Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Johnny Mercer Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 8th October 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you. We will move straight to questions. I call the Minister.

[The Minister for Defence People and Veterans (Johnny Mercer)]

Q Chris, good afternoon. Thank you for coming along. Your regiment has been through this process a number of times. Can you outline why the legislation we are considering today is necessary? The PWRR has had a pretty on-the-coalface experience of repeat investigations over many years. I have two questions for you. Can you outline the effect of legislation such as that which we are considering today, and what it will mean to those who have served on operations?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: The effect of the legislation on people would be to remove quite a large amount of pain and misery, which I have experienced not only with individuals but with their families. We must remember that when people’s lives go on hold for several years due to investigations, whether they are right or wrong, that can have a very damaging effect on families and individuals. This legislation certainly will remove most of that pain and misery, which I have witnessed, as many have.

From our regiment’s point of view, few things have been harder for our men—our infantry are primarily male—who are often from the most vulnerable places in our society and often very tough backgrounds, who do their bit and then find that they are exposed. This legislation is broadly going to remove that risk and pain—in broad terms. I know you might want to talk about the smaller aspects.

In terms of the effects on operations, I can only speak from a subjective point of view about the impact on me, but also on all the people I speak to. There is an increasing concern among very young junior commanders—I have been one of them on operations, where you have to make decisions. Going forwards, without this sort of legislation, there is the increased risk to life of people not being able to take decisions, as I had to, such as: do you bring in a precision airstrike or not and take 10 lives with some risk of collateral damage on the spot, to save lives, without some form of legal concern, because you are doing the right thing and you are following drills?

I think your Bill’s effect on operations will be to remove a large amount of that concern. I think that is probably the bigger professional concern—that it would cost more British lives because people would be hesitant.

[Johnny Mercer]

Q I think that there is a temptation in this place to let the perfect be the enemy of the good in a lot of the legislation that we pass. Of course, legislation is not going to be all things to all men, but within the art of what is possible—I have asked everybody this question—what would you do to improve the Bill? There are things that people want to do. For example, they want to separate classes of claimants, so that the six-year limitation on human rights claims is unlimited for armed forces personnel but limited for those we go against. That is not legal under European human rights law. We heard that from the British Legion this morning. There are plenty of ideas coming forward that are not possible. What, within the art of what is possible, would you do to improve the Bill?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: That is a difficult question, because of the stretch of my understanding of what is and is not legally possible. If I may add value in this way, I think there is a concern about the six-year time limit. There is a perception—maybe it is my misunderstanding —that the six-year time limit would apply to service personnel themselves bringing claims against the armed forces, or against people. Is that correct?

[Johnny Mercer]

Q That is correct. What I was saying is that we cannot differentiate between different classes of claimants. That is illegal under European human rights law. If you are going to draw a line to stop people bringing European human rights cases against this country, it has to apply to anyone. The calculation that is then made is where to draw the line. Given that 94% of those claims came before that, and that the six years will give a better level of evidence and people will be helped going through the process—the whole thing in the round—that is why the six years were taken. But what would you do to improve that?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I think there has to be some form of recognition and qualification that the major concern—I see it as a volunteer—is that we are getting close to 100 cases, in a body of about 5,000 people, of severe mental distress, and those are rising by the week, primarily out of Afghanistan. On the timeline of those cases appearing—we are in the category of post-traumatic stress disorder in about 90% of cases—we are talking about 10 years.

Bear in mind that there are proven facts that the bell curve of PTSD cases is 28 years. My own personal experiences was 24 years after the event, out of the blue, and then being treated for it. If cases were to be brought—and I think it is quite reasonable to allow soldiers, sailors and airmen to bring cases for mental duress that could have been caused by a mistake, an error or incorrect equipment, or some form of claim—to put a six-year time limit does not help. It may help legal reasons for other purposes, but it certainly does not help the mental duress, because the facts and evidence point to a 28-year bell curve, with 14 years therefore being the mean.

[Johnny Mercer]

Q Of course, and that that is why we have built in there that it is the point of knowledge, rather than when the incident took place. Therefore, if you had PTSD 24 years later, your six-year clock would start from that 24-year point.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Understood. It is great to hear that clarification.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

No, it would not.

[Johnny Mercer]

Yes, it would. You have no idea what you are talking about.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: You can understand the problem that the military community have. It is hard enough for someone like me, as a master’s graduate, to understand it, but also trying to get this understood by a large body of quite unqualified people who fought bravely is difficult enough.

