Defamation Bill

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Paul Farrelly

Tuesday 12th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Paul Farrelly (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)]

First, I should declare my interests: I am chair of the all-party group on libel reform and a member of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee.

I hope there will be cross-party support for an improvement to our libel laws, and in keeping with that spirit I join other Members in congratulating the Secretary of State on making sure the Government have found time for this Bill, and in acknowledging the efforts of his ministerial colleagues, the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and especially Lord McNally in the other place, greatly and expertly assisted by Lord Lester, who is a veteran of this campaign. Like the shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan), I am grateful that they so willingly took up the reins passed to them by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), who is another true veteran of this place and who did so much in the last Parliament to pave the way for reform.

Clearly, no thanks would be complete without praising the efforts of the Libel Reform Campaign, which includes Index on Censorship, English PEN and Sense about Science. They came together in 2009 to lobby for a change, and they have lobbied very effectively both in terms of party manifestos and, importantly, through their organisation, which has served to amplify the voices of many of the victims of the excesses of our libel laws who were crying out for both help and change—people such as Simon Singh, Hardeep Singh Kohli and Dr Peter Wilmshurst. I shall refer briefly to some of those cases later, because one of the litmus tests of this Bill will be whether there will be any similar cases following its reforms. At each stage of the Bill’s passage we should ask ourselves, “What would this Bill change? What difference would it make to some of the worst excesses we have seen in recent years?”

As a former investigative journalist who was once sued myself—only once, I stress—I have been interested in libel reform since I entered the House in 2001, and I have certainly pushed the issue since joining the Select Committee in 2005. The Committee’s investigation into this subject started in earnest in 2008 and our 2010 report, “Press standards, privacy and libel”, contained several recommendations that have been pursued by both of the Governments since then and have, thankfully, found their way into this Bill.

Other people have been pressing for root-and-branch reform for much longer. Last autumn, I was privileged to sit down with one of the greats of British journalism, Sir Harry Evans. His investigation while he was the editor of The Sunday Times into the thalidomide scandal in the 1970s was a defining moment in the history of the quality end of the British press. It lasted six or more years in all and, in 1979, went all the way to a landmark European Court of Human Rights decision regarding free speech. As is recounted in Harry’s book, “Good Times, Bad Times”, Lord Lester was an advocate in that case. That affair showed this House in a great, independent light, because the then all-party group on disability, which was chaired by the much missed Lord Jack Ashley, the former Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South—a predecessor of my hon. Friend on the Front Bench, the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello)—was right in the thick of the fight for justice regarding thalidomide.

As a spring chicken, I asked Harry, when I met him last autumn, whether he thought that serious investigation, given recent developments in libel laws and the state of our newspaper industry, would be harder nowadays. “Oh, easier, easier,” he replied, without a moment’s hesitation. “Nowadays,” spring chicken, he almost said, “you don’t have civil contempt.” Then, if there was civil action in the courts, as there was against the thalidomide drug company, investigation was off limits. After the European decision, the law was changed in 1982. Civil contempt, therefore, was out as a bar to investigation in the public interest, but our antiquated libel laws remain. In one sense, therefore, I had to disagree with Harry given my experience as a journalist. I stopped practising as a journalist in 2001, by which time, as previous speakers have said, Google had been founded in a Californian garage for fewer than three years. The change since then has been frantic and it now seems almost to have been around for a lifetime.

I remember that at the end of the 1990s, amid the upheaval of Yeltsin’s Russia, I was writing several investigative pieces about money laundering and the connections between Russian politicians, business and the Russian mafia, no less. In recent years, such investigations would have been harder to get past a news desk—certainly with every oligarch claiming a global reputation in this internet era, with aggressive libel firms touting their expertise in so-called “reputation management”, with London having been cemented as the libel tourist’s destination of choice and, frankly, with the sheer cost of defending an action. There might be a lull in the courts at the moment, given the effectiveness of the Libel Reform Campaign, but old habits and hostilities will surely return, given the chance, aided and abetted by how the court system has tended to operate in spinning out cases, spiralling up costs and spawning expensive uncertainty.

If the codification of existing law in this Bill adds to certainty, that will be worth while in itself, but if that is all it does it will be a real missed opportunity for deeper reform. Similarly, it will be a missed opportunity if changes to the law are not accompanied by resolute change to court practice and procedures and vigorously followed up and followed through.

