(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberI have heard these arguments from my hon. Friend before. I have always been clear that we have no choice but to reduce the size of the Regular Army to operate within our budgets. The difference between an Army of 102,000 and an Army of 82,000 is £1 billion a year. He does not have that funding available, and neither do the Opposition. If we are to operate within our budgets, we have no choice but to draw down the Regular Army as we withdraw from Afghanistan and to build up the reserve strength that will primarily be needed if we again become embroiled in an enduring operation with six-month troop rotations.
Recruitment is critical to the success of this project. In Northern Ireland, almost all our reserve units are at 100% recruitment capacity. Why not extend and raise the ceiling for recruitment in successful areas?
I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that, although we have not publicised it, we have increased the recruiting cap on units in Northern Ireland to 115% of liability, and the Army will continue to consider increases in liability caps in other parts of the country where recruiting performance is strong. I can go further and tell him that a review is currently under way to look at trade skills available in Northern Ireland. Most of the reserves recruiting is trade skills-specific. If we find that pools of additional trade skills are recruitable, we will consider locating additional units in Northern Ireland to tap into them. We have to be agile and go where the potential recruits are and where the skills we need are.
I want to go briefly through some of the other points that have been raised. I want to nail the point my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has made several times in debate and in the media. He says that a 40% or an 80% mobilisation rate is not achievable. We are looking at a maximum mobilisation of between 3,000 and 4,000 reservists at any given time, out of an Army Reserve of 30,000. By my maths, that is significantly below 40% or 80%. During Operation Telic in Iraq, 85% of reservists responded to call out—an 85% mobilisation rate—and Operation Herrick had a 79% mobilisation rate, so I do not quite understand his point.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my hon. Friend and he is absolutely right. The complexity of such an issue requires a written statement, which is why I have made one today. The changes to the structure of the Army run into the hundreds—re-rollings, relocations and amalgamations—to create an effective force, and I pay tribute to the Army staff, who have done an enormous amount of work in producing this structure. I urge right hon. and hon. Members to look carefully at the detailed documents that have been provided today, because they explain the detailed position more clearly than an oral statement ever can. My hon. Friend challenges me to publish regular updates. I have already said that I have previously committed to publishing recruitment figures and trained strength figures—on a quarterly basis, I think—and I repeat that commitment.
We welcome the broad thrust of the statement. As the Secretary of State will know, the reserve forces in Northern Ireland are among the best recruited of any region in the United Kingdom. Indeed, 2nd Battalion the Royal Irish Regiment is one of the best recruited reserve infantry units in the British Army. Although we welcome the decision to reopen Kinnegar, will the Secretary of State explain the decision to close the Territorial Army centre in Armagh?
I am afraid I shall be repeating myself. The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that Northern Ireland is one of the best-recruited areas—in fact, most of the units in Northern Ireland are over strength and we appreciate the commitment of the community in Northern Ireland to reserve service. The changes to Army structure and the delivery of efficient and effective training require the closure of the TAC at Armagh and the opening of an additional site. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept that the transfer from Armagh to Portadown is part of the Army’s best effort to deliver the most effective way of training, recruiting and managing the reserve Army in Northern Ireland. We are not talking about something for just the next couple of years but about a structure and laydown that we expect to endure for many decades and to form the basis of the fully integrated Army we all want to see.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberNot necessarily: some of the kandak-level advisory activity may well involve moving with the battalion headquarters element, and if the battalion commanders are moving outside their bases, on some occasions the advisory team may move with them. This is a flexible construct, however, and things will depend on how individual commanders prefer to work and how their kandak advisory teams find it most constructive to work with them. There is a large degree of discretion.
Although of course it is right to press ahead with dialogue with the Taliban, it is also prudent to keep an eye on what they are doing as regards the ongoing conflict. What are our military doing to build the intelligence gathering capacity of the ANSF in advance of withdrawal?
That is a very good question. It is probably fair to characterise ISAF as having had rather poor human intelligence capability and having relied on very sophisticated electronic and other technological intelligence gathering. We will not be able to replicate in the ANSF a similar level of high-tech intelligence gathering, but I am pretty confident that what the ANSF will lack in that regard will be more than made up for by its human intelligence capability. Members of the ANSF have an intuitive understanding of what is going on in local communities that gives them a touch and feel for the local area that ISAF troops, however long they stay there, will never have.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am not sure that raising 1 million troops in a year will be easy, but I can say to my right hon. Friend, who raises an important point, that one design parameter we set for the Army 2020 exercise is that the Army should be able to regenerate capacity if, at a point in the future, the strategic context demands it and the fiscal situation permits it. I can assure him that the Army, in designing Army 2020, has held that very much to the front of its consideration.
This is a difficult day for the Army, but I welcome the retention of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment—the 2nd Battalion is a reserve unit—and of the Irish Guards. Reserve forces are heavily recruited in Northern Ireland. We supply up to 20% of operational reserves in the United Kingdom. When will we hear of the new formation of the reserve units in each of the regions?
If the right hon. Gentleman looks at the written statement that I laid this morning, he will see that a new Royal Auxiliary Air Force unit will be stood up in Northern Ireland.