(5 years, 9 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
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I am grateful for that question about the regional and income breakdown of the distribution of child trust funds. Such information is published by HMRC and discriminates by region and county and by whether additional contributions were made; no income distribution data is collected by HMRC. I am happy to look into the matter further; if I can give the hon. Gentleman any more information, I will write to him.
Looking to the future, approximately 6 million child trust funds have not yet been transferred to junior ISAs. The first of those accounts will mature next September, and a further 55,000 will mature every month thereafter until 2029. What young people choose to do with their money is ultimately a matter for them, but we want them to engage in the process so that they can make the best decision for their individual circumstances.
As I have explained to the Minister, the problem is that people cannot use the Government website to access their accounts if they do not have a payslip, a P60 or a passport. Will the Minister address that point? Hundreds of thousands of young people will be in that situation.
The key question is how an individual child knows what they have. The hon. Lady’s allegation is that this money is lost, but it is not lost; it is just that the individuals have not come to the point at which they can engage with it, which will happen at age 16 when they get a letter with their national insurance number. At 16, they are allowed to make decisions about their investment choices for that fund, and at 18 they can access it. They get the letter, along with their national insurance information, at 16, the age when they can start making individual decisions about that money. I think it has been suggested that the Share Foundation should interrogate data from the Department for Work and Pensions, cross-reference it with HMRC’s, and somehow write to these individuals—
The key point is that children have access to this money when they are 18, but can influence decisions about it from the age of 16, when they are paying tax and have a national insurance number. They will gain that access mechanism when they secure their national insurance number. The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland made a point about how this issue should be depicted on the form when 16-year-olds get their NI number, but that number provides the key to unlock awareness of, and access to, the fund that has been invested for them.
I do not like to denigrate my former profession, but I do not think the Minister has been very well briefed. According to the Share Foundation, the lost accounts of the most wealthy number 54,000, the middle income 560,000, and the poorest 444,000. Those are not families in which the child is already 16 to 18; it includes all families. It means that the addressee has gone away. We do not know whether the address we have got is the right address for that group of people.
The point I am making is that all individuals, no matter what their background is, will gain access to the funds at the point when they can gain their national insurance number, by reference to the letter that has been provided. I have had extensive conversations with my officials, and I note the hon. Lady’s reference to bureaucrats. She worked for over 20 years at the Treasury—I have the highest regard for it and the accuracy of the material it has given me.
No funds or accounts have been lost. All child trust funds have been managed by child trust fund providers—either by the original provider with which the account was set up, or by a subsequent provider to which the funds have been transferred. There are 69 providers currently managing child trust funds, and the Share Foundation’s analysis appears to be based on accounts held with just one provider: the Share Centre, which represents only 1.5% of the number of accounts. The hon. Lady might want to contradict that by extrapolating the data to all of them, but the Government are working together with the industry to encourage child trust fund holders to re-engage with their accounts.
As I said, we have developed an online tracing mechanism and recently amended the national insurance notification letter to 16-year-olds to include a reference to child trust funds. That happened in January in order to take into account the points raised. Any account holders who are unable to retrieve their account details online are encouraged to contact HMRC directly.
I have just explained to the Minister that to get through to the website, people must have other documents that—by definition—16-year-olds do not and cannot have. The system is not working. The Minister needs to rethink how the website works!
On behalf of the Under-Secretary of State for Education, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), who is the Minister responsible for this area and is currently before a Select Committee, I would be very happy to offer a meeting with hon. Members to discuss this matter further. It is his responsibility, and I am sure he would be very happy to attend.
We have made efforts to provide young people with savings to draw on as they reach adulthood, and we hope this encourages further saving at every stage of life. The points made by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland on access have been comprehensively addressed by the Government’s sending a letter to 16-year-olds.
Will the Minister take on board my suggestion of writing to the recipient of the child benefit when the person turns 18? The Government writes to every mother across the entire nation, and that would be an opportunity to catch them in the net.
The key point here is: when does somebody have access to make investment decisions as a young person? It is when they turn 16, and then they can access it when they are 18. Trying to overlap the letter with the mother when actually it is about the beneficiary, who is the child, is not the route to go down.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI can tell my right hon. Friend that I am in conversation with the Financial Conduct Authority about its move to a relative rather than an absolute test. I note that there are a range of views out there about how this problem can be dealt with. The FCA has said that it will come back later this spring with its response, and I am happy to meet my right hon. Friend to discuss her concerns further.
This morning, the Financial Times entitled its editorial, “UK territories need to embrace transparency”, prompted by the Government’s decision to pull a vote they knew they were going to lose last night. Does the Chancellor of the Exchequer not feel that he is completely out of kilter with the spirit of the modern age?
Some amendments were tabled on Thursday, and given the constitutional implications of those amendments, I think it is right that the Government work across Departments—with the Ministry of Justice and the Foreign Office—and have dialogue with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories to resolve the matter as the amendments suggested.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThat is certainly not the way forward. I can assure my right hon. Friend that we are doing everything we can to plan for all eventualities. That is why I am taking through a large number of statutory instruments to take account of all possibilities next year, but we are working on, and focused on, achieving a good deal.
There is no estimate in the Red Book for the benefits to tax revenues of the measures that we took in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. Is that because Ministers are holding that money in their back pocket in case of a no deal?
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Government’s own statistics show that leaving with no deal would put unemployment in the north-east up to 20%. What is their calculation of the effect on unemployment in the north-east of leaving the customs union?
