Strategic Defence and Security Review

John Glen Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

At the core of the debate are three interlocking factors. I want to examine them and draw some conclusions from them. First, there has been a massive reduction in the defence budget since the war. It is now clear that, in the past decade, funding for defence has fallen too low. During our recent two foreign wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the sheer number of urgent operational requirements is evidence of the lack of investment in defence. We do not have the equipment in place for the engagements that we have chosen to pursue. Resources are scrambled at the last minute—at times, that leads to concerns about the adequacy of provision for our armed forces in theatre.

Secondly, we need to recognise that the debate cannot occur in the abstract. As we have just heard, it concerns men and women who are prepared to lay down their lives on our nation’s behalf. We must remember the very real needs of the 9,500 men and women who are currently serving in theatre in Afghanistan. Any outcomes of the continuing review must give them the highest priority in investment and spending.

Thirdly, the conclusions of the debate on the SDSR hinge on our assessment of the threats that we may face in future. Some see Afghanistan as the template for future operations, and want our armed forces configured on that basis, whereas other intelligence suggests that additional threats from different sources—such as interstate conflict, threats from failed states and cyber warfare—should be given greater consideration. The tension between those three factors must be resolved to reach the right conclusions on the future shape of our armed forces.

In short, while the Afghan commitment dictates our current priorities, it must not be allowed to dictate Britain’s future capabilities and defence posture. There is much discussion about the nature of the future threats. Some failed states show no signs of compromise, and history demonstrates the dangers of cutting defence spending in the belief that interstate war is over.

In future, an attack is as likely to come from disruption to our computer and IT networks as it is from a conventional military force. The debate is about the design of our defence capability and the extent to which it should be shaped on current or contingent operations, or on the threats we may be expected to counter in 10 or 15 years. Although we must ensure that our forces are armed properly and can fight and win in any combat operation with which the Government may task them, we must also make sure that we are a leader in countering cyber warfare. We must invest in Britain’s intelligence capacity as a priority, both in the armed forces and in other Government agencies. Whatever the challenge may be—terrorist attack, invasion of a dependent territory or NATO article 5 commitment—it will probably come when we least expect it. The capture of the Falklands, 9/11 and the gas shortages a few years ago have all demonstrated that, whatever the nature of the threat, it frequently comes from out of the blue.

Our front-line forces need strength, flexibility and the capability to fight all foes. It is clear that there is an irreducible minimum for each service if they are to remain viable, credible and capable of dealing with the threats that we ask them to counter. Whatever short-term economic pressures exist and however they weigh in this debate, they should not shape the strategy of our defence spending. As a member of the Defence Committee, I endorse the comments made by several Members, especially my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot). I remain concerned that a budgetary straitjacket, imposed by the Treasury, will dictate some of the SDSR outcomes, despite the best efforts of the ministerial team and the Secretary of State.

The UK’s decisions on defence need to be made in conjunction with the obligations and alliances that we have in NATO, as well as our commitments to the UN and in the EU. These are foreign policy areas and perhaps outside the scope of this debate, but the hard facts mean that defence comes at a cost—either we pay for it or we reshape the role and expectations of influence that we have.

I wish to offer a few observations about where savings can be made, such as in training. Rightly, the armed forces invest heavily in training, but in many areas that training overlaps among the three services, necessitating many initial training establishments with all the associated duplication of costs. There is scope for areas of joint training between the services, which will further reduce costs. This kind of cut will always generate a rearguard action from the services but we need to be bold. It is not a case of abandoning one service or another, but the question needs to be asked whether distinct establishments are needed when they have significant elements of training in common. However, it must be acknowledged that people, and by that I mean service personnel, are still required in significant numbers—for servicing equipment; for maintaining aircraft; for fire fighting and damage control on board ship; and for dominating an area on land.

These are tough times. The Treasury, as one would expect, has a tight grip on the spending review process—perhaps too tight for some of us—but this should not lead the SDSR to make decisions today that will cost more tomorrow. The capabilities to be deployed at times of critical but undefined threats in the future should not be sacrificed to deal with imminent budgetary threats. Anything we cut for good today will not be easily recovered tomorrow. I hope that the SDSR will make wise decisions that put our serving forces first. I hope that it will take tough decisions based on rational analysis rather than tradition, while acknowledging that if we do not look beyond the spending review to the risks and threats the nation will face in 10 or 15 years—and invest in research into new capabilities—this review will have failed.