Clonoe Inquest
Jesse Norman Excerpts(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
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David Davis
The hon. Member is exactly right, and he prefaces what I intend to say. He repeats the point that his party leader made in the urgent question, when he said that the judgment was ultra vires. I believe the right hon. Gentleman was right in that, although I leave that to the lawyers.
To answer the rest of the question from the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), we have to return to the actual facts of the Clonoe incident. The self-styled East Tyrone brigade was one of the most active Provisional IRA units. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it undertook a surge of activity, pursuing a Maoist-style murder strategy. I think it was called Lynagh’s strategy at the time.
In August 1988, eight soldiers were killed by a Provisional IRA bomb at Ballygawley. On 7 March 1989, two Protestants were shot dead at a garage in Coagh. A former member of the Ulster Defence Regiment, Derek Ferguson, was murdered in 1991, also at Coagh. An attack against Glenanne barracks on 31 May 1991 left three soldiers dead. It is also thought that some of their members were involved in the Derryard attack in 1989, notably using a heavy machine gun, probably the DShK we will see later in this story, to kill two British soldiers.
In February 1992, the RUC special branch found out that the IRA was planning a number of attacks on 15 and 16 February. It had information that an IRA team, armed with a 12.7 mm Soviet DShK heavy machine gun and three Kalashnikov rifles, would attack the Coalisland police station. The intelligence indicated that the attack would be mounted from the Clonoe chapel car park, so the SAS commander’s plan was to arrest the terrorists as they formed up at the car park, preventing the attack on the police station altogether and seizing the heavy machine gun.
The commander did not know how many terrorists, vehicles or weapons would be involved, but it was thought that as many as 20 IRA members could be involved. The troop sergeant assessed the rather straggly hedge line adjacent to the car park to be the only suitable position where partial concealment was possible, but it notably did not provide cover from gunfire. The SAS team carried the standard Heckler & Koch G3K rifle and one soldier had a general purpose machine gun. Perhaps more notably in this context, some had shotguns loaded with alternate rounds designed to smash windscreens and deliver tear gas to immobilise the drivers and stop the vehicles. The soldiers also carried caltrops to wreck the tyres of vehicles attempting to escape. The armour-piercing rounds that the judge referred to could penetrate body armour, but their primary purpose in this context was to penetrate the engine blocks of the vehicles and stop them.
The equipment was all designed to stop escape and allow arrest—that is the key point. The plan was to close in on the IRA operatives and to arrest them as they assembled and mounted the heavy machine gun on to the vehicle in the chapel car park. At 7.40 pm on that dark February night, 12 members of the SAS were in position on the boundary of the Clonoe chapel car park, behind the hedgerow. The soldiers observed the movements of five cars in and out of the car park. They were assumed to be reconnaissance vehicles scouting out the car park for the lorry to which the DShK was to be attached.
However, the intelligence briefing was wrong—an error that ended up creating chaos and extreme danger. Instead, at around 22:40 hours, the lorry-mounted DShK was used to attack the Coalisland police station. Sixty rounds were fired at close range from the DShK and from the Kalashnikovs. As the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) said, the attackers’ intent was clear: to kill police officers. They were all would-be murderers; of that, there can be no doubt. The gunfire could clearly be heard and the tracer bullets were observed by the SAS patrol in the car park at Clonoe.
After a minute or two, the soldiers heard another burst of gunfire. The soldiers, of course, did not know that that was simply bravado. For all they and their commander knew, hiding behind their hedge, the murder gang were engaging other soldiers or other policemen. Within a minute, the lorry appeared out of the darkness, driven at breakneck speed, lurching around corners and with its engine screaming in too low a gear. As it drove into the car park, the IRA truck’s headlights illuminated the SAS position behind the hedgerow. At that point, the soldiers did not know whether they had been spotted. The soldiers then stood up, advanced on the occupants of the lorry and three other vehicles in the car park with the lorry, and opened fire. Four IRA members were shot dead, four were wounded, one of whom was arrested at the scene and, notably, given first aid by the soldiers, and others fled in cars.