There are a range of assumptions around the implications of different scenarios. The Government seek to ensure that we minimise the downsides and maximise the upsides in the agreement that we come to. I recognise that significant industries in the north-east rely on certainty in that relationship, and that is why it is very important that we get it right.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberEnding tax secrecy in the overseas territories will bring in £10 billion a year. Will the Chancellor organise a lunch for my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) and the entire Labour Whips Office, who were instrumental in securing this change?
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am happy to be corrected, and I apologise to the hon. Lady.
Amendment 29 relates to the procedure by which individuals or entities apply for licences and exceptions to be included in the regulations. Retaining the application procedures in guidance will give the Government the flexibility to update them as needed and to respond to stakeholder feedback.
The Government have tabled new clause 4 because we recognise the concern raised by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the repeal of part 1 of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 would remove the independent reviewer’s oversight of domestic counter-terrorism asset freezes. Government new clauses 15 to 17 and amendments 23 to 26 will provide the UK Government with the powers necessary to enforce UK sanctions regulations against ships in international and foreign waters. These powers will ensure adherence to the standards set out in relevant UN Security Council resolutions and provide protection against the transportation of dangerous and harmful goods in international waters. These provisions contain important safeguards on the use of these powers, including a requirement to have reasonable grounds to suspect that sanctions are being flouted before enforcement action can be taken as well as flag state and foreign state consent where relevant.
New clause 20, tabled by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central—I hope I have got that one right—would oblige the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament each year on the exercise of the powers in the Bill. We have a range of reporting requirements in the Bill already, including an annual report on the sanctions regulations in force, and further reports when sanctions are imposed or amended. In addition, new clause 3 sets out reporting requirements for regulations made under the human rights purpose. We consider it unnecessary, therefore, to add an additional report on top of these, given that the issues that would be addressed in the report would be mirrored by those already required in the Bill.
Amendments 3 to 6, also tabled by the hon. Lady, would require that every sanctions designation be comprehensively re-examined annually. We agree that sanctions should only be in place for as long as there are good reasons for them to be so, and the Bill contains a range of procedures to ensure that all our sanctions are subject to regular scrutiny and review. We believe that three-year comprehensive reviews, combined with a robust package of procedural safeguards in the Bill, will ensure that these standards are at least maintained, so we would ask that she consider not pressing her amendments.
New clause 10, tabled by the hon. Members for Bishop Auckland and for Oxford East, would require statutory instruments that are to be considered under the draft affirmative procedure to receive a positive recommendation from a House of Commons Committee before being laid. All secondary legislation to which it would apply requires affirmative votes before coming into force, and we believe that that negates the need for additional parliamentary scrutiny. Sanctions are a manifestation of the UK’s foreign policy. They are not stand-alone or independent initiatives. Indeed, a number of existing parliamentary Committees have considered, or are planning to consider, sanctions issues, including the House of Lords EU Committee and the House of Commons Treasury Committee. It is not clear why further layers of scrutiny are necessary or desirable.
Amendment 22 would remove the requirement for Ministers to publish a written statement of explanation if they did not comply with a reporting provision. I should make it clear that this provision does not in any way displace the statutory duty to report; Ministers who fail to comply with that duty must face the consequences, regardless of whether an explanation is given.
Amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, would mean that sanctions regulations could be created only when that was deemed “necessary” for the purposes of the Bill, rather than when it was deemed “appropriate”. For many years the use of sanctions has been an essential part of international diplomacy, to respond to threats such as terrorism or to change unacceptable or threatening behaviour. It is important for the Government of the day to have the flexibility to impose sanctions or not to do so, after a thorough review of the prevailing political situation. Changing “appropriate” to “necessary” would mean that the Government could consider sanctions only as the last resort.
Amendment 9 would require the legislative consent of the devolved Administrations for any sanctions regulation made under section 1, if that regulation included a consequential repeal of, revocation of, or amendment to any law created by those Administrations. The power to create sanctions regulations falls under matters that are reserved to Westminster, and that includes modifications consequential on those regulations. Under the UK’s constitutional settlement, foreign policy is a reserved matter. The Bill gives the Government the power to impose sanctions as a foreign policy and national security tool.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury and to the Member for Nottingham North for their further observations. I understand the sentiments of frustration and impatience with the Government on this matter. I hope I have spelled out in some detail—in the areas of land registration; alignment around the different parts of the United Kingdom; and making sure that the penalties are appropriate and that the enforcement measures are set to meet the challenge—that the Government have bold ambitions to get this right and to be a world leader in this area. I acknowledge that this has taken rather longer than it would have done in ideal circumstances, but I can confirm and reiterate to my right hon. Friend that the Government are fully committed to delivering this as soon as possible, and that there is a commitment across multiple Departments and the ministerial team to ensure that this reflects the bold aspirations that we have as a nation. I hope that that would be sufficient for us to move on.
Ministers have heard that this is an issue of significant concern, and interest in making speedy progress has been expressed on both sides. We will return to this on Report and, that being the case, I do not intend to press it to a vote. I beg to move that the clause be withdrawn.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 6
Alignment of sanctions
(1) It shall be a negotiating objective of Her Majesty’s Government in negotiations on the matters specified in subsection (2) to continue the United Kingdom’s participation in the Political and Security Committee of the European Union in order to align sanctions policy with the European Union.
(2) Those matters are—
(a) the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, and
(b) a permanent agreement with the European Union for a period subsequent to the transitional period after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union.
(3) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to lay a report before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with either subsection (4) or subsection (5).
(4) A report under this subsection shall be to the effect that the negotiating objective specified in subsection (1) has been achieved.
(5) A report under this subsection shall be to the effect that the negotiating objective specified in subsection (1) has not been achieved.
(6) This Act shall not come into force until a report under either subsection (4) or (5) has been approved via resolution of the House of Commons and considered by the House of Lords.—(Helen Goodman.)