The only other qualification that I would add is to do not with the question that you have directly asked but with a broader question, which you may want to touch on later. It is very difficult to separate, in the view of the veteran, operations from one theatre and operations from another theatre. Obviously, you probably know straight away that I am referring to Northern Ireland. I understand, and we understand, that it is not part of this Bill, but I think there has to be a measure by the Government to say—and I think they have—that other measures will be taken ahead to deal with that. That is something that I know is a concern, and it is something that is of prime concern.

Broadly—I have to say this broadly because, again, we have to remember that we do not get people scrutinising the Bill itself; they hear the broad terms of it—it is welcomed by the community and there is no major feedback of negativity other than the points we have registered about claims, which you have clarified very helpfully.

[Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)]

Q Good afternoon, colonel. Just a quick question from me. How could the Ministry of Defence better exercise its duty towards soldiers who are accused of crimes?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: The problem came, in a lot of our cases—certainly with some of the earlier ones with the Iraq Historic Allegations Team and others—that, because it was done in a very legal and correct fashion, sometimes we can forget that the care is needed, because they still are people. It was often very difficult for people to get facts and information about what was likely happening. I would say that we have come quite a long way with that. We have an independent ombudsman and others. Personally I think that has been a huge step forward, and I met Nicola the other day. We must remember that we have to think about whether there is a resource capability gap or not, to allow some form of funded or additional care for the families, and also potentially for people’s loss of earnings and loss of promotion.

One of the biggest fears and concerns that people had is that their career was on hold and their career was affected. Like it or not, that comes down to the financial burden that people feel they have suffered unduly. I can think of several cases where it is pretty hard to explain why certain people were not promoted for a few years when these investigations were going on. Obviously, it was a difficult position for everyone.

There are two things there: a broad duty of care with some resourcing for the impact on families and the individuals themselves, whether that is more information or some sort of independent helpline. Perhaps it could be done through a body such as the ombudsman or something in addition to that. Secondly, it is the ability to explain and understand those pieces.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Q We will now hear from His Honour Judge Jeff Blackett, who very recently retired as Judge Advocate General. We have until 4 o’clock for this session. Welcome, Judge. Would you care to introduce yourself for the benefit of the Committee?

Judge Blackett: I am His Honour Judge Jeff Blackett. I was the Judge Advocate General for 16 years. I had 31 years’ service in the Royal Navy before that. I retired as Advocate General last week, on 30 September, so that I could go and become president of the Rugby Football Union.

[Johnny Mercer]

Q Hi, Judge Blackett. Thank you for coming in today. We have had broad discussions along this issue already, so I will not reheat any of those. What would you do within the art of what is possible? There are plenty of ideas—taking out the six-year limit, applying it to one set of claimants and so on—but within the art of the possible and the strategic aim of the Bill, what would you do to improve it?

Judge Blackett: That has gone to the end of where I was going to speak, because I was going to start off by saying that I think the Bill does not do what it is trying to do. My concern relates to investigations, not prosecutions; but there are a number of issues, and I think you and I have discussed some of them.

The first thing I would do is apply section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to the military. That puts a six-month time limit on summary matters, and I would extend that to be matters that were de minimis—there would have to be a test of de minimis. Interestingly enough, halfway through my time as the Judge Advocate General, I issued a practice memorandum, which effectively incorporated that into the court martial. Following Danny Boy, the only offences that could be brought to trial were common assaults, and they were not, because the Army Prosecuting Authority followed my practice memorandum. The Ministry of Defence at the time were not in favour of that, and they challenged. Unfortunately I had to withdraw that practice memorandum.

That would deal with minor cases, and there are lots of minor cases. The sorts of things that IHAT was dealing with were that there would be a complaint that appeared to fall at the upper end of the spectrum. There would be an investigation. It would find that the allegations had been wildly exaggerated and end up finding that the most serious offence might have been an attempted actual bodily harm. In cases like that there should be a limitation period. So that is my first thing.

The second thing is that I would have judicial oversight of investigations. I introduced something called “Better Case Management in the Court Martial”, towards the end of my time as the Judge Advocate General. That puts time limits on investigations. The most important thing about it is that a case, early on, goes before a judge, and a judge then sets out a timetable of what various things should do. If section 127 of the MCA was brought into force, and the case dealt with de minimis, he could then say, “This is de minimis; stop the investigation.” So you need some mechanism, and judicial oversight. In my opinion, you could do that.

Thirdly, I would look at legal aid and funding. We have to remember that Northmoor and IHAT were set up by the British Government, and were funded by the British Government. The ambulance-chasing solicitors—people like Phil Shiner—used public money to pursue the means. I think you need to look at how legal aid is approved in those matters, and whether complainants should be funded, and the bar for funding them and their solicitors should be set higher.

