Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJonathan Reynolds
Main Page: Jonathan Reynolds (Labour (Co-op) - Stalybridge and Hyde)Department Debates - View all Jonathan Reynolds's debates with the HM Treasury
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 1, page 1, line 14, leave out from “(g)” to “does” in line 16.
This amendment would amend the definition of “adjustments” to restore its natural meaning, while retaining the prohibition on major changes.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 12, in clause 1, page 1, line 17, leave out “major” and insert “material”.
This amendment would prevent material changes to EU financial services legislation being made through adjustments under subsection (2).
Amendment 13, in clause 1, page 1, line 18, at end insert—
“(2A) But ‘adjustments’ may not include any changes that, in the Treasury’s view, lighten or remove the regulatory burden in comparison to the legislation as it would have operated had the United Kingdom not withdrawn from the EU.”
This amendment would prevent adjustments to EU legislation under this Bill from lightening or removing regulatory burdens on financial services.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Edward, and to open the debate for the Opposition. I would now like to speak to amendments 11, 12 and 13, which aim to address some of our wider concerns about the powers being given to the Treasury in this Bill. In the Opposition’s view, the Bill lacks the necessary checks and balances that would prevent it being subject to the potential exploitation of its stated objectives. I express my gratitude to my colleagues in the Lords who began this process and achieved some important initial restrictions on those powers. However, we believe that further controls can be added to ensure that the powers cannot be abused.
I will address this group in two parts. Amendments 11 and 12 would alter the language in the Bill to prevent material changes taking place and restrict the nature of the adjustments that can be made. Amendment 13 explicitly prevents any deregulation under the Bill. Those changes of language are significant and important, because they specify in the Bill clear limits on what alterations and adjustments fall within acceptable realms. We must exercise such caution because included within the Bill, as specified in the in-flight list, are fundamental pillars of the post-financial crisis regulatory regime. That list includes critical rules which are designed to strengthen our financial markets and infrastructure, to prevent a repeat of the disastrous events of 2008, of which we still feel the consequences today. Those include the capital requirements directive V, the bank recovery and resolution directive II, and the central counterparty recovery and resolution regulation. Those regulations have played a central role in promoting integrity in financial markets.
The capital requirements directive, for example, sets out the asset buffers that systemically important financial institutions must hold, and in what ratios. That is to prevent a repeat of the events of 2008, so that banks do not enter a downward spiral at times of market stress and put the public purse at unacceptable risk again. Given the costs involved for banks, the regulations often involve significant negotiation and lobbying to find an agreeable level of capitalisation with which banks feel they can reasonably comply. Last year, for example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision granted concessions to United States banks after a long process of lobbying by those banks, which resulted in flexibility in how the rules were ultimately applied.
I will not comment on whether that was the right or wrong decision, but that is a clear example of the interests that will need to be managed in such a process. It does not seem right to the Opposition that the Treasury could be lobbied on such a matter with fairly limited public transparency and that the subsequent changes could then be channelled directly into an SI for which the Treasury is responsible for drafting. In truth, although the current Treasury can reassure us in good faith that that will not be the case, we simply do not know how things might change or who the Government or Ministers might be in future.
Since the referendum result, we have heard noises about deregulation—faint, though they may be—and in our view, the Bill must be built to withstand the pressure that may come. That is why we have explicitly specified in amendment 13 that deregulation cannot be enabled as part of the Bill. That builds in vital protections for a regulatory framework to which we have already signed up at a European level. There will no doubt be reasonable disagreement about what constitutes a weakening or a lightening of the regulatory framework, but we are inserting an important direction to lawmakers and a clear signal to consumers that their interests will continue to be protected.
In truth, we simply do not know how things might change if we crash out of the EU without a deal. I and my Front-Bench colleagues have highlighted in Delegated Legislation Committees the complications that could be associated with capital requirements in such a situation. Capital requirements could be susceptible to problems with the removal of preferential treatment of Euro sovereign debt. At present, EU Government debt is treated with the same risk weighting as UK Government debt. If we crash out without a deal, the preferential treatment of EU sovereign debt will instantly change—it will no longer receive preferential treatment. The reverse would apply for UK sovereign debt.