This new clause would require the UK Government to seek continued participation in the Political and Security Committee so as to allow alignment on international sanctions.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for setting out her new clause, which would prohibit TCSPs that do not conduct business in the UK from incorporating UK companies, unless they are overseen by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor. As hon. Members will know, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 specifically provide for TCSPs conducting business in the UK to be subject to a fitness and propriety test and to register with either Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or the Financial Conduct Authority. In borderline cases where it is unclear whether a TCSP is conducting business in the UK—in which case it would be supervised by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor—HMRC would consider on a case-by-case basis whether registration for supervision is necessary. This acts as an anti-evasion mechanism preventing TCSPs from artificially claiming that they are outside the scope of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.
The hon. Member for Oxford East asked earlier where this was based. The Government recently established the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, known as OPBAS, within the Financial Conduct Authority. It works to secure consistently high standards of AML supervision of professional bodies, including TCSPs. These reforms follow the identification of risks associated with TCSPs in the Government’s 2016 action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. This found that service sectors such as TCSPs were a significant money-laundering threat.
Although it is for anti-money laundering supervisors to determine their areas of focus, they are required to have regard for the UK’s national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing when assessing risks in their own sector. The risk assessment that the Government published in October last year concludes:
“The highest risk TCSPs are assessed to be UK TCSPs which offer a wide range of services (including nominee directors, registered office services, and banking facilities)”.
Additionally, individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess the international and domestic risks of money laundering and terrorist financing to which their sectors are subject.
I am surprised by what the Minister is saying. He obviously did not listen to the BBC “Analysis” programme that was broadcast about three weeks ago on the role of overseas TCSPs. We think it is great when people build real-life factories as a jumping-off point into the single market, but it is evident that TCSPs and banks located in the Baltic states, which do not have such good anti-money laundering regulatory regimes, attract money and are used as a jumping-off point to move that money into the European system. Does the Minister really think that the anti-money laundering regimes throughout the European Union are as effective the one in the UK?
I cannot comment on the specific cases that the hon. Lady mentions, because I have not seen or studied them. I imagine that there is a degree of variability in the effectiveness of regimes, but I am trying to set out the Government’s rationale for what we have in place. I do not suggest that it is perfect, but some of the developments have occurred in response to shortcomings that have been identified.
The individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess international and domestic risks, including the money laundering and terrorism risk, which ensures that the most intensive supervision is applied where the highest risks of money laundering exist. The establishment of OPBAS will assist with the consistent identification of such risks across the TCSP sector. Our national risk assessment makes it clear that the Government are aware of the money laundering risks connected with TCSPs, and further reform in the area should take account of the conclusions of the ongoing FATF review. I assure Opposition Members that the regime is a searching and exacting one. I know from ministerial meetings concerning preparations for it that the evaluation will be exacting. We expect the observations to be meaningful, and we will need to respond carefully to them. However, until we receive the outcome of that review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime and of the experience of OPBAS as its role develops, it would not be appropriate to adopt the amendment.
Hon. Members should be mindful of the fact that anti-money laundering supervision around the world follows a territorial model. Simply requiring non-UK TCSPs to have a UK supervisor when they set up UK companies will not address the challenges of extra-territorial supervision. Effective anti-money laundering supervision depends on measures that include supervisory on-site visits and close engagement with higher-risk firms. Requiring a UK supervisor to do that in relation to a non-UK firm will not, in and of itself, address the issue that hon. Members have identified.
As was noted in the other place, the most effective means of combating international money laundering is cross-border co-operation to drive up the standards of overseas supervision and enforcement. For those reasons, we have imposed a duty on each UK anti-money laundering supervisor to take such steps as they consider appropriate to co-operate with overseas authorities. That is the agenda we pursue through the global FATF process. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury and to the Member for Nottingham North for their further observations. I understand the sentiments of frustration and impatience with the Government on this matter. I hope I have spelled out in some detail—in the areas of land registration; alignment around the different parts of the United Kingdom; and making sure that the penalties are appropriate and that the enforcement measures are set to meet the challenge—that the Government have bold ambitions to get this right and to be a world leader in this area. I acknowledge that this has taken rather longer than it would have done in ideal circumstances, but I can confirm and reiterate to my right hon. Friend that the Government are fully committed to delivering this as soon as possible, and that there is a commitment across multiple Departments and the ministerial team to ensure that this reflects the bold aspirations that we have as a nation. I hope that that would be sufficient for us to move on.
Ministers have heard that this is an issue of significant concern, and interest in making speedy progress has been expressed on both sides. We will return to this on Report and, that being the case, I do not intend to press it to a vote. I beg to move that the clause be withdrawn.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 6
Alignment of sanctions
(1) It shall be a negotiating objective of Her Majesty’s Government in negotiations on the matters specified in subsection (2) to continue the United Kingdom’s participation in the Political and Security Committee of the European Union in order to align sanctions policy with the European Union.
(2) Those matters are—
(a) the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, and
(b) a permanent agreement with the European Union for a period subsequent to the transitional period after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union.
(3) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to lay a report before both Houses of Parliament in accordance with either subsection (4) or subsection (5).
(4) A report under this subsection shall be to the effect that the negotiating objective specified in subsection (1) has been achieved.
(5) A report under this subsection shall be to the effect that the negotiating objective specified in subsection (1) has not been achieved.
(6) This Act shall not come into force until a report under either subsection (4) or (5) has been approved via resolution of the House of Commons and considered by the House of Lords.—(Helen Goodman.)
