Sgt Alexander Blackman (Marine A)

Johnny Mercer Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2015 Westminster Hall

[Johnny Mercer (Plymouth, Moor View) (Con)]

I have been asked a few times for my views on the case, for a variety of reasons, and I have not offered them, but as it is yet again in Parliament and I am now, fortunately, a Member, I will use the opportunity to set out my view.

To give some context, I never achieved anything particularly great in the Army, but I have a unique viewpoint. I served three tours from the beginning of the Afghanistan conflict. I served in the chaos that was 2006, when we first went there; and at the strategic level in 2008 and 2009, with a unit that was involved in the strategic man-hunting outside of Task Force Helmand. I then served in 2010 in exactly the same area where the individual we are talking about served. At the end of that tour, my CO told me I was probably the most combat-experienced terminal controller in the Army at the time; so I have an intimate understanding of the issues at stake in the case.

I served in the exact same area as Marine A just 12 months before him, during a final tour of duty in southern Afghanistan. The area was renowned as one of the most contested in Helmand. In January 2010, the Americans had completed a huge operation in Marjeh to the south, which was complemented by a British effort called Operation Panther’s Claw to squeeze the heavily enemy-occupied areas around Nad-e Ali and the district centre in that area. All operations have unintended consequences, and the main one on this occasion was that the heavily armed and well organised Taliban commanders—what we would call tier 1 and tier 2 Taliban commanders—had been squeezed into an area just north of Nad-e Ali just south of the main Nahr-e Bughra canal; so they were fixed geographically in that area. The area is known on the map as 31 west; to the rest of us it became known as the jungle.

The area that I and subsequently Marine A served in was so demanding that, half way through that last tour, the holding ground unit that I was supporting was replaced by the theatre reserve battalion. My small fire support team, with one already dead, was asked to stay and be the continuity—the corporate knowledge, if you like—for that area of operations. The truth is that at that time, and no doubt a year later when Marine A was there—I shall call him that throughout my speech, because I do not believe that he should have been publicly named—the area was the darkest place in Helmand. That title switched areas as the campaign wore on. At times it belonged to Sangin, at others to Musa Qala. As I have said, I served in multiple areas on multiple tours, with different forces from strategic down to tactical level, and I have no doubt that it was the most demanding place I served in.

I found life a challenge when I came home from that tour. As ever, I made sure I could look my wife and daughter in the eye. No one died who did not need to die; but it was perhaps the most formative experience of my life. I suspect that for Marine A the experience was broadly similar. I would at this stage like to make an important point clear. I am no apologist for Marine A. I have been in his position, as have many others, but we have not broken the law and stepped over the abyss as he did. I also do not think it is for politicians to interfere with the judicial process, and I respect the opinion that has been given; but there are some serious problems with the case that I am deeply uncomfortable with, and I feel I have a duty to speak out about them.

One of my driving forces for coming into Parliament was how we look after our people within the military whom we ask and expect to keep us safe—although often we do not want to know how they do it. There is no doubt that the past 10 years have had a chronic effect on a generation of young men and women. There is also no doubt of the desensitising process that occurs when one is engaged with the enemy on a daily basis. It is how people cope and get by—morphing from human to animal and back again, as they learn to fight, live and survive like an animal in the backstreets of “the jungle”. Taking another man’s life is a serious and sobering engagement; extreme violence is to be expected, but as humans we adapt and cope, and as British soldiers we do what needs to be done to survive and win.

None of that trumps professionalism in the conduct of one’s duty. I give no traction to the views of those who say, “Marine A did what any one of us would have done,” or even, “He only did what they would do to him, given the opportunity.” I am afraid they entirely miss the point and do not help his case. However, we must never take the collective faults of a system or policy generated by the demands placed on our men, and hang them around the neck of one individual, as has happened in this case. During the maturing process of the Afghanistan campaign, there were some epic failures in the chain of command. “Courageous restraint” was a great concept, which most of us employed anyway before they gave it a fancy name; but that did not stop the commander of British forces in 2010 suggesting that summer that we start giving state awards for those who showed “courageous restraint”. I think the Americans are still laughing at us now.

