Wales Bill

Debate between John Penrose and Hywel Williams

Tuesday 5th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[John Penrose]

I am not saying what the hon. Gentleman fears I am saying. I can reassure him on that. The power to move things by a month already exists. It just happens to be vested in the Secretary of State. All we are seeking to do here, as part of the St David’s day agreement and following the principles set out in it, is to devolve that power from the Secretary of State to Welsh Ministers. We are not seeking to change the power in one direction or another; we are just making sure that it is being exercised more locally in Cardiff rather in than Westminster. It continues to be legally the case that the Assembly elections and the UK parliamentary elections cannot happen on the same day, so it would only be a question of moving some of these elections around in that case—although there might be other reasons why one might want to—if at some point, many decades hence, an accident of the diary meant that the two happened to coincide. In order to comply with the constraint, they cannot happen on the same day and one would have to move, whereupon this power would apply.

I was talking about the online voter registration system and the way that that needs to be adjusted, if it is to be adjusted, by mutual consent. As I said, the Assembly is free to decide on the franchise and the registration process for Assembly elections, but as a practical matter, where the Welsh Government want changes to the Great Britain-wide Digital Service, they will need the approval of UK Ministers to do so. That is because the Digital Service is a series of interconnecting digital applications, including online voter registration, for people living in England, Wales and Scotland, as well as British citizens resident overseas. We all need to ensure that any changes to the franchise or registration process for Welsh Assembly and local government elections in Wales do not adversely impact on voters in other parts of the UK or abroad.

With these considerations in mind, the clause allows Welsh Ministers to make regulations concerning the Digital Service in relation to Assembly and local government elections in Wales with the agreement of a Minister of the Crown.

[Hywel Williams]

I apologise to the Committee for my voice today. My daughter Enlli came back from nursery the other day with a slight tickle, and that has led to world war three breaking out in my larynx, unfortunately.

My hon. Friends and I support the motion that clauses 5, 6 and 7 stand part of the Bill, preferably along with our amendments 28 to 31 to clause 6. These are probing amendments and I would be interested in hearing the Minister’s response.

As the Assembly has grown in competence, it is reasonable that the power over the timing of its own elections, as well as powers over the conduct of those elections and the registration of electors, should be devolved. Any ambitious democratic body would surely seek such powers. The amendments in this group, as Members on both sides of the Committee will be aware, were originally drafted and published by the office of the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly. In a letter dated 30 June, the Presiding Officer set out that the aim of this set of amendments is to

“deliver a constitutional settlement that is workable, clear and provides a firm foundation for the Assembly’s future.”

She noted in the same letter that these amendments were informed by evidence given during pre-legislative scrutiny of the previous draft Wales Bill to the then Assembly’s Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, and were equally informed by the Assembly’s experience of working under the current settlement.

Amendments 28 to 31 would transfer the power to vary the date of an ordinary general election, as well as the power to fix the date of extraordinary Assembly elections, from the Secretary of State directly to the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly, rather than to Welsh Ministers. The amendments are underpinned by the principle that the Assembly should have powers over its own internal affairs.

It is worth pointing out, as the context, that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 set a precedent for moving decision making over the administration of elections away from the Government. Our amendments in this group, though probing, have this same underlying principle at their root—that is, that powers over determining the date of Assembly elections should be moved away from the Government. To our mind, this power should not be conferred on the Executive, so as to remove the possibility of any accusations of political interference. Were this change to be made by our amendments, it would add to the competence and responsibility of the legislature, which should surely be welcomed by all parties. It would also increase public confidence in the independent nature of election management in Wales.

As drafted, the Bill transfers the power to vary the date of an ordinary Assembly general election from the Secretary of State to Welsh Ministers. This is in contrast to the system operated in Scotland, whereby this power is bestowed on the Presiding Officer. Amendment 28 would put the Welsh Assembly’s arrangements on the same footing. Amendment 29 relates to conferring powers over varying the date of an ordinary general election. Although the Bill devolves powers over electoral arrangements, it does so in an unnecessarily impractical way.

[John Penrose]

Can the hon. Gentleman expand on his thinking about why those changes would be helpful? There are different approaches, as he will appreciate. Does he believe that there is anything unclear about the criteria that must be satisfied under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act as to whether a majority has been achieved in an Assembly or Parliament, or does he have other concerns about potential political game playing? Does he believe that the measure might put the Presiding Officer in a politically contentious position?

[Hywel Williams]

I have considered that, and it is my opinion and that of the Presiding Officer that it would not put her in that difficult position. These amendments are hers, after consideration. The point about parity and similarity with Scotland is persuasive, to our minds.

