John Redwood
Main Page: John Redwood (Conservative - Wokingham)Department Debates - View all John Redwood's debates with the HM Treasury
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe clauses before us are directly related to what was originally in the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, and they were there for a very good reason. They were there because it is absolutely essential that we maintain our sovereignty, and the decisions must be taken by Parliament, and should not be taken by the House of Lords, whose Members are unelected. We are the House of Commons, and that part of the House of Commons which is elected has a Government who were elected in December 2019, almost exactly one year ago. In that general election, it was made quite clear that the decision before the British people was effectively to be decided in line with what was decided in the referendum. There are therefore two things joining together, in conjunction with one another: the referendum in 2016, followed by a whole series of enactments of Parliament. That includes the decision on the notification of withdrawal, which was accepted by the Labour party and was voted through in the House of Commons by 499 to around 120. It is not as if anybody could say that the supremacy of Parliament was not made manifest in the light of the referendum.
There was then a series of other enactments, and we eventually ended up with a confirmation of Acts of Parliament, including the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, which was passed after the general election. Section 38 of that Act made it abundantly clear that we had the right to insist—as a matter of constitutional principle and through the enactment of an Act of Parliament—that the United Kingdom was sovereign, and, furthermore, that we would be allowed to override the withdrawal agreement. That was contained in section 38(2)(b), which specifically refers to section 7A and in turn therefore directly relates, through the use of the word “notwithstanding”, to the overriding direct effect. That is a very important point—a point that is conveniently overlooked by some people, who continually assert that somehow or other the Government have been out of order, breaking international law or breaking constitutional principles. But they never come forward with any arguments; as I said in a recent speech in the House regarding the attitude of the House of Lords, they were basically strong on assertion and empty in argument.
Does my hon. Friend agree that those of us who could only vote for the withdrawal legislation because it contained clause 38 understood fully that it was a conditional agreement to the withdrawal agreement, because the EU always said that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and we wished to see the full package before deciding whether to allow it to be untrammelled?
Yes, indeed. I sometimes find that Lewis Carroll has some very useful ways of putting things. There was the famous exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty, in which Humpty Dumpty says: “Words mean what you choose them to mean. The question is who is to be master, that is all.” Words can be used in all kinds of different ways to try to justify propositions that are unsustainable.
I say with respect, but none the less very firmly, that in this particular case it is absolutely clear that when the decision has been taken by the British people—the voters—in the referendum and has then been endorsed by an Act of Parliament and a whole series of other Acts of Parliament, including section 38, it really is not down to the unelected House of Lords to resist it on the scale that they have, and to claim that they can override the House of Commons. We have just had a whole series of agreements and disagreements going backwards and forwards on the UKIM Bill alone.
As Lord Bingham made absolutely and abundantly clear in chapter 12 of his magisterial book “The Rule of Law”, it is for Parliament to make law and pass Acts of Parliament; it is not for the judges to intervene, to seek to make law and to impugn the sovereignty of Parliament. Anyone who wants to get the full flavour of it should read chapter 12 of “The Rule of Law”, because it is the most explicit and clear statement that one could possibly imagine.
Interestingly, I made some reference to the principles that are under discussion in the current negotiations. Of course, we do not know the outcome of those negotiations as we speak—as I said in the previous debate, I wish them well—but it has to be made clear that, certainly as far as I and those of my friends who agree with me are concerned, one of the most crucial questions is that of state aid, because that issue is right at the heart of the discussions and negotiations this week. I asked the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to assure the House that nothing in any treaty text or subsequent Act of Parliament will prevent the UK from having its own sovereign state aid rules, including on energy, so that we are not subjugated to EU state aid rules, nor to the European Court, given that the EU intends, as it has stated over the past week or two—in very bad faith, in my opinion—to impose and enforce its rules against us. Ultimately, of course, that would be done by a majority vote in the Council of Ministers, behind closed doors, without our even being at the table after 31 December. The fact is that we have to assert our sovereignty in the negotiations so that any treaty that emerges from them—if one does—must comply with the assertion of the sovereignty of this House, this country and this Parliament, and must at the same time apply whether in respect of direct or indirect effect.