Let me turn to what sensible reformers want from this Bill and this process. First, in the public interest, we would like the “chilling effect” to be properly addressed. A writ for libel requires no more than a rubber stamp, whereas to defend one, however trivial or vexatious it might be, takes precious time, effort and lawyers. As we have heard, lawyers and courts cost money—an awful lot of money in libel. Too often the system is weighted in favour of deep-pocketed claimants whose threats are an all-too-effective deterrent to investigation and publication in the public interest.

Secondly, and this is a corollary, we want to jettison London’s reputation as “A city named sue”. It tarnishes our country and our democracy. The situation is not overblown, as certain judges have suggested. One cannot measure the attraction and impact of our libel laws by the number of cases alone, but one can listen to the voices of publishers, non-governmental organisations, scientists, medics and academics in relation to what they will and will not publish, around the world, for fear of being sued in London.

Thirdly, as we have heard, there needs to be a proper balance between freedom of speech, especially in the public interest, and reputation. As the phone hacking scandal has once again shown, there is a world of difference between the quality press and the gutter press. There are responsible bloggers and evil people whom I understand are called trolls. Often, getting a simple correction or apology from the highest-minded newspaper is like pulling teeth. In the macho culture that has grown up, if one does not sue, newspapers often do not treat one seriously, but the costs of being taken seriously are ordinarily beyond most people. In the absence of real and proper reform, this will raise issues of access to justice.

Let me address the three issues I have raised in reverse order. On joining the Select Committee in 2005, I had a cast around Fleet street to gauge the appetite for a serious push on libel reform, but I found that the traditional concerns about libel had overwhelmingly been overtaken by consternation at the effects of conditional fee arrangements. CFAs had been introduced to improve access to the law, but had escalated the costs of defending claims enormously. Following the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, the press has certainly had its way on CFAs, as neither success fees nor insurance premiums are recoverable from the loser, whether claimant or defendant.

Given the extremes of the press we have, I think—and I am a late convert to this view—that things have gone too far. The Government and the Bill must seriously address this issue. Our Select Committee’s 2010 report was prompted by a number of events, including Max Mosley’s privacy case, the libel pursued by Tesco against an old colleague of mine, Ian Griffiths at The Guardian—I shall refer to that case later—and, importantly, by the press’s disgraceful treatment of the family of Madeleine McCann. Following the settlement of the libel actions brought by the McCann family, a seminal article in the New Statesman by a former colleague of mine, Professor Brian Cathcart, entitled, “Scandal: How the Press Tried to Destroy the McCanns”, resonated with me as our Select Committee agreed to start our inquiry. As has been pointed out already, the McCanns would have been hard pressed to start their action or gain any settlement without CFAs. Similarly, without CFAs, people from the scientific and medical community would not have been able to defend themselves in some of the more recent, high-profile libel cases. Dr Peter Wilmshurst’s case is an example of that.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

May I make a short intervention in what is an excellent speech to point out that there are no proposals, certainly not within the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, to get rid of CFAs?

[Paul Farrelly]

I thank the Minister for his intervention, but it is the cumulative effect of the changes in the Act on people’s access to justice that we really need to look at as this Bill proceeds through Parliament.

The reality is that press self-regulation in this country is broken, and the reforms in the Bill are as yet unproven. A sensible balance that addresses the issue of access to justice needs to be struck. I hope that that can be done in our proceedings on the Bill. If it is not, I think we will lurch back to the bad old days—I am a former journalist—with newspapers simply asking, “How much are they worth? Can they afford to sue?” They might also use the system, the costs and the delays to their advantage, having trashed reputations on the way.

Let me address briefly issues of libel tourism, forum shopping and this city called sue. I welcome clause 9 and, importantly, the guidance notes, which address this area specifically. The terminology regarding consideration of where is

“the most appropriate place in which to bring an action”

leaves great scope for judicial interpretation. The Government promise to ask the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to consider “relevant factors” in more detail in respect of amendments to the civil procedure rules, but as with all these issues court practice is key and the Government have not published, as the Joint Committee on the draft Defamation Bill recommended, the detail and nature of those rule changes. It is incumbent on them to do so in order for us to have greater clarity. I hope that during the Bill’s progression the Government will provide more detail and comfort on this crucial aspect of reform.

