitive exercise?

[Dr Huppert]

I would certainly give no guarantee of that kind. It is important to say that the proposals we are making at the moment do not deal with this issue. I am suggesting that the code of conduct should be updated. I am very happy to have a discussion on the details of that, but it is not germane in detail to this amendment—they are separate processes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

I think the right hon. Gentleman’s point is answered by amendment 8, which has a fuller definition of misconduct. I hope he will have a chance to take a look at that precise point.

Amendment 24 adds another recall trigger: if a Member has been convicted of an offence under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009—providing false or misleading information for allowances claims—whether or not it has led to a prison sentence. The amendment was proposed in Committee by the Opposition and, given the particular sensitivities of the issue, we fully support the proposal. It is a good idea. Similarly, amendment 15 provides another trigger: if any Member is convicted of misconduct in public office, whether or not they are imprisoned—something that has never happened to a Member before, but which does happen on a semi-regular basis, sadly, to police officers in particular. It seems inconceivable that an MP convicted of such an offence could be immune from recall, so I hope the House will support that amendment too.

Amendment 14 tackles the time frame for suspensions from the House to count and ensures that only suspensions after the Committee on Standards has produced a report are involved, thus excluding those from the Speaker alone. Again, this was an idea proposed by the Opposition in Committee and it is sensible. The other amendments that my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr Heath) and I have supported deal with a range of technical details—not least the need to add words such as “third”, “fourth” and “fifth” to legislation that frequently enumerates conditions—as well as more substantial matters, such as historical offences, which I will leave to the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife to explain.

Lastly, there are the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) and the amendment to his new clause 4, from the hon. Member for South Down (Ms Ritchie). I have particular sympathy for the amendment to the new clause, which follows on from the work of Charles Bradlaugh to expand the oath to allow more Members to take it honestly. I am therefore supportive of the ideas of the amended new clause 4. However, I am concerned by the proposal in new clause 5, even though I recognise much of the wording has been taken from my new clauses. It is reasonable to ask a court to consider misconduct offences, but it is much harder to ask it to judge abstract conceptions such as leadership. Do we have any idea how a court could judge whether we in this House had displayed adequate leadership?

I look forward to hearing comments from across the House on the amendments, but I intend to test the will of the House on all amendments, in particular new clauses 2 and 6, as well as the consequential amendments, and, if they are not accepted, I shall support those proposed by the hon. Members for Dunfermline and West Fife and for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg), rather than passing the buck to the other, unelected House.

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) has already touched on new clauses 4 and 5, which stand in my name, and amendment (a) to new clause 4, which has not been selected, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for South Down (Ms Ritchie).

I should clarify that the purpose of new clause 4 is to answer a question that I and other hon. Members posed when we discussed the Bill in Committee and on Second Reading. There is no job description for MPs, so if we are creating the principle of recall—a principle I fully endorse: I believe recall should be possible at the initiative of constituents and the electorate—it is important to have a yardstick. If we are affirming that MPs have and owe that degree of accountability to their constituents, there should be a clear basis on which constituents can rightfully wrest the exercise of that right. We had all sorts of circular arguments about whether having an open petition system could lead to all sorts of specious and spurious grounds that were motivated by partisan or other interests. I believe it was important to create a basis on which MPs could subscribe to the possibility of recall by acknowledging from day one when they take their seats here that they are subject to that degree of accountability and owe service to their constituents. That is why I support the concept of MPs taking a new pledge.

It is rather strange that we are pursuing a Bill that is creating the idea that a strong rule of accountability is to be translated into a recall, yet whenever MPs come here to assume their seats, all they do is issue words in the form of an oath or an affirmation about allegiance to the Crown, which many of them do not actually believe. I am not sure that that does anything for the credibility or reputation of politics when the first thing that politicians do in taking their seats is to recite words that they might not believe. Those who believe in those words should absolutely be able to recite them, but it is important that, regardless of whether Members believe in the affirmation or the oath, we should utter a pledge in respect of our parliamentary standards.

Given that hon. Members proposed amendments in Committee that made reference to the MPs’ code of conduct and given the importance of expenses and other relevant issues that could motivate a recall, we need to recognise the significance of the seven standards of public life, which appeared in the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, for this Bill. Hence the pledge I propose in new clause 4 has MPs, on taking their seats, affirming that they will abide by the MPs’ code of conduct and honour the seven standards of public life as they are now. Those standards could, of course, be revised and extended in future. The new clause would leave the phrasing of the pledge open.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Julian Huppert and Mark Durkan

Monday 5th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

I am sorry to disagree with the hon. Gentleman, but I do not believe that it will be a tonic to the mental health of people under these orders if they know that Parliament will not seriously discuss the matter for another five years. I do not see what relief or redress that offers them. I agree with the hon. Gentleman, however, about the issue of our pretending that annual review will somehow of itself offer comfort to people under these orders in that it might result in their being reprieved from their exigencies. I would not give that false comfort or promise, and nor should we.