Evidently, that could be highly disruptive and one would expect big institutions to recalculate their capital ratios and recapitalise when there has been no real change in the risk that they hold. Such a change would inevitably have an impact on how we ultimately implement the capital requirements directive V, as the status quo will have changed so dramatically from when it was first agreed. There must however be safeguards on the underlying process so that that dialogue can be publicly assessed.
I feel therefore that the amendments are reasonable, proportionate and would command public confidence. We might press them to a vote, subject to the Minister’s response.
I start by thanking the hon. Gentleman for his explanation of the intent of the three amendments, which I shall address in turn.
I must confess that I was surprised to see amendment 11. The language that it seeks to remove was inserted as a concession to the Labour Front Bench on Report in the Lords. Indeed, the language was directly inspired by an amendment to the Bill tabled by Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Davies of Oldham in Committee in the other place. Our original drafting reflected the Government’s position that the word “adjustment” is inherently limiting. Following concern in the other place, however, we agreed to insert this language—along with a further limitation, to which we will turn in amendment 13—to clarify what was meant by the term.
Under this wording, as agreed in the other place, the Government will be able to make only adjustments that reflect or facilitate the transition to the United Kingdom’s new position outside the EU, but that does not include changes that result in provisions whose effect is different in a major way to that of the legislation. The new wording clarifies limitations on the power to make adjustments, while, crucially, still allowing for some changes that may be needed, as the UK will have been neither at the negotiating table when the files were finalised nor advocating on behalf of the UK financial services industry during that process. Lord Davies’s position on Report was that he and Lord Tunnicliffe were content with the amended drafting. In light of that, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw amendment 11.
On amendment 12, I am reminded of another debate that took place during the Bill’s passage through the Lords. That debate centred around the Opposition amendment that sought to replace “major” with “significant”, which was later withdrawn. Lord Sharkey, who spoke to that amendment, noted that subsequent to its tabling, he had realised that his dictionary defined “major” as “significant”. I note that the Oxford English Dictionary in turn defines “material” as “significant”. It is therefore clearly possible to interpret all three words as in essence meaning the same thing, in which case the amendment does not have the effect desired by those who tabled it.
I appreciate the Minister’s response to our three amendments. On amendment 11, my understanding in good faith of the position of my colleagues in the Lords is that it is not quite as he believes it to be. Their concession was on the prohibition on major changes, rather than on the language on adjustments.
On amendment 12, we could have a semantic discussion of the differences between “major” and “material” for some time. In statutory instruments, for example, on a substantial number of occasions legislation has simply changed European regulatory bodies to UK ones, and I would consider that a fairly minor change. However, I would consider something that resulted in a substantial change to the status quo to be material, and so I make a distinction between what is material and what is major.
On amendment 13, I genuinely believe and trust the Minister when he says that he has no interest in leading a race to the bottom on financial regulation. I know that, like me, he believes that the quality of UK regulation in financial services is a key part of our competitive advantage. However, none of us in this room can guarantee who the Ministers in this country will be in a relatively short space of time—they could be the same, or different, no one is entirely sure—[Interruption.] I am sure that the Whips Office will remain, as ever, a bastion of consistency. These are volatile times, and when legislation is assessed, discussions in Committee about the intent of parliamentarians are taken into consideration and are important. Both sides must be fairly united in believing that we should avoid the illusory race to the bottom as if that would somehow help UK competitiveness, and I simply feel that amendment 13 establishes that clearly. I intend to press all three of my amendments to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 1, page 2, line 35, at end insert—
“(c) that draft was laid more than 1 month after the Treasury conducted a public consultation that was promoted to trade unions, regulatory institutions, service users, and any other stakeholders the Chancellor of the Exchequer considers appropriate.”
This amendment obliges HM Treasury to undertake wide-ranging consultation on their proposed implementation of EU legislation, to ensure appropriate public scrutiny on any regulatory divergence.