A strange culture developed around the conflict at that time. Commanders wanted to “do” Afghanistan—to get it on their annual reports. As ever, most new officers in theatre would start trying to outdo their predecessors. We started to be asked to follow up direct action strikes from the air, which meant conducting a ground patrol to check for collateral damage on a target just after it was hit, which is insanity, considering where those targets are in enemy territory, and the IED risk—notwithstanding the fact that the effects of strikes are pretty obvious straightaway. The effect of that on our blokes was that every single step they took and every single round they fired was raked over time and again, under microscopic scrutiny with potential strategic effects. The pressure that that placed on men engaged in mortal combat was never correctly assessed or accounted for by the chain of command, or in the court case of Marine A. That pressure has never been higher in the history of armed conflict. There is a reason why Marine A is the first man to be convicted for the crime in question since the second world war. The effects of the strategic corporal, as it became known, have never been correctly assessed, and due care and attention have not been paid to the problem.

Into that arena stepped a deeply scarred man, of whom we had asked more and more as a nation, without respite. He had conducted multiple combat tours, yet those who thought they knew better down the other end of the radio did not heed his assessments of the specific threat to his patrol base in his area of operations. He had already lost his officer; he had seen body parts displayed and had been involved in the hunt for Highlander McLaren, which ended in such bad circumstances that to this day they rightly remain unreported.

My point is that someone should have seen what was coming. Marine A made a mistake and he got caught, and it would be naive to suggest that he should not be punished; but the mitigating circumstances in this case are great. He killed a mortally injured enemy combatant—of that there is no doubt; but does he deserve to be serving an eight-year prison sentence for murder? That is something I am deeply uncomfortable with. To my mind, the situation represents a serious and unfortunately characteristic failure in the chain of command to protect the man at all costs and assume a collective responsibility for a duty of care.

The trauma risk management procedure instigated to try to ameliorate the onslaught of disturbing experiences was a good idea but, again, tokenism prevailed. It was appallingly implemented and administered. I had a conversation only three weeks ago with someone at the top of the Ministry of Defence about how the TRiM procedure is being implemented, and all I can say is that it is delusional, the way assessment is done. We need to get that right. We have no one prepared to take responsibility for a care pathway for our servicemen and women once they leave, and I am determined to implement that.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

My hon. Friend’s comments are very powerful. I think most Members of Parliament would be surprised at how many of their constituents are suffering from PTSD to this day.

[Johnny Mercer]

As to the PTSD system, there is a chronic effect on a generation that we have asked to do our bidding in conflicts miles away. There is often a time lag before the effects kick in, but there still seems to be an idea of putting it aside, and that is simply not good enough. We have to look after our blokes better.

If a civilian commits murder they are entitled to a psychiatric assessment as part of the trial process. Why on earth was that not done in Marine A’s case? That man broke the law. He knew it, and he got caught; but someone must have seen it coming, and there was the point of failure. In this country, we do not look after our blokes well enough, and he is yet another example. We are getting better; the first thing the Prime Minister and Chancellor think of when more LIBOR fines come through is veterans charities. We now have a unique opportunity to get veterans’ care right. The sector needs clearing up, but that is for another day.

We have a justice system that is one of the fairest and most stringent in the world, and I have little doubt that Marine A’s conviction will not stand by the end of this Parliament. He has killed a man when he should not have done, in the heat, intensity, fear and sweat of a modern counter-insurgency campaign; but convicted of murder and sentenced to eight years? I am not comfortable with that, and I suspect I am not in the minority. We must do right by this man. I support efforts to look again at his conviction, and am grateful to have had the opportunity to speak.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mark Lancaster)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I start, of course, by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax) on securing this debate on an emotive case that has continued to be of concern to many people. I also congratulate, on their passionate contributions, my hon. Friends the Members for Taunton Deane (Rebecca Pow), for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), for Eastleigh (Mims Davies), for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke), for Wells (James Heappey) and for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer) and the hon. Members for Strangford (Jim Shannon), for Stirling (Steven Paterson) and for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue).

