(1 week, 6 days ago)
Commons ChamberI thank my hon. Friend for sharing his lived experience. I can relate that to when I have spoken to organisations through the Business and Trade Committee and through my role on the Joint Committee for National Security Strategy. I have heard from organisations that have been impacted about how paralysing the immediate aftermath of such an attack is and how it challenges an organisation. It is crucial that these red team, blue team scenarios get played out, but when it is actually happening and a company is facing an entire shutdown of its systems, it is very difficult to navigate. Many have talked about the culture change that is needed, and we need to urgently embrace that change. The experience in the NHS that my hon. Friend mentions is a good example.
These attacks are the new normal and we must be better prepared. In September 2024, led by the FBI and the National Security Agency, the United Kingdom, Germany, Estonia, Canada and a plethora of other allies released their clearest articulation of the threat posed by Russia, and Putin in particular. They said that Russia is
“responsible for computer network operations against global targets for the purposes of espionage, sabotage, and reputational harm since at least 2020.”
The NCSC annual review in 2024 called the landscape “diffuse and dangerous”, while the 2025 review could not have been clearer in saying “It’s time to act” in the defining text on the front cover. Richard Horne, head of the NCSC, said:
“Empty shelves and stalled production lines are a stark reminder that cyber attacks no longer just affect computers and data, but real business, real products, and real lives… The recent cyber attacks must act as a wake-up call.”
Just last week, Andrew Bailey, the Governor of the Bank of England, said that cyber-attacks were one of the biggest threats to UK financial stability and stressed the critically important need for collaborative defence.
The reality should be clear to everyone here. The frontline is everywhere. It is our phone, it is at our desk, it is our businesses, it is our infrastructure and it is even here at the heart of our democracy. Such a threat requires a whole-of-society response. We are not the first to have been targeted. Back in 2007—18 years ago—Russia launched a determined cyber-attack on Estonia. It was damaging and debilitating to Estonia’s society and economy. The cyber-attack was a call to action for Estonia and it responded at pace. It brought about cultural change, which was talked about earlier in the debate. Estonia overhauled its legal, political and strategic framework—even looking at its education system—and adopted a whole-of-society approach to cyber-security, developing a serious public-private partnership to counter the threats posed by Russia. No doubt the Minister will have looked at this case in more detail to understand what learnings could be applied here and to our cyber-security strategy more widely to ensure whole-of-society resilience.
The reality is that cyber-attacks target the weakest link. It was welcome to hear my right hon. Friend the Minister talk about the initiatives with the FTSE 350 companies and some of the smaller businesses about how they should be engaging with these threats. It cannot be acceptable that the most popular password in the United Kingdom is “password”. It is ridiculous. Every one of us must act as guardian against our cyber-adversaries.
The Bill lays out valuable and desperately needed provisions. Its extent and scope are hugely welcome, bringing in data centres, large load controllers and managed service providers under the network and information systems regulations protects more of the economy from cyber-attacks. I am particularly pleased to see the inclusion of managed service providers, given the vulnerabilities that organisations often face from external IT suppliers or their supply base.
The amendments to the regulatory framework are a positive step. Improving the reporting of incidents will allow the Government to respond at pace and be agile to the evolving threats and shared vulnerabilities. That said, during the last Parliament, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which I now chair, called for one cross-sector cyber regulator, and I echo those calls, as I believe that would enable far greater regulation and enforcement. Finally, the improved resilience and security enabled through additional powers granted to the Secretary of State are crucial in enabling the Government to act quickly in real times of crisis.
Despite all the positive aspects of the Bill—I congratulate Ministers after the years of dithering by their predecessor Government—it does leave large parts of the economy outside its scope. As I have mentioned already, how can we incorporate a whole-of-society approach to cyber-security like that of Estonia? There will be many different levers for the Government to pull. This Bill is just one part, and I trust that others will follow swiftly. It is worth noting that the EU’s NIS2 directive is broadly parallel to the Bill before us. However, the EU goes further on cyber-resilience, having added sectors such as manufacturing, food distribution and waste water. Having witnessed such devastating attacks in these sectors in the past year, I urge us to act swiftly with further legislation to address those areas.
In summary, I just restate that I absolutely welcome the Bill and the three key pillars of the legislation—the expanded scope, improving regulation and strengthening resilience—are hugely welcome, as is the importance of experience reporting and sharing by victims. The cyber-attacks we have suffered this past year must be our inflection point—our call to action. Like Estonia in 2007, we have an opportunity to reinvigorate our cyber-defences and ensure the whole of society is resilient. The shadow Minister mentioned digital ID, and I gently say that that opportunity was seized upon by Estonia at the time and it has since introduced digital ID. It is secure, as it is in Denmark. Estonia looked at the opportunity presented by that challenge and that attack that they faced, and those systems work. That has been demonstrated by both those countries. As the annual review from the National Cyber Security Centre rightly asserts,
“the UK’s cyber security is… a shared responsibility where everyone needs to play a part.”