This new clause would require the UK Government to seek continued participation in the Political and Security Committee so as to allow alignment on international sanctions.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for setting out her new clause, which would prohibit TCSPs that do not conduct business in the UK from incorporating UK companies, unless they are overseen by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor. As hon. Members will know, the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 specifically provide for TCSPs conducting business in the UK to be subject to a fitness and propriety test and to register with either Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or the Financial Conduct Authority. In borderline cases where it is unclear whether a TCSP is conducting business in the UK—in which case it would be supervised by a UK anti-money laundering supervisor—HMRC would consider on a case-by-case basis whether registration for supervision is necessary. This acts as an anti-evasion mechanism preventing TCSPs from artificially claiming that they are outside the scope of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.
The hon. Member for Oxford East asked earlier where this was based. The Government recently established the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, known as OPBAS, within the Financial Conduct Authority. It works to secure consistently high standards of AML supervision of professional bodies, including TCSPs. These reforms follow the identification of risks associated with TCSPs in the Government’s 2016 action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. This found that service sectors such as TCSPs were a significant money-laundering threat.
Although it is for anti-money laundering supervisors to determine their areas of focus, they are required to have regard for the UK’s national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing when assessing risks in their own sector. The risk assessment that the Government published in October last year concludes:
“The highest risk TCSPs are assessed to be UK TCSPs which offer a wide range of services (including nominee directors, registered office services, and banking facilities)”.
Additionally, individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess the international and domestic risks of money laundering and terrorist financing to which their sectors are subject.
I am surprised by what the Minister is saying. He obviously did not listen to the BBC “Analysis” programme that was broadcast about three weeks ago on the role of overseas TCSPs. We think it is great when people build real-life factories as a jumping-off point into the single market, but it is evident that TCSPs and banks located in the Baltic states, which do not have such good anti-money laundering regulatory regimes, attract money and are used as a jumping-off point to move that money into the European system. Does the Minister really think that the anti-money laundering regimes throughout the European Union are as effective the one in the UK?
I cannot comment on the specific cases that the hon. Lady mentions, because I have not seen or studied them. I imagine that there is a degree of variability in the effectiveness of regimes, but I am trying to set out the Government’s rationale for what we have in place. I do not suggest that it is perfect, but some of the developments have occurred in response to shortcomings that have been identified.
The individual anti-money laundering supervisors are under a duty to identify and assess international and domestic risks, including the money laundering and terrorism risk, which ensures that the most intensive supervision is applied where the highest risks of money laundering exist. The establishment of OPBAS will assist with the consistent identification of such risks across the TCSP sector. Our national risk assessment makes it clear that the Government are aware of the money laundering risks connected with TCSPs, and further reform in the area should take account of the conclusions of the ongoing FATF review. I assure Opposition Members that the regime is a searching and exacting one. I know from ministerial meetings concerning preparations for it that the evaluation will be exacting. We expect the observations to be meaningful, and we will need to respond carefully to them. However, until we receive the outcome of that review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime and of the experience of OPBAS as its role develops, it would not be appropriate to adopt the amendment.
Hon. Members should be mindful of the fact that anti-money laundering supervision around the world follows a territorial model. Simply requiring non-UK TCSPs to have a UK supervisor when they set up UK companies will not address the challenges of extra-territorial supervision. Effective anti-money laundering supervision depends on measures that include supervisory on-site visits and close engagement with higher-risk firms. Requiring a UK supervisor to do that in relation to a non-UK firm will not, in and of itself, address the issue that hon. Members have identified.
As was noted in the other place, the most effective means of combating international money laundering is cross-border co-operation to drive up the standards of overseas supervision and enforcement. For those reasons, we have imposed a duty on each UK anti-money laundering supervisor to take such steps as they consider appropriate to co-operate with overseas authorities. That is the agenda we pursue through the global FATF process. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the new clause.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is nice to see you in the Chair again, Mr McCabe, in this much warmer Committee Room 12.
Clause 44 is a concession that the Government made in the other place because there was a lot of concern that they had not cracked on with making progress towards a register of beneficial owners of overseas entities—an extremely important part of the machinery for preventing money laundering. It is rather a pathetic clause, so the Opposition have tabled a new clause that would speed up the timetable, for reasons that I will explain when I move it. I want to register the fact that although we do not intend to vote against clause 44, we think it somewhat weak as a concession.
As the hon. Lady says, clause 44 fulfils a Government commitment made at an earlier stage of the Bill in response to a call for clarity on our intentions for the delivery of a separate anti-corruption policy. My noble Friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon committed us to reporting on progress made on our policy to create a register of beneficial owners of overseas entities that own or buy property in the UK or that participate in UK Government procurement. We are committed to the register being operational in 2021.
The clause requires the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament three reports on the progress made towards putting the register in place, each of which will be due after the expiry of a 12-month reporting period. The first and second reports must set out
“the steps that are to be taken in the next reporting period towards putting the register in place, and…an assessment of when the register will be put in place.”
The third
“must include a statement setting out what further steps, if any, are to be taken towards putting the register in place.”
The obligation to report to the House on progress reinforces the commitments on our timetable that the Government have given elsewhere.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Crown application
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 47, page 34, line 38, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) Regulations under section 1 may amend the definition of “terrorist financing” in section 43(4) so as to remove any reference to a provision of regulations that is revoked by regulations under section 1.
(3A) Regulations under section 1 may amend the definition of “terrorist financing” in section 43(4) so as to add a reference to a provision of regulations under section 1 that contains an offence, but only if—
(a) each purpose of the regulations containing the offence, as stated under section1(3), is compliance with a UN obligation or other international obligation, or
(b) paragraph (a) does not apply but the report under section 2 in respect of the regulations containing the offence indicates that, in the opinion of the appropriate Minister making those regulations, the carrying out of a purpose stated in those regulations under section1(3) would further the prevention of terrorism in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”
This amendment provides that regulations under Clause 1 may amend the definition of “terrorist financing” in the Bill to add a reference to an offence only where the purpose of the regulations containing the offence is compliance with a UN or other international obligation or a purpose related to the prevention of terrorism.