Is it not also the case that the agreement with the European Union is muddled and contradictory? The EU has always said that it understands that the UK is going to be sovereign, so if this House simply asserts our sovereignty, as it can do, that is, in a way, our fair interpretation of the agreement.
Yes, absolutely. Sovereignty is also a question of fact. I do not want to get into the intricacies of 15th century history, but there was a chap called Henry VII who made it abundantly clear that as far as he was concerned he won the battle of Bosworth and that was it. I do not think we need to pursue that one too much, because sovereignty is quite a simple thing when it comes down to it: it is called political will and legal arguments of the kind I am addressing.
I have declared my business interests in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
I rise to support what may be an amendment that we are going to vote on or may be a probing amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), because I think there has been a deliberate misunderstanding by the EU and its friends over what Brexit is about and what we need to do in order to achieve a proper Brexit. A proper Brexit is taking back control; it is recreating the sovereignty of the people of the United Kingdom through their Parliament.
My hon. Friend has a distinguished career in this place trying to rebuild that sovereignty and watching, year after year, more and more of our powers taken away by successive treaties, by successive directives and regulations, many of them automatic ones over which the UK had little or no influence, and by court judgments which, again, we had precious little ability to shape. He is right that, as we come to legislate for our new arrangements as a sovereign country from 1 January next year, we need to make quite sure that we have back under the control of people and Parliament all those powers that we need to regulate, to govern and to take wise decisions on behalf of the United Kingdom.
I am very worried about some elements of the withdrawal agreement. I was told, as we were all told, that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed, and that that meant the future relationship as well as the withdrawal agreement. The EU decided for its own convenience to sequence things and say, “You have to sign the withdrawal agreement first and then the future relationship agreement will follow.” A bit of flesh was put on the bones of the future relationship in the so-called political declaration, which one would have thought there was a lot of moral pressure to go along with even if it was not as strictly legally binding as they hoped the withdrawal agreement would be.
I now think there has been a lot of bad faith, because, according to both sides, the central feature of the future relationship was always going to be a free trade agreement, and where is the free trade agreement? We now discover that the EU wishes to take all sorts of other powers away from us as the price for the free trade agreement, which we have already overpaid for in the withdrawal agreement and which one would have thought, in good faith, the EU would now grant. It is very much in its interests—even more than it is in our interests—given the huge imbalance in trade, and above all in the trade that would attract tariffs if we had no free trade agreement: the trade in food.
That is really what we are talking about: are there going to be tariffs on food or not? We, the United Kingdom, run a colossal £20 billion trade deficit with the EU on food. We have to impose pretty high tariffs on food from the rest of the world—that makes absolutely no sense where we could not grow any of it ourselves; it may have some benefit for some of our farmers some of the time—but we are not allowed to put any similar tariffs on EU-sourced produce where we could produce it ourselves.
The EU system is to try to use tariffs to buttress domestic production, but it has not worked for the United Kingdom; it has worked the other way. The tariffs have been taken off in order to benefit the Dutch, Spanish, French or Irish suppliers of our market with food at zero tariffs. The EU already has rather more interest in tariff withdrawal than we do, because we could have a range of tariffs that would probably achieve the aims both of cutting food prices by having a lower average tariff and of having a bit more protection on the things that we really could make and grow for ourselves here, which we are not allowed to protect against continental products at the moment.
I therefore think that the Bill could be improved by reminding the EU that we will not be pushed around and we will not suffer too much bad faith from those original negotiations or from the withdrawal agreement itself. I think it was a very imperfect agreement. It is pretty ambiguous in places; it is imprecise in places. I have never felt that anything the Government have done, or thought of doing, was in any way illegal. Lawyers could make a perfectly good case under the withdrawal agreement treaty terms themselves, and anyway, we have the protection of my hon. Friend’s section 38, which made it very clear that this Parliament’s acceptance of the withdrawal agreement was conditional. Why else would anyone have put section 38 in the withdrawal agreement Act unless they were making a point?
Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that it was the Prime Minister who, after an eight-hour meeting I had in No. 10 that day—17 October 2019—insisted that section 38 was necessary and appropriate?
