Middle East

Debate between John Redwood and Madeleine Moon

Monday 30th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs Moon]

I thank the hon. Gentleman, who serves valiantly on the Defence Select Committee with me. I know how much work he did on that visit, when we really delved deeply into what the capability and the success of the intervention were. Of course, the peshmerga are a tremendous asset and a great fighting force, but they are not going to fight everywhere in Iraq. They want to focus on their own area and on protecting Kurdish lands and Kurdish people. They are not the Iraqi armed forces; they are the Kurdish armed forces.

The Prime Minister told us last week that we are going to regain more territory. I do not want us to transfer our limited intervention capability from Iraq to Syria. In December 2015, our military presence in Iraq outside of the Kurdish regions was three individuals—we met them—yet our missions there are critical to preventing Daesh from spreading across Iraq.

I urge Members to read the Defence Committee report produced in January this year, which outlined the problems we faced in Iraq and the capability we had to intervene there. The report states that we saw no evidence of the UK Government seeking to analyse, question or change the coalition strategy to which they are committed. Ministers, officials and officers failed to set out a clear military strategy for Iraq, or a clear definition of the UK’s role in operations. We saw no evidence of an energised policy debate, reviewing or arguing options for deeper engagement.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Is it not also the case that if we are to launch air-to-ground attacks, we need to be able to collaborate with forces on the ground to report the targets and whether or not the attacks were successful?

[Mrs Moon]

That is exactly the information that we need. We know that 360 attacks have been made by our planes, but what we do not know is how valid they were. Were they successful? Are they making a difference? Here we are, talking about intervening somewhere else, when we do not even know how successful our intervention has been in Iraq.

The expensively trained and equipped Iraqi army fell apart when confronted by Daesh. The army has serious structural issues, poor-quality leadership, and a sectarian divide that must be addressed before any real progress in combating Daesh is possible. The brutality of the Shia militias often forces Sunni tribes into seeing Daesh as the safer alternative; let us never move away from that recognition. Sunni reconciliation and the taming of the Shia militia are impossibly difficult. If we cannot make that happen in Iraq, what chance have we in Syria? What is the basis of the sectarian divide? Is it simply religion, or is it also the age-old strategy of divide and rule? Is it a question of getting groups to fight among themselves, and allowing the corruption and the repression of the autocratic ruling regime to continue, allowing the poverty to grow, and allowing young men to turn to jihadism when there is no work and no hope for the future?

In Syria there is no compelling image for the future, and there are no leaders to rally behind. Syria is a state in the midst of civil war. In Syria there is nothing that will pull people together, but in Iraq we have potential. There is a Shia president, a Sunni defence Minister, and a wonderful Kurdish president.