There are two purposes behind the amendment. The first is to allow us to update the definition of “terrorist financing” in regulations. The nature of terrorist finance has a tendency to change over time and it is important that we are able to update our counter-terrorism measures to take account of the changes. This will allow us to continue to maintain a robust counter-terrorism regime, while meeting our international UN obligations.
While that is crucial, we also seek to restrict the ability to add to the definition of terrorist financing in the second part of the amendment. The Government listened to the concerns expressed by noble Lords about the aims of the regimes and the need for a proportionate approach. Having engaged with noble Lords, we agreed to restrict the ability to add to the definition of terrorist financing. The definition may be changed only to comply with international obligations or to further the prevention of terrorism, as set out in the clause. If the amendment were not agreed to, we would be unable to update our terrorist finance regime to respond to changing events.
Of course, nobody thinks that we should not have effective measures to tackle terrorist financing. That is plain and there is an obvious consensus about that. There are two questions. First, is this the appropriate way to go about it? Secondly—I would like the Minister to elucidate on this a little further—could the Minister give us some examples of the kind of changes to terrorist financing, that are not caught at the moment, but that could be dealt with in regulations as the issues arose?
The issue of the secret jurisdictions of the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories is extremely vexed. The Opposition are disappointed by what has happened, because we felt that considerable progress was made under David Cameron’s Administration on this matter. There are no Liberal Democrats on the Committee—they normally take credit for anything positive that happened when David Cameron was Prime Minister—but my impression from talking to Conservative Members is that many of them were strongly supportive of what the then Prime Minister promised.
I will remind hon. Members what was promised, go through what has happened and the current state of play, say something about why it matters, and then say something about both the counter-arguments and what we are proposing. The Government of the day committed to implementing a central registry of company beneficial ownership information at the G8 conference in Lough Erne in June 2013. It was truly a British initiative; I was criticised on Second Reading for not giving David Cameron credit, but I am not going to fall into that trap today.
The Companies House register contains information on people with significant control, meaning individuals who hold more than 25% of a company’s shares or voting rights. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills published details of its intention to create such a register in a discussion paper called “Transparency and Trust” and then made a call for evidence. The Government passed the relevant primary legislation—the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015—at the end of March 2015 and the new register went live in 2016.
The new register is very interesting. Searching for information at Companies House used to involve trolling through lots of papers without finding anything of interest, but now that we can see who is controlling companies, we can spend a very interesting hour finding out who owns what—we are all interested in companies in our constituencies. The register is not perfect, as will become evident when we debate other Opposition new clauses—there is no process for checking information, and 10% of the 4 million companies have not submitted the information—but it is a big, helpful step forward none the less.
In parallel with the new register, the then Prime Minister wrote to the overseas territories to encourage them to consult on a public registry and look closely at what we were doing in this country. Whereas progress in this country has been good, albeit not perfect, progress in Crown dependencies and overseas territories has been extremely limited. Let me explain the very different situations in each place.
In the British Virgin Islands, legislation is in place and a registry exists, but it is not public—a big weakness. There is information sharing with five or six regulatory or prosecuting authorities in this country, including the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. Those organisations can phone up and say, “We are suspicious about Bloggs, the Member for Salisbury South.”
Yes, indeed. Our authorities can ask the BVI registry to check what is going on, which I understand has been quite helpful. However, unlike our register, the BVI registry is not public, which means that our authorities are not allowed to go on fishing expeditions; they need a reason to ask for information. The problem is that they cannot see the full pattern of ownership. That can make it very difficult to work out what is going on, because people involved in money laundering set up extremely complex structures and relationships. In other areas of organised crime, the NCA maps nodal interconnections, which helps it to find criminals, but a secret register makes that impossible.
Another relevant point is which EU list people are on—whether they are on the greylist, or whether they are not on the list, for lacking transparency. The BVI were given more time in order not to be on the greylist.
The situation in the Cayman Islands is similar. We have an exchange of beneficial ownership information—a central register—but it is done in secret. They are on the European Union’s greylist. The Turks and Caicos have a private register. Like the British Virgin Islands, they were given more time by the European Union because they were affected by the hurricanes. Bermuda has a private register and is on the European Union greylist. The legislation is in place for Montserrat, but no register has been set up. Mind you, Montserrat does not have any particular financial expertise, so it does not matter very much.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is not about the reporting, but the frequency of the reporting. The point I am making is that to increase it to quarterly would add unnecessary compliance cost to industry, when that cost is already considerable if necessary. It would also result in an administrative burden for Government to produce figures that may not be of much practical use. We do not think that is the best way to spend the limited resource of public money.
Providing quarterly reporting regime by regime may also risk breaking other laws. At the moment we only provide regime figures for the largest regimes. For the small regimes there may only be a small number of designated persons with frozen funds in the UK so providing that specific information, which can easily be traced back to them, may risk breaching data protection laws.
The Government have already committed to being transparent where appropriate. As part of the monetary penalty guidance published last year by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Government committed to publishing details of breaches and criminal prosecutions. That is a matter of public record.
For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland to withdraw the amendment.