If we go back to the previous Administration, just imagine where we would be when we consider the Chequers arrangements, and then imagine what it would have been like if we had not decided to vote against that dreadful withdrawal agreement in its original shape. There were provisions that needed to be rectified, and section 38 provides the mechanism that enables us to do that.
Indeed. I think my hon. Friend has confirmed that under the previous Prime Minister, when those of us who could not vote for her agreement said that we needed a sovereignty escape clause, we were told that that would not be permissible because it would not be effective implementation of the agreement; which was then reassuring to us, not liking the withdrawal agreement very much and realising that it was a provisional agreement and would be completed only were there to be a satisfactory outcome to the total range of talks. It was a totally artificial constraint that the EU invented that it had to be sequenced, when up until that point everybody had always rightly said that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed.
I would like to hear from the Minister a little more explanation on the detail of the Bill. As I understand it, the Northern Ireland protocol would apply only to goods that are passing from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and then on to the Republic of Ireland, or the reverse—goods coming from the Republic to Northern Ireland and then passing on to Great Britain. Am I right in thinking that that is a very small proportion of the total trade? In what ways will the Government ensure that it is properly defined, so that we do not catch up most goods in those more elaborate procedures? The bulk of the trade will be GB to Northern Ireland and back, or Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland and back, and it should not in any way be caught up in any of these proposals. I am not sure that we do have a de minimis way of dealing with the so-called things at risk.
It is not clear how the system will work for items at risk where we agree that they are at risk—and I hope it is a UK decision about what is a risk, not some other kind of decision with EU inspectors. It would be helpful to me and the wider community interested in this debate to know how a business would proceed if it had such a good at risk, to whom it would answer, and what decisions would be made about such a good in Excise, because it sounds a rather complicated and difficult arrangement, both for the business concerned and for those who are trying to enforce.
I am trying to tease out from the Minister, in pursuit of the interests of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone and myself on sovereignty, whether we are really in control if the trade has started off from GB and is going to Northern Ireland. What kind of external intervention can the EU or the Republic of Ireland engineer—how is that fair, and how will it be determined? I think that is what we are most worried about in this piece of legislation, and we would be more reassured if there were the override that my hon. Friend proposes. I should be grateful for some explanation.
I come to this debate with many of the same concerns as I had last week. I shall not repeat them because I think everybody is quite clear on what they were. We come to this debate with the clock ticking louder and louder, and with uncertainty ahead.
I must agree with the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) when he says that this is a complex, complicated and difficult arrangement. Yes it is, and it is absolutely baffling why we are still not certain what will happen, with such a close deadline looming. It is impossible for businesses to know what to plan for and how they will manage this, because so much is still uncertain. The Institute for Government’s Jess Sargeant went through some of the outstanding issues in the Northern Ireland protocol still to be agreed, and these are not small things but quite significant things in many cases. There is still great uncertainty about the grace period that was talked about last week, what will happen at the end of it, and what the Government are going to do between then and now, whenever this finishes. What work will they be doing in the meantime? It does feel, quite often, that this Government put things off and leave things, and then say, “Oh gosh, suddenly I have to do that at the last minute.” They do that quite regularly.
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention. I have great sympathy with his points. The difficulty is that when we are in an international agreement, there is a judgment as to whether they are “acting in bad faith” or “prattling on”, and they are subjective judgments he makes. All international trade agreements need an independent body to decide who is breaching the agreement. If Parliament is simply sovereign and is able to say, “In our judgment, you are breaking the agreement”, all trade agreements would fall apart. We saw that in the case of the Mexican Government and the breaching of the terms of GATT, where that judgment was made unilaterally. The independent body, which was the arbitration council of the North American free trade agreement, settled the dispute. That is an international body; it is not subject to one national jurisdiction or the other. There has to be someone who adjudicates; we cannot simply have national sovereignty making a judgment on these points. That is why we have these investor-state dispute settlement bodies.
All too often in international trade agreements it does come down to power and sovereignty. President Trump has regularly used national security as a good reason to impose tariffs and override World Trade Organisation rules. The EU, for years, ignored state aid rules to promote Airbus. I can perfectly understand what it was trying to do. It took a long time to catch up with it and in practice the damage, from the WTO point of view, was done.