[Hywel Williams]

I take my hon. Friend’s point entirely. The four Assembly elections held so far have not produced a majority Government, so the consent of the Assembly collectively would be required in that situation. I am not casting any aspersions on the motives of Governments in Cardiff, London or anywhere else, but the amendment would remove any suspicion of political advantage being sought.

By adding a strict seven-day timeframe, during which period the Assembly must meet and elect a Presiding Officer, the Bill once again puts Wales on an unequal footing with Scotland. The Scottish Parliament is allowed 14 days to carry out this function. Given the history of the outcomes of elections to our Assembly, as I said a moment ago, and the obvious consequence that time has been required for the parties to discuss all manner of arrangements, seven days for this particular exercise seems unreasonable. That is why amendment 29 extends this period to 14 days for the Welsh Assembly.

Amendment 30 amends the Government of Wales Act 2006 so as to confer powers over varying the date of an ordinary general election to the Presiding Officer, as opposed to transferring this power directly to Welsh Ministers under the Bill as currently drafted. Finally, amendment 31 amends the 2006 Act so as to ensure that powers over proposing the date of an extraordinary general election are given to the Presiding Officer. The amendment once again extends the timeframe during which the Assembly is required to meet following an election to 14 days, thus establishing parity with Scotland.

These amendments are meant to probe and promote discussion. We do not intend to press them to a vote.

[John Penrose]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for laying out his case so clearly and so helpfully. He is right to point out that the provisions in the Bill seek to mimic the existing provisions to which his four amendments relate and to devolve the existing arrangements from the Secretary of State down to Welsh Ministers. However, he is also right to point out that this is not quite the same thing as has already happened in the parallel situation in Scotland, where the powers were devolved not to Scottish Ministers but to the Presiding Officer. We therefore already have in British constitutional arrangements two parallel but subtly different approaches.

The reason I asked my question of the hon. Gentleman is that there are competing views on this issue. I am not sure that either is necessarily automatically better or worse than the other, but there are different strengths and weaknesses, and different pros and cons, to both. Some people are concerned that devolving these powers to the Presiding Officer could put them in a politically contentious position. I do not think that that is the view of the Scottish Presiding Officer, the Welsh Presiding Officer or many politicians in the Welsh Assembly, but some people would certainly cleave to it—perhaps here, for example.

Equally, the question is whether the criteria that have to be satisfied for a fixed-term Parliament to be altered in length and for an early, extraordinary election to be called, are clear. For example, for this Parliament, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act says that we either have to have a Government who cannot command a majority and who, over two weeks, have failed to find one, or we have a two-thirds majority. Those are fairly clear criteria, so there is relatively little opportunity for political game-playing, either by Ministers or a Presiding Officer.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Penrose]

If the hon. Gentleman is not already in his party’s Whips Office, he probably should be, because that is a proper Whips Office wheeze. Were such a thing legally possible—I defer to others to decide whether it would be—I do not think it would pass the test of democratic credibility. Any Government who sought to precipitate their own downfall through that kind of mechanism—voting against themselves and saying they were not competent—would, as a practical matter, probably be judged quite harshly by voters in the polls. However, I appreciate that we are talking about theoretical circumstances, and we will have to leave that issue to the future to decide.

The point I was trying to make is that there are legitimate arguments on both sides, and both systems—one here, and one in Scotland—already persist quite happily side by side in British constitutional arrangements, and the question is now being raised in relation to the Welsh Assembly. I do not want to say that one system is inherently legitimate or illegitimate, or that one is necessarily better or worse than the other. It has to be a question of what is acceptable to local decision makers—in this case, Assembly Members and their officials in the Welsh Assembly.

We are therefore sympathetic to taking this issue away and thinking about it carefully. I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising it, and he makes a thought-provoking case. If he agrees, I would be happy to take his amendments away—I think he indicated they were probing amendments—to see whether we can take this issue forward or at least develop his ideas and thinking a little further.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 6 and 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Super-majority requirement for certain legislation

[Hywel Williams]

I beg to move amendment 32, page 10, line 3, leave out subsections (5) and (6).

The amendment removes the requirements on the face of the Bill for the National Assembly for Wales’ Standing Orders to include requirements for the publication of a statement in Welsh and English.

Short Money

Debate between John Penrose and Hywel Williams

Tuesday 23rd February 2016 Commons Chamber

[John Penrose]

I could not agree more. People outside this place—outside the Westminster bubble—who are looking at our discussions today will not understand why politicians feel that they should treat themselves separately and as a special case. Those people will look at what has happened to their budgets over the last five or six years and say, “What is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the political gander as well.”

[Hywel Williams (Arfon) (PC)]

Setting aside for a moment the outrageous detail of the request for views, will the Minister tell the House what effect a cut in Short money would have on scrutiny and on the comfort, or discomfort, the Executive feel as they go about their business?