In May 2010, in the High Court, Mr Justice Eady threw out a libel suit brought by an Indian so-called holy man against the journalist Hardeep Singh Kohli over an article he had written in The Sikh Times. His holiness—to give him his title—had never set foot in Britain, but this was not the end of the matter; lawyers were given leave to appeal, and it took until February 2011 for the Court of Appeal finally to strike out the case—after his holiness had failed to produce a £250,000 surety for costs. By then, the case had been going on for nearly three years, at a potentially ruinous financial cost to Mr Singh, and had had a terrible impact on his health and family life. Thankfully, Mr Singh has just got married, and I am sure that we all wish him well after what he has been through. As a wedding present, surely we can give him a commitment to early resolution and the strike-out of inappropriate, trivial and vexatious claims. Members will want the Government to give them comfort on this matter during the passage of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

We have had an extensive and informed debate in which many varied and interesting points have been raised. As the Secretary of State said in his opening speech, our core aim in introducing the Bill is to reform the law so that it strikes the right balance between the right to freedom of expression and the protection of reputation. I was impressed by the elegant description of this balance by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips).

I want to take this opportunity to thank the draft Bill Committee members, a number of whom have spoken today. They were very capably chaired by Lord Mawhinney, and we have valued their recommendations and careful scrutiny of the Bill. I also thank Lord Lester, whose private Member’s Bill focused attention on this important issue. I am sure that the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) about the openness of the Government’s position in the Joint Committee will be well received by my noble Friend, Lord McNally, who has worked very hard on this legislation over the past year.

As the points that have been raised illustrate, there is a range of views on exactly what the balance should be and on how individual issues should be dealt with, but for the most part these are issues of nuance rather than principle. I can confirm to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello) that of course I remain in listening mode and shall continue to do so throughout the Committee’s proceedings. I welcome the clear recognition from the shadow Secretary of State and Members on both sides of the House that reform of defamation is needed. I also welcome the support that has been expressed for the Bill and what we are trying to achieve with it. The Bill was described as a “burning light” by my hon. Friend the Member for South Derbyshire (Heather Wheeler).

Let me respond to some of the specific points that hon. Members have raised. Questions were raised by the hon. Member for North Antrim (Ian Paisley), the right hon. Members for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) and for Tooting (Sadiq Khan), the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham and the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) about how far the serious harm test raises the bar for claims. As the Secretary of State indicated, it is our view that the requirement to show serious harm represents a higher hurdle than the current law. It will be a matter for the courts to determine how the test should apply in individual cases, but we wish to nudge the threshold up to deter trivial claims. No doubt we shall be discussing this issue further in Committee. Hon. Members have expressed concern that the test might require detailed evidence to be presented. We recognise that the introduction of the test might involve some front-loading of cost, but we believe it is better to resolve this issue at an early stage so that only cases involving serious harm proceed.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) has been a determined and consistent advocate for scientific research and freedoms. On his request for a strike-out power in clause 1, we took a different and wider approach than Lord Lester’s Bill on this issue. Our measures change the substantive law of defamation instead of focusing on one aspect of the procedure. Our intention is that the normal rules, as set out in the civil procedure rules, will apply. It seemed preferable to rely on those rules rather than create a new and unprecedented procedure for mandatory strike-outs. If the court decides that the serious harm test is not satisfied it will be able to use its power under the rules to strike out the claim.

On clause 2, the hon. Member for North Antrim and others have expressed concern that legislating to rename and restate the defence for justification as one of truth could lead to uncertainty about how far the new law might differ from existing law. The right hon. Member for Tottenham, the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham also raised more general concerns about the Bill in the same regard. I agree that any new legislation will inevitably require interpretation and development by the courts in individual cases. However, as the Secretary of State indicated, we want to simplify and clarify the law, which has become unnecessarily complicated. We believe that the clause sets out the key principles of the defence as clearly as possible and will provide greater clarity and certainty in defamation proceedings.

Similar concerns were raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) regarding the new statutory defence of honest opinion and whether it would be misused by the press. Again, this is an area in which the law has become particularly complex and technical and has often led to protracted disputes. I confirm to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham that clause 3 clarifies and simplifies the law. We believe that this change will provide greater certainty and will help to avoid unnecessary litigation and cost.

On clause 4, my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), the right hon. Member for Tooting, the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland, the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) and my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge have expressed the view held by some that the clause might not provide strong enough protection for publications in the public interest and that instead of the defendant having to show that a publication has been made responsibly, the claimant should have to show malice or recklessness on the part of the defendant in order to defeat the defence. We share the view of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill that this would not be appropriate. It would widen the scope of the defence and not offer sufficient protection to people whose reputations had been defamed.

