Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Seema Malhotra

Report stage
Tuesday 24th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Seema Malhotra]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. We should be ambitious for the registrar and for Companies House in tackling economic crime and being a beacon around the world for how a nation should do that. She makes an important point about where the new clause goes further than the Government’s proposal. Along with the report and the data in it, importantly, there would be recommendations about whether further legislation should be brought forward in response to that report and the information in it. That is extremely important, because that is where Parliament will have to make choices about whether it chooses to take further action.

Issues of concern that the report may draw attention to, and which we could encourage the registrar to look at, could include investigations of unusual patterns of directorships and companies registered at one address. All of that would also enable Parliament to hold Companies House to account for its performance. We are willing to work with the Minister to strengthen the Government’s new clause so that it becomes more purposeful and effective—and, in doing so, collectively achieve the outcomes that we intend for the Bill.

I turn to further amendments tabled by Labour Front-Bench Members. New clause 22 seeks to disqualify any individual convicted of a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay the national minimum wage, from serving as a company director in future. In Committee, the Minister stated that it was

“right to identify the scale and nature of the problem before we legislate”.––[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 3 November 2022; c. 240.]

He said that he was “keen to do so.” He also said:

“There have been 16 people convicted under the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. I want to do some further research on that to see what has happened to those people and their director qualification or disqualification. That might inform debate more clearly.”–[Official Report, Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Public Bill Committee, 3 November 2022; c. 233.]

Since then, we have not heard a satisfactory answer to the central question: should an individual convicted of an offence for a serious breach of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, such as a deliberate refusal to pay the national minimum wage, be prevented from serving as a company director?

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Is not the point that if someone is convicted of a criminal offence, the court automatically has the power to disqualify them, and that by not being prescriptive in legislation, we ensure that the judge in a particular case has more leeway than perhaps the hon. Lady would give him?

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. Perhaps he is missing some of our argument around the central question, because it does not happen in all cases. We have not received any further information on the work and research that the Minister started during Committee on what happens with those directors, which he committed to follow up.

In our view, new clause 22 would strengthen the Bill. We are talking about people whom we hope to have trust in to undertake their responsibilities as a director. The Bill introduces a substantial amount of regulation about who can and cannot serve as a company director as a result of criminal or potentially criminal practices, so this feels like the right place for consideration of such a measure. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response. I am happy to give him forewarning that, subject to his response, we may well press the new clause to a vote.

New clause 24 calls for a creditor or liquidator to be able to apply to restore a company to the register administratively. Currently, if creditors, former creditors or liquidators wish to apply to restore a company, that is done through the court in what is often a complex and costly procedure that may well take 12 to 18 months or longer. In Committee, the Minister said that there ought to be a basis for a “less cumbersome” process for creditors and particularly for liquidators. We agree. Currently, when companies are struck off the register—that happens on average to about 400,000 companies a year—little is done to check whether fraud has occurred. As a side issue, the Minister may helpfully confirm whether directors of companies that have been struck off will also be subject to verification checks so that we do not have a period through which they may escape ID verification as Companies House looks to undergo those checks with existing directors.

The key issue is that unscrupulous directors can misappropriate the strike-off process to avoid scrutiny and rack up debts or sell company assets ahead of the company dissolution, absconding with the proceeds. The Minister said he appreciated the case for widening access to the less cumbersome process of administrative restoration, and he undertook to consider the matter further. If he does not agree to our new clause 24, I would be grateful if he would commit to bringing forward proposals during the passage of the Bill. This is a window of opportunity that we should not miss.

On new clause 34, the processes set out in the Bill rely on effective ID verification of company directors. There has been a debate as to whether that should be done in-house. The Government have chosen to use a model whereby authorised corporate service providers are trusted to undertake ID verification on behalf of Companies House and effectively certify that through a confirmation statement. The debate is ongoing on how that introduces risk into the process. Indeed, if the registrar can do only part of the verification and we need to use authorised corporate service providers, that only works if the ACSPs are known, trusted and effectively regulated.

New clause 34 seeks transparency reporting on the involvement of foreign corporate service providers in the two main routes by which they may be authorised to conduct ID checks and to incorporate a company in the UK that is registered with Companies House. Such a company being registered could have an office address in the UK; a postal address in the UK, with all the risks we debated in Committee; or an address abroad as an overseas company. The directors of the company registered in Companies House by the foreign corporate service provider may be living abroad and may never come to the UK. New clause 34 seeks to create an obligation for the Secretary of State to publish a report, first, into the number of authorised corporate service providers with a head office based outside the UK, by which we mean where the authorised UK subsidiary supervised by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is beneficially owned by a company that is outside the UK; and secondly, on the number of foreign corporate service providers authorised by regulations set out in proposed new section 1098I(1) of the Companies Act 2006, which is amended by clause 63.

Clause 63 enables the Secretary of State, by regulations, to authorise a person abroad to become a foreign authorised corporate service provider

“even if the person is not a relevant person as defined by regulation 8(1) of the Money Laundering Regulations”.

For example, they could be a lawyer or an art dealer. They would therefore not be supervised. Proposed new section 1098I(2) specifies that a

“‘relevant regulatory regime’ means a regime that, in the opinion”—

I stress, in the opinion—

“of the Secretary of State, has similar objectives to the regulatory regime under the Money Laundering Regulations”.

However, it does not specify any transparency on how that conclusion is reached. Clause 63 is a risk for a backdoor route to the authorisation of foreign corporate service providers—