Based on the experience that we have all had of the many previous annual renewals, the hon. Gentleman also makes a valid point in saying that the Chamber might take its responsibilities in this regard somewhat lightly, but let us therefore be exposed to condemnation for such dereliction of duty and for not turning up every year to consider renewals duly and properly, rather than pretend that it is sufficient to do that on a five-yearly basis. Considering the issues at stake under this Bill, the attendance for the current debate is not particularly unimpressive in comparison with the likely attendance, which the hon. Gentleman indicts, for an annual review debate.

We should not kid ourselves about the false merits of a five-year sunset clause as opposed to an annual review, and nor should those of us who might vote in a Division to keep a version of annual review delude ourselves about the extent of the impact of annual reviews. However, annual reviews might ensure that the various other parliamentary means of scrutiny—whether through the Backbench Business Committee or Select Committees—are used to condition such reviews and, perhaps, explore more of the alternatives.

In the context of our deliberations today, I and others regret the fact that good amendments that were submitted on police bail and the conditions that could be attached to that are not available for us to discuss. Through discussing them, we would have been able to consider possible restrictions in cases where the police so far have only limited evidence that is not amenable to their taking the case to full prosecution. For such cases, there are means within the standard criminal law that can be deployed and developed, and amendments were tabled that offered that option. Through having annual reviews, some such alternatives might build up more of a head of steam. I am not saying we need annual reviews in the same style as in the past, but if we were to use annual reviews and the other parliamentary means now available to us, we could make more of this system.

Focusing now on the substance of the Bill, control orders are a poor tool and a crude weapon, but whereas TPIMs might appear to be softer, even when looked at through the bubblewrap of all the claims that the Government make for this Bill, they are also a poor tool and a crude weapon. Some of us have experience of how counter-terrorism measures can be deployed in counter-productive ways. They can act as grist to the mill of those who would radicalise others and try to spread subversion and dissident tendencies. They can also be used in ways that get in the way of good police work, and good police interface and engagement with communities whose sympathies and confidence are essential in holding the line against terrorist and subversive tendencies. We should therefore always tread lightly in relation to measures brought before us and offered as necessary and justified on the basis of countering terrorism.

Parliament should be particularly wary when we are given the assurance that these powers will not merely be activated on the basis of secret intelligence by mysterious Executive servants who may or may not appear before Select Committees or anybody else in Parliament, because there will be a degree of judicial oversight through posts such as special advocates. We should be very wary about being casual about any provisions that involve constant reference to words such as “special” and features such as “secret,” but that is precisely what we have in the TPIMs cocktail that is before us, and it is the same cocktail that was before us in relation to control orders. We as a Parliament should at least be trying to provide some sort of antidote to that, or diluting it through putting in place the kind of scrutiny and challenge that an annual review might provide.

I have listened to the arguments for and against these amendments. I am not impressed by the Government’s arguments, including those of the Liberal Democrats, in favour of their proposed measures. I support the Opposition on annual renewal, while not being under any illusions that that will be any great shakes in itself, but I certainly do not support the Opposition in trying to insinuate that somehow this legislation is dangerous in itself and exposes us to new risks because it damages control orders. I do not believe control orders have been necessary or effective in the way that they have operated. In fact, that has been dangerous in some regards, because sometimes both the terms and conditions of control orders have been interpreted randomly and capriciously, so that not only have people’s movements been restricted, but people have been made amenable to prosecution, and the threat of it, for supposed breach of unreasonable conditions.

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Just today, I heard from somebody who used to be under a control order who said that there were a number of such instances. On one occasion he had to wait to sign in because there was a queue at the police station, which led to him signing in two minutes late. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important that this Government also look at such details, because unreasonable conditions will make the whole system completely ridiculous?

[Mark Durkan]

Yes, I fully agree with that point about the ridiculously pedantic and capricious use of conditions to get something on these people, when they demonstrate no greater threat than the fact that they find it difficult to cope with increasingly bizarre conditions. Therefore, I do not hold the same brief as the Opposition for control orders and the existing legislation, which is why I do not support them on the amendments that suggest that control orders are somehow better; but neither do I fall for the Government’s false argument that TPIMs are substantially different, because they involve a large part of the same mix as control orders. I never bought the product “I can’t believe it’s not butter” and I am not going to buy “I can’t believe it’s not control orders.”