We have already discussed in Committee today the Opposition’s concerns about the transparency and suitability of the process that we are legislating for in the Bill; clearly, the concerns are quite widely shared across all Opposition parties. That is why we also propose amendment 15, which would mandate the Treasury to undertake full consultation before each regulation is transposed. That would provide an opportunity for better public scrutiny than the statutory instrument process normally affords. It would allow consumer groups, trade unions and academics, alongside a wide range of stakeholders, to give their input and identify where there might have been regulatory divergence that was not immediately apparent. The mandatory consultation would allow any adjustments to be openly debated and scrutinised. Such consultation is essential to maintaining a transparent process where the Treasury is being given powers in this manner.
Consultation and proper impact assessments have become major issues in the process so far of transposing existing EU legislation. I therefore urge hon. Members to support the amendment. It would empower the public and consumer institutions with an essential layer of scrutiny on a set of unprecedented powers being assumed by the Treasury.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. The Government have committed to following Cabinet Office principles on consultation, and they have made clear their commitment to consult on each SI laid, as appropriate. As a matter of course, the Government publish impact assessments for statutory instruments, and that will be no different for those brought forward under powers in the Bill. Those assessments will include an analysis of economic impacts, and equalities considerations where relevant. In line with duties under the Equality Act 2010 and with Cabinet Office guidance, regulations will be made with that equality duty in mind, and any impacts identified will be included in the relevant impact assessments in the usual way.
The Government are already required by legislation to produce reports ahead of, and looking back at, the publication of SIs under the Bill, and those reports will include any inspected and realised impacts of the legislation. That commitment to rigorous reporting and transparency about the Bill’s powers, and the potential adjustments to files and proposed SIs, is evidence that the current Bill contains appropriate provisions for proper scrutiny. I hope that that provides reassurance about the Government’s commitment to transparency in the public and parliamentary spheres, and in that light I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
I appreciate the Minister’s acceptance and reassurance that the levels of consultation and impact assessments are crucial to this process, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 1, page 2, line 37, leave out “4” and insert “8”.
With this it will be convenient to consider new clause 1—Draft consolidated financial services legislation.
New clause 1 aims to address what the Opposition consider to be one of the central issues with the Bill. As we stated earlier, the Government’s chosen approach, which is to combine statutory instruments to transpose existing legislation with this Bill to transpose future legislation, risks creating a patchwork of legislation. Within that patchwork, it will be very difficult to identify areas of overlap, omission and inconsistency. That is an extremely precarious position in which to put a sector that is of such high value to the British economy—particularly one that is so reliant on regulatory certainty and clarity.
Equally, a variety of new powers is being bestowed on institutions such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Bank of England and the Treasury, as the Opposition have previously highlighted in Delegated Legislation Committees. We believe that there is a clear need to have a central, transparent picture of which institutions will be carrying out which functions, so that we can assess the new balance of powers holistically. A huge shift in powers is being proposed. It is essential that those powers are debated openly and transparently, so that all Members are clear about what is being put forward. Our alternative approach, which is achieved by new clause 1, differs by putting the power to properly scrutinise financial legislation back into the hands of Parliament. To borrow a phrase, it would take back control.
Clause 1 comprises the core substantive content of the Bill. In a no-deal scenario, the Bill gives the Government the power to implement, in whole or in part, a specified list of EU legislative proposals or in-flight files. In many cases, the UK has strongly supported the proposals throughout their negotiations and has played a leading role in shaping them over a number of years.
The files fall into two categories. The first relates to the pieces of legislation that have been agreed while we have been a member of the European Union, but that will not have come into force prior to the UK’s exit from the EU on 29 March. Those files are listed in clause 1(3)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (f). In a no-deal scenario, there would be no way to implement them in a timely manner, as each would require primary legislation. Clause 1 gives the Government the power to domesticate those files, in whole or in part, via affirmative statutory instruments. Furthermore, as was clarified following concerns expressed in the House of Lords about the breadth of powers, the Government have the power to fix deficiencies.
The second category of files relates to those still in negotiation. The UK has played a leading role in shaping them so far and they could bring significant benefits to UK consumers and businesses when they are implemented. Those files are set out in subsections (3)(e) and (g), incorporating the schedule. Clause 1 also gives the Government the power to domesticate those files, in whole or in part, via affirmative statutory instruments. The UK will not be at the negotiating table when the files are finalised, however, so we will not be able to advocate for the interests of the specific nature of the UK’s financial services sector as negotiations are concluded. The Bill, therefore, provides the Government with the ability to fix deficiencies within the files and to make adjustments to them that go beyond the deficiency-fixing power.
