Defence Reform Bill

Debate between Jim Murphy and Tobias Ellwood

Tuesday 16th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Murphy]

That is a kind offer from the Secretary of State, although he could have done so off his own back, and the problem is that we are running out of time for named day questions and replies. The alternative, with his permission, would be for me simply to tweet his letter. That would be quicker and I would be happy to do so if he so wishes. [Interruption.] With the Secretary of State’s permission, I will now tweet the letter I received some months ago detailing the Government’s response to The Sunday Times revelations.

These issues, alongside the impact of any reform of our strategic and working relationships with major international partners, particularly the US, and providing clarity on the ownership of risk, will be priorities for the Opposition. The restructuring of DE&S, however, should also be seen as part of a wider structural reform of defence procurement.

There is much else that I could have said, but time is against us today and my colleagues will raise in Committee additional points about sovereign capabilities, long-term planning and predictability for British industry, so I shall now turn briefly to reform of the reserves.

The Opposition want to ensure that reservist recruitment is successful so that the reserves can work alongside regulars to project force globally. Our reservists make an enormous contribution here at home in many ways. About 2,000 of them, some of whom I saw for myself when I went to see the Greco-Roman wrestling, helped to protect the London Olympics. Many serve overseas in far-away terrain in the name of national security. We should pay tribute to each one of those who have served, and above all to those who have lost their lives serving our nation.

While we champion the reserve force, we recognise the need to modernise. The name change to “Army Reserve” will reflect a modern composition and hopefully help to attract a new generation of recruits. The task ahead is, however, enormous and we should not pretend otherwise. The plan to double the size of the reserve forces to 30,000 by 2018 is now central to the Government’s ability to deliver their planning assumptions—originally, of course, designed for an Army of 95,000, but after further cuts now reliant on a regular force of just 82,000.

The scale of this task is underlined if we consider that the reserve forces of the US, Canada and Australia make up between 40% and 50% of their armies, as opposed to 20% here in the UK. Many analysts worry that, rather than reform of the Army being synchronised with that of the reserves, both are disjointed and the reserve uplift will not complement the regular Army but supplement lost capacity. Cuts in the regular Army are happening regardless of the success of any uplift in the reserves, rather than the one being contingent on the other.

This development comes as Army reserve recruitment has hit real trouble. The figures are publicly available—that recruitment targets were missed by more than 4,000 last year. Great care has to be taken to ensure that the loss of 26 Territorial Army centres does not make civilian communities in certain areas more disconnected from the military and disinclined to volunteer for the reserves.

[Mr Ellwood]

I echo the tone adopted by the shadow Secretary of State, but I am concerned by his direction of travel. Will he not take some responsibility for what happened to the TA during the previous Government’s tenure? The size of the TA fell by 40% and recruitment was down by tens of thousands. As a member of the TA, I remember an announcement from this place that training was to be cut and that no funding would be provided. He must acknowledge that the previous Government have some responsibility for where things are today.

[Mr Murphy]

That would be a very fair point if it was based on a fact. I suspect that our conversation today will be less productive if we repeat some of the debates of recent times, but the fact is that we increased the size of the Regular Army, whereas this uplift in the reserve forces is happening at a time of reductions in the Regular Army—that is the significant difference.

[Mr Ellwood]

I did not mention the Regular Army, but the TA. When Labour came to power in 1997, TA numbers were 62,000. When Labour left power in 2010, they were 37,000. It does not take a maths degree to realise that that is a massive reduction in TA capability.

[Mr Murphy]

My point is that in the same context, Regular Army numbers increased. I do not want us to bat each other about the head on this; I am assessing how we can make a success of the boost in reservist numbers. The comparison the hon. Gentleman invites me to draw, however, is with the Labour Government, and we boosted the size of the Regular Army. His party said that it was not big enough; it wanted an even bigger Army and was elected on a manifesto of going in that direction. The comparison is clear: we boosted the number of regulars. Of course, there is always pressure when it comes to reservists, who were under-recruited for about nine decades, so this is not a short-term problem for us or the current Government to grapple with.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Jim Murphy and Tobias Ellwood

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Murphy]

I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I said right at the beginning that I am keen to have a bipartisan approach in Afghanistan, and that will continue. There is sometimes a temptation with these very difficult, often impractical, problems to give in to the temptation to seek and find synthetic differences, but as I have said before at the Dispatch Box it is important that this year there should be a genuine political process to match the military might of the past decade. That did not happen last year, and it should be compulsory this year. The Bonn conference was a failure in that regard, but I did not attack our Government for that from the Dispatch Box because it was an international failure to formulate the political strategy that that country so badly needs.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman was not in post during the relevant period, but does he regret not conducting a defence review in the past decade? A review might have helped to identify the fact that Snatch Land Rovers were not appropriate in Afghanistan. We went through a period of bizarre procurement in which the Ridgback, the Cougar, the Vector, the Jackal and the Mastiff were produced one after another and bought off the shelf to try to identify something that would work in Afghanistan. If we had held a defence review, perhaps we would have seen that the conduct and style of war was changing before our eyes and we could then have ensured that we sent our armed forces to Afghanistan with the right equipment.

[Mr Murphy]

The hon. Gentleman has great and varied experience, but I think he will fairly accept that the urgent operational requirements worked well in Afghanistan, and after 9/11 we updated our defence review with a new chapter. In a debate that is intended to be relatively thoughtful rather than our traditional cut and thrust, it is fair to say that the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan changed and surprised many people, including those who were engaged in it day to day. As we reflect on what happened in Afghanistan, it is crucial that we learn deeply the lessons of the conflict, in the hope that we never have to deploy them, but in the fear that on occasion it might become necessary.

I was making the wider point that events in north Africa and the middle east continue to prove the uncertainty and unpredictability of the future shape of conflict. Coupled with the Arab spring, the growing global population, the threat of climate change, new information technology and biotechnologies, nuclear proliferation and cyber-attack, we live in what is, by consensus, an era of dramatic new global security challenges. All that means that it is sensible for the Government to invest the £650 million they have announced for cyber-security. The continuing emphasis on soft power and multilateralism to supplant the inevitable capability shortfalls resulting from spending constraint is vital. It was crucial in good times, but it is compulsory in these difficult times of budget cuts in a world of flux.