We parliamentarians have a duty to raise the salience of the issue, and to bring about a national conversation to ensure that everyone plays their part.
Finally, may I gently encourage the Minister to go further and faster, and to look at the broader cyber-landscape, as Estonia did and as the European Union is doing with its NIS2 legislation? May I encourage him to consider introducing legislation to cover food production and distribution, manufacturing and other critical sectors? As I have said, however, the Bill is an important first step, and I look forward to working constructively with him to ensure that the UK and its citizens are secure from, and resilient to, any future cyber-attacks.
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI hope this point of order will be relevant. Can you confirm that it is relevant?
It is relevant, Madam Deputy Speaker. The hon. Gentleman mentioned my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), but had he warned her that he would be mentioning her in the Chamber?
I thank the hon. Member for the point of order. However, that is not a point of order; it is a courtesy of the House.
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am afraid that I want to let everyone speak this evening.
Let me give three clear examples of how the Bill will contribute to weakened protection for asylum seekers. First, clauses 16 to 20, requiring them to provide evidence supporting their claim by a specific date, appears to be almost entirely arbitrary. Indeed, the Immigration Law Practitioners Association has said that those clauses ignore the practical difficulties faced by many asylum seekers. Secondly, clause 24, which allows the Home Secretary to accelerate appeals when she thinks they would be disposed of expeditiously, grates against both article 34 of the UN refugee convention and the principles of natural justice—the very principles on which our legal system is founded, signed into force by the Attlee Government. It is more than regrettable that the convention appears now to be held in such little regard by this Government. Thirdly, not only will the Home Secretary have a much wider arsenal of powers at her disposal, but the Bill authorises decision makers to decide on the balance of probabilities, rather than on the basis of reasonable likelihood, whether a person claiming asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution.
Let us be clear: this amounts to an unnecessary raising of the legal bar for asylum seekers to succeed in cases. I struggle to see a valid policy reason for such a move, in the light of the Home Secretary’s commitment to upholding the apparently long, proud tradition of providing a home for people fleeing persecution and oppression. The answer lies not in raising the bar disproportionately high for asylum seekers to overcome, but in a more holistic approach to the support offered. It is not just our footballers who see this divisive Government for what it is; the public are more compassionate than the Government, and they seek a fair, compassionate system to provide for those in need.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank my hon. Friend for being so generous. To amplify that point, I think it was Nick Dearden who, during the oral evidence sessions, spoke about modern trade deals and the huge opportunity presented to us. It is almost a no-brainer to include the things listed in the amendment. There is almost an assumption that they should be included, and that is why we are putting forward the amendment. These are modern trade deals. We have an opportunity to update the arrangements. This is a simple amendment.
The Chair
For clarity, when we vote, we will vote on the amendment as on the amendment paper. It is perfectly in order for the hon. Member for Bradford South to discuss the principles that she wishes to see applied in the Bill.
My hon. Friend makes a very important point. It is important that we consider those wider issues in this Committee.
It is unacceptable that we might come to such a debate in the future only to discover that our right to choose what we eat and how it is produced has already been traded away in secret negotiations by a Secretary of State who ranks getting a trade deal far above protecting food safety for the British people. Amendment 8 would simply ensure that our trade agreements conform to food safety policies, not the other way around.
The significance of the challenge laid down by Wilbur Ross at the CBI last November was lost on no one. Two days after the speech, the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, responded to Wilbur Ross and posed the No. 1 question for the UK: do the British people wish to remain aligned with the European Union’s relatively high standards, or do we want our food safety standards to be downgraded so we can do a dirty deal with the USA?
Does my hon. Friend agree that, given the Secretary of State’s statement that there
“are no health reasons why you couldn’t eat chickens that have been washed in chlorinated water”—
of course, that is the same Secretary of State who said that Brexit is the easiest thing in human history—it is crucial that we set out in statute that international trade agreements must maintain the food safety standards in our country?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that that must be set out in regulations and in statute.
I want to spell out clearly the connection between this amendment and one of the key issues in the post-Brexit settlement between the UK and the EU—namely, the border issue on the island of Ireland. Hon. Members will recall the dramatic scenes last month when our Prime Minister finally managed to move us on to negotiations with the EU about what our long-term relationship should be after Brexit. That was achieved by way of an agreement in respect of the island of Ireland, which committed the UK to the following:
“In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement.”
When pressed further on what exactly that might mean, the Prime Minister was more explicit. She specified that there are six areas that are covered at present by north-south co-operation on the island of Ireland, and confirmed that one of them is agriculture.