Again, following concerns raised in the other place, the Government have clarified the nature of those adjustments and have stated that they cannot depart in a major way from the original EU legislation. However, the Government will have some flexibility to make adjustments to take account of the UK’s new position outside of the EU. It is only right that the UK retains the latitude to ensure that pieces of legislation finalised after we have left the EU reflect the interests of the UK’s financial services industry, and this Bill must tread the line between giving sufficient powers to enable the Government to effectively implement the legislation and imposing appropriate restraints to reassure Members that safeguards are sufficient.
I put on record my thanks for the collegiate way in which Opposition Front Benchers in the Lords worked with us to arrive at the present drafting and set of safeguards without division. Those safeguards are set out in subsections (7) to (10) of clause 1, and include a two-year sunset clause; a requirement for the affirmative procedure in every instance in which the power is used; strong reporting requirements on Government, including a requirement to publish a draft SI alongside a report detailing omissions and adjustments at least one month before laying it before the House; and a further requirement to publish a report twice a year setting out how the power has been exercised in the previous six months, and how the Treasury intends to exercise it in future.
I should note at this stage one issue to which we may return on Report. Members will note that subsection (3)(e) is not included among those files deemed settled. The Commission was required under the prospectus regulation to adopt delegated acts in January of this year; that has not yet happened, and as such, we do not yet know the content of that delegated legislation. Should the Commission adopt those acts prior to Report, we will seek to amend the Bill accordingly, limiting any adjustments that may be made to the fixing of deficiencies.
Clause 1 is the heart of this short Bill. It is the duty of responsible Government to prepare for all outcomes, and the Bill will provide us with the critical ability to implement legislation that maintains the functionality, reputation and international competitiveness of our financial sector. It is a key part of our no-deal preparations, and without this clause, I am afraid that there would be no Bill to take forward. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will now turn to new clause 1, which is suggested, essentially, as an alternative. The Government believe that the new version of clause 1 tabled by the Opposition is inappropriate as an alternative to the current version, as it does not as drafted provide the Government with any means of domesticating legislation through the Bill. As has been set out a number of times over the course of this and other debates on the Bill, there exists a body of in-flight EU legislation that the UK will want the ability to implement in a timely manner in the period following EU exit, in order to maintain the functionality, reputation and international competitiveness of our financial sector.
New clause 1 does not include any powers to domesticate EU legislation. It compels the Treasury to bring a motion before the House to debate a document stating what EU legislation it proposes to domesticate, but it does not include the necessary mechanism through which those measures can be implemented subsequent to the House’s approval. As such, the Bill would become a hindrance rather than a help—a means for debate without the necessary powers—and the Treasury would be left, having sought the approval of the House of Commons on those pieces of EU legislation it wishes to domesticate, needing to again seek approval by introducing primary legislation or, indeed, another version of this Bill. That would undermine the purpose of the Bill by not enabling the UK to implement important EU legislation in a timely manner when necessary. It would leave the UK lagging behind international counterparts on the issue of financial services regulation—something that I am sure Opposition Front Benchers would not wish to happen—and our financial services industry would then be at a competitive disadvantage at a crucial period in our country’s history.
Even if new clause 1 were amended to include a power to implement the legislation, I suggest that it is an unsuitable alternative to the current procedure. It requires the Treasury to collate into a single document the legislation it wishes to implement, alongside any adjustments it wishes to make and explanations of why those adjustments are necessary. That document would then be debated by the House through the aforementioned motion.
My objections to that extra layer of procedure are, in part, identical to those rehearsed earlier in my objections to amendment 4. Under the Bill as drafted, there will be extensive opportunity for scrutiny of the legislation before it is implemented. During the Bill’s passage through the Lords, we inserted the requirement to publish a draft SI alongside a report detailing any adjustments and the justification for those adjustments one month prior to laying it before the House. The publication of those draft SIs will allow Members to seek a debate on the proposed content, should they so wish. Indeed, the draft SI and the accompanying report seem essentially similar in function to the document that this new clause would require the Treasury to produce. I should also note that publication of those draft SIs will allow Parliament, including any interested Select Committees, to scrutinise the proposed content.