Therein lies the difficulty, does it not? As soon as a nation, however powerful, is allowed to make a subjective judgment, it leads to international chaos. We can have international agreements that people sign and adhere to, with independent resolution. My point is that as soon as we have done that, we have handed over the settlement of the issues and disputes to another body, and we are, in effect sharing some of our sovereignty. We do not have total sovereignty at that point. We have sovereignty to sign the agreement and to exit the agreement, but I cannot see how using sovereignty to override an agreement works. I think it would result in chaos.
Does the hon. Gentleman not understand that, from 1 January, the EU and the UK are both full members of the World Trade Organisation, which does not allow its members to charge to trade, controls what tariffs can be levied and says to each of its members that they have to offer most favoured nation status to any other member of the WTO? That is how we do our trade with the whole of the rest of the world, which is bigger than our trade with the EU. Why can we not do that for everything?
Our biggest and nearest customer is the EU. It is a critical customer and supplier to so many businesses in the UK, particularly in our manufacturing sector.
Let me briefly turn to the Northern Ireland protocol. We were told that there would be no checks, but as of last week, we have seen the need to implement new checks and controls for goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland and, to a lesser extent, from Northern Ireland to Great Britain. The Government have said rather vaguely that a significant majority of internal UK trade will be tariff-free. I would be interested to know what assessment the Government have made of the precise percentage of GB-Northern Ireland trade that will be and the volume and value that will be subject to tariffs.
That is why these amendments are important. They are aimed at injecting urgency, with just 16 days until the transition period ends. Businesses want clarity and certainty, and they need it urgently. The intention of new clause 3 and amendments 1 and 2 is simply to demand that the Government make clear when they will propose the secondary legislation flowing from the Bill, to help those businesses. The Food and Drink Federation has said that the guidance is being published too late, and 43% of its members that supply Northern Ireland have said that they will not be able to do so in the first three months of next year. Our amendments are very similar to those proposed and, sadly, voted down in Committee. They are vital to assist our businesses and are business-friendly, as the Opposition are.
I cite the disruption that we are in danger of allowing. We have seen what happened with Honda—one of the most efficient companies on the planet. That should be the canary in the mine. If Honda is not able to get parts from its supply chain here to the UK, what hope is there for small and medium-sized businesses across the UK? Whether they are a clothes retailer or a car manufacturer, they just want clarity and certainty. They want an uninterrupted supply of goods into the first quarter of next year. Given the damage already done by the pandemic, we cannot afford further economic disruption. The Government need to move swiftly. That is why new clause 3 and amendments 1 and 2 are so important, and that is why I am supporting them.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
We have had some good debates in the course of the Bill. I thank right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions, but there are two in particular whom I would like to thank. First, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) has truly been the workhorse of the shadow Front Bench throughout the Bill. For a shadow Economic Secretary, as he is supposedly designated—he should of course be much higher—he has done a wonderful job, and I salute him for it. Secondly, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), who is sadly no longer in his place. I think he should be referred to as the ancient mariner of Brexit. As you may recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, Coleridge says:
“It is an ancient Mariner,
And he stoppeth one of three.
‘By thy long grey beard and glittering eye,
Now wherefore stopp’st thou me?”
Although my hon. Friend does not, tragically, present us with a long grey beard, he has something of a glittering eye where matters of Brexit are concerned. We can only salute the energy and indefatigability with which he has attacked the topic over many years, while perhaps devoutly hoping that this may be the moment at which, at the end of this year, a hiatus or pause may be reached.
In just over two weeks’ time, the transition period will end. The UK and its tax system must be ready to support the smooth continuation of business across this country. In that regard, the Bill is a cornerstone of those preparations. In addition, it will play an important part in helping to implement the Northern Ireland protocol and to safeguard the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. It introduces a framework for charges on goods arriving in Northern Ireland and enables the Government to put in place decisions made by the Joint Committee for goods deemed to be at risk of moving into the EU. It also includes mechanisms to ensure that, in so far as is possible, VAT will be accounted for in the same way as it is today in Northern Ireland.