Standing here now and having listened to the debate, I am remembering that it is nine years since I served in Afghanistan, in the summer of 2006. I listened to the contributions of some of my hon. Friends, but frankly my tour was quite unremarkable. It bore no significance compared with the experiences of the Royal Marines in Afghanistan, in Helmand, and I seek to make absolutely no comparison between my experiences and theirs. I am, however, very mindful, when I think of that time, of just how far away we are today in the House of Commons from Helmand all those years ago. I am very mindful of that.

In the days before this debate, I spent considerable time considering this case. I have read in detail the full internal review and have seen the headcam tapes presented at trial. As part of my wish for transparency, I arranged court permission and offered my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax) the opportunity to see the full unredacted footage alongside me this morning, in my desire to understand the wider issues. I have discussed the case and appeal with a number of military officers, including both commanding officers. I share the concern of many for Mrs Blackman and am clear that the MOD must not stand in the way of a fair and just consideration of this case. I am, however, equally clear that no serviceman or woman of our armed forces is or can be above the law.

This case has been difficult for everyone connected to it. No one can see the clear pain of Mrs Blackman as she seeks to support her husband and not be deeply moved. Equally, we are all conscious that we cannot fully appreciate from the safety of the House the challenges of operations in extraordinary and dangerous circumstances, and these are extraordinary challenging circumstances, with extraordinary people doing an extraordinary job. I know that the House will join me in recognising the Royal Marines for their huge contribution in Afghanistan during many gruelling operational tours. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] We are justly proud of our soldiers, sailors and airmen—of the work they do and the way they conduct themselves. We hold our armed forces to a higher standard, and we are right to do that. Our men and women must be better than those they confront; they must set a higher standard and, even when provoked, must hold to their professional standards. Our Royal Marines fight hard, but they fight fair.

We as Members of Parliament and I as the Minister responsible for service personnel have a special duty to these people and their families. It is right that we have undertaken the review to learn the lessons from this incident, and I recognise the public interest in seeing the report in full, but I must weigh that against being fair to individuals named in the case. For that reason, I have agreed to the release of the executive summary, recommendations and letter from the Fleet Commander, with the only redactions being individuals’ telephone numbers and a relatively junior civil servant’s name. I have also withheld the bullet points that relate to an individual who has not yet been named in the media. Simply due to the shortness of time between the announcement of this debate last week and today, I have been unable to follow the full process required under the Data Protection Act, but let me make it clear that it is my intention to unredact those paragraphs as well in due course.

I have, as I said, read the full report in detail. It is a full and frank assessment and contains detailed information about our tactics and operational security. It is my view that its unredacted release into the public domain would breach our ability to conduct campaigns in the future. However, as hon. Members will have seen from the 17 recommendations released today, the Royal Navy, alongside the other services, is pursuing detailed implementation plans, many of which are already well advanced. I have spoken today to the Fleet Commander, and he assures me that he is tracking and pressing progress and this is a matter treated with the utmost seriousness.

That said, I remain convinced that transparency is the key in this case and I am keen to provide it. Therefore, if Sergeant Blackman’s defence team wished this report to be considered by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the MOD would provide them with a confidential copy.

I hope that this release quashes the claims that the MOD is trying to undertake some sort of cover-up or conspiracy in this case; that is simply not the case. With regard to the legal case itself, Sergeant Blackman and two marines under his command were charged with and prosecuted for murder. They were tried in an independent and impartial judicial process. Guilt or innocence is decided by a panel made up of military personnel who understand the unique challenges that our service personnel face. The two marines were acquitted, but Sergeant Blackman was convicted. A great deal of evidence was heard in the trial of the immense stresses and strains of the operational context. Sergeant Blackman’s company commander during the time of his deployment gave evidence at the trial. He outlined the tactical situation and difficulties faced by troops located in patrol bases. I do not think that those personnel underestimated the immense challenges that Sergeant Blackman, and so many of our people, faced during that time.

[Johnny Mercer]

We can say that somebody is in the military, but that is clearly a very broad church. What steps were taken to ensure that the individuals who were passing judgment on this soldier had relevant personal experience of the pressures that that individual was placed under at the time?