Our position is that the clause strikes the right balance and will provide effective protection for responsible publications, but we will be pleased to discuss the matter further in Committee, including the implications of the Flood decision. We do not consider, as suggested by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland, that we have departed from the Reynolds defence. Clause 4 is based on existing common law and the defence established in Reynolds, and is intended to reflect the principles established in that case and subsequent case law. The essential test is whether the defendant has acted responsibly in a matter of public interest. That matches the case law and gives the court appropriate flexibility.

This is probably an appropriate time to consider the suggestion from the hon. Member for North Antrim that newspapers be required to notify people in advance about any story they propose to publish. We do not consider it appropriate to require that prior notification be given to the subjects of newspaper articles. However, the defence in clause 4 follows the Reynolds case in identifying as factors that the court can consider in deciding whether the publication was responsible, first, whether the defendant sought the claimant’s views on the statement complained of before publishing it and, secondly, whether an account of any views the claimant expressed was published with the statement.

On clause 5, many hon. Members have discussed how technology has changed the arena in which defamation operates. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Nadine Dorries), my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, my hon. Friends the Members for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith) and for Northampton North (Michael Ellis), and the hon. Members for Liverpool, Walton (Steve Rotheram) and for Bishop Auckland raised important questions about the extent to which the new provisions will tackle trolling and abusive behaviour on the internet. Clause 5 establishes a new procedure that can be followed by website operators on receipt of a complaint about defamatory material on the site on which they host user-generated content. Provided that website operators comply with this procedure, they will have a defence against a civil action for defamation. The procedure focuses on putting complainants in touch with the author of allegedly defamatory material so that they can take action against the author and bring civil proceedings of defamation, if the matter cannot be resolved by other means.

It is recognised, of course, that the dead cannot be defamed, but it is also important to recognise, in response to the sad case in Liverpool mentioned by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton, that a range of criminal offences exist to tackle trolling and other offensive behaviour on the internet. These criminal sanctions include section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, which creates an offence of sending or causing to be sent

“by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”.

Section 127 has been used to prosecute instances of cyber-bullying, hate crime, homophobic crime, incitement to violence, crimes committed by animal extremists, domestic violence and other sorts of threatening and abusive behaviour. Other offences, under statutes such as the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, may apply, depending on the circumstances.

The Crown Prosecution Service will determine under which legislation to progress prosecution, depending on the circumstances of each case. Some 2,000 criminal prosecutions for trolling have occurred in the past year, but I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire that action must be taken, where appropriate, and that trolling can be a very nasty business indeed. She clearly explained the range of the activities involved. We are confident that this criminal legislation is being used effectively to tackle offensive behaviour, as the recent case involving Facebook demonstrates. In addition, clause 5 will help to improve the civil law in relation to defamatory postings. Our idea is to help enable the claimant to take action against the author, including anonymous trolls, at a low cost and with the possibility of avoiding the involvement of lawyers.

[Paul Farrelly]

I have learned in this debate that the word “troll” is being used in this way. Let us not give these people the respectability of Norse mythology. Can we not describe them as they are? Can we avoid using “troll” and just say that these are sad, irresponsible people?

[Mr Djanogly]

I understand and agree with the hon. Gentleman’s sentiment, however I am reflecting what is now in common usage and “troll” is a word that people will understand. Some people understand it in either the criminal or the civil context, but the point I am making is that it can be used in both contexts.

Our approach will also promote freedom of expression by helping to ensure that material is not needlessly taken down without the author being given the opportunity to defend it, as often happens now. I can confirm to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge that we will also be ensuring that protection is in place for whistleblowers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

We intend that issue to be addressed both in terms of the substantive law and in terms of the procedure.

[Paul Farrelly]

I was also trying to give the Minister a pause for breath when the hon. Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) intervened. I tabled the question on Trafigura. One of the consequences was that because of the clash between Parliament and the courts, the courts started to look at how their procedures were working. The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, issued a press statement saying, in effect, “I did not realise what my courts were doing.” Similar circumstances are applicable in libel, but they have not come to a constitutional clash, which why it is so important that the Government look at civil procedure rules and make sure that the courts are managed properly from the top by the Lord Chief Justice and throughout, without our intervening in their affairs.