Now we come forward to February 2025, when Mr Justice Michael Humphreys ruled that the use of lethal force by the SAS in this incident was unlawful. The ruling is demonstrably wrong and ignores the plain facts of the case. The SAS soldiers operated under the control of the police force, and the operation was carried out with police officers in close proximity. They faced heavily armed terrorists who had just carried out an attack on a police station—lethally, for all they knew. They did not know how many terrorists there were, but they assumed that there could be up to 20. They did not know how many vehicles there were or how many weapons were in the other cars. That creates a number of problems for issuing a challenge, which is the first option under the yellow card system. While it may be reasonable to stand up and issue a challenge to either one terrorist or a small number of terrorists who could be seen and covered while they respond, the circumstance is completely different when there is an unknown number of antagonists in an unknown number of cars with an unknown number of weapons.
The probability of one of 20, let us say, deciding to fire on the soldiers is much higher, particularly when that individual may be out of sight of the patrol. That is doubly so when one remembers that this band of killers had just attempted to murder many policemen and had returned in a high state of excitement, pumped up with adrenalin and firing their weapons in the air. Secondly, the fact that the SAS commander did not know where they all were meant that his issuing a challenge could expose his entire troop to a lethal crossfire. Remember: this was happening on a dark February night at about 10.45 pm. Issuing a challenge under those circumstances could have amounted to collective suicide. Circumstances such as that are precisely why the yellow card rules allow a soldier to fire without challenge when the danger is too great.
I find it hard to imagine a more clearcut case that allows firing without challenge, but in his ruling the judge ignored several significant facts and appears to have been naive in his view of others. His selection of facts appears to be extremely partial. For example, the judge made much of the SAS’s use of armour-piercing bullets, but he made no mention of the fact that the anti-aircraft gun the IRA was using fired armour-piercing incendiary rounds five times the size of any rifle bullets, or the fact that they could be fired at a rate of 600 to 1,200 rounds a minute. Those bullets can pierce concrete walls or shoot down aircraft at a mile range. The machine gun had just been deployed and could have eliminated the entire SAS patrol in a matter of seconds. It was a terrible weapon, and capturing it before it could be used to kill more people was an important part of the SAS tasking.
The judge accepted assertions that the IRA weapons all had their safety catches engaged. Frankly, if that were true, there was no way at all for the SAS commander or the troops to know that at the beginning of the fight. In fact, how likely was that? Let us take the DShK, which the forensic examiner said had its working parts forward, with no round in the chamber. The gun was mounted on a lorry that had just been driven back at breakneck speed from Coalisland in a few minutes. During the few minutes of that journey back, getting the gun into the state described would have required nine actions, some of which require two hands, while hanging on to the side of a lurching truck. I am afraid it all sounds just a bit improbable. The forensics specialist did not actually arrive until two hours and 45 minutes after the action, at a scene contaminated by firemen, police, soldiers and other staff—indeed, she complained about that very contamination.
Against the forensic specialist’s views, we must take the observations of soldiers on the ground and other evidence. Four soldiers reported seeing flashes from the back of the lorry, which they interpreted as muzzle flashes. We are not talking about inexperienced soldiers: they would know what they were looking at. Two soldiers heard rounds striking the ground to their right, near the hedgerow where the SAS was hiding. The forensic examiner documented bullet strike marks on the hedgerow. One soldier received a bullet wound to the face that knocked him to the ground. Without any forensic evidence, it was attributed to a ricochet, which implausibly would have required the round to go through a 180° change of direction.
Soldier G heard the exchange of gunfire and saw a soldier go down, which
“confirmed my belief that the terrorists were shooting at us”.