I am sorry, but notwithstanding the blandishments of the right hon. Member for Newbury, I do not think that the Minister has made the case for keeping that information secret. The fact that the numbers can jump around in the way that they did last month suggests that the Government have not got a grip. One way to incentivise Ministers is through the OFSI, which after all is the body that the Treasury set up to run sanctions policy. We have a whole group of people there devoting their lives to that—perhaps they are even in room, supporting the Minister today—and to supporting Ministers to do that. It is a perfectly reasonable piece of information for us to be requesting. It would help Ministers to manage things better and help to give the public confidence that breaches of sanctions are being dealt with properly. I am afraid that I therefore wish to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I am not necessarily denying the role of Government in issuing guidance in a whole range of areas. What I am dealing with here is the necessity of adding the provision into the Bill when the need to give guidance is sufficiently catered for in the text of the Bill.
The Bill will put the requirements in a better place because of the new flexibility on exemptions, licensing grounds and the ability to provide general licences. We are therefore unable to agree to the level of guidance sought, and I ask the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland to withdraw her amendment.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Revocation and amendment of regulations under section 1
Amendment made: 6, in clause 39, page 30, line 24, leave out “(d)” and insert “(h)”—(Sir Alan Duncan.)
The provision amended here is a condition which applies to the power to amend regulations made under Clause 1 which state a purpose within Clause 1(2). The amendment expands the reference to Clause 1(2) so that it covers paragraphs (e) to (h) of Clause 1(2) (as well as paragraphs (a) to (d)).
Clause 39, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
Power to amend Part 1 so as to authorise additional sanctions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move Government amendment 7, in clause 43, page 33, line 13, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment removes the provision that prevents contraventions of regulations under Clause 43 (money laundering and terrorist financing etc) from being enforceable by criminal proceedings.
In moving this amendment, I acknowledge the recognition that this House has given to the importance of a rigorous anti-money laundering regime. To ensure the robustness of future anti-money laundering regulations, corresponding powers to create criminal offences are necessary. At the same time, I recognise that Lord Judge and others in the other place expressed significant concerns about the scope of criminal offence powers in the Bill upon its introduction. It is important to note that those concerns were not about the existence of offences for breaching anti-money laundering regimes; instead, they were concerns about the unchecked ability of Ministers to create offences.
The amendment reinstates the power to create criminal offences, while the package of amendments as a whole directly addresses those concerns through additional safeguards, which narrow the scope of and the ability to use these powers. I shall elaborate upon these safeguards, which the Government have discussed with Lord Judge since the passage of this Bill through the other place, and then I will turn to amendments 10, 11 and 12. Before I do so, however, it would be useful to consider how anti-money laundering regulations have operated with criminal offence powers in the past.
In accordance with standard practice, when implementing EU directives on money laundering, criminal offences in this area have been created by Ministers in secondary legislation made under the powers in the European Communities Act 1972. That was done under the negative procedure, with no prior consultation with Parliament and no need to seek Parliament’s consent. That position will be improved for future money laundering regulations made under the Bill. They will now be made under the draft affirmative procedure, so Parliament will consider and vote on them before they come into force. Using the affirmative procedure is a direct response to the concerns raised, to ensure that where changes need to be made, they will be properly scrutinised.
Criminal offences were created by both the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and their predecessors, the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, which were brought into force by the then Labour Government. As hon. Members can see, the approach has been supported on a cross-party basis in the past. The detailed provisions in such regulations set standards and procedures for regulated businesses. They are designed to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing and to help law enforcement authorities to investigate those crimes, and should also be seen in the context of a separate penalty regime for the key substantive money laundering offences. Such offences are established under part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which provides for more punitive prison sentences of up to 14 years, for example for those guilty of directly laundering the proceeds of crime. Money launderers are typically prosecuted through those offences as they allow for longer sentences.
Without the power to create new criminal offences in secondary legislation, the enforceability of new regulations would be seriously weakened. That would dramatically lower the effectiveness of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime. More generally, it is not unusual for requirements to be set in delegated legislation that can be enforced using criminal penalties, In the area of financial services, for example, the regulated activities order, made under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, specifies which activities are or are not regulated. Carrying on such activities without permission from the regulator is a criminal offence. It remains the position of the Government that it is neither unusual nor improper for Parliament to confer powers of that type to Ministers.
I just want to clarify with the Minister the status of his conversations with Lord Judge. I do not know if he was trying to give us the impression that Lord Judge had agreed the amendments. I felt on Tuesday that he was trying to give that impression, so I spoke to Lord Judge, who told me that he had indeed had conversations with Ministers, but he did not say to me that he had approved the amendments. Is the Minister now trying to tell us that Lord Judge has agreed Government amendment 7?
What I can tell the Committee is that officials have had sensitive conversations with Lord Judge. It is not for us to presume the outcome of his deliberations at this point. I am setting out what we have discussed and the consequence of those discussions. Clearly, Lord Judge will make his position known in his own way in due course.
I would like to set out why the ability to create criminal offences for the UK’s anti-money laundering regimes is necessary. The issue has been considered previously, when the Government consulted specifically on whether to remove the criminal offence provisions in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. The British Bankers Association stated that removing such provisions would be at odds with the objective of driving an effective anti-money laundering regime.
Further, the Crown Prosecution Service argued that provisions for creating criminal offences in the Money Laundering Regulations that are different from those of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 serve a separate and useful function in tackling money laundering. In some instances, prosecuting according to the Proceeds of Crime Act could jeopardise ongoing investigations. It said that in such cases, the ability to prosecute for a regulatory offence relating to defective anti-money laundering counter-terrorist financing systems can be an important tool. Finally, HMRC noted in response to the same consultation that abolishing criminal sanctions for breaches of regulations carries significant risk to its ability to tackle money laundering.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am happy to address those points. I can of course confirm that NGOs in countries subject to sanctions are still able to access these provisions. On the hon. Lady’s point on the fast-tracking process, and the point on fuel sanctions, I said what I said in response to the amendments, but we are obviously living in a very imperfect situation, with highly challenging environments. It will not be possible to get things right every time, but I think the provisions in this legislation give us the best opportunity to do so. I think I have set out the Government’s position clearly.
