National Insurance Contributions (Rate Ceilings) Bill

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Kelvin Hopkins

Tuesday 15th September 2015 Commons Chamber

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I can only refer the hon. Gentleman to the excellent article by the economist Ben Chu, which goes into detail showing why Labour was not to blame and was not responsible. The crisis caused the deficits, but if we had not recapitalised the banks, where would we be now?

Let me go back to the instability mentioned by the hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), who is no longer in his place. He talked about businesses wanting stability. Instability arises because of the globalisation of financial markets. Before 1979, we managed financial markets with exchange controls. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement is what caused the problems.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

The hon. Gentleman is completely right to say that this is purely a gimmick by the Government. There is no need for a legislative vehicle to enact this policy; the announcement could be made in a Budget statement or an autumn statement, as appropriate. Does he agree that, if the Government were serious about helping working people, and people on low incomes in particular, they would increase the threshold at which national insurance contributions kick in to the level of personal allowances for income tax, rather than implementing the pure gimmick of this Bill?

[Kelvin Hopkins]

That would certainly be one way of dealing with it, but I think that not cutting tax credits, which are coming up for debate this afternoon, would be a much more important way of helping people on low incomes. We should certainly do that.

Finance (No.2) Bill

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Kelvin Hopkins

Tuesday 8th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Jonathan Edwards]

That is a very valid intervention. My political position would be to support a 50p rate, but let us have the evidence to make the decision. As I am outlining, the evidence suggests to me that 50p would be a better top rate than 45p, and certainly better than 40p.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I agree with everything that the hon. Gentleman has said. If it were shown that an increased tax rate at that level brought in lower revenues, would not that simply be evidence of more tax evasion and insufficient enforcement?

Finance (No. 2) Bill

Debate between Jonathan Edwards and Kelvin Hopkins

Monday 15th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Kelvin Hopkins]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point: when we go to a hospital, we find that no one is there, because those in such jobs are not real people. Indeed, I might add Members of Parliament to that list.

The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) was desperately trying to be positive about the Budget, but in the process he effectively damned the Chancellor with faint praise. If we had pressed him hard enough, I think he would have conceded most of our points.

The Bill will clearly do nothing to transform our economy. We are in a desperate state—an ongoing recession. The Chancellor says that his Budget is fiscally neutral, but when 2.5 million people are unemployed and we have low or negative growth, we do not want a fiscally neutral Budget. We should have had an expansionary Budget to promote growth, but of course even a fiscally neutral Budget could inject growth into the economy by raising taxes and spending more, rather than doing the opposite. If taxes on businesses and the wealthy are reduced, they tend to save their money—indeed, they put it in tax havens—whereas if ordinary people are given jobs, the first thing they do is to spend their money, and that money goes directly back into the economy and starts to generate demand through the multiplier.

The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster was right that forecasting is difficult. I remember that in 1990—I am older than everybody else in the Chamber—when The Sunday Times carried out a survey of forecasting organisations, it found that the London Business School was bottom of the league, scoring nought out of 10 for its forecasts, although of course that was the forecasting body adored by the Conservative Government under Mrs Thatcher. The best forecasts were by the Cambridge Economic Policy Group, a left-leaning Keynesian group, which got six out of 10 to come top of the league. The then Government were so annoyed by the Cambridge group that they took away its Government grant because they did not like people telling them that they were wrong, although they were.

Demand for the things that people produce is a crucial factor if an economy is to succeed, because although Governments can cut taxes for businesses and introduce all sorts of supply-side measures, if no one is buying anything, the economy will not grow. An equally crucial factor for sustaining that demand is an appropriate exchange rate. Successive Governments have ignored the exchange rate at their peril, but there have been times when the depreciation of our currency has had dramatic results, and I can cite three examples under a Conservative Government. Following Golden Wednesday and the collapse of the exchange rate mechanism, the economy grew strongly after a substantial depreciation. By the time that 1997 came along, the Conservatives were still being condemned for the collapse of the housing market and the people voted Labour—thank goodness for that—yet the Labour Government benefited from the strong demand generated by that depreciation. In 1979 Mrs Thatcher was praised for her economic policies, but the 1979 Budget, masterminded, if I can describe it like that, by Geoffrey Howe, resulted in a catastrophic collapse in demand. A fifth of manufacturing disappeared and unemployment soared to 3 million. It was only when those policies were reversed that there was a recovery, and on Nigel Lawson’s watch—I do not necessarily agree with everything he did—the pound depreciated by over 30%. Again, the economy grew strongly and unemployment came down.

Going back even further into history, in the 1931 crisis, a Labour Government mistakenly tried to sustain sterling on the gold standard, and tried to keep its parity up. The Government fell apart, and effectively a Conservative Government with a nominally Labour Prime Minister came in straight afterwards. The first thing they did was take the pound off the gold standard and depreciate, and the recovery began. That was only part of it; other factors were necessary to sustain recovery in the 1930s. We had to spend a lot of money, and towards the end of the ’30s the country built thousands—indeed, millions—of houses, and that was how we recovered. That is what we ought to do now.