There was also an interview taken by the Garda, in the Republic of Ireland, of one of the IRA drivers, who said he could not understand why his colleagues had opened fire. He had been in a position in which he was able to judge where the fire was coming from and obviously believed that it was from his own side. He refused to sign the interview notes, presumably when he considered the consequences for him back home of giving away such critical data.
All of this was countered by the claim that no bullet casings were found on the ground in the car park, but a number were found in the lorry, and one of the cars present appeared to have had a general-purpose machine gun and an AKM on board. If those weapons were fired from inside a car, there would of course have been no casings on the ground in the car park. Instead, GPMG live ammunition and disintegrating links were found in that car, as well as an AKM casing from a rifle other than those recovered, implying that a fourth AKM had been fired from the car. The car had all its seats other than the driver’s laid flat, which was standard practice for the IRA when using a hatchback as a weapons platform. The car escaped and was then set on fire, and the fire services were kept away from it while it burned out—another standard IRA tactic to destroy forensic evidence. I am afraid that this ruling exposes the double standards that have plagued the legacy of the troubles.
Jesse Norman (Hereford and South Herefordshire) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is giving an important and telling speech on a very important topic. As he rightly says, these soldiers were subject to well-defined rules of engagement. He has described the IRA as a terrorist organisation, but what he has not said is that at the time, it was the most sophisticated terrorist organisation in the world. The soldiers he talks about were operating under orders, in a chain of command and on the Queen’s business, and could not respond. Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a grotesque double standard here, and that not only is this an injustice, but the Government’s position is potentially deeply corrosive of morale, as well as deeply unjust to the veterans?
David Davis
My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. Of course, he is the Member for Hereford, so many of the people who have retired and will face these threats will be his constituents. He and I are long-standing supporters of human rights in this country, and have both defended article 2, for example, but this case is a misuse of article 2. The people who wrote the European convention on human rights were recently out of the second world war—they did not write it to be interpreted in this way. He has made a double point.
Returning to my right hon. Friend’s point about the IRA, since the events in question, the Good Friday agreement has allowed for the release of convicted terrorists in order to achieve an end to the bloodshed. I guess we all agree with that, yet we continue to persecute those who fought against the terrorists. These persecutions are conducted decades after the fact, without any new evidence being presented to give reason for the reopening of cases. After the action, everybody involved was questioned thoroughly to establish the facts—what the intelligence was, what the arrest plans were, and what happened. On the basis of that questioning, on 15 October 1992—with the evidence close to hand and the events fresh in the witnesses’ minds, and when investigation of everything was possible—the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland concluded that there should be no prosecution of the soldiers. There was no case to answer.
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Hilary Benn)
I really welcome the opportunity that the right hon. Member for Goole and Pocklington (David Davis) has given me and the House to listen to this debate, and I welcome the opportunity to respond. I congratulate him on securing it. I listened very carefully to everything that he said. As he will know, on 11 February he asked me an urgent question about the findings of the coroner in the Clonoe inquest. In answer to that question, I told him and the House that the Ministry of Defence was considering the coroner’s findings carefully. Before turning to the outcome of those considerations, it is worth reminding the House of the facts of the case, which we have heard a lot about already.
On 16 February 1992, there was an attack on Coalisland police station by a unit of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, armed with a lot of weaponry, including a heavy machine gun. Approximately 60 rounds were fired, but thankfully no one was injured. Following its departure, and subsequent arrival at the Clonoe church car park, the unit was engaged by members of the Army’s specialist military unit, resulting in four PIRA gunmen being shot and killed. As we know, the inquest into their deaths began in 2023. On 6 February this year, the coroner found that the use of lethal force by the soldiers was unjustified, and that the operation
“was not planned and controlled in such a way as to minimise to the greatest extent possible the need for recourse to lethal force.”