I sympathise with what I suspect is the intention behind the new clause. I imagine, and perhaps the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde will confirm this, that the consolidated document is an attempt to make sense of all the pieces of financial legislation that form part of this essential Brexit planning for a no deal. This Bill addresses a specific issue; it is vital for the UK’s financial services industry that these 17 key pieces of legislation can be domesticated in a timely manner in a no-deal scenario. It will not be possible for the Treasury to set out in a single consolidated document its intentions for all these pieces of legislation prior to their final publication.
We simply do not know what the final version of each file will look like. It would mean the Treasury’s having to wait until all legislation in the Bill was finalised at EU level before producing this document. That would potentially lead to intolerable delays and to the UK financial services sector’s lagging behind its international competitors during this crucial period.
That is why, in the current draft of the Bill, the Treasury has committed to six-monthly reports that will set out how we have used the powers under this Bill in the preceding six months, as well as how we intend to use them in the subsequent six months. That should provide a clear and timely overview of how the Government are using the powers provided for in this Bill. In light of that, I ask that the hon. Members refrain from pressing the new clause as an alternative.
I appreciate the Minister’s point that clause 1 is essentially the whole of the Bill that we are discussing, but we do intend to press new clause 1 to a vote as an alternative, for the reasons that I outlined. If I can explain to hon. Members who have not been on a Bill Committee before, under advice from the Chair I understand that if existing clause 1 were accepted then he could not then offer us a vote on new clause 1, because we would have accepted that entirely. Therefore, we will vote against clause 1 stand part in order to move new clause 1.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 2, page 3, line 42, leave out subsection (4).
This amendment removes the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.
I shall speak only briefly on this amendment, as it is a standard form amendment removing the privilege amendment inserted by convention into all Bills that begin life in the House of Lords and have consequences for the public purse. The privilege amendment, as I am sure members of the Committee are aware, recognises that it is the constitutional right of the Commons to initiate legislation that relates to revenue raising or expenditure, and so forbids Acts that are introduced in the Lords from engaging in these activities.
As stated in the explanatory notes accompanying the Bill, regulations made under clause 1(1) could result in money flowing into, or out of, central Government funds. Further, regulations made by virtue of clause 1(4) could lead to provision for the charging of fees. Such financial matters are among those in respect of which the Commons claims the privilege to initiate legislation, and so the privilege amendment was inserted in the Lords. This amendment simply clears it away to enable regulations under, or by virtue of, the Bill to make provisions having consequences for public finances.
We were interested, having never been on a Committee for a Bill that has been to the Lords already, in exactly how this worked. We were slightly worried at one point that the Minister was seeking to usurp the Bill of Rights 1689 by trying to make Treasury regulations without recourse to primary legislation; I am relieved to see that he is not seizing power in such an inappropriate way. I understand now that it is a pro forma amendment and I understand why such a process works in the Lords before it comes back to us. We therefore have no objection to this amendment.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2 is simply a technical clause that extends the powers granted in clause 1 across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Financial services policy covered in the Bill relates entirely to reserved matters. It also enables the Act to come into force on the day on which it is passed, as we know of at least one file—the prospectus regulation—that will likely need to be implemented soon after EU exit. I therefore recommend that the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 2
Report on the provisions of regulations under this Act
“(1) Prior to making any regulations under this Act, the Treasury must publish a report on the impact of the provisions of those regulations.
(2) A report under this section must consider, in respect of the regulations proposed to be made—
(a) the impact of those provisions on households at different levels of income,
(b) the impact of those provisions on people with protected characteristics (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010),
(c) the impact of those provisions on the Treasury’s compliance with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, and
(d) the impact of those provisions on equality in different parts of the United Kingdom and different regions of England.” .—(Jonathan Reynolds.)
This new clause would require a report to be made on the impact of any regulations under this Bill before any such regulations are made
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.