The significance of the Prime Minister’s words goes far beyond the immediate issue of how we are to relate to the remaining 27 member states of the European Union in the future. Any suggestion that the UK might downgrade its food safety regulations to do a deal with the USA or any other trading partner would wreak havoc among farming communities both north and south of the border in Ireland, which would find themselves unable to continue trading freely. Allowing the Secretary of State to contemplate such a divergence in a trade deal with the USA or any other trading partner would jeopardise the peaceful co-existence that we have all endeavoured to hold together since the Good Friday agreement was signed 20 years ago. That is why amendment 8 is so important, and we hope the Government will vote to support it.
There are real threats. The USA agricultural lobby called for EU rules on pesticides to be downgraded in TTIP, given that we have far stricter regulations on the levels of chemical pesticide residue permitted in food. It called for our ban on the sale of genetically modified organisms to be eliminated, given that 70% of all processed food in US supermarkets is now made with genetically modified ingredients. It also called for an end to the mandatory labelling of products containing genetically modified ingredients, on the grounds that it represents a hidden barrier to trade. Consumer choice would go out of the window with public health, food safety and animal welfare rights.
Does my hon. Friend agree that this is clearly an issue, as has been described, of consumer information and consumer rights, in terms of not just the quality of food being put on our plates but the conditions in which our animals are kept, the state of the abattoirs and the standards we maintain so highly in this country?
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, and I repeat that it is important to maintain the regulatory standards we have in this nation.
The US Government trade representative confirmed in writing at the very outset of the negotiations that the USA’s TTIP negotiators would be seeking to eliminate or downgrade those sanitary or phytosanitary measures that prevent US exports from entry into the market of the UK and other EU member states. That was one of the central reasons why TTIP became so toxic across country after country in Europe, and why the European Commission soon discovered that it had no legitimacy to continue the TTIP negotiations at all.
I should also note that there is a commercial aspect to this. The celebrity chef, Jamie Oliver, was so concerned about the potential impact of TTIP on his business—which is based on high-quality food imports at every stage of the supply chain—that he took it upon himself to call on the previous Secretary of State for cast-iron guarantees that food standards would not be included as part of the TTIP negotiations. The Secretary of State was unable to give him those guarantees, since the TTIP negotiations were, at that same moment, addressing sanitary and phytosanitary measures at the express demand of the US Government. Of course, those negotiations were going on behind closed doors.
That is what Wilbur Ross meant when he warned that the USA would demand the downgrading of UK food standards. That is why it has been so appalling to see the current Secretary of State laughing off the threat represented by such a downgrading of our standards.
(7 years, 11 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Cliff Stevenson: In principle, I think it is not necessarily a bad idea—that if you have an organisation full of trade expertise, you might use it for other purposes as well. I mentioned Canada earlier. The Canadian international trade tribunal, the independent entity that makes determinations on injury, can also be given other tasks and produce expert reports. So I do not think it is a bad idea in principle that the TRA may do other things. The concern would be about resourcing.
Trade remedy investigations are highly resource-intensive. They are incredibly detailed. Gareth mentioned earlier about the dumping calculation being easy. In a sense, what he was saying is that it is straightforward, the steps are very clear—but it is a massive calculation with thousands of data entries on a spreadsheet or in a model. To the extent that there would be a concern, it would be to ensure that there was sufficient capacity ring-fenced for the different functions. Principally, it seems to me that the Trade Remedies Authority’s purpose is the administration of the trade remedy regime. That would be the only issue I would raise.
Q
Tom Reynolds: One example I can give you is from MTRA partner sectors, the chemicals fertiliser sector, around the long-term implications for the consumer if adequate trade remedies are not installed. In Ireland, for instance, the domestic manufacturing industry for fertilisers sadly went by the wayside, because the anti-dumping measures were not introduced in time to provide a defence for their industry. As it became a less attractive market because of less competition, the prices started to rise for all the previously dumped exports, so the lack of competitive environment in Ireland ended up costing farmers more for their fertilisers.
Cliff Stevenson: Obviously, it depends on the product, because when you are talking about products used in another industry, such as in the case of steel, even a fairly substantial anti-dumping duty, if you work it through to the final price to the retailer of the downstream product, is going to have a much smaller effect. Obviously, in the case of a consumer product, where the product goes directly to the consumer, the impact of the duty would be exactly at the level of the duty, so that is certainly true.
It is important always to consider what the purpose of trade remedies is. They are about remedying a distortion, an anti-competitive situation or a subsidy. In that way, any time you increase a duty the users, the importers, or the consumers of that product are going to face the negative impact of the increase in duty. What is really important to remember about trade remedies is that they are not about protecting domestic industry, I do not believe. They are about restoring effective competition. That is a key point. Even if a consumer product does increase in price, in the long term the consumer is better off if effective competition is maintained.