I listened very carefully to what the House said when I answered the urgent question. Following careful consideration, the Ministry of Defence has written to the coroner to outline its intention of applying for a judicial review. In its view, the findings of the coroner do not properly reflect the context of the incident—I listened very carefully to what the right hon. Gentleman said about what happened—or the challenging circumstances in which members of the armed forces served in Northern Ireland. The Ministry of Defence has also confirmed that it is funding the veterans in question to seek a judicial review, and it is continuing to provide them with welfare support.
The independence of the judiciary is a fundamental democratic principle, and it is crucial to upholding the rule of law in the United Kingdom. One important element of that principle is the right to legally challenge the findings of judicial decision makers where it is believed that an error has been made, and the Government have determined on this occasion that that is indeed the most appropriate course of action. It is now important, as I think the House will recognise, given the confirmation by the Ministry of Defence that it intends to seek a judicial review of the findings of the inquest, that these proceedings are allowed to run their course.
This Government have a long-standing commitment to repeal and replace the almost universally opposed Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023. I think it is fair to say that, among the political parties in Northern Ireland, it is universally opposed. The Act has been found by the domestic courts to be unlawful in a number of respects, and we should not forget that the legislation in question made provision to grant those responsible for terrible terrorist crimes immunity from prosecution. That is what the Act did.
As part of our commitment to repeal and replace the Act, the Government are committed to proposing measures to allow inquests previously halted by that legislation to proceed. I set out this position in my written ministerial statements of 29 July and 7 October 2024 and in my oral statement to the House on 4 December 2024.
The Government recognise that the Clonoe findings have caused great concern among many of those who served in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner, and we have heard tonight from some who have given distinguished service to the armed forces and also to this House. The veterans I have met, including a group I met this afternoon, have also expressed a strong view that the way in which we collectively address the legacy of the troubles has to be fair, balanced and proportionate.
Jesse Norman
Could the Secretary of State not simply say now to the House that he has a deep understanding and awareness of the trauma that has been caused, and that he takes the side—not judicially, but politically, in his own mind as a matter of human sympathy—with the poor people affected by these decisions and how they are playing out in the public realm? Could he not say that now, so that veterans and their families understand that a Government Minister in a senior position gets it and is on their side in his own mind, even if not judicially?
Oral Answers to Questions
Jesse Norman Excerpts(3 years, 2 months ago)
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The Prime Minister
I do not know who has been eating more cake. [Interruption.] People do not get this, but behind the scenes the right hon. Gentleman and I co-operate well, and I want to continue to do so.
Jesse Norman (Hereford and South Herefordshire) (Con)
The Prime Minister
I once had a memorable swim in the Wye—I think at about 5 o’clock in the morning—and it tasted like nectar. I understand the problems that my right hon. Friend raises: it is important that our beautiful rivers should be clean. My right hon. Friend the Environment Minister will visit the Wye area shortly, with or without his swimming trunks, and we are urging the Welsh Government to take the matter as seriously as this Government are.
Oral Answers to Questions
Jesse Norman Excerpts(11 years, 3 months ago)
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The Prime Minister
I totally accept that we are still recovering from the great recession that took £3,000 out of the typical family’s income, but what we are seeing now is more people in work, including in Wales. We are seeing real wages starting to rise, and I think that we can be confident. Yes, it is difficult; yes, it is still hard work; but our economy is growing, and we want that to be a recovery for everyone in our country.
Jesse Norman (Hereford and South Herefordshire) (Con)
Q10. The number of people in Hereford and South Herefordshire in receipt of jobseeker’s allowance fell by 31% between November 2012 and November 2013. Youth unemployment fell by an even more impressive 40%. Does the Prime Minister share my view that the Government’s long-term plan is already giving employers the confidence to get hiring again?
The Prime Minister
I am grateful for what my hon. Friend says, because an absolutely key part of our long-term economic plan is to see a growing number of people in work in our country. We see 1.2 million more people in work. In the west midlands, employment has risen by 60,000 since the election. Private sector employment is up 64,000. There is still further to go, particularly in the west midlands, where we need to get young people in particular back to work, but the figures in his constituency are very encouraging.