Reservists

Debate between John Baron and Thomas Docherty

Tuesday 23rd April 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) on securing the debate and on his excellent speech, which was born out of experience of commanding soldiers in the field.

When I was a young platoon commander in Berlin in 1984, we were told not to worry, because the quality of our troops and our kit would see us through. We knew very well that we could hold out only for so long, because quantity has a quality all of its own, as the German forces on the eastern front during the second world war found to their cost.

I mention that because I see similarly flawed thinking in the Government’s plans for 30,000 reservists somehow to plug the gap left by the loss of 20,000 regular troops. Let us be clear: this plan is designed to save money. It is not what the MOD would have wanted to do, as the CGS confirmed to the Defence Committee. The focus seems to be on the bottom line. The plan might work on paper, but a number of us severely doubt whether it will work on the ground.

I have three main concerns. First, could this be a false economy? The Green Paper admitted that it costs more to train reservists than regular soldiers, a fact confirmed by the Secretary of State during Defence questions. When we add in other factors, such as force-generation figures and the additional costs of matching a TA soldier’s civilian salary, there is a big question mark over how much this will all cost. To date, the Government have been coy about costings. We are promised a White Paper, but it has been too long in the coming. As several colleagues have said, none of that would matter were it not for the fact that five regular infantry battalions will be disbanded over the next 18 months; indeed, 20,000 regular troops have been given their marching orders. Pursuing such a policy before we are sure that the reservist plan will work is foolhardy and a high-risk strategy.

Secondly, I have concerns about whether 30,000 reservists could plug the capability gap. In my day—in the 1980s—TA reservists, gallant though they were, were essentially expected to ship out to Germany and wait for the Warsaw pact forces to come to them. Today, reservists are expected to have a much broader range of roles, but they are still expected to achieve that higher skill base with about 35 to 40 days’ training. We live in a world where challenging, asymmetrical warfare will become the norm.

My third concern is about boots on the ground. I doubt whether 30,000 reservists can plug the gap. The Government make great play of the fact that they have had many expressions of support from prospective employers, but expressions of support and boots on the ground are often two very different things. The latest MOD figures I have—they are fresh out of the MOD, and the Minister is welcome to challenge them if he so wishes—show that the establishment strength of the TA infantry is about 6,700 soldiers, but only 2,800 of them are actually eligible for mobilisation. That suggests an effective rate of about 40%. The MOD’s own figures—as I say, the Minister is welcome to challenge them if he so wishes—suggest that, in terms of plugging the gap left by 20,000 regulars, the Government’s estimate of 30,000 reservists is way off beam. A minimum of 50,000 reservists is more the ballpark figure.

We then need to look at further factors, which could throw even the figure of 50,000 into doubt. MOD figures confirm that the TA is losing infantry soldiers. Furthermore, as a number of colleagues have pointed out, the current economic climate means that small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, will struggle to allow key employees to leave employment with them for extended periods without being compensated by the MOD. I am not convinced that that costing has been factored in.

For those three reasons—value for money, the capability deficit and boots on the ground—several of us have severe reservations about the Government’s plans. Meanwhile, however, those plans are having distorting effects on the ground. Excellent infantry battalions are being lost, and the 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is a case in point. It is one of the most experienced battalions in the British Army, having served in all the major conflicts during the past 15 years, including Kosovo and Bosnia. It remains one of the best recruited. By the MOD’s own admission, it was not one of the original five infantry battalions to be disbanded; instead, more poorly recruited battalions were meant to go. However, through interference, intervention or whatever we want to call it, it was decided to save a poorly recruited battalion north of the border. The MOD then had to go hunting for a battalion south of the border, and, for some reason, fell on 2RRF.

[Thomas Docherty]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Baron]

I am conscious that I am running out of time, so I will proceed if I may.

In our contracting Army, one-battalion regiments stand less chance of survival. We were told a few years ago that the future rested with larger battalions. However, that distortion means the Government are spending millions of pounds unnecessarily supporting understrength battalions. Surely, the Minister can understand that it is more economical to keep well-recruited battalion families together than to spend millions of pounds trying to bring understrength battalions up to strength. Such a policy simply suggests we are reinforcing failure.