So those are three areas. Finally, I would raise the bar for reinvestigation, or investigation. Having said that, there were only two courts martial where people were acquitted where there was a reinvestigation, but I would raise the bar for reinvestigation as well. So those are four practical matters that I think the Bill should concentrate on, rather than prosecution.

[Johnny Mercer]

Q One of the difficulties I think people like me face is that we have had General Parker, x-Armed Forces Ministers and others, saying that this and that should happen; why, over the last 10 or 15 years have none of these things been done?

Judge Blackett: You would have to ask them. I am an independent judge, who was the judicial head of the service justice system.

[Johnny Mercer]

Q Why do you think the MOD has not taken on your advice?

Judge Blackett: I think in terms of the six-month time limit, there were lawyers in the MOD who said that we did not put that in the Armed Forces Act 2006. There are commanding officers who do not want to be limited, because sometimes they need more time. In terms of better case management, I think that the MOD thinks that is a good idea, but I did not come to it until quite late in my time.

I will say one thing, though. In terms of IHAT and Northmoor, as the Judge Advocate General I wanted to be more involved, but I was kept out—properly, I suppose, because I might have to try the cases in the end. We expected a lot of cases to come out of those two matters, and as you know, not a single case came out of them, which tells its own story.

[Stephen Morgan (Portsmouth South) (Lab)]

Q Thank you, Judge Blackett, for being so willing to come before the Committee to hear our concerns and to help us improve the Bill. You described the Bill as ill conceived. Can you explain why you had that view?

Judge Blackett: Yes. Perhaps I can say this. I wondered why, in the face of all the opposition—there is huge opposition, from various bodies—the Government seemed intent to pursue this particular issue. I have three concerns about the Bill. One is the presumption against prosecution, one is the wording in clause 3(2)(a), and the other is the requirement for Attorney General consent.

I listened very carefully to what Johnny Mercer said to the Joint Committee on Human Rights a couple of days ago. He described a pathway that goes from civil claims for compensation. That becomes allegations of criminal behaviour. That leads to investigation. That leads to re-investigation. I think that is the pathway you described, Mr Mercer. He said the lock was a presumption against prosecution, and Attorney General consent. I can understand, looking back, how you might get to that, but I think that logic is flawed, because actually he agreed that the issue of concern is investigations, which is my concern as well, and the length of time they take. He accepted, as he would, that all allegations must be investigated. That acceptance and a presumption against prosecution just do not equate, in my terms.

Let us look at some statistics. In my time as JAG, we have had eight trials involving overseas operations, with 27 defendants, of whom 10 were convicted. There were obviously trials. I did the two murder trials. The first murder trial was about the murder of a chap called Nadhem Abdullah by 3 Para. That was a case called Evans. The events took place in 2003; the trial was in 2005. In the case of Blackman, Marine A, the unlawful killing took place in 2011; he and two others were tried in 2013. So the system worked and due process went along. There were eight trials.

At the same time, there were 3,400 allegations in IHAT and 675 allegations in Northmoor. We all know how long they took, and nothing came out of them. So I agree wholeheartedly with what the Minister is trying to do. I am absolutely behind protecting service personnel. I simply do not believe this Bill does it, because I cannot see that a bar on prosecution or—sorry—a presumption against prosecution is going to stop the ambulance chasing that the Government are so worried about.

My second concern, of course, was the International Criminal Court. Take a case like Blackman, for instance, where there was a video of him shooting somebody. Had that come to light over five years later and there was a presumption against prosecution, first of all, the investigation would have taken place. The prosecutor could have said, “The presumption exists. Therefore I am not going to prosecute.” That would lead to a victim right of review, perhaps. More importantly, it would lead the International Criminal Court to say, “You are unable or unwilling—article 17 of the Rome statute—to prosecute. Therefore we’ll take this and we’ll put him to The Hague.” That is a real concern of mine.

The prosecutor could decide there is a case to answer, but he would send it to the Attorney General, and the Attorney General says either, “Prosecute”—in which case, so what?—or no, and you have exactly the same thing: judicial review of his decision by all sorts of people, and the International Criminal Court saying, again, “You are unable or unwilling.”

In my view, what this Bill does is exactly the opposite of what it is trying to do. What it is trying to do is to stop ambulance-chasing solicitors and vexatious and unmeritorious claims. The Minister quite rightly said we want rigour and integrity. What it actually does is increase the risk of service personnel appearing before the International Criminal Court. That is why I said it was ill conceived.