Common Fisheries Policy

Debate between Jim Shannon and Frank Doran

Thursday 15th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Doran]

We have always had a problem with quotas. I agree with the hon. Lady to a certain extent, but all Governments since 1973 have had problems and made mistakes in that area.

We have a system in which quotas are bought and sold, and many are held by individuals and companies that once operated fishing vessels which have since been decommissioned. Quotas are often leased out, and sometimes at eye-watering prices. I shall not cite any because I have not seen the details, but the figures that I have been given are staggering, and that has a perverse effect on the industry, because the lower the TAC in any one year, the higher the quota price, distorting the industry quite seriously.

When we have ever-more expensive fishing vessels, fuel, insurance, labour and other costs as we do now, we have a market in quotas which distorts the industry. I strongly support the point, made by the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton, that the register of who owns quotas should be published. That area is in complete darkness, and the system should be looked at seriously.

[Jim Shannon]

Does the hon. Gentleman feel that any transferrable quotas should go to those registered boats that are active fishing boats only, not to football clubs or to whoever else seems to have control over quotas?

[Mr Doran]

There are many ways in which we could resolve the problem, but the starting point is to shed a little light on the system and to see what is happening. That is extremely important.

One area that the report does not cover, but which I should like to say a word or two about, is black fishing. I have had brief conservations with the Minister about it, and I have mentioned to him twice now, once on the Floor of the House and once in private, that I want to have a meeting with him and will write to him, and I am in the process of gathering material for our discussion.

We are working on the assumption that the whole issue of black fish is not a problem any more, but I am not sure that that is correct. Everyone in the Chamber will be aware that there have been some serious criminal cases—they were not trials, because everyone pleaded guilty—in the Scottish courts in which a number of fishermen and fish processors have been found guilty of serious offences.

We are talking about tens of millions of pounds, and everyone I know in the fishing industry, no matter at what level they are, knows that the figures that have been quoted, and which were prominent in the individual trials, are just the tip of the iceberg. It was a much more serious issue. I shall not say much more than that, because, although a number of cases been dealt with, one more has still to be dealt with and will be in court later this month.

From the information that we have so far on the way in which the system operated, it is apparent that a very sophisticated process was under way. Skippers falsified their log books as they landed their catches, lying about how much fish was on board. Weighing scales at the factory were rigged. I am told that at a factory at the centre of one case there were two computer systems—one computer, recording a false weight, was visible to the regulators, and the other one was in the loft recording the true weight. There was separate pumping equipment on the quay, with the legitimate fish to be declared sent through one system and the black fish sent through another. I am talking about pelagic fish; I should have emphasised that. Exactly the same thing has been happening in the white fish industry.

The situation has not yet been dealt with, and it might not be, because the trials may have been just for effect, to try to focus on the problem and make sure that it was properly killed. A police officer who made a statement at one of the trials said that there is an assumption that nobody is a victim in these cases except our fish stocks. In fact, there have been a large number of victims, most of whom are in the fish processing industry.

Fisheries

Debate between Jim Shannon and Frank Doran

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Doran]

With the leave of the House, may I say that we have had an excellent debate? I am deeply sorry to those who were not able to contribute. We seem to have had half an hour taken off our debate because of the urgent question. In the 20 years or so I have been attending fisheries debates, this is the one in which there have been the most speakers, which clearly underlines the importance of the issue we have been discussing.

The message to the Minister is loud and clear: we support radical reform. That has come from all hon. Members’ contributions. The Minister can go to the negotiations in December and in 2012 in the full knowledge of that support. He can afford to be brave. The Commission has put very little meat on the bones, but that could be an opportunity. He can be brave and bring the radical reform that we all want to see.

[Jim Shannon]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. Last year, this debate took place in Westminster Hall and lasted for three hours. The request was made to have the debate here in the House, to which everybody could contribute. Will the Deputy Speaker consider the process and the time scale, because we thought we were going to have a three-hour debate here as well?