[Mark Lancaster]

My hon. Friend tempts me into getting into the details of the preparation for the particular court martial. Of course, he will understand that it is right that, as Ministers and Members of Parliament, we do not seek to start influencing the way in which these trials are conducted. I do not know what the process was. There would have been a balance, of course. Anybody who knew Sergeant Blackman probably could not sit in judgment against him. However, my hon. Friend will forgive me if I avoid being drawn into those sorts of detail, because I do think that would be inappropriate for someone in my position.

Sergeant Blackman appealed against his conviction and sentence to the court martial appeal court. It is important to note, given the concerns that some have expressed about the court-martial process, that that court is made up of the same judges as sit in the civilian Court of Appeal. The court martial appeal court, chaired in this case by the Lord Chief Justice, upheld the conviction and the sentence. However, it reduced the minimum term, as has been said, from 10 years to eight.

I understand that Sergeant Blackman and his legal advisers are considering whether, as their next step, there is any new evidence that they would wish to put to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, with a view to its being referred to the court martial appeal court. This is a legal matter and not a decision for Ministers, but let me reiterate: should that happen and should either the commission or Sergeant Blackman’s legal representatives make a request for the review or elements of it, I reassure hon. Members that the Ministry of Defence will, of course, co-operate fully to ensure that justice is done. To be perfectly clear, I mean that I would be willing to release the report in full, on a confidential basis, to either the defence legal team or the commission.

I began by saying that I was fully aware of the concern felt by many regarding the case. I recognise and accept that it remains difficult for some to accept the decision of the court martial and the court martial appeal court. The system seeks to combine independence and legal professionalism with an appreciation of the military context and the realities of military life. The civilian judge advocate gives direction on the law, and military personnel decide on guilt or innocence. It should not be forgotten that in this case they acquitted two of the accused. Where there is a conviction, they decide with the judge advocate on the sentence. An appeal can be made to the highest and most experienced judges, and there is the possibility of further review if important new evidence emerges. This is, rightly, an independent judicial process, not a political decision. I respect the system, and hope that hon. Members will do so as well.

[Richard Drax]

I am most grateful to the Minister for the hard work that I know he has put into researching the case, and for his frank response, which was not expected. The new legal team and the family will be grateful for the fact that he has offered to give the report to the defence team if they request it in confidence. That will help enormously. I also pay tribute to all my honourable and, in many cases, gallant colleagues. The Minister speaks humbly about his time in Afghanistan. He may not have faced the same challenges as others, but he was still there, and for that I commend him most highly.

This has been, as colleagues have said, a highly emotional, charged debate. That will not get Sergeant Blackman out of jail, however, nor will it get his case reviewed. What will are the facts. As the Minister and others have rightly said, we cannot and should not interfere with the legal process. My job and ours, along with the Daily Mail and others, is to highlight where we think that things have gone wrong. Where we see an injustice, it would be wrong not to stand up and say what we think. That is what we were voted in to do, and that is what we have done today.

I hope that the attention that the case is receiving, and the facts of the case, will get it reviewed. Regrettably, I am not as eminent, as bright, as intelligent or as experienced as Mr Goldberg, and sadly I never will be, but it is into his hands and those of his team that we place the responsibility of pursuing that legal avenue. Big Al, as he is affectionately known, and I have met him—

[Johnny Mercer]

I just wanted to build on that point and clarify what I said earlier about the MOD. I thank the Minister for the candid nature of his speech. He has shown us that we have a real opportunity, with the team of Ministers at the MOD, not only to get this case right but to tackle the causes of what happened. We all know the facts, but there are causes behind the story. We have a unique opportunity now, before the matter moves out of the public eye, to get those things right.

I know that this is strong, but in my experience of dealing with Ministers and those at the top of the MOD, there is a significant gap between the duty, attention to detail and the genuine heartfelt concerns of the ministerial team and the attitude of those at the top of the MOD. The latter have recently, in conversations about trauma risk management and how we manage people going forward, shown themselves to be delusional. We need to tighten that gap to make sure that we do not miss the bow wave of people coming home from Afghanistan and Iraq and suffering from mental health problems. I hope that as a result of our debate today, we will be able to see the many factors that contributed to the incident that we are discussing.

[Richard Drax]

I thank my gallant and distinguished colleague. Given all his experience, there is, dare I say it, no one better on our side of the House to speak in such a way.