[Mr Djanogly]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that that is already happening and forms the subject of my not infrequent meetings with the Master of the Rolls.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Farrelly]

At a time when the country is going through some severe problems, we have more pilots in the legal profession than we have, potentially, in the RAF, determining how to cut the costs of lawyers in defamation cases. When we discussed this in the Select Committee, we came to the ludicrous conclusion that cost-capping measures in the courts led only to costs increasing because of the number of cases that were being discussed for cost-capping. It is important that the Government and the Courts Service get a grip on, I am sad to say, how judges run their own courts.

[Mr Djanogly]

We have been doing that, and the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that we addressed the issue to some extent in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, although perhaps not to his satisfaction. As I have said, we are also consistently discussing the issue with the judiciary, because it is an important one.

These issues should not need primary legislation, which is why they do not appear in the Bill. However, I can assure the House that we are firmly committed to ensuring that they are addressed in order to reduce costs and encourage settlements and that we are taking the work forward on all these issues alongside the Bill.

With regard to the provision sought by the right hon. Member for Tottenham, the hon. Members for Bishop Auckland and for Newcastle-under-Lyme and my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington, namely a specific provision requiring corporations to show financial harm, a proposal made by the Committee, we share the view that the inequality of financial means that exists when a large corporation sues or threatens smaller companies, individuals or non-governmental organisations lies at the heart of current concerns. In view of the fact that corporations are already prevented from claiming for certain types of harm, such as injury to feelings, in order to satisfy the Bill’s “serious harm” test a corporation would in practice be likely to have to demonstrate actual or likely financial harm in any event.

The right hon. Member for Tottenham, the hon. Members for Bishop Auckland and for Stoke-on-Trent South and others made observations on cost protection for claimants in defamation cases in the light of concerns raised during the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act. The Government’s reform of no win, no fee conditional fee agreements in that Act should not prevent strong cases from being brought. However, we recognise the concern that individuals who are not wealthy or powerful sometimes need to bring defamation or privacy cases. The Bill and the procedural reforms we intend to take forward alongside it seek to reduce the complexity and cost of defamation proceedings. In order to achieve those aims, I can confirm that we are carefully considering the issue of cost protection in defamation and privacy proceedings and will keep Parliament updated as the Bill progresses.

Continuing the theme of privacy, my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon suggested that the law on privacy should be codified. The Government welcome the report of the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, on which he served. The Committee recommended, on a majority vote, that the law on privacy should not be codified. The Government are considering the recommendation, along with all the Committee’s other recommendations, and will publish our response in due course. My hon. Friend also queried whether section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 should be repealed. Section 13 relates to the ability of Members of Parliament to waive privilege in relation to defamation proceedings. The Government are consulting on the issue as part of the Green Paper on privilege and consider that the issue is better examined in that context than in the Bill.

In conclusion, the Government firmly believe that reform of the law is needed to bolster free speech and ensure that the threat of libel proceedings is not used to frustrate and impede responsible investigative reporting or debate on issues of public importance, while ensuring that people whose reputations have been seriously harmed have clear and effective remedies against those responsible. I look forward to detailed scrutiny of the Bill and further constructive debate in Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Defamation Bill (Programme)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Defamation Bill:

Committal

1. The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

2. Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 26 June 2012.

3. The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Consideration and Third Reading

4. Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.

5. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

6. Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.

Other proceedings

7. Any other proceedings on the Bill (including any proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments or on any further messages from the Lords) may be programmed.—(Stephen Crabb.)

Question agreed to.

Defamation Law

Debate between Jonathan Djanogly and Paul Farrelly

Thursday 15th July 2010 Westminster Hall

[Mr Djanogly]

With the leave of the House, I thank the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) and my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) for the interesting and helpful views that they have expressed during the debate. I recognise that the co-operative approach taken by the hon. Member for Warrington North (Helen Jones) is the best way to help the Bill to become law.

The wide range of issues that have been raised and the strongly held opinions that exist serve to illustrate the complexity of this debate. They also show the importance of finding solutions that are workable in practice and will achieve a fair balance that preserves and upholds the right to freedom of speech, while not preventing people from taking action to protect their reputation from defamatory material where appropriate. The views that hon. Members have put forward will be of considerable help to the Government in developing proposals for a draft Bill that will endeavour to strike the right balance on those important and sensitive matters.