Cross-border Child Custody

Debate between Jim Shannon and Frank Doran

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr Frank Doran (Aberdeen North) (Lab)]

I want to use this debate to highlight a case that shows that our legal system has badly failed one of my constituents, Mr Robert Bennett. I raised his case in an Adjournment debate on 4 December 2007, when there were ongoing legal proceedings in England and Scotland involving the custody of my constituent’s child. He has now exhausted all remedies in the courts, but there are legal issues that I want to discuss. I rely heavily on the advice given to my constituent by Mr Alan Inglis, a barrister and advocate, who has considerable experience of family law in the courts of Scotland and England.

The facts of the case are fairly straightforward. Mr Bennett married and had a child. The family lived in Aberdeen, and therefore were habitually resident in Scotland. Without Mr Bennett’s knowledge, his wife left the matrimonial home in September 2000 with the child and moved to London. He did not know her exact whereabouts and at no time did he consent to his daughter’s removal. A few months after Mrs Bennett left the family home, she commenced legal proceedings in Willesden county court, where she obtained an ex parte residence order and an order preventing Mr Bennett from removing the child from her care.

A key part of the law that determines such matters is the Family Law Act 1986. Section 41 is the key part here, and I can summarise its effect as follows: where a child under the age of 16 is moved from, for example, Scotland to England, as in this case, then in certain circumstances a court in England would have jurisdiction to deal with any issue relating to the child after one year has elapsed. One of those circumstances is set out in subsection (2)(a), which states that it is required to be shown that there is

“the agreement of the person or all the persons having, under the law of that part of the United Kingdom, the right to determine where he is to reside”.

In this case, that means both parents. Mrs Bennett had effectively abducted the child from Scotland to England, and Mr Bennett, as a legal guardian of the child, had not given his consent.

Mrs Bennett made her application to the court before the year set out in the legislation had expired, and Mr Bennett also entered appearance in the case within the time limit. Notwithstanding those facts, the judge in the Willesden court made an order in favour of Mrs Bennett. It is clear that none of the lawyers involved at that stage—the solicitors or the judge—properly understood the implications of the 1986 Act, or, for that matter, indicated that they were even aware of its existence.

Mrs Bennett’s solicitors had a duty to the court as well as to their client, and should not have raised the action, because any interpretation of the Act would make it clear that the Willesden court had no jurisdiction. The judge should not have granted the order, and Mr Bennett’s solicitors should not have neglected to raise the point of jurisdiction before the court, despite his explicit instructions. I should add that Mr Bennett took action subsequently against his solicitors for that neglect and received an award of compensation.

That was the first stage before the one-year period had expired. As the case moved through its various stages, it seems clear that none of the judges who later considered it looked very closely at Mr Bennett’s rights under the legislation as a parent and legal guardian of his daughter. The 1986 Act provides that

“Where a child…becomes habitually resident outside that part of the United Kingdom...he shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as continuing to be habitually resident in that part of the United Kingdom for a period of one year beginning with the date under which those circumstances arise.”

That section therefore applies only where the child has already become habitually resident in another part of the UK, and it postpones the legal effect of that habitual residence for a period of one year. Correctly construed, it does not operate as a time limit of one year on habitual residence as held later by the Court of Appeal in England.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware of examples similar to the one that he clearly outlines? Is this an isolated case or do many others fall into this category?

[Mr Doran]

There are lots of examples of couples splitting up and moving to different jurisdictions, but, as far as I am aware, this is the only case in which the 1986 Act has not been properly construed—at least, that is my allegation.

In Mr Bennett’s case, for the child to have become habitually resident in England and, therefore, to give the English courts jurisdiction, both parents would have been required to consent, and even then there would have been a delay in operation of one year. There is ample legal authority to show that habitual residence cannot be changed by the unilateral action of a parent who shares parental responsibility with another. That is also the law in Scotland, and it follows that the courts in England have never had jurisdiction in this case because both parents had not given their consent.