The Economic Secretary is right that the situation is complex, and he is right that we do not want to add to the complexity with new requirements and new consultations. However, I am sorry to say that I do not think he has made the case for not accepting our new clause 5 on reporting to Parliament.
I want to draw the Committee’s attention to an article from The Guardian of 23 July 2014, which illustrates the problem. It is headed: “UK arms export licences for Russia still in place, despite claims of embargo”. It reported:
“More than 200 licences to sell British weapons to Russia, including missile-launching equipment,”
were still in place at the time,
“despite David Cameron’s claim in the Commons…that the government had imposed an absolute arms embargo against the country”.
I think we have seen a great reluctance on the part of the Government to be more open. What is going on with these sanctions, exemptions and licences is a highly sensitive political area. It seems to me that it would help the Government if we had more openness. We could then have arguments about what was really going on, not about what people might surmise or imagine. I wish to press new clause 5 to the vote.
I do not want to press amendment 18. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Enforcement
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 17, page 16, line 12, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations—
(a) may create criminal offences for the purposes of the enforcement of prohibitions or requirements mentioned in subsection (2)(a) or (b) or for the purposes of preventing such prohibitions or requirements from being circumvented, and
(b) may include provision dealing with matters relating to any offences created for such purposes by regulations (including provision that creates defences).
( ) Regulations may not provide for an offence under regulations to be punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding—
(a) in the case of conviction on indictment, 10 years;
(b) in the case of summary conviction—
(i) in relation to England and Wales, 12 months or, in relation to offences committed before section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, 6 months;
(ii) in relation to Scotland, 12 months;
(iii) in relation to Northern Ireland, 6 months.”
This amendment enables sanctions imposed by regulations under Clause 1 to be enforced by criminal proceedings, and limits the terms of imprisonment that such regulations can allow to be imposed for breach of sanctions.
The offences provisions are perhaps the most important amendments that we need to debate today, following the Government’s defeat in the other place. Hon. Members should be aware that without the fullest set of enforcement measures available to deal with breaches of sanctions, the UK will not be able to ensure effective implementation and enforcement of sanctions. That would make what are currently key foreign policy and national security tools virtually toothless, and therefore redundant.
It is important to recognise right at the start that the concerns in the other place were not about whether there should be criminal offences for breaching sanctions; it was accepted that there was a need for these offences. What was at issue was the circumstances where Parliament could properly give to Ministers the power to create offences. The Government have listened to those concerns. We understand them and these amendments address them.
Currently, EU sanctions against countries such Russia and Syria are imposed through EU legal Acts. These require member states to put in place enforcement measures at national level. In line with that requirement, the UK routinely creates criminal offences for breaches of sanctions by way of statutory instruments made under powers in the European Communities Act 1972 as modified by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, as well as other legislation such as the Export Control Act 2002. The Government therefore want to maintain continuity in this area by reproducing the powers available under existing legal frameworks for enforcement across the various forms of sanctions in the Bill.
Since the defeat in the Lords, Government officials and lawyers have worked with Lord Judge and others to seek a legislative solution. That has been a deep and meaningful dialogue, and I must express my gratitude to Lord Judge for his engagement in seeking to find a way forward. We believe that can be found in amendment 4, the enhanced procedural requirements, which we will debate later, in new clause 3 and the corresponding offence provisions for money laundering. The Government believe that combination of measures is the best solution to meet the concerns expressed in the other place while being practical to implement, which I think was the intention of those who raised the concerns.
The amendment restores to clause 17 the provisions to create sanctions offences in regulations. It provides for the enforcement of any prohibitions and requirements, to provide for criminal consequences if they are contravened or circumvented. The clause also provides for maximum penalties for breaches of sanctions in regulations. The provision states that regulations may not include offences with maximum penalties greater than 10 years’ imprisonment, which is in line with the maximum penalty available through the 2002 Act, and for offences other than trade sanctions we do not intend to create penalties greater than seven years’ imprisonment, in line with current practice. The clause should be read alongside the safeguards in new clause 3, which I will discuss later.
Even with the safeguards that we plan to introduce in new clause 3, the Government remain very aware that creating criminal offences and setting penalties in regulations is a serious matter, not to be undertaken lightly. I am therefore happy to repeat assurances given in the other place. First, no Government would ever create criminal offences for trivial matters. The powers detailed in clause 17 would be used only to create offences within the categories of offences that already exist for breaches of sanctions, breaches of licences and breaches of disclosure or information requirements. Secondly, Ministers should not use these powers in a way that is incompatible with the basic and fundamental rights of people in the UK—section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 expressly forbids it. Thirdly, as I said before, regulations under the Bill cannot create offences for trade sanctions with maximum penalties greater than 10 years, and we do not intend to create offences for financial sanctions and other types of sanctions with maximum penalties greater than seven years.
We have listened to the concerns expressed in the other place, and we have tabled amendments to introduce controls on the use of this power. As I said, I will speak to those amendments later in our consideration in Committee. In conclusion, the amendment will restore our ability to enforce sanctions by reintroducing the provision to create criminal and civil offences and penalties that are proportionate to the scale and nature of sanctions breaches and still effective as a deterrent. It should be read together with the enhanced procedural safeguards in new clause 3, which directly addresses the concerns raised in the other place.