As I said at the beginning of the debate, I am not in a position today to indicate exactly which provisions may be included in the draft Bill, or to set out conclusively the Government’s position on all the individual points raised. However, I assure hon. Members that I will take all the views that have been expressed fully into account, together with those views that have emerged from the recent debate in another place and the outcomes of the informal consultation with interested parties that will take place over the summer. A large number of points have been raised, and I would like to expand on some of them. I do not wish to restrict the consultation process in any way but, I repeat, today is about the Government encouraging debate, not about providing conclusions.

In that vein, let me congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon on his re-election as Chair of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, not least because he can now see through his Committee’s valuable work on defamation. In a report published earlier this year, the Committee made recommendations on a range of issues relating to the law of libel. Those included proposals on a responsible journalism defence, libel tourism, the defences of justification and fair comment, the ability of corporations to bring libel actions, the early resolution of meaning and issues relating to the internet, and the multiple publication rule.

On CFAs, the Committee agreed that costs were too high and that reform was needed. As my hon. Friend said, the Committee also recommended that in defamation cases, CFA success fees should remain at 100% of base costs, but that only 10% should be recoverable from the defendant. The Committee’s approach therefore differed from both the previous Government’s proposal to impose a maximum success fee of 10%, and from Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendation to abolish the recoverability of the success fee and the after-the-event premium.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend and the members of his Committee for the valuable contribution to the debate made by that report. As the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Joan Walley) noted, many of the issues raised were also included in a report entitled “Free speech is not for sale”, which was published by English PEN and Index on Censorship last autumn, in a report by the Ministry of Justice’s libel working group in March this year, and in Lord Lester’s private Member’s Bill. I would like to extend the Government’s thanks to all those involved in considering those important matters. I confirm that their views will be taken into account both in our review of the substantive law and in how we progress the issue of CFA reform.

[Paul Farrelly]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am moving on to CFA reform, if that is what the hon. Gentleman wishes to speak about.

[Paul Farrelly]

It is.

[Mr Djanogly]

Then the hon. Gentleman should listen—I knew that I would not get away by saying just that. He addressed the issue of cost and mentioned the statutory instrument produced by the previous Government at the end of the previous Parliament. I would like to explain our thinking on that issue. I confirm to him and to my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon that we are firmly committed to taking timely action to reduce the high costs under CFAs, while ensuring appropriate access to justice. As my hon. Friend spelled out in great detail, the high cost of CFAs is a concern not only in defamation proceedings, but more widely across other areas of civil litigation. I was pleased that he thought it important to look at the issue in the round, and I confirm that we will not delay the process as a consequence of that.

I am conscious that, as the hon. Member for Warrington North said, the attempt by the previous Government to limit CFA success fees in defamation cases through the Conditional Fee Agreements (Amendment) Order 2010 was not recommended to the House of Commons by the Committee. The Labour Government seemed to believe that by reducing the success fee mark up on CFAs and defamation cases, the problems that we are debating today would simply go away. It is true that those who were not rich would have been denied access to justice, but that would not have been the case for a wealthy individual or a corporation that wanted to suppress academic or scientific research, because they would not have wished to use CFAs in the first place. That blundering piecemeal approach is exactly what the Government intend not to pursue, and we will be looking at the issue in the round. I was pleased to hear the hon. Lady agree to that.

[Paul Farrelly]

The issue is complex. One person who was relieved that the statutory instrument did not succeed was Peter Wilmshurst, who is a consultant cardiologist at Shrewsbury and the University hospital of North Staffordshire. He is being sued by an American company, NMT Medical, and is being defended under a CFA. His problems are that there is one-way traffic. There are costs and delays and ultimately, he has no guarantee of getting his costs back if he is successful in countersuing for libel, or if NMT Medical loses the case. That is an example of the complexity of the issue, and the way that the libel laws urgently need to be reformed because of the costs and complexities involved, and the ability of companies to silence scientific debate.

[Mr Djanogly]

I disagree that the proposed order would have had the immediate impact that the hon. Gentleman suggests. However, we are moving on and the process is under way. That order sought only to reduce success fees in defamation-related proceedings. Although those proceedings are important, we know that CFAs have been a cause of major concern in other areas such as clinical negligence cases against the NHS, or in the context of the compensation culture debate.