In short, these plans are fundamentally flawed. Parliament has not been made aware of the costings to justify their execution, despite the fact that five regular infantry battalions have already been given their marching orders. I strongly suggest to the Minister that it would be wiser to see whether the plans work first, before losing 20,000 regular troops.

There is one final reason why the Government’s policy is high risk. Our armed forces are being reduced at a time when many countries, which are not necessarily friendly to the west, are increasing their expenditure. No one can tell where the next threat will come from. We must always remember that the first duty of the Government is defence of the realm.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Debate between John Baron and Thomas Docherty

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

The bottom line is that there are various factions of the Taliban, but the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is very complex and not well understood. I could return the question and ask: how is it that, given that the fundamental differences between the two are clear, we are failing to explore them? At the end of the day, peace is not made with friends but with enemies. We have got to initiate talks.

These two distinctions—the distinction between the key objective and the four main goals, and the distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaeda—are very important. If we are trying to build a more stable and secure Afghanistan and make it a better country, we will in all probability have to beat the Taliban. If, on the other hand, we are just trying to make sure that Afghanistan is free of al-Qaeda, we might not have to defeat the Taliban. That shows the importance of the two distinctions. What they lead one on to believe is the need for the Americans and the British to open meaningful and non-conditional talks with the Taliban in order to explore common ground.

[Thomas Docherty]

It is certainly the understanding of the Defence Committee that our role is to place the Afghan national security forces on a footing where they can deal with security. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that it is not about beating the Taliban, as the mission goal is to get the ANSF to a point where they can take control of their country.

[Mr Baron]

In an ideal world I would agree with the hon. Gentleman, but the report makes it clear that there are severe doubts about the ability of the Afghan national security forces to take over once we leave, despite all the money and the training that have gone in. The fact that the ANSF could not protect UN personnel in areas that had been handed over and were deemed to be safe illustrates the problem that we face. There is not a uniform view on this matter, as it is worthy of note that there are severe reservations about whether the Afghan security forces will be in a position to take on that role, come the deadline.

Suggestions have been made that preliminary talks have taken place. This is welcome news. The delisting from UN sanctions of 18 former senior members of the Taliban is perhaps part of that process. However, I have concerns about the substantive nature of these talks. Until very recently, the American view has been that America will talk to the Taliban only if they lay down their arms and accept the constitution. Frankly, that is living in a dream world. The Taliban will not be beaten and they will not lay down their arms.

History suggests—we could look at counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya, for example—that not one of the preconditions for a successful counter-insurgency campaign exists in Afghanistan. There is no control of the borders; the troop density levels are insufficient; we do not have the support of the majority of the population; and we certainly do not have a credible Government in place. Not one of the preconditions exists. The Taliban are not going to lay down their arms and simply walk away, particularly now that we have declared our hand with the deadlines.

I believe that the time has come for the British Government to press the Americans to have non-conditional talks with the Taliban. That is crucial. Just holding preliminary talks will get us nowhere. They have to be non-conditional. We need to remind the Americans that it is possible to talk and fight at the same time, as we proved in Northern Ireland. However, it was the very nature of those talks—the fact that they were unconditional—which played such a key role in bringing the IRA into the peace process. The American wish to see the Taliban and al-Qaeda sever all contact must be part of a settlement, rather than a precondition. I believe that the decapitation strikes on the Taliban leadership should end, because there must be a degree of trust in the negotiations. If the last 10 years have shown us anything, they have shown us the Taliban’s ability to replace one generation of leaders with another.

Given the cost to the United States in blood and treasure, this will not be easy for US politicians. There will be those in the Democratic party who will think about human rights, women’s rights and so forth, and there will be those in the Republican party who will not want to talk to terrorists. At the end of the day, however, holding unconditional talks is the only way forward. Our brave soldiers can only buy time; now it is time for the US politicians to step up to the plate.