Despite those facts, at every stage in the court proceedings in England, from the judge at first instance through to the Court of Appeal, section 41 has been interpreted as giving the English courts jurisdiction as soon as the child’s stay in England had exceeded one year. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal, through Lord Justice Wall, said:

“on the facts of this case Section 41 ceased to have effect in September 2001”.

As additional cover, the court also argued that even though there was no jurisdiction, the original decision was not a nullity. Lord Justice Wall said:

“The normal rule about orders, which on their face are regular, but which are in fact made without jurisdiction, is that they remain in force until they are discharged”.

He quoted the case of Hadksinson v. Hadksinson in 1952, but I am advised that it is questionable whether that case supports the Court of Appeal’s position. The ratio decidendi of that case is that there is an

“unqualified obligation of every person against…whom an order has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it until it is discharged”.

The difference between that case and Mr Bennett’s case is that the Willesden court was not

“a court of competent jurisdiction”.

I have been directed to “Halsbury’s Laws of England”—as a Scottish lawyer by training, I am not very familiar with it—and page 314, chapter 10 of the fourth edition says:

“Where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing”.

When it was clear to Mr Bennett how the English courts were dealing with his case, he raised the issue in the Scottish courts by raising an action of divorce. I will not go through all the processes, but the case eventually reached the inner house of the Court of Session, having started its processes in the Aberdeen sheriff court. The inner house decision is directly in conflict with that of the Court of Appeal. Among other points, it noted that the order that initiated the proceedings in England was made without jurisdiction—a very clear statement. It agreed that the habitual residence of the child of a marriage cannot be changed without the consent of both parents. It doubted that the effect of section 41 of the 1986 Act was automatically to change habitual residence one year after an abduction. It recorded the failure of the English courts to hold a welfare hearing during the whole period when the matter was before them, despite a recommendation from Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service that it was necessary, which is quite a serious matter. However, the inner house of the Court of Session also accepted that

“the Court of Appeal considers that the English courts have jurisdiction to make orders respecting the child with which this divorce action is concerned”.

The word “considers” is very important. The inner house does not cede jurisdiction, but recognises that the English court thinks it has jurisdiction. It is clear that the inner house of the Court of Session did not wish to get into a direct conflict with the English courts, and it has been tactful and diplomatic in the way in which it has questioned the decisions of the English courts.

Over the years, I have written to the Ministry of Justice and the Scottish Government about the apparent conflict in the law. I understand that meetings were held between representatives of the Scottish Government and the Ministry of Justice. I have not been formally advised of the conclusions of those meetings, although I received a brief letter from Scotland’s deputy Justice Secretary, who said that the meetings had concluded that section 41 of the 1986 Act did not require changing. It was as blunt as that. That view is probably correct.

As I pointed out earlier, the problem seems to be one of interpretation and application rather than the legislation itself. However, I am deeply concerned about the way in which the courts have acted in this case and the impact that the decision of the Court of Appeal could have in other cases. I find it extraordinary that all the lawyers involved in the initial proceedings in the Willesden court could either be so ignorant of the legal position in such cross-border cases or so easily misinterpret the legal position.

As the case moved on through the system, all the arguments that I have presented today were presented by Mr Bennett, my constituent. Part of the tragedy is that once he had discharged the lawyers who so wrongly advised him and who refused to carry out his instructions, Mr Bennett found it virtually impossible to find another solicitor to represent him, and he was forced to represent himself. He is a very single-minded individual and has become extremely knowledgeable in this area of law.

Reading through the various judgments, it is quite clear that the judges viewed Mr Bennett as an obsessive who was more concerned about legal principles or niceties than his daughter. I get the impression that he was not taken seriously. He desperately wanted contact with his daughter and felt that he was the more suitable parent to look after the child. He also strongly believed that it should be for the Scottish courts to decide the matter. It is probably fair to say that he was not learned in the law and did not treat judges with the respect that they are used to. He also became frustrated at what he believed was their refusal to consider his arguments.