I was very disappointed, but not surprised, when I saw that the Government had tabled this amendment before the weekend. I anticipated that they might seek to reverse one of their defeats in the Lords. I think it is striking that the Government are seeking to reverse amendment 45 from the other place, when they lost the vote on that amendment by 80 or 90 votes. It was not a narrow little thing. The amendment in the other place was moved not by some party hack, but by the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. He made a number of speeches about the excessive use of Henry VIII powers.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 21, in clause 17, page 16, line 36, at end insert—
“(8) An appropriate Minister must publish guidance from the Crown Prosecution Service on when it is in the public interest for a breach of a sanctions regulations to be prosecuted.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish guidance on when it is in the public interest for a breach of sanctions regulations to be prosecuted.
It is a great pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Dame Cheryl. It is not quite as sunny as it was this morning, but it is still very cold.
The clause is about enforcement of sanctions regulations. Breaching sanctions is a criminal offence, and this morning we discussed whether the legislation on those criminal offences is appropriate. It is fair and reasonable that people have a clear view of what the penalties will be for any breach of sanctions. Our amendment would require the Crown Prosecution Service to say when it is in the public interest that a breach of sanctions regulations be prosecuted.
The Treasury published some guidance a few months ago entitled “Monetary Penalties for Breaches of Financial Sanctions”. I am sorry to say that it does not include the sort of detail that we would expect. The stark reality was brought to our attention last week, when the Economic Secretary to the Treasury had to correct an answer to a written parliamentary question. I had asked him what the total level of breaches was in 2017 and on 8 February, he told me it was £117 million. On 22 February, he told me that the estimate had shot up to £1.4 billion—a tenfold increase, which suggests that the Treasury is not keeping the beady eye that it ought to be keeping on this matter.
Many years ago, I was a Treasury civil servant. One year, I was responsible for the Budget arithmetic and I had to go and tell Chancellor Nigel Lawson that I had lost £50 million from the Budget arithmetic and it was very embarrassing. I never lost £1.2 billion, which is what current Treasury Ministers seem to have managed to do. The fact that the figures are so large tells us that the level of breaches is significant. It is hard for us to believe that, in a great wodge of £1.2 billion, there are not some breaches that should be prosecuted. From the information Ministers have given us, we have no idea whether this figure involves many small breaches or three or four really big breaches.
A report published in December in a magazine called Nikkei Asian Review says that 49 nations have breached North Korean sanctions. The sanctions against North Korea have been agreed at the UN Security Council—they could not be more important. We have a situation where North Korea is trying to develop nuclear weapons. Everybody in this House and this country knows that that would be disastrous—completely destabilising to the region and potentially the whole world. If North Korea acquires nuclear weapons, the risk of proliferation is immense. I know Foreign Office Ministers understand this. The report suggests that 13 of the countries that have breached North Korean sanctions have engaged in arms trading; they are primarily countries with a history of political turmoil such as Syria, Angola, Iran, Myanmar and Sir Lanka, but even Germany and France were deemed culpable in certain respects.
Obviously, breaching weapons of mass destruction sanctions against North Korea is something that nobody would take lightly. One would think that this would be a case where it would be appropriate to prosecute, but because of the lack of transparency, we have no idea whether we in this country have made mistakes in the same way as the Germans and French have. Obviously there would be nothing intentional about it, but accidents too can be dangerous. That is why we think the Government should be stronger and clearer on enforcement. The Government could make matters clearer by publishing CPS guidelines explaining how and when they believe prosecutions are in the public interest. If the Economic Secretary could tell us a little more about what happened with this mistake—how the figure came to be £1.2 billion out—and whether the Treasury has looked back over previous years to see the pattern of breaches, I am sure that would be of great interest to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Dame Cheryl.
First, I would like to address the serious matter that the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland raised with respect to Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation data. She is quite correct to assert that there was an error; this was caused by technical and data problems. Officials have now manually checked each case by reference to the original information and have confirmed that the revised figures for suspected breaches reported in 2017 accurately answer the question. I wrote to the hon. Lady at the earliest opportunity and apologised to her.
The Government take financial sanctions evasion extremely seriously and have made an unprecedented commitment to tackling it, increasing the dedicated resources and providing new enforcement powers to deal with breaches, including new penalty powers and an increase in the criminal offence’s maximum sentence from two to seven years. We cannot go into specifics on the size of the breaches but I can assure the hon. Lady and the whole Committee that I do not anticipate difficulties in future.
Amendment 21 would require the Government to provide specific guidance, produced by the Crown Prosecution Service, on the prosecution of sanctions breaches. Hon. Members will be interested to know that the CPS already publishes guidance on how the public interest is taken into account in any decision to prosecute in “The Code for Crown Prosecutors”. This public interest test is the same one that we applied in decisions to prosecute sanctions offences. The Government’s view is that no additional public interest guidance is necessary for a sanctions prosecution decision. The public interest is a fundamental assessment in any decision to prosecute, and “The Code for Crown Prosecutors” includes factors relevant to public interest tests such as the seriousness of the offence and the level of culpability of the suspect. These and other factors included in the code are relevant to the decision to prosecute in sanctions cases. There is therefore no need for separate guidance on this amendment.
We will be discussing clause 37 and the Government’s duty to issue guidance later in Committee. Clause 37 sets out a comprehensive duty to provide guidance where it is required, but the Government believe that in this instance separate guidance is not required.
That is rather unsatisfactory, because the general guidance is intended for the practitioners. As we were discussing this morning, it is for the NGOs and for the banks. I am sure that the Minister understands that the CPS guidance is for the lawyers, and although the banks and NGOs may be advised by lawyers it does take a different form. The Treasury guidance addresses processes; it does not look at the public interest in this context. I am not satisfied with what the Minister says and I do wish to test the view of the Committee on this amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made