In other countries, Germany built arms and autobahns; in America, there was the new deal—spending money on all sorts of public works, which created the demand in the economy that brought about recovery. It was not fiddling around with tax rates and supply-side measures. That did not work then, and it will not work now. The exchange rate is therefore absolutely crucial, and the exchange rate at this time is too high. Part of our recovery should depend on a significant depreciation. An erudite and informed book by my friend John Mills has been written about this, and I have quoted from it in the Chamber. It makes a detailed case for such measures.

The trade statistics are disastrous, and some of us have been worried about manufacturing for a long time. Our manufacturing sector is about half the size of the German manufacturing sector as a proportion of our economy, which is disastrous. We should be a similar economy to Germany in many ways. Historically, we have been very similar in all sorts of ways, but our manufacturing has collapsed. That was partly because in 1997, when Labour came to office, there was at the same time a substantial appreciation of the pound, which began to damage manufacturing. We were sustained by an asset price bubble, which carried on, and thank goodness, we had a relatively strong economy for some time. However, manufacturing did not do well, because of the relatively strong pound. It was only the crisis of 2008, when there was a significant depreciation, that saved us. Had we been stuck in the euro, we would be like Spain now—it would be absolutely disastrous—so we must applaud my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) for keeping us out of the euro, despite pressure from the then Prime Minister. I was one of those who supported my right hon. Friend very strongly at the time.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I agree with a number of the hon. Gentleman’s points. The Government talk a good game about rebalancing the economy geographically and sectorally, and about an export-led recovery, but they will not achieve those objectives unless they tackle the exchange rate.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Indeed. We have to use all the weapons and measures of macro-economic policy to make sure that we recover. Fiddling around with supply-side measures is no doubt the sort of thing that the London Business School talked about in 1990, but it will not solve our problems.

The macro-economic measures that we must take include, first, tackling the exchange rate. Secondly, we must inject demand through additional public spending, and we can pay for that in various ways without necessarily increasing the deficit. We could raise taxes on the rich very substantially. For example, we could begin seriously to close the tax gap and collect the tax that has been avoided or evaded, perhaps sending a few corrupt bankers to prison in the process. That would concentrate their minds, as I said earlier.

We need to begin to spend in areas of high labour intensity. If we can get people back to work quickly by spending in those sectors—construction and the public services, which have been cut by the Government—we can bring down unemployment. People pay tax when they are in jobs, they do not claim benefits, and the economy begins to recover. At the same time, we can build millions of houses that we need, particularly local authority houses, and we can provide all the nurses we need in hospitals. Hospitals are under stress because of a lack of staff on the wards. We can develop other areas too: local authority services, children’s services, and social services for the elderly, all of which are under stress and are things on which we should spend to generate more employment. We generate employment directly by spending money on areas with high labour intensity.

There is another great advantage of spending money in such areas. As my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies), who has left the Chamber, said, the rich do not spend money: they put it in banks and tax havens. But ordinary people, especially if they have been unemployed, spend every single penny of their money on supporting their families, dealing with their debts and so on. They spend their money. They have what the economists call a high marginal propensity to consume. We should give as much money as possible to those who have that high marginal propensity to consume, not to those who stuff it in banks and foreign tax havens. That would help to regenerate the economy.

Another great thing about public services and construction is that they put demand into the domestic economy, not into the foreign economy. If I were given extra cash, which I do not need—I think I should pay a bit more tax—what would I do? I would have another foreign holiday. I might buy another case of French wine. That does not help our economy at all. But if construction workers have extra cash, they go out and spend it in the shops on food, their homes and their family. They spend it in the domestic economy. They do not, as far as I know, buy large quantities of French wine or have fancy foreign holidays, especially when they are just coming out of unemployment. They would spend their money in the domestic economy.

The great thing about construction is that it has a low import content. Most of what is used in construction comes from the domestic economy. Again, the demand goes into the domestic economy so the spending by construction workers in their new jobs becomes someone else’s income within the domestic economy. We get the multiplier effect of one person’s spending becoming another person’s income going around in a big circle and the economy is regenerated.

That is what we need—pure Keynesian reflation, but we have other measures to deal with that. If it necessitates some serious tax increases, so be it. The majority of the population have said in opinion polls, I understand, that they would prefer tax hikes to spending cuts. That is absolutely right. We are frightened of saying that we should have higher taxes. Francois Hollande in France decided to introduce a significantly higher tax rate for a substantial proportion of the population. Some people will squeal about it and no doubt the right-wing media in Britain would squeal about it, but there should be a bit more tax, even on MPs such as myself. I have suggested that the first tax rise should be the 50% rate not at £150,000, but at £60,000, so that I would pay a little more tax. I am talking about me as well as about other people. It is easy for us to make changes that affect other people, not ourselves.

Such a change could be made, if need be, but in the short term we do not need to do that. We need to collect the taxes that should be paid and which are the subject of tax avoidance and tax evasion. We need a radical economic strategy, including all the components that I have suggested, to get us out of the mess we are in—and we are in a mess. In his Budget speech, the Chancellor looked like a frightened man. He looked very worried. Clearly, his strategy is not working. He does not know what to do without doing a complete U-turn and adopting a completely different strategy—the kind of strategy that I am talking about—which would mean political humiliation for him. He should worry less about political humiliation than about doing the right thing by the country.