Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJames Sunderland
Main Page: James Sunderland (Conservative - Bracknell)Department Debates - View all James Sunderland's debates with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(4 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Matthew Evans: I am happy to take that question. From the principle point of view, the principles of cyber-security are the same regardless of the network: having security built in by design, but also having a zero-trust principle and good assurance that your defences are looking inwards as well as outwards. On a principle basis, they are very similar.
Hamish MacLeod: I have nothing to add to what Matt said.
Thank you. I am going to Mr Sunderland. I will come back to you if you want to come back later.
Q
Mr Baker is the obvious candidate.
John Baker: I think the legislation, as you have it written, is good and supportive. The underlying thread of this is all about open interfaces. Having open interfaces fully specified makes the ability for testing of elements in the network simpler and easier, because you open up the testing community, the vendors, to produce interoperable equipment, so you can compare equipment side by side. This has been the basis of the whole open RAN discussion. Open RAN is about open and interoperable interfaces. If you follow that philosophy through into this Bill, you should be able to test each of the elements and the network end to end, from a security perspective, so we are fully supportive of the activities that you have in place.
Anyone else?
Stefano Cantarelli: I will just add that of course, when we say “open interfaces” and “open and interoperable”, “open” means standardised and well known, not open in the sense of open sources or whatever else people can think of. As far as the Bill is concerned, I believe that it is quite appropriate for the specific actions and conditions that will be triggered. I would just suggest that you make sure that it is followed up by secondary legislation to make sure that in some cases there are very tangible and specific examples that will be able to make it a bit more specific and will give directions within the framework that the Bill itself provides.
Thank you. Mr Robson, do you want to add anything to that?
Julius Robson: I think it is very important. One of our angles on this security Bill is that we see diversity as important not just for building resilience, but for delivering on the promise of 5G, which is to take mobile—which currently is about voice and data for people—and deliver it into organisations, to have e-health, smart industry and connected communities. To do that, you need a diversity in service providers. It is fair to say that mobile operators have done a great job of the outdoor national network, but perhaps not so much delivering into enterprise.
We want to ensure that when we implement new policies, like the telecoms security Bill, we are not introducing large barriers to entry to those smaller players that will come in and diversify our network. This talk of making everyone auditable is a workload that will drive us back towards a monolithic industry, where you have a small number of service providers, and only the largest vendors are able to service that. We need to ensure that whatever policy we implement looks forward and is workable for this diverse ecosystem that we aim for in 2025 and beyond, not the monolithic one we have today.
Q
Who wants to go first? Dr Bennett, I think that was mostly directed at you.
Dr Bennett: I appreciate that it is a framework, but it is a framework that does not say that powers in certain areas are going to happen and how you might do it. I think the Secretary of State and the whole industry actually needs a lot of help to do this. The whole tenor of wanting to have things like the telecoms diversification taskforce and the 5G diversification strategy is absolutely right, but as you do that you are bringing in people to do these things who have less resources than the people currently in there. As Mr Robson said, they can afford the expense of the barriers to entry, whereas smaller players require assistance from the Government to enter this world without going out of business because of the impacts of the cost of compliance.
Q
I have questions for both of you, but let me start with Dr Bennett. I was impressed by your structured list of things that are missing from the Bill, because we are here to scrutinise the Bill and see how we can improve it. I think you talked about the breadth of the security challenge and how this Bill, as it stands, might not meet the full breadth of it. You had four areas, and I think you have run through two of them in more detail. Could I ask you to summarise again the areas that you think are missing? In particular, could you talk a little bit more about the need for improved scrutiny? Could you just summarise that and then go into more detail on the ones where you have not yet?
Dr Bennett: I said that the areas that needed to be covered were network architecture, which is the Bill’s focus, the security of the asset databases that make up the network, how to ensure security of the data passing over the network, the maintenance of security over time, and the operational costs and other impacts of compliance. I have touched on all of them, but perhaps not very much on the operational costs and impacts of compliance.
The more diversified your network, and the more small vendors there are, the harder it will be for them to maintain the level of scrutiny, record-keeping and general security that is required as their bits of the network develop and the interfaces they have with other bits of the network change over time. That is an area where the Government should consider giving help to people to cover those costs. I have said that audit is needed of the assets in the network. The costs of being audited and of dealing with audits are very high, and they are costs that small companies may not have the resources to meet.
If the Government suddenly say, “All components from supplier X must now be removed from the network because of x, y and z,” it is incumbent on the Government to have some funding to help people to do that and to ensure that that really does happen, because it could be a step too far if you have a lot of very small suppliers that do not have the resources of skills, time or money to do it. You need to think about that and about how you can ensure that they are not squeezed out of the network—this diverse network that we want—by those costs.
I think I might interrupt you there, because we have only until 4.45 pm. I would really like to bring in Mr Sunderland, the Minister and the shadow Minister, so we need very tight questions and very succinct answers.
Q
The important question from me is: what will be the reaction to the Bill within the Five Eyes community?
Dr Steedman: I will lead on that. I think the Five Eyes community will welcome the Bill, and it may well begin to set a model for the way that the UK and like-minded nations can create a pro-innovation market framework which has sufficient regulatory powers, backed up by industry standards, to deliver the environment that we want and that will, particularly in the UK’s case, stimulate new entrants, SMEs and innovation. That is a really critical part of future diversification, because we have no incumbent major players based out of the UK, so we need to stimulate our own industry as well.
Charles Parton: I do not have a great deal to add to that, other than, as a side note, that I do not think we should underestimate American bipartisan attitudes to the whole question of China and technology. I think we are going to have to take that into account in the broader context, because they are long-standing allies and sharers of the same values as us.