(8 years, 10 months ago)
General CommitteesIt is part of the Lisbon treaty and permits the Council to entrust the conduct of a CSDP mission to a willing group of member states smaller than the entire EU membership, allowing those without an interest in the mission to give it their political blessing without actually having to participate. Under article 44, a coalition of the willing could therefore take on a mission under the EU banner with the support of EU infrastructure and spending programmes. Italy and a number of southern member states are particularly keen on that at the moment because they are talking about a further CSDP mission in the Mediterranean.
The article has the potential to be useful because it would provide a way to reflect the reality that it is inevitable in a diverse EU membership that member states have different levels of interest in particular crises. It will be no shock to the Committee if I say that Malta is concerned about what is happening in Libya and that Lithuania is concerned about the situation vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. Article 44 will add value only if it has some different rules that allow for greater flexibility of action. By definition, the article is likely to be used when not all member states want to be fully engaged in a mission and therefore use of the article should not come with an automatic expectation of common funding from member states that have chosen not to participate. Those who want to take part should pay for it.
We can delegate a mission to a particular group of member states, but we are very reluctant to support the idea of delegating responsibility for that mission’s conduct, even if it is being conducted by only a minority of willing member states. In any use of article 44, we would want to insist that standards of planning, organisation, governance and spending oversight in the conduct of a mission remained just as high if it took place under article 44 as it would for any other EU mission.
The Minister’s responses have raised a question in my mind about what the Government’s policy actually is; I hope he does not mind if I ask him about that in the context of this motion. Is the Government’s policy with regard to the EU to withdraw powers wherever possible in line with the doctrine of subsidiarity? Is it never to remit any further powers to the European Union? Is it to contemplate remitting powers to institutions of the EU where policy, and in particular, British policy goals are served by such a remission of power? Or is it to remit such powers if—and only if—such remission is purely temporary? I would be very grateful if the Minister clarified the policy.
To a large extent, one would need to look at the detail of the subject area being addressed. On my hon. Friend’s first question, it is certainly the Government’s position that in all areas of EU activity, the cardinal principle ought to be “Europe where necessary, national where possible”, and that action should be taken at a European level where we believe that will give genuine value added. We therefore want to see subsidiarity applied rigorously in areas of activity that fall within EU competence under the treaties.
When it comes to new powers, as my hon. Friend will know, we set out very significant checks in the European Union Act 2011 in the form of requirements for parliamentary agreement, primary legislation and in many cases, a referendum in this country before this or any future British Government could agree to the transfer of additional competences to the EU by way of treaty amendment or a new treaty.
I think there is certainly deep scepticism on the Government’s part towards the idea that EU competences need to be expanded. The Lisbon treaty already gives very significant competences to the EU. It is dangerous in politics ever to say “never”, and we do not know what the world will look like in five, 10 or 25 years’ time, but I think it is good that we have those checks in place on the statute book to ensure that if any future Government were tempted to agree to an expansion of EU competences, they could do so only with the full support of Parliament, and in most cases, of the British public in a referendum.
When it comes to the additional exercise of powers within an existing competence—for example, with the proposal for a new justice and home affairs measure—we will, in that particular case, make a judgment, based on our assessment of the national interest, as to whether it is in our interest to participate or not participate in that measure. Where the matter falls within the EU’s treaty competence already and where we do not have the opt-out—for example, single-market matters—part of our negotiating approach would be to press for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality to be observed fully.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Committee takes note of European Union Document No. 11083/15, Main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP (part II, point E, paragraph 25 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013)—2014: Draft Annual Report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament; and welcomes the constructive coordination between EU Member States and Institutions to achieve a range of positive foreign policy outcomes.— (Mr Lidington.)
(10 years, 1 month ago)
Commons Chamber4. What recent assessment he has made of the security situation in Turkey.
Turkey is an important security partner for the UK in NATO and in actions against terrorism. She faces major challenges because of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and we value the Turkish humanitarian contribution and her support for coalition activities against ISIL.
I thank the Minister for that reply. The security situation in Turkey remains extraordinarily delicate. What support have the Government given to assist Turkey with those serious security concerns while also respecting the rights and freedoms of its citizens?