Let me once again assure the House that HMRC will remain the tax authority for the whole of the UK, and let me remind hon. and right hon. Members that businesses will continue to submit only one UK VAT return to account for VAT on all supplies of goods and services. The Bill also amends current legislation for excise duty to be charged when excise goods are removed to Northern Ireland from Great Britain, as required by the protocol. However, that does not mean additional costs for Northern Ireland businesses and consumers, because the Government will be introducing a mechanism to offset any excise duty already paid on those goods in Great Britain.
The Bill introduces a small increase in the rate of duty on aviation gasoline, which will apply across the UK to ensure consistency between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Finally, the Bill includes a small number of other taxation measures, including measures to ensure the Government retain their ability to prevent insurance premium tax evasion.
I think the Minister needs to be a little more forthcoming. What is the EU’s enforcement mechanism if it thinks UK authorities have not fulfilled the remit? What percentage of trade are we expecting to be caught up in this double jurisdiction?
As I have already said to my right hon. Friend, without venturing a percentage, the test for at-risk goods is those where there is a “genuine and substantial risk”, and therefore those are expected to be a smaller proportion of goods, but trade of course is a flexible and ever-changing thing, so whatever numbers there are may change over time.
My right hon. Friend also asked a question about the EU. I am not going to speculate on what the EU does, but I can assure him that there will be no EU customs, embassy or the like and no joint control over customs in Northern Ireland. HMRC will remain the tax authority for Northern Ireland, as it is for the whole of the UK.
The Bill also includes new powers that will enable HMRC to raise tax charges under the controlled foreign companies legislation for the period 2013 to 2018. Lastly, to help level the playing field for UK businesses, the Bill also moves VAT collection on certain imported goods away from the border and removes VAT relief on low-value consignments to clamp down on VAT abuse and to protect our high streets.
The Bill gives businesses throughout the UK certainty about the arrangements that will apply from 1 January of next year. Above all, it helps the Government to safeguard what we all prize and desire, or should all prize and desire: the unity and integrity of the United Kingdom. I commend the Bill to the House.
I have declared my business interests in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
The Bill is a great missed opportunity. It should have been the Bill in which we started to cut and reorganise the taxes, celebrating our new freedoms as we leave the European Union. There is so much good we could do by remodelling and reducing the incidence of VAT, for example, or by having excise duties and tariffs that make sense for British business and for British importers, because we need to balance the two. Instead, it is a rather technical Bill.
I think it is a pity that this House has not been given a detailed account of what the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has agreed so far, and a detailed account of what still remains to be agreed, because I believe that there were outstanding issues. On behalf of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, we need to know the extent of this possible dual jurisdiction and how it actually works.
The Minister has kindly assured me on more than one occasion that the VAT regime in Northern Ireland will be the UK VAT regime and will be enforced by normal UK enforcement. That is very good, but cannot be the whole story, because we know that there is this overlapping jurisdiction for certain types of goods. We are still not privy to how big an issue that is. I presume it is a small proportion of trade, but we have not been given any indication of that, and we have not been told—perhaps the Joint Committee has not yet agreed it, or does not want to share it with us yet—exactly how that might work. It is a pity that we do not have more of that detail.
I am also concerned that we should not get drawn into the state aid issue, which is clearly part of the wider discussion between our Ministers and negotiators, and those in the European Union. We know that the European Union takes a very wide definition of state aids. State aids definitely include all taxation, which is the subject of this piece of legislation, and grants, subsidies, the competition framework and general industrial policy. It is very wide ranging, and there is no way we can say we have Brexit if the EU will have powers over our state aid policies, because that would be tentacles stretching into this Bill and the powers of the Treasury, Customs and Excise, and the Business Department and its competition and industrial policies, as well as into energy and practically every other major area one can imagine. I therefore hope my right hon. Friends and the UK negotiators are firm on that in their discussions.
We must have control of taxation and state aids as a fundamental part of our Brexit departure. We would have taken more confidence from the Government if they had used this Bill to show just how much better a UK-based taxation policy could be. We need a taxation policy that promotes more fishing and farming at home, promotes more industry and manufacturing at home, and promotes that green revolution they want by stripping the VAT off the green products that the EU has imposed on them—a policy that allows small businesses to flourish and does not overburden them with compliance and red tape. That is what we wanted from Brexit, and the sooner Ministers bring it forward, the better.