I have had the opportunity to meet Mr Bennett and his child, who is disabled. He visited my office several times with the child on a previous matter. When we spoke about the difficulties that he was having with this case, I was in no doubt that he had a strong relationship with his daughter and was able to care for her. He and his wife—they are not divorced—split care between them, and he made quite a contribution to the care of the child in the household. Unfortunately, he never had the opportunity to have his side of the argument on residency or access considered by the court.

In Scotland, the inner house of the Court of Session made it clear that the court could have been obliged to consider the interests of the welfare of the child by carrying out the usual investigations and having an appropriate hearing regardless of the other issues in the case. The courts in England took no action in this respect. In addition, Mr Bennett was told by a legal adviser that if he tabled a motion on residency or contact, it would prejudice his argument on jurisdiction. He would effectively cede jurisdiction to the English court. That matter needs to be considered seriously by the Minister.

Cases such as Mr Bennett’s are not that unusual. What is unusual is his tenacity in pursuing this point of law. It is wrong that, in all the years while the English courts were considering the matter, no consideration was given to the interest of the welfare of the child—apart, of course, from Mr Bennett’s continuing interest in maintaining contact with his daughter.

I practised in the Scottish courts for a number of years, and family and child care law were my special areas of interest. I have not held a practising certificate since 1988 and do not claim any special expertise, but I do know that the guiding principle in all child care cases is and should always be the paramountcy of the welfare and interests of the child. Those interests cannot be met if a court has a case before it for about four years and does not itself inquire into that child’s situation. I am not significantly well versed in English law to know whether that suggested failure is a failure of the various courts in this case or a failure of the system, but I believe that the Minister should look into the matter urgently.

As I said earlier, Mr Bennett was put in an invidious position, because he was told by legal advisers that if he tabled a motion on contact or care and control, he would prejudice his case on jurisdiction. He should not have faced that dilemma. If they do not already have the power to investigate a child’s situation of their own volition—I suspect that they do—the courts in England should have that power, without prejudice to any other issue before them.

When there is a clear conflict between the decisions of the courts in England and Scotland, public confidence in the system requires there to be a proper inquiry. I do not know what understanding was reached by the Scottish and English civil servants who met to discuss this case, but I do know that nothing has been published. It is not enough to say that everything is okay and that everything is working fine, when clearly it is not. I should like a report published on the discussions that took place and on the details of the conclusions that were reached and why they were reached.

Of course, there is another way to resolve this case: to take the matter to the Supreme Court. That might seem appropriate, given the conflict between the two jurisdictions. Unfortunately, when Mr Bennett and his advisers—he now has legal advice—attempted to take the case from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, his application was refused.

Without fully understanding all the mechanics, the idea that courts in Scotland dealing with the same circumstances and the same legislation could be in complete conflict with the courts in England is difficult for the lay person to understand. It is extremely regrettable that this important issue has not been considered by the Supreme Court. I know how important it is that politicians do not interfere in any way whatever with the judicial process, but I believe that a number of serious matters need to be fully considered, and the best place for that is the final court of appeal of both civil jurisdictions—the Supreme Court.

The issues that I have raised primarily affect my constituent and his daughter, who is denied access to her father. However, breakdown of marriage and movement between jurisdictions is not uncommon in our society. I believe that the courts in England have got the interpretation of the law completely wrong as it is applicable to this case. Now that the case is concluded, I hope that the Minister will agree that a serious injustice has been done and that Mr Bennett is fully entitled to feel that the legal system has let him and his daughter down badly. It is incumbent on our legal system and the Government to do something to correct the situation. As I said, changes do not necessarily need to be made to the Family Law Act 1986—unless section 41 can be amended so that it is more clearly understood, particularly by lawyers.

I ask the Minister to give serious thought to the matters that I have raised today, and to consider how we can move forward, so that the case of B v. B does not stand as a precedent to be applied in similar cases of conflict.