Deployment to Mali

Jim Murphy Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his questions. First, the UK has a clear interest in the stability of Mali and in ensuring that its territory does not become an ungoverned space available to al-Qaeda and its associates to organise for attacks on the west. Secondly, we have established military co-operation with France, which is an important part of Britain’s strategy for the future, and this situation, along with the Libya campaign, is an opportunity for us to demonstrate the validity of that working relationship with France. The role of British troops, as I set out in my response to the urgent question, is clearly not a combat role, and it will also not extend, as we envisage it at the moment, to a force protection role. We are looking for force protection arrangements to be put in place, probably by the French, but certainly by the European Union in relation to the EU training mission.

My hon. Friend asked me about the exit strategy. France has made it clear that it envisages a short intervention to stabilise the situation on the ground while the African forces from neighbouring countries and the Malian army deploy to sustain the situation in the longer term. We concur with that strategy. I should say, again, that it is not our intention to deploy combat troops; we are very clear about the risks of mission creep and we have defined very carefully the support that we are willing and able to provide to the French and the Malian authorities.

My hon. Friend referred to UN Security Council resolution 2085 and the time delay in deploying African forces. I think it is well known that the intention was to deploy African forces in support of the Malian authorities later this year, but the situation on the ground has become more urgent, hence the decision by the French to intervene. Some of these forces require equipment and some require additional training, and the response time to the mobilisation envisaged by resolution 2085 has perhaps been longer than we would have liked. The lesson we can learn from that is that if we want local forces to be able to deploy and respond to resolutions of this nature, we may have to take a more proactive role in resourcing them to do so.

On the broader strategy for encouraging local forces to tackle extremism, part of our defence posture, set out in the strategic defence and security review 2010, is to devote an increasing proportion of our defence resources to upstream engagement, building capacity in fragile nation states to allow them to deal with early threats to their security, rather than waiting for the situation to degenerate to the point at which it requires outside intervention.

[Mr Jim Murphy (East Renfrewshire) (Lab)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for giving us the opportunity to discuss security in north Africa today, and I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. It is essential that Mali does not become a haven for terrorism, which would allow militants to oppress a people, hold territory, destabilise a region and threaten UK interests. It is therefore vital that the international community enables Mali and its neighbours to defend themselves.

Let me turn to six specific issues. Can the Secretary of State guarantee that no UK personnel will be redeployed to Mali from Afghanistan? What other European allies plan to commit trainers and at what level?

There will be broader worries about mission creep. The UK commitment to Mali has grown from lending the French two transport aircraft to the deployment of perhaps hundreds of troops to the region. It appears clear that Islamists have chosen to abandon population centres and might now melt away across near-non-existent borders. It is possible that they will be able to regroup and return to carry out the type of terror attacks we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. What assessment has the Secretary of State made of the ability and intent of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its associates to do so?

I want the Secretary of State to say more about force protection. If UK trainers are based in Bamako, which has not to date been the centre of violence, that might make them and the capital a target. Our forces will, I assume, be armed, so what will the rules of engagement be? UK trainers might be non-combat, but that does not mean that they are without risk. They are deployed and will need to be protected in a hostile environment, so what security guarantees has he received from French forces about protecting UK trainers as a condition of this deployment from day one?

We all know that lasting stability will be achieved through a political process, so will the Secretary of State outline the strategy to achieve that? In particular, will he give his assessment of whether the Tuareg people will be part of the process?

While we consider the importance of winning hearts and minds in Mali, there is another country where public consent must be retained and that is here in the UK. The public are wary and weary of conflict as a consequence of recent history. There will be worries about mission creep and the safety of UK trainers and it is essential that the Secretary of State allays those fears today.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, although I have to say that there was a little bit of fence sitting. Although we all recognise that the public are wary and weary of conflict, I did not hear a clear indication of whether he supports the actions that the Government propose to take in support of this French mission.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the redeployment of troops from Mali to Afghanistan and I assume he meant Afghanistan to Mali. We are acutely conscious of the primacy of the operation in Afghanistan and the limits of what we have been able to offer the French in this operation are defined largely by the need not to degrade our capabilities in Afghanistan. We are looking all the time at what we can do without impacting on the air bridge or the operation in Afghanistan. As he noted, our initial response was to offer logistical support as that was what was urgently required to get French troops and equipment into Mali. The French ask has evolved to include additional surveillance capability, which we have now provided with the Sentinel R1. Over the next weeks and months the requirement will be for training of the Anglophone African troops who will provide the force in support of the Malian army in due course.

The right hon. Gentleman asked for an assessment of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It is fair to say that our situational awareness of the Maghreb is not as great as we would like it to be. It is not an area where Britain has had traditional involvement, but we are making strong efforts to obtain awareness of what is going on there. We should not underestimate the potential for terrorist threats to emerge from the Islamic Maghreb, but nor should we overestimate the strength of the Islamists in this region.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked about our forces on the ground in Bamako. Bamako is well to the south of Mali and the problems are in the north. I agree that it is not impossible that Islamists could penetrate the south of the country in small groups, but there are many reasons why it might be difficult for them to operate there. The rules of engagement for British personnel will be on the basis of self-defence when they are based at Bamako. Force protection is provided within the airfield at Bamako by the French forces on the ground. As I said earlier in relation to any UK training mission, we will not allow any UK trainers to deploy until we are satisfied that adequate force protection measures are in place.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the political process, and of course a political process is essential. I envisage that the European Union will be engaged in economic and political development in Mali in the future. The involvement of the Taureg people, of course, is essential to a sustainable and lasting peace in that country.