The change that the order sought to achieve was inconsistent with more considered proposals in the field, which were known to the Government at that time. Lord Justice Jackson spent a year considering those proposals and wider issues, and made recommendations in January this year for the reform of CFAs across all areas of civil litigation. In addition, the report by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee entitled, “Press Standards, Privacy and Libel” was published under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon. The Government recognise the urgency and the complexity of these issues, but we strongly believe that it is important to consider the case for potential reform across all areas of civil litigation, rather than confine it to individual areas. Lord Young of Graffham is conducting a review into health and safety law and the compensation culture, and we await his report with interest. We are examining the options for reform and will announce the way forward as soon as possible.

My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon discussed funding litigation in a wider context, and I should add that Lord Justice Jackson is persuaded that solicitors and barristers should be permitted to use so-called contingency fees in litigation, subject to appropriate regulation and arrangements for costs recovery. Contingency fees are a type of no win, no fee agreement, under which the lawyer’s fee is payable only if the client wins, and is calculated as a percentage of the sum recovered. Importantly, the lawyer’s fee is a percentage of the damages, rather than being fee-based. That type of funding is widely available in other jurisdictions, but is not permitted in civil litigation in England and Wales. Lord Justice Jackson considers that contingency fees could increase access to justice. We shall also need to consider his recommendations on that issue.

My hon. Friend also expressed concern on libel tourism. There is a widespread perception that the English courts have become the forum of choice for those who want to sue for libel and that that is having a chilling effect on freedom of expression in other countries. For example, in the USA, a number of states have introduced legislation to prevent foreign libel judgments from being enforced there. I understand that legislation on the issue completed one of its stages in the US Senate this week. My hon. Friend mentioned that.

Although we need to review the implication of that possible law and other laws, such as those coming from the EU, as far as they relate to English jurisdiction, I am concerned that we should not be stampeded into basing our laws on an American world view of free speech. My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) expressed that point very well in his strong and valuable intervention.

There are mixed views about how far libel tourism is a real problem. A wide range of interesting views were expressed in the Second Reading debate on Lord Lester’s Bill in another place on 9 July, including by Lord Hoffmann, who in his speech and in a very interesting lecture earlier this year was extremely sceptical about the extent of any problem in that area. The problem with the Ehrenfeld case, for instance, is that she did not defend the action, so it is difficult to draw conclusions from it. Lord Hoffmann suggested that Dr Ehrenfeld could have relied on the Reynolds defence. I make no comment on that, but those issues will need to be reviewed.

Research that we conducted in the context of the Ministry of Justice libel working group’s consideration did not show any significant number of actual cases involving foreign litigants in the High Court in 2009. However, non-governmental organisations have said that a major problem arises from the threat of libel proceedings by wealthy foreigners and public figures, which is used to stifle investigative journalism, regardless of whether cases are in the end brought, so the number of cases alone may not accurately reflect the extent of the problem.

A number of possible approaches have been proposed to deal with any problems that exist. For example, the libel working group proposed procedural steps to tighten the rules and practice to head off inappropriate claims at the earliest possible stage in cases in which court permission is required to serve a defamation claim outside England and Wales. Lord Lester’s Bill has adopted a different approach, which focuses on whether the publication in England and Wales can reasonably be regarded as having caused substantial harm to reputation, having regard to the extent of publication elsewhere. We shall consider those proposals and other possible options carefully in reaching a decision on the way forward. In doing so, we will of course have to keep it in mind that there is relevant European legislation—in particular, the Brussels I regulation on jurisdictional matters—with which we shall need to ensure compliance.

The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme discussed the timing of our considerations of the Jackson review. I can advise him that we intend to revise the relevant cost-related recommendations in conjunction with our review of legal aid. That will be consulting in the autumn of this year, which he will appreciate is before the draft defamation Bill is to be tabled for consultation.

[Paul Farrelly]

May I come back on that, as the Minister might have expected? I think that I noticed the quizzical brow of my friend the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale). The Minister’s statement on going ahead and more consultation in line with the reforms to legal aid has left me none the wiser as to when that process will come to an end.

[Mr Djanogly]

As I said, I cannot at this stage give a firm date for when a draft Bill will be published or for when the legal aid consultation will finally be settled. However, I can tell the hon. Gentleman that those matters are moving forward at speed. The legal aid consultation will be published in the autumn. I hope that he will take some comfort from the fact that we are not pushing the issue into the long grass.

[Paul Farrelly]

With respect, I think that comfort will be taken in certain quarters—I can hear the Bollinger corks popping as we speak.