Britain and International Security

John Glen Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Commons Chamber

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

I welcome the opportunity to contribute to this debate. I wish to focus my remarks on three areas: the changing nature of the threat; the increased need for broader and deeper collaboration with our allies, with reference to NATO; and the critical significance of the need to win the battle of ideas.

Military strength, though vital to our nation, must be complemented by a more sophisticated understanding of extremist perspectives and the dynamics of how people are recruited to such evil causes. Let me start by examining the very different threats that Britain now faces. The stark differences between the world today and that of the cold war are abundantly clear. Economic and military power are now widely diffused across non-state actors, and an increasingly unpredictable Russia and an inscrutable China, which has evolved and will evolve further into a major player in international security matters, make the world we face very different.

In very recent times, the threat of Islamic extremism, splintering into al-Qaeda offshoots in west and north Africa and the even more extreme Boko Haram, as we have just heard, has made the geographical scope of security risks even broader, thereby accounting for our armed forces being deployed on 21 different operations in 19 countries, double the number of operations just five years ago. Then we have the separate but linked group of al-Shabaab in Somalia. We must recognise that the wide range of extremist groups have different emphases, even though they have a common uncompromising resolve to undermine and attack western values, interests and citizens.

The Arab spring certainly had the consequence of generating greater uncertainty. Even though progress towards democracy appeared to have been secured in Tunisia, last weekend we tragically saw just how easy it is for extremists to penetrate Britain’s security interests—that is, the wellbeing of all our citizens—throughout the globe. In Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Mauritania, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Libya and Kuwait, grave but wide-ranging risks face those who live there as well as those who travel and do business there. This fragmented, complex and uncertain security environment, involving security events, risks and attacks that are much more unpredictable, means that Britain’s assets must be deployed with increased frequency and with more sophisticated skills and roles.

That leads me to my second point. In this uncertain and profoundly more complex international security environment, Britain will need to collaborate more effectively with our NATO allies. The Gracious Speech made clear the Government’s commitment to remain at the forefront of NATO. That will involve intermeshing our assets and capabilities with those of our allies more and more, but it is inconceivable to me that NATO can continue to exist as it does with such wide variance in the interpretation of the 2% of GNI that is to be spent on defence.

In the expanded theatres in which we operate, such as our work with the Kurdish Regional Government, our help for the unprecedented humanitarian response in Syria and our work in Iraq, we must see our allies in NATO spending more. In the UK, the challenge requires three options for defence spending. We must either meet the 2% of GNI not just in the current year but in the comprehensive spending review period for 2016-17 and beyond, or concede that the principle is not sustainable and assess the impact that will have on our moral leadership in NATO and how that differs from where we were at the summit in Wales last year. Alternatively, we can do what I fear we are moving to, and have a fudge using some more DFID money, deftly appropriated for joint humanitarian work. Although the arguments about the £163 billion—1% above RPI—in the equipment budget and the retention of the size and shape of the armed forces will be deployed, the options place a question mark over the integrity of the 0.7% commitment on DFID expenditure and do not fully reflect the necessity to defend and maintain defence budgets at current levels in the face of increasingly diverse and fragmented security interests. Although I readily concede that the budgetary pressures are immense, a greater and impressive list of activities leads me to the view that more effective defence spending, and more of it, is required.

Finally, and more briefly, I wish to reflect on the need to examine more fully the battle for ideas. We will always need military force and I am fully committed, representing the constituency that I do, to the people of our armed forces, who do so much and put so much at risk for our nation. If we examine the geopolitical landscape and fully grasp the fragmentation of extremist ideologies, we will see that we must devote more energy, thought and resources to understanding how to fight against those who hold a very different and extreme eschatology to ours. We must develop a fuller grasp of how the radicalisation process occurs in the UK and in the unstable states we have referred to. This is difficult. It will not be quick or easy.

Today’s debate is timely and critical. We live in a world of changing threats where greater collaboration on a fairer basis will be needed. Britain has led the way in Europe. It must soon decide if it will continue to perform that role in its defence expenditure, but the budget envelope is only one part of it. Without intelligent collaboration, more effective spending focused on reliable outputs, and improved understanding of how all the Government’s assets are used together, we will be at risk of